Donata & Hannes (No 2)
[2024] FedCFamC2F 277
•11 March 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Donata & Hannes (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 277
File number(s): PAC 3011 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE OBRADOVIC Date of judgment: 11 March 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – De facto relationship – Relationship of 14 years – Findings as to credit – Findings as to domestic violence – Add backs – Cross-examination not permitted due to operation of 102NA – Superannuation splitting order – 50/50 split after adjustment Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Cases cited: Bain v Bain (2017) 319 FLR 119
Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116
Chapman & Chapman [2014] FamCAFC 91
Oamra & Williams [2021] FamCAFC 117
Russell & Russell (1999) FLC 92-877
Scott & Danton [2014] FamCAFC 203
Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52
Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120
Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 21 February 2024 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Livingstone Solicitor for the Applicant: Khalil Family Lawyers Pty Ltd Appearing for the Respondent: In person ORDERS
PAC 3011 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS DONATA
Applicant
AND: MR HANNES
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE OBRADOVIC
DATE OF ORDER:
11 MARCH 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The parties shall forthwith do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to disburse the balance of proceeds of the sale of the property known as B Street, Suburb C in the State of New South Wales presently held in trust by Khalil Lawyers on behalf of the parties as follows:
(a)The sum of $201,125.50 to the applicant at her direction;
(b)The sum of $125,525.50 to the respondent at his direction; and
(c)Any balance to be divided 50/50 between the parties.
2.Within 7 days of these orders, the respondent do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary so as to transfer to the applicant all of his right title and interest in the on-site caravan situated at D Street, Town E.
3.Unless otherwise specified in these orders each party shall be entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property and financial resources of any nature and kind in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
(a)In the case of the applicant:
(i)Her F Bank account #...83;
(b)In the case of the respondent:
(i)His Commonwealth Bank of Australia account #...78;
(ii)His Motor Vehicle 1;
(iii)His Motor Vehicle 2;
(iv)His Motor Vehicle 3;
(v)His Motor Vehicle 4;
(vi)His Motor Vehicle 5;
(vii)His caravan; and
(viii)The parties’ chattels currently in storage with G Company.
4.Unless otherwise specified in these orders each party shall be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any personal liabilities and any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
(a)In the case of the applicant:
(i)Any debt owed by the parties to Ms H as at the date of these orders;
(b)In the case of the respondent:
(i)His Commonwealth Bank of Australia MasterCard debt;
(ii)His Commonwealth Bank of Australia overdraft account debt bearing account #...71;
(iii)His J Company debt;
(iv)His K Company debt;
(v)His L Company debt;
(vi)His toll debt;
(vii)His M Company debt;
(viii)Any personal debt owed to Mr N;
(ix)Any personal debt owed to Ms O; and
(x)Any personal debt owed to Mr P.
5.Paragraph 5-11 of these orders are binding on the trustees of Super Fund 1 (“the fund”).
6.That, in accordance with section 90XT(1)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”):
(a)The applicant is entitled to be paid the specific percentage out of the respondent’s interest in the fund;
(b)The respondent’s entitlement in the fund is correspondingly reduced by force of this order; and
(c)The percentage specified for the purposes of this order is 50%.
7.That the trustee of the fund do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to:
(a)Calculate, in accordance with the requirements of the Act and the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001 (Cth) the entitlement awarded to the applicant in the immediately preceding clause of these orders; and
(b)Pay the entitlement whenever the trustee makes a splitable payment from the respondent’s interest in the fund.
8.That this order has effect from the operative time and the operative time is the beginning of the day upon which this order is made.
9.That, after service of the payment split notice in accordance with the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the regulations”) the respondent shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary, including but not limited to exercising the applicant’s request in accordance with the regulations for the transfer or rollover of the non-member spouse’s interest in the respondent’s name in the fund.
