| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
No. 7718 of 2001
| DOMINION CAPITAL PTY. LTD. (ACN 064 533 802) | Plaintiff |
| v. | |
| PICO HOLDINGS INC. | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | HABERSBERGER, J. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 9 NOVEMBER 2001 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 DECEMBER 2001 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DOMINON CAPITAL PTY. LTD. v. PICO HOLDINGS INC. | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2001] VSC 458 | |
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CATCHWORDS: Companies – Statutory demand not specifying address for service in State where demand served – Creditor a foreign company with no registered office in Australia – Impossibility of compliance with s.9 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) – Application to set aside statutory demand – Not under s.459G of Corporations Act 2001 – Whether inhibiting orders should be made at time application dismissed – Whether merits of application should be assessed in deciding whether to make inhibiting orders – Ground not raised in supporting affidavit – Whether service of statutory demand was taking a step within meaning of r.60.01(2)(a).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Mr. S.P. Gardiner | Mallesons Stephen Jaques |
| For the Defendant | Mr. M.R. Pearce | Herbert Geer & Rundle, as town agents for Gilbert & Tobin |
HIS HONOUR:
The Proceeding
This is an appeal by the defendant, Pico Holdings Inc. ("Pico") from a decision of Senior Master Mahony in respect of an application by the plaintiff, Dominion Capital Pty. Ltd. (ACN 064 533 802) ("Dominion"), under s.459G of the Corporations Act 2001 seeking an order setting aside a statutory demand dated 4 September 2001 served on it by Pico.
Although the application was dismissed, in circumstances I will refer to in due course, Pico appealed because it was aggrieved by the overall result of the Senior Master's order. Under the Other Matters part of his order made on 19 October 2001, the Senior Master recorded the following:
"This proceeding was intended to be an application under section 459G of the Corporations Act for an order setting aside the statutory demand dated 4 September 2001 served on the plaintiff by the defendant. There was a defect in the demand, however, in that it gave as the address for service of the defendant for the purposes of such an application not an address in Victoria where the registered office of the plaintiff is and where the demand was served on it (and as provided for in Form 509H, the form of statutory demand – see section 459E(2)(e)), but the address of the defendant's solicitors in New South Wales. Service of the defendant at that address could not validly be effected save in compliance with the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992; but that Act could not be complied with because the defendant's registered office is not at the solicitors' address and, indeed, the defendant, a company incorporated in the United States of America, has no registered office in Australia: see Service and Execution of Process Act, section 9, 15(1) and…
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- Case
- [2001] VSC 458
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the statutory demand was not properly served and was therefore invalid. It noted that the failure to specify an address for service in the state where the demand was served, coupled with Pico Holdings Inc's lack of a registered office in Australia, rendered the demand ineffective. The court found that Dominion Capital Pty Ltd's application to set aside the statutory demand was not under section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001. Consequently, the court decided not to make any inhibiting orders at the time of dismissing the application. The court determined that the merits of the application should not be assessed before deciding on the inhibiting orders, as this ground was not raised in the supporting affidavit. Additionally, the court concluded that the service of the statutory demand did not constitute a step within the meaning of rule 60.01(2)(a).
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi