Donnelly (a pseudonym) v The King

Case [2022] SASCA 125


Supreme Court of South Australia

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

DONNELLY (A PSEUDONYM) v THE KING

[2022] SASCA 125

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice Doyle, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)

2 December 2022

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - RESPONSE TO CHARGES - CO-OPERATION WITH POLICE OR ASSISTANCE TO AUTHORITIES - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - RESPONSE TO CHARGES - INFORMERS

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENDER - PRIOR CRIMINALITY

Application for permission to appeal and appeal against sentence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of the offence of causing harm with intent to cause harm, contrary to s 24(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).

Upon being convicted of the present offending, the applicant sought a declaration under s 37 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) that he had cooperated with law enforcement agencies. The sentencing judge heard evidence of the applicant’s cooperation and received letters from the SA Police. He also received confidential material from the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) pursuant to a certificate issued under s 25A(12) of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth).

The sentencing judge made the declaration sought and reduced the notional starting point of three years imprisonment by slightly more than 10 per cent on account of the applicant’s cooperation, to two years and eight months imprisonment.  His Honour further reduced the sentence by four months on account of time spent in custody and on home detention.

Accordingly, the applicant was sentenced to two years and four months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months, backdated to commence on the date the applicant was taken into custody.

The applicant sought permission to appeal on 10 grounds, summarised as follows:

1.      the sentence was manifestly excessive;

2.      the sentencing judge erred in failing to suspend the sentence;

3.the sentencing judge erred in reducing the sentence by 10 per cent under s 37(2) of the Sentencing Act;

4.the sentencing judge erred in failing to have any or adequate regard to the matters required to be considered under s 37(3) of the Sentencing Act;

5.the sentencing judge erred in determining that the applicant had received some prior benefit from his cooperation;

6.the sentencing judge erred in delivering his remarks concerning the s 37 declaration in the absence of the applicant, contrary to s 19(1) of the Sentencing Act;

7.      the sentencing remarks were inadequate;

8.the sentencing judge erred in ruling on [Day 11] that it was not in the interests of justice that the material provided by ACIC be disclosed to the applicant’s counsel;

9.the sentencing judge erred in deciding on [Day 13] that the ACIC material would be taken into account in his ruling, but then determining on [Day 14] that the material was irrelevant to sentencing; and

10.the sentencing process was affected by a lack of procedural fairness such as to cause a miscarriage of…

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Donnelly (a pseudonym) v The King [2022] SASCA 125
Case
[2022] SASCA 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a criminal sentence imposed on the defendant, referred to as Donnelly, by a judge of the District Court. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing, among other grounds, that the sentencing judge's remarks were inadequate regarding the reduction of his sentence for cooperation with authorities. The Director of Public Prosecutions had filed a notice of cross-appeal against the sentence, but indicated it would not be pursued if the defendant's appeal was refused.

The primary legal issue before the appellate court was whether the sentencing judge's remarks adequately explained the decision to reduce the defendant's sentence under section 37(2) of the Sentencing Act. Specifically, the defendant contended that the judge failed to individually address and make factual findings on the various matters relevant to the extent of this reduction, as listed in section 37(3) of the Act.

The court determined that the sentencing judge's remarks were adequate. It was noted that section 19(2) of the Sentencing Act did not obligate the judge to include specific references to cooperation in sentencing remarks. Furthermore, the court held that reasons for sentence are generally brief and intended to explain the sentence to the defendant, rather than being akin to reasons for a verdict. The task of determining sentence reductions for cooperation involves considering sensitive and confidential material, and is an evaluative, often impressionistic, exercise not requiring detailed findings on each enumerated factor. The judge's reference to the materials before the court, which detailed the cooperation, was deemed sufficient given the lack of significant dispute as to its general nature and the sensitive nature of the information.

The application for permission to appeal was dismissed, and consequently, the Director's cross-appeal was also dismissed as it was contingent on the defendant's appeal being refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As mentioned at the outset of these reasons, the Director filed a notice of cross-appeal against sentence, but indicated that he did not intend to pursue the cross-appeal if the defendant were to be refused permission to appeal. As I would refuse permission to appeal on all grounds, it follows that it is not necessary to address the issues raised on the Director’s cross-appeal. Nor is it necessary to address the defendant’s procedural objections to that cross-appeal.Conclusion I would dismiss the application for permission to appeal, and the Director’s cross-appeal. BLEBY JA: I would dismiss the application for permission to appeal and the cross-appeal for the reasons given by Doyle JA. DAVID JA: I would dismiss the application for permission to appeal and the cross-appeal for the reasons given by Doyle JA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the circumstances, I do not think there is any merit in the complaint the subject of Ground 6.Ground 7 – adequacy of sentencing remarks in relation to cooperation In Ground 7, the defendant complains that the judge’s sentencing remarks were inadequate. While only developed to a limited extent in submissions, it would seem that the essence of the defendant’s complaint under this ground of appeal is that the judge did not set out adequate reasons for his decision to reduce the defendant’s sentence under s 37(2) of the Sentencing Act by 10 per cent; that his Honour did not individually address, let alone make factual findings in relation to, the various matters relevant to the extent of the reduction, and in particular those listed in ss 37(3)(b) to (j) of the Sentencing Act. I have already mentioned the terms of s 19(2) of the Sentencing Act, which make it plain that the judge was not under any obligation to include any reference to the information relating to the defendant’s cooperation in his sentencing remarks. On the face of it, this subsection appears to be an answer to the complaint made under this ground of appeal. But even putting the terms of s 19(2) to one side, I am not persuaded that there was any inadequacy in the judge’s reasons. It is trite that the practical content of a judge’s obligation to provide reasons depends upon the nature of the judicial task. Here the relevant task was an aspect of the sentencing process relating to the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement agencies. It is well recognised that reasons for sentence should not be treated as though they were reasons for a verdict (in the criminal context) or final judgment (in a civil context). It is appropriate that they be brief, and while the reasons are intended to assist the appeal court, it is also appropriate that they be expressed in terms directed towards explaining to the defendant the reasons for the sentence to be imposed. Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of the present appeal, it is also important to bear in mind the nature of the task confronting a judge when determining the extent of a reduction in sentence under s 37(2). The task involves the consideration of material which is sensitive and confidential in nature. Further, while the task involves considering each of the matters listed in s 37(3), the judge is not required to make detailed findings in relation to each. The task is an evaluative one that is often not susceptible of that level of precision or analysis. The task is more impressionistic in nature. The terms of the sentencing judge’s [Day 16] ruling in support of his decision to make a declaration under s 37(1), and to reduce the defendant’s sentence by 10 per cent under s 37(2), have been set out in full earlier in these reasons. On a fair reading of that ruling, the essence of his reasoning is clear. His Honour began by explaining that the detail of the defendant’s cooperation had been set out in the materials before the court (being a reference to the first, second and third Golding letters, the Brown affidavit, and the oral evidence of Detective Brown and the defendant). In circumstances where there was no significant dispute as to the general nature of the cooperation provided,[64] and the detail of that cooperation was plainly sensitive information, it was adequate for his Honour to express himself in this way, rather than embarking upon any more detailed summary of the cooperation detailed in that evidence. [64] To the extent there was any dispute at all it was confined to the extent of any outcome achieved from some of the information provided, and the extent to which some of the information related to serious and organised criminal activity for the purposes of s 37(1)(a) (with the latter being relevant more to whether a declaration should be made than the extent of any reduction to be made).