10.That, the Court notes:
(a)The value of the non-member spouse interest is calculated in accordance with the SIS Regulations; and
(b)Any payments from respondent’s superannuation interest in the fund made after the trustee has created a new interest in the applicant’s name in the fund are not splitable payments in accordance with the requirement of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001.
11.There be liberty to each party and the trustee of the fund to apply regarding the implementation of these orders affecting the interests of the respondent and the applicant in the fund.
12.That the applicant and the respondent shall each do all such things as are necessary and sign all such documents as are necessary to give effect to these Orders.
13.Pursuant to section 106A of the Act a Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) is authorised to execute any document or do any such thing as is required to give effect to these orders in the event of a default of a party to execute such document or do such things as is necessary under these orders.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE OBRADOVIC:
These are the Reasons for Judgment in relation to the property adjustment orders as sought pursuant to s.90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) by the applicant de facto wife, Ms Donata (“applicant”), and the respondent de facto husband, Mr Hannes (“respondent”).
On 19 April 2023, the Court declared that the parties lived in a de facto relationship in NSW from mid-2008 until early 2022, and delivered its reasons for judgment in respect of that decision (“April 2023 Judgment”).[1]
[1] Donata & Hannes [2023] FedCFamC2F 439.
On 15 November 2023, the Court made a declaration pursuant to s.102NA of the Act, thus preventing the parties from personally cross-examining each other. At final hearing, the applicant was represented by a solicitor and counsel, while the respondent was unrepresented. He had not applied for representation under the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme.
CREDIT
Due to the provisions of s.102NA of the Act, the respondent was not permitted to cross-examine the applicant personally.
The respondent was cross-examined. His answers were at times non-responsive, he was at times highly argumentative and was generally disrespectful in his manner of speech and presentation. He did not impress as a witness of truth.
It is well accepted that where evidence is uncontradicted and is not otherwise inherently improbable or inherently incredible, and where the other party has not elicited in cross-examination or led in evidence some material to overcome it, either by proving the contrary or throwing the matter into doubt, it should be accepted.[2]
[2] Bain v Bain (2017) 319 FLR 119 at [112].
In general, and except as specifically noted, where the two are in conflict, the Court accepts the evidence of the applicant to that of the respondent.
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The overall approach to the determination of an application for property adjustment orders was set out by the High Court in Stanford v Stanford.[3] The High Court recorded three fundamental propositions. The first was the need to identify existing legal and equitable interests; the second was that those interests can only be altered by a principled application of judicial discretion; and the third was that, the requirement that the Court must not make any order, unless it is satisfied that in all of the circumstances it is just and equitable to make the order, requires separate consideration and should not be conflated with the statutory considerations required to be taken into consideration as to what order, if any, should be made.[4]
[3] [2012] HCA 52, see in particular [37] to [42].
[4] Oamra & Williams [2021] FamCAFC 117 at [35].
Such approach was subsequently considered by the Full Court of the then Family Court in Bevan & Bevan,[5] Chapman & Chapman,[6] and Scott & Danton.[7] Such an approach is also applicable to proceedings pursuant to the de facto relationship provisions of the Act, namely Part VIIIAB.[8]
[5] [2013] FamCAFC 116 (“Bevan”).
[6] [2014] FamCAFC 91 (“Chapman”).
[7] [2014] FamCAFC 203 (“Scott”).
[8] See for example Peters & Walker [2015] FamCA 732.
As such, once the issue of whether it is just and equitable to make any order is resolved, the Court is to then consider the contributions made by the parties as defined in s.90SM(4)(a) to (c), the matters set out in s.90SM(4)(d) to (g) and, in particular, the subjective considerations as to the parties by having regard to the provisions of s.90SF(3) in so far as they are relevant.
The Court is then to consider the justice and equity of the actual orders to be made, in the context of the Court’s obligations to make appropriate orders as provided for in s.90SM(1) of the Act.[9]
[9] See generally Russell & Russell (1999) FLC 92-877; Teal & Teal [2010] FamCAFC 120, but in the context of s.79.
