Donnell v Murrell Stephenson (a firm)

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Donnell v Murrell Stephenson (a firm) [2002] QDC 169
PARTIES:  OWEN DONNELL

Appellant

V

MURRELL STEPHENSON (a firm)

Respondent

FILE NO/S:  Appeal 5830 of 2001; M3806 of 2001
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:  Appeal
ORIGINATING
COURT: 
Magistrates Court Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  11 June 2002
DELIVERED AT:  Gympie
HEARING DATE:  20 May 2002
JUDGE:  McGill DCJ
ORDER:  Appeal allowed; judgment of the Magistrates Court at
Brisbane of 13 November 2001 set aside, except insofar as
that court gave liberty to either party to apply in relation
to costs; substitute judgment that the defendant pay the
plaintiff $11,630.15 together with the costs of the
proceeding to be assessed if not agreed; the respondent to
pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.
CATCHWORDS:  LEGAL PRACTITIONERS – Solicitor and Client – Costs –
whether payment of lump sum bill prevents assessment of
itemised bill – whether claim to recover overpayment within
release and discharge – Queensland Law Society Act 1952
ss62A, 62E, Legal Practitioners Act 1995 ss65,16.

CONTRACT – Construction – release and discharge – no reference to separate existing dispute – whether that dispute is in any way connected with the proceeding settled.

Re Bailey’s Bill of Costs [1994] 1 QdR 576 – followed.
Schenker & Co (Aust) Pty Ltd v Maplas Equipment &
Services Pty Ltd [1990] VR 834 – applied.
Re Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bill of Costs [1990] 1 QdR 288
– followed.
COUNSEL:  P.W. Hackett for the appellant
J.S. Miles for the respondent
SOLICITORS:  Crouch & Lyndon for the appellant
Murrell Stephenson for the respondent
  1. The respondent solicitors formerly acted for the appellant in proceedings in the District Court in New South Wales at Grafton (“the NSW action”). The appellant commenced proceedings seeking to recover an amount alleged by him to have been overpaid in respect of the respondent’s professional costs for so acting. That action was dismissed by a magistrate, and the plaintiff has appealed to this Court. Appeal is by way of re-hearing: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules rr 765, 785(1).

Background

  1. The facts leading up to the litigation may be summarised as follows:

24 February 1997 Plaintiff retained defendant to act on his behalf in respect of the
NSW action
March 1997 Plaintiff signed and returned written engagement and trust account
authority; Exhibit 4.
24 October 1997 The NSW action settled.

13 November 1997

Defendant sent a lump sum bill of costs for $27,928.28, which was satisfied by the application of moneys previously received by the plaintiff on account of outlays ($10,536.00) and an amount transferred from funds held in the defendant’s trust account, the proceeds of settlement of the NSW action ($17,402.28).

24 July 1998 A second lump sum bill forwarded by the defendant to the plaintiff
for $3,121.78.
28 July 1998 Plaintiff sought an “itemised account” from the defendant:
Exhibit 2.

3 August 1998

Plaintiff’s new solicitors advised that there ass a dispute in relation to instructions to settle “and also in relation to the bills that have been rendered” and,…

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Details
Case
[2002] QDC 169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Donnell v Murrell Stephenson (a firm), the appellant sought to recover a sum of $8,918.83 from the respondent, who was a solicitor, in the Magistrates Court. This amount represented the difference between the total fees paid by the appellant and the amount assessed by the costs assessor. The appellant's claim in the Magistrates Court was unsuccessful due to two primary issues: the lack of transitional provisions in the 1998 Act, and the applicability of the 1995 Act in the absence of relevant transitional provisions. The court was required to determine whether the 1998 Act applied, given the absence of transitional provisions, and whether the 1995 Act allowed for the recovery of fees and disbursements within the specified timeframe.

The court examined the provisions of the 1995 Act, which consolidated and replaced provisions from the Costs Act 1867. Under this Act, a solicitor could not sue to recover fees or disbursements until one month after delivering a bill in taxable form. During this period, the party chargeable with the bill could obtain taxation without any special order from the court. After this month, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to order taxation. However, there were limitations on the making of such an application in terms of time and the progress of an action to recover fees. The court also considered the requirement that the bill be in sufficient detail to enable the client to take informed advice as to whether they should require taxation. The court held that the first bill delivered by the respondent did not meet the requirements of the 1995 Act as it did not permit an informed decision to be taken as to whether to submit the bill for taxation.

The court found that the appellant was entitled to a bill showing how the amount claimed by the respondent was properly payable in accordance with the agreement. This arose from the general law and was reflected in Rule 84 of the Rules of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the Magistrates Court was set aside, except for the liberty granted to either party to apply in relation to costs. The court ordered the respondent to pay the appellant $11,630.15, together with the costs of the proceeding to be assessed if not agreed, and the appellant's costs of the appeal to be assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal allowed; judgment of the Magistrates Court at

Brisbane of 13 November 2001 set aside, except insofar as

that court gave liberty to either party to apply in relation

to costs; substitute judgment that the defendant pay the

plaintiff $11,630.15 together with the costs of the

proceeding to be assessed if not agreed; the respondent to

pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts leading up to the litigation may be summarised as follows: The amount assessed by the costs assessor was less than the total amount which the appellant had paid for the respondent’s fees, by $8,918.83. That was the amount the recovery of which was sought by the appellant in the Magistrates Court. The appellant was unsuccessful in that court in respect of two issues either of which is fatal to the appellant’s claim. These were that: There are no useful transitional provisions in the 1998 Act; all that they provide is that an agreement between solicitor and client made in accordance with the 1995 Act will be a client agreement for the purposes of the 1998 Act.[2] In the absence of relevant transitional provisions, the 1998 Act will apply except where to do so would interfere with rights which have accrued under the former Act.[3] Under the 1995 Act, which was a consolidation and replaced provisions enacted in the Costs Act 1867, a solicitor could not sue to recover fees or disbursements until the expiration of one month after delivery of a bill in taxable form: s.5. Within that month the party chargeable with the bill could obtain taxation of it without any special order from the court, and after the month the Supreme Court on application by one of the various relevant parties had jurisdiction to order taxation: s.8. There was however some limitation, in terms of time and in terms of the progress of an action to recover fees, on the making of such an application: s.8(3). [2] Section 56 of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952, inserted by s.10 of the Civil Justice Reform Act 1998. [3] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s.20(4). However it is important to bear in mind that this section refers to the payment of any “such bills as aforesaid”. That means a bill which satisfied the requirements of s.5.[4] Under the 1995 Act, the requirement was that the bill be in sufficient detail to enable the client to take informed advice as to whether he should require taxation.[5]The bill however did not need to be in the form required by the Rules of the Supreme Court.[6] The two decisions cited establish that until a bill of costs in such form has been delivered, payment will not be a bar to taxation, and the client can still demand a proper bill. In the same way, the reservation of a right to dispute the bill at the time of payment is a circumstance sufficient to allow taxation notwithstanding payment.[7] [4] Re Bailey’s Bill of Costs [1994] 1 QdR 576 at 580. [5] Re Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bill of Costs [1990] 1 QdR 288 at 294. [6] Re Bailey’s Bill of Costs (supra) at page 580. [7] Re Walsh Halligan Douglas’ Bill of Costs (supra) at page 295-6. Accordingly the fact that the first bill had been paid was not conclusive for the purposes of the 1995 Act. The first bill was not a bill in accordance with the requirements of s.5; it did not permit an informed decision to be taken as to whether to submit the bill for taxation. For present purposes, I assume that the agreement Exhibit 4 was valid and binding on the parties. Accepting that that agreement provided for charging on an hourly basis, the bill did not indicate how the amount claimed for professional costs had been arrived at in accordance with that agreement. The appellant was entitled to a bill showing how the amount claimed by the respondent was properly payable in accordance with that agreement. That arises from the general law, and is reflected in Rule 84 of the Rules of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Are there any useful transitional provisions in the 1998 Act for the purposes of the appellant's claim?

2. Can the 1998 Act apply in the absence of relevant transitional provisions, except where it would interfere with rights accrued under the former Act?

3. Did the solicitor's bill comply with the requirements of section 5 of the 1995 Act, to enable the client to take informed advice on whether to require taxation?

4. Does the fact that the first bill had been paid bar the client from demanding a proper bill and seeking taxation?

5. Is the appellant entitled to a bill showing how the amount claimed for professional costs was properly payable in accordance with the agreement between the solicitor and client?

6. Can the appellant recover the difference in the amount assessed by the costs assessor and the total amount paid for the respondent’s fees?

Held
1. There are no useful transitional provisions in the 1998 Act for the purposes of the appellant's claim. The court concluded that the transitional provisions were not helpful as they merely stated that an agreement made under the 1995 Act would be considered a client agreement under the 1998 Act.

2. The 1998 Act can apply in the absence of relevant transitional provisions, except where it would interfere with rights accrued under the former Act. The court held that the 1998 Act would apply, but not if it would interfere with rights that had accrued under the previous Act.

3. The solicitor's bill did not comply with the requirements of section 5 of the 1995 Act, as it did not enable the client to take informed advice on whether to require taxation. The court found that the bill was not detailed enough to allow the client to make an informed decision about taxation.

4. The fact that the first bill had been paid does not bar the client from demanding a proper bill and seeking taxation. The court determined that payment of the initial bill did not prevent the client from requesting a proper bill and seeking taxation.

5. The appellant is entitled to a bill showing how the amount claimed for professional costs was properly payable in accordance with the agreement between the solicitor and client. The court held that the appellant had the right to a bill that demonstrated how the claimed amount was calculated according to their agreement.

6. The appellant can recover the difference in the amount assessed by the costs assessor and the total amount paid for the respondent’s fees. The court ruled that the appellant could recover the difference between the assessed amount and the total fees paid.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court first addressed the issue of transitional provisions under the 1998 Act and its applicability to the appellant’s claim. The court held that the transitional provisions in the 1998 Act only ensured that agreements made in accordance with the 1995 Act would be valid under the 1998 Act. However, these provisions did not provide a direct solution for the appellant's claim. The court acknowledged that the 1998 Act would generally apply unless it interfered with accrued rights under the former Act, but found that the transitional provisions did not offer a useful framework for resolving the specific issues in this case.

Next, the court considered whether the 1998 Act could apply in the absence of relevant transitional provisions, provided it did not interfere with rights accrued under the former Act. The court reasoned that while the 1998 Act could apply in such cases, it must not undermine any existing rights. Given the context of the appellant's claim, the court determined that applying the 1998 Act would not interfere with any accrued rights and thus could be considered.

The court then examined whether the solicitor's bill complied with the requirements of section 5 of the 1995 Act, which mandated that the bill be sufficiently detailed to enable the client to take informed advice on whether to require taxation. The court held that the first bill delivered to the appellant did not meet these requirements as it did not provide enough detail to inform the client about the basis of the fees claimed. This non-compliance was crucial because, under the 1995 Act, a properly detailed bill is necessary to allow the client to make an informed decision regarding taxation.

The court also addressed the issue of whether the payment of the first bill barred the client from demanding a proper bill and seeking taxation. The court relied on previous decisions which established that payment of a bill does not preclude the client from demanding a proper bill and seeking taxation, provided the client reserved the right to dispute the bill at the time of payment. This reasoning supported the appellant’s right to demand a detailed bill and seek taxation, despite having already paid the initial bill.

Furthermore, the court considered whether the appellant was entitled to a bill showing how the amount claimed for professional costs was properly payable in accordance with the agreement between the solicitor and client. The court concluded that the appellant was indeed entitled to such a bill, which would reflect the terms of their agreement. This entitlement arose from the general law and was supported by Rule 84 of the Rules of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated, emphasizing the importance of transparency and clarity in billing.

Finally, the court assessed whether the appellant could recover the difference between the amount assessed by the costs assessor and the total amount paid for the respondent’s fees. The court determined that the appellant was entitled to recover this difference, as the bill did not properly reflect the agreement between the parties. This decision underscored the necessity for accurate and transparent billing in line with the client-solicitor agreement.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that in cases where a solicitor’s bill does not meet the requirements of section 5 of the 1995 Act, the client is entitled to a detailed bill and can seek taxation, even if the initial bill has been paid. Additionally, the court emphasized the importance of adhering to the terms of the client-solicitor agreement in billing practices, and recognized the client's right to recover differences when the billed amount deviates from agreed terms.