Domenico Alessandro Calabretta in his capacity as receiver of Harris Health Care Pty Limited v French

[2022] NSWSC 869

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	Domenico Alessandro Calabretta in his capacity as receiver of Harris Health Care Pty Limited v French [2022] NSWSC 869
Hearing dates:	20 June 2022
Date of orders:	20 June 2022
Decision date:	20 June 2022
Jurisdiction:	Equity
Before:	Black J
Decision:	Judgment in favour of the Second Plaintiff in the amount of $450,000 with interest against the Defendant. No order as to costs and proceedings otherwise dismissed.
Catchwords:	CIVIL PROCEDURE — Summary disposal — Judgment for plaintiff — No defence — Where plaintiffs seek summary judgment for an amount due under a loan agreement with interest — Where plaintiffs also seek summary judgment for a declaration and specific performance in relation to an alleged settlement agreement — Whether defendant has a defence to the claim or part of the claim
Legislation Cited:	Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.1
Cases Cited:	Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Mr DA Calabretta as receiver of Harris Health Care Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff) Harris Health Care Pty Ltd (Second Plaintiff) Mr A French (First Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr A Fernon SC (Plaintiff) Solicitors: Nelson McKinnon (Plaintiff) Mr A French (First Defendant) (self-represented)
File Number(s):	2021/00321884

Judgment – ex tempore (Revised 29 June 2022)

Nature of the application

1. By Further Amended Notice of Motion filed on 1 June 2022, the Plaintiff, Mr Calabretta, in his capacity as