The just and equitable requirement is “one permeating the entire process”.[10]
[10] Bevan at [86].
Add-Backs
In Trevi & Trevi[11] the Full Court of the then Family Court of Australia held as follows:[12]
[27]The Full Court held in Omacini and Omacini that addbacks fall into “three clear categories”: where the parties have expended money on legal fees; where there has been a premature distribution of matrimonial assets; and “waste” or wanton, negligent, or reckless dissipation of assets.
[28]However, the Full Court also made it clear that an addback does not necessarily occur whenever “a party has expended money realised from the disposition of assets that existed as at the date of separation”, the Full Court describing such a proposition as “unduly simplistic”. An earlier Full Court made the same point, saying that adding back is “the exception rather than the rule”.
[29]The fundamental precept that addbacks are exceptional, reflected in the decisions just referred to, also mirrors what has been said in earlier decisions of the Full Court that, for example, “the Family Court must take the property of a party to the marriage as it finds it” at trial. An important parallel proposition is that the parties do not “go into a state of suspended economic animation” after separation. Thus, reasonably incurred expenditure does not usually come within accepted categories of addback.
[30]Two fundamental premises emerge from Omacini and the authorities preceding it. First, “adding back” is a discretionary exercise. When the discretion is exercised in favour of adding back, it reflects a decision that, exceptionally, in the particular circumstances of a case, justice and equity requires it. The second premise is its corollary: in cases that are not “exceptional” justice and equity can be achieved, not by adding back, but by the exercise of a different discretion – usually by taking up the same as a relevant s 75(2) factor. Indeed, it has been said that the latter is “a course which is, perhaps, technically more correct” than adding back to the list of existing interests in property.
(citations omitted)
[11] [2018] FamCAFC 173 (“Trevi”).
[12] Trevi at [27]-[30].
RELEVANT FACTS
The Court in its April 2023 Judgment made a number of findings, as follows:
(a)The applicant was born in 1963.
(b)The respondent was born in 1966.
(c)The parties met in 1982.
(d)In 1997, the applicant started receiving a disability pension.
(e)In 2003, the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
(f)In 2007, the respondent had weekend leave and he spent it with the applicant.
(g)In 2008, the respondent was released from gaol and granted parole to live at a home in Suburb Q rented by the applicant.
(h)In early 2009, the respondent purchased in his sole name the property at B Street, Suburb C, and on completion of the purchase, the applicant started living at the Suburb C property with the respondent.
(i)In late 2022, the respondent purchased in his sole name accommodation in Town E and the applicant then starts to occupy the accommodation.
(j)Upon the respondent’s release from prison, the applicant and members of her extended family financially supported the respondent for a period, helped him find employment and “generally put him on the right track”.
(k)For the entirety of the time the parties lived in the same home, from mid-2008 onwards, the applicant was in receipt of a Commonwealth disability pension at the rate for a sole pensioner paid into her own account. This was despite the applicant’s contention that the parties lived as a de facto couple and the respondent being in a well-paying job, being two facts that would mean she was not eligible to receive that pension.
(l)At no stage did the applicant inform or notify the relevant pension authority that she was living in a de facto relationship.
(m)The applicant was responsible for undertaking all household tasks for the parties such as shopping, cooking, cleaning and washing.
(n)The Suburb C property and the caravan were purchased in the respondent’s sole name and the borrowings were in his sole name.
(o)The respondent had the applicant’s first name tattooed upon himself.
(p)At times, the respondent stayed elsewhere than the Suburb C property for short periods of time to make his attendance at his workplace easier by lessening travel time.
(q)The applicant would weekly provide money to the respondent to finance joint expenses.
At the commencement of the relationship, the parties had nothing by way of assets, except in so far as the applicant had a furnished home. The respondent had little more than the clothes on his back upon his release from gaol.
