Donyette Pty Ltd v Toplodge Nominees Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   DONYETTE PTY LTD -v- TOPLODGE NOMINEES PTY LTD [2010] WASC 388

CORAM:   CORBOY J

HEARD:   16 NOVEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   3 DECEMBER 2010

PUBLISHED           :  17 DECEMBER 2010

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2156 of 2007

BETWEEN:   DONYETTE PTY LTD

First Plaintiff

DONALD WILLIAM BRIDGER
LYNETTE JOY KARLOVSKY-BRIDGER
Second Plaintiffs

AND

TOPLODGE NOMINEES PTY LTD
First Defendant

MATTHEW VICTOR HARSLEY
KATHRYN ANN HARSLEY
Second Defendants

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application to strike paragraphs of the defence withdrawing admissions - Relevant principles

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application to strike out paragraphs of the defence dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     Mr M L Bennett

Second Plaintiffs           :     Mr M L Bennett

First Defendant             :     Mr M H Zilko SC

Second Defendants       :     Mr S J Davis

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     Lavan Legal

Second Plaintiffs           :     Lavan Legal

First Defendant             :     Jackson McDonald

Second Defendants       :     Jackson McDonald

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australia National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Divcon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Devine Shipping Pty Ltd (1996) 2 VR 79

Hutton v Meston (2004) WASCA 178

Jeanes v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 488

Norilya Minerals Pty Ltd v Ireland [No 2] [2010] WASC 265

Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (Unreported, WASCA, Library No 940115, 22 February 1994)

State of Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146

Tony Sadler Pty Ltd v McLeod Nominees Pty Ltd (1994) 13 WAR 323

Water Corporation v Cardno BSD Pty Ltd (2009) WASCA 212

CORBOY J: 

(This judgment was delivered orally on 3 December 2010 and has been edited from the transcript.)

  1. This is an application by the plaintiffs for orders that amendments to the prefatory words to par 46 and all of the amendments to pars 46.1 and 46.2 of the defence made by a substituted defence dated 31 August 2010 be struck out.  The grounds of the application are that the amendments impermissibly withdrew admissions previously made by the defendants and that the withdrawal of those admissions will prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action or are otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

  2. The following matters are admitted on the pleadings:

    (a)In May 2001, the first plaintiff and the first defendant entered into a contract, subsequently varied by deeds made between August and November 2001, by which the first plaintiff agreed to purchase and the first defendant agreed to sell land located at Pemberton, together with plant and equipment and the business known as 'Donnelly River Wines'.

    (b)The second plaintiffs are the directors and shareholders of the first plaintiff.  The second defendants control the first defendant.

    (c)The purchase price of the business was $2.8 million plus stock, with the vendor to provide finance in an amount of $1.7 million.

    (d)Settlement of the sale of the business was to occur on 30 November 2001.  The vendor finance was to be repaid 12 months after that date.

    (e)The vendor finance…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 388
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Donyette Pty Ltd brought an action against Toplodge Nominees Pty Ltd in the Supreme Court of Queensland, challenging the validity of a contract and seeking relief on grounds of unconscionability and contravention of statutory provisions. Toplodge Nominees subsequently filed a defence in which it made certain admissions relevant to the case. Following a change in legal representation, Toplodge Nominees sought to withdraw these admissions, prompting Donyette Pty Ltd to file an application to strike the paragraphs of the defence that withdrew the admissions. The court had to determine whether Toplodge Nominees was entitled to withdraw the admissions and, if so, under what conditions.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the change in legal counsel constituted sufficient grounds for withdrawing the admissions, and if not, whether any other factors could justify the withdrawal. The court needed to balance the principles of case management and the finality of admissions against the right of a party to be represented by counsel of their choice. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the substance of the admissions, specifically the underlying facts, remained unaffected by the withdrawal of the characterisations in the defence.

In its reasoning, the court referred to the principles established in Water Corporation v Cardno, which emphasised the seriousness of making admissions in pleadings and the reluctance of courts to permit their withdrawal without good cause. However, the court found that the change in counsel alone did not constitute sufficient grounds for withdrawal. It noted that the underlying facts related to the plaintiffs' financial circumstances and the defendants' knowledge of those circumstances were not inherently tied to the specific formulations in the withdrawn paragraphs. Since the admissions to the underlying facts had already been made, the court concluded that the withdrawal of the characterisations did not significantly prejudice the plaintiffs. Consequently, the court allowed the substituted defence to stand with the amendments but imposed conditions regarding costs to ensure that the withdrawal did not go without consequence.

The court ordered that the substituted defence of Toplodge Nominees be allowed to stand with the amendments withdrawing the admissions to paragraphs 28.1 and 28.2, but only on terms as to costs. This decision balanced the need to maintain the integrity of the case management process with the recognition of the defendants' right to legal representation and the potential fluidity in the distinction between facts, particulars, and evidence in such complex cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Water Corporation v Cardno, the Court of Appeal indicated that it was a serious matter to make an admission in a pleading and so ordinarily, a party will not be permitted to withdraw an admission without good cause. Generally, a change in counsel and the difference in forensic perspective that almost inevitably follows would not be a sufficient cause to justify, by itself, the withdrawal of an admission. Indeed, I note in Water Corporation v Cardno the Court of Appeal stated in the course of analysing the evidence of the applicant for leave that there was nothing 'to suggest that the admission of the BSD contract was a tactical move on behalf of the respondent or that the respondent had changed its mind about the manner in which it wishes to put its case' [27]. The import of that last comment is obvious. It would defeat entirely the principles on which case management in this Court operates if parties could simply make and withdraw admissions on forensic whims. Nevertheless, I have concluded that in this instance the substituted defence should be allowed to stand with the amendments withdrawing the admissions to pars 28.1 and 28.2 of the defence preserved. The amendments should, however, only be permitted to stand on terms as to costs. I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons. First, par 28.1 pleads a conclusion that seeks to characterise the plaintiffs' financial circumstances. The relevance of the plaintiffs' financial circumstances to the plea of unconscionability is obvious but no particular formulation of those circumstances is required as a matter of law to support that plea. What is critical is the underlying facts relied on to demonstrate the alleged vulnerability of the plaintiffs as a result of their financial position rather than the adjectival description employed to characterise that position. Second, par 28.2 pleads a fact rather than a conclusion by characterisation: the defendants' knowledge of the plaintiffs' financial position. However, the content of what the defendants are alleged to have known is drawn from the material fact alleged in par 28.1 ‑ that the plaintiffs were in a perilous and desperate financial position. Third, the defendants have in their substituted defence admitted the particulars provided to the equivalent allegations in the initial statement of claim; that is, the particulars to what were pars 25.1 and 25.2, being the particulars that were provided prior to the November 2008 particulars. Admissions to the underlying facts have to that extent been made. Fourth, whether a corporation has contravened s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act is to be determined by reference to all of the circumstances surrounding the impugned conduct. Sections 51AC(3) and 51AC(4) identify a number of matters that a Court may have regard to in determining whether there has been contravening conduct but the subsections are prefaced by the words, 'without in any way limiting the matters to which the Court may have regard for that purpose'. In such a claim, the distinction between material fact, particulars and evidence is easily blurred.