It is the applicant’s evidence that during the parties’ relationship, she would withdraw the entirety of her pension when she received it and give it to the respondent in cash. The respondent conceded during the hearing that the applicant would regularly give him money but that it was nowhere near as much as she claims, and that it was only $200 per week. The Court accepts that the applicant handed over the entirety of her pension to the respondent upon receiving it and that the money was utilised for the parties’ expenses.
When the Suburb C property was purchased in the respondent’s sole name, except for the first homeowners’ grant which the respondent was able to obtain, the balance of the purchase price was funded by way of a loan from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in the respondent’s sole name. The purchase price was $257,000. There is no evidence to suggest that the applicant herself would ever have been in a financial position to purchase this property or any property after the parties started cohabiting.
The parties lived together in the Suburb C property for almost 14 years. During that time the respondent was in paid employment and worked full-time. He worked hard and brought home an income. The applicant also contributed the entirety of her disability pension to the parties’ expenses.
The applicant was primarily responsible for maintaining the parties’ home, cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping and the like. She had the role of homemaker, while the respondent had the role of primary breadwinner. While according to the respondent, the applicant did no more than she would have done for herself in terms of cooking, cleaning and similar, this is not so. She did such work for two people. She did the work so the respondent did not have to.
The applicant supported the respondent in his employment and she supported him in staying sober and to not use illicit drugs, something which he had been doing prior to the parties’ relationship.
In late 2021, the respondent purchased accommodation for $37,000 which is located at Town E. The respondent obtained a personal loan of $35,000 to buy the accommodation. The applicant has been living there since late 2021, but to the exclusion of the respondent since early 2022.
The applicant deposes that she gave the respondent her winnings she received from gambling and an inheritance of $72,000 she received in or about 2020. Her evidence is silent, except for a general assertion as to how the moneys she gave to the respondent was applied, as to what happened to the $72,000 inheritance. The respondent’s evidence is that she used her inheritance to pay for the costs of family court proceedings, children’s court proceedings and criminal proceedings which involved the applicant and/or her family members.
The Court is not satisfied on the evidence before it, that the applicant contributed a sum of $72,000 to the parties’ joint expenses or that she handed the entirety of her inheritance over to the respondent. While the Court accepts that some of the moneys may have been used for joint expenses, the Court also accepts that some of the moneys was used for the applicant’s (and/or her family’s) legal expenses which were not associated with the respondent. Likewise, the Court accepts that the respondent supported the applicant in her quest for orders in respect of her grandson.
The Court accepts the applicant’s evidence in respect of family violence, in particular the Court finds that:
(a)The respondent called her names such as “cunt” from time to time;
(b)The respondent demolished a piece of furniture with a weapon in the applicant’s presence, following an argument between the parties in late 2009;
(c)The respondent would from time to time use his open right hand to slap the applicant’s face;
(d)In about 2005, following an argument between the parties and while the applicant was in the kitchen washing up, the respondent poured petrol on the kitchen floor, said to the applicant “You want to fucking leave – I’ll set you on fire” and grabbed a lighter;
(e)In mid-2020, following an argument, the respondent came into the bedroom where the applicant was watching television and punched the televisions screen 3 or 4 times, with such force that it resulted in him breaking his hand; and
(f)In early 2021, the respondent lifted the mattress off the bed on which the applicant had been sleeping causing her to roll on the floor, he then barred his teeth at her, he then approached her and bit her on her body 3 times drawing blood and causing bruising. The respondent then grabbed the applicant, threw her face first onto the bed, got behind her and pulled her underpants down and said “Do you want me to be a fucking animal?”. The respondent then let the applicant go and began smashing items, such as a glass bowl and bottles of perfume, on the floor. He also broke all 4 blades of the ceiling fan that was in the room.
The applicant’s contributions were more arduous as a consequence of the respondent’s violence towards her. She was at times in pain, she was feeling down and depressed but nonetheless continued to undertake all of the ordinary everyday household tasks.
The parties separated in early 2022. The respondent remained living in the Suburb C property until its sale, while the applicant remained living in the accommodation at Town E.
The applicant has been responsible for payments of the site costs for the accommodation, which she has had exclusive occupation of since separation.
The respondent was responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the Suburb C property post separation, and he readied the property for sale by undertaking some minor renovations. He has borne the full cost of such work.
In mid-2022, following the termination of his employment and a subsequent unfair dismissal complaint, the respondent received termination payments totalling $35,100. Those payments related to a period of employment while the parties were in a relationship. Some tax was payable in respect of the termination payment, and on the respondent’s evidence he received a net amount of approximately $25,000.
The Suburb C property was sold in mid-2022 for $725,000. The respondent received $447,009 in mid-2022 and a further sum of $21,600 in mid-2022. This is despite Court orders made on 15 June 2022 restraining the respondent from dealing with any amount received from the proceeds of sale, and requiring that the net proceeds of sale be paid to the applicant’s solicitors’ trust account. It was not until a further court order of 31 August 2022 that the funds of $400,000 were paid into the solicitors' trust account.
Future Needs
Neither party is currently employed.
The applicant is 60 years old. The respondent is 57 years old.
The applicant suffers from health conditions which have affected her earning capacity, such that she has been in receipt of a disability pension for decades. She is unlikely to be gainfully employed in the future.
The respondent was limping when he was in Court, he had a brace on. He gave evidence about his injury and the need for surgery in the future. He also gave some evidence about his health in general. He is hoping to be able to return to paid employment in the future, but doubts his prospects due to the way he departed from his previous and long-term employer.
However, the respondent was gainfully employed for the duration of the parties’ relationship and there is no cogent reason as to why he would not be able to obtain gainful employment in the future.
The Pool
The respondent has had the benefit of and retained over $68,600 from the proceeds of sale of the Suburb C property prior to the transfer of $400,000 into the trust account.
Subsequently and on 21 October 2022, $50,000 was released to the respondent by Court order, and in early 2023, the applicant agreed to release a further $20,000 from the trust account to the respondent. Therefore, the respondent received an additional $70,000 from the proceeds of sale by early 2023.
On the respondent’s case he borrowed money from friends since separation and presently owes over $21,000. This is money which he has had available to him post separation.
The respondent has not explained in his evidence satisfactorily what he has done with the moneys he has received post separation, which is a total of $164,600[13] (accepting that the respondent received only $26,000 net for his termination payment) plus $21,000 in borrowings. As such, the respondent had access to just under $186,000[14] since separation in early 2022 to date.
[13] Made up as follows: $26,000 + $68,600 + $50,000 + $20,000.
[14] Rounded to the nearest $1000
The respondent has said that he has paid off the loan associated with the accommodation where the applicant lives, this accounting for $37,000.
He gave evidence that he spent $20,000 on legal fees for these proceedings.
While some of the moneys might have been spent on reasonable living expenses, and accepting the respondent’s evidence that his weekly expenditure is $950,[15] over a period of just under two years, these expenses would have been approximately $100,000. However, he has been in receipt of the jobseeker allowance of $414 per week since the end of 2022. Accepting that the shortfall of his weekly expenses was paid from the moneys he received post separation, this accounts for $77,500.
[15] Financial Statement filed 21 February 2024.
Leaving aside the respondent’s personal borrowings post separation, which the respondent has failed to prove not only as to the existence of such alleged loans, but also what he has done with the moneys he received, with any such alleged debts to not be included in the pool, the respondent has failed to account for at least $32,100.[16] In those circumstances, the Court is satisfied that such funds were recklessly dissipated.
[16] $164,600 - $35,000 - $20,000 - $77,500 = $32,100.
This amount of $32,100, together with the amount of legal fees paid to his former solicitors engaged in these proceedings, will be added back to the pool, making a total of $52,100.
The respondent has approximately $118,000 in superannuation. The superannuation accumulated during the period of the parties’ relationship, and is attributable to the employment the respondent was engaged in while the parties were together.
There is presently $326,650 being the balance of the proceeds of sale of the Suburb C property which is held in a trust account on behalf of the parties. Neither the evidence nor the submissions explain this exact figure.
There is no valuation for the accommodation. It was purchased in late 2021. There is no suggestion on the evidence that it has decreased in value, and for the purposes of assessing the property pool its value at purchase, 2 years ago, will be assigned against it.
Indeed, there are no valuations in respect of much of the parties’ property. Where there is disagreement and no valuation has been provided, the Court will “split the difference” between the parties’ estimates for the same item.
In respect of a Motor Vehicle 6 which was damaged and written off, it appears from the respondent’s evidence that he did not in fact receive any insurance payout for it. The car is gone and if there was money received, it was at most $1,400 which is now not able to be identified. The Court is not satisfied that such funds should be added back.
The respondent concedes that the debt to Ms H is owed, and that it is a debt that relates to the period of the parties’ relationship. It will be included in the pool, as will the parties’ various credit card debts and other loans to financial institutions.
As such, the pool is assessed as follows:[17]
[17] Rounded to the nearest dollar.
Ownership Description Value Respondent Moneys held in Kahlil Family Lawyers Trust Account from sale of Suburb C property $326,000 Respondent Addback $52,100 Respondent Accommodation at D Street, Town E $37,000 Respondent Motor Vehicle 5 $27,500 Respondent Motor Vehicle 4 $17,500 Respondent Motor Vehicle 3 $7,000 Respondent Caravan $3,000 Respondent Contents of G Company Storage Shed $2,000 Respondent Super Fund 1 (accumulation superannuation interest) $118,000 Respondent Total value of various credit card debts, financial institution debts and overdraft (from financial statement) ($28,500) Applicant/Joint Debt to Ms H ($30,000) TOTAL: $531,000 CONTRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENT
Taking into consideration the parties’ contributions during their relationship, including that the applicant’s contributions were at times more arduous due to the family violence, and the parties’ post separation contributions, the parties’ overall contributions are assessed as 45% to the applicant and 55% to the respondent.
In respect of what is commonly referred to as “future needs” there will be an adjustment in the applicant’s favour of 5%, thus bringing the overall adjustment to 50% to the applicant and 50% to the respondent.
As such, the applicant will receive assets to the value of $265,125.50 by way of adjustment of property interests and the respondent will receive assets to the value of $265,125.50 by way of adjustment of property interests. This adjustment will include a superannuation splitting orders as to 50% of the value of the superannuation.
Therefore, the parties will receive as follows:
To the applicant:
Ownership Description Value Respondent Moneys held in Kahlil Family Lawyers Trust Account from sale of Suburb C property $201,125.50 Respondent Accommodation at D Street, Town E $37,000 Respondent Super Fund 1 (accumulation superannuation interest) $59,000 Applicant/Joint Debt to Ms H ($30,000) TOTAL: $265,125.50
To the respondent:
Ownership Description Value Respondent Moneys held in Kahlil Family Lawyers Trust Account from sale of Suburb C property $125,525.50 Respondent Addback $52,100 Respondent Motor Vehicle 5 $27,500 Respondent Motor Vehicle 2 $17,500 Respondent Motor Vehicle 3 $7,000 Respondent Caravan $3,000 Respondent Contents of G Company Storage Shed $2,000 Respondent Super Fund 1 (accumulation superannuation interest) $59,000 Respondent Total value of various credit card debts, financial institution debts and overdraft (from financial statement) ($28,500) TOTAL: $265,125.50
Each of the parties will receive a significant lump sum in cash. The superannuation will be split equally between the parties, thus providing them with a source of funds for the future. The applicant will retain the caravan in which she has been residing since early 2022 and the respondent will retain the other caravan and motor vehicles, which are currently in his possession.
In all of the circumstances, the orders are just and equitable.
For all of those reasons, orders as set out at the forefront of these Reasons for Judgment will be made.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Obradovic. Associate:
Dated: 11 March 2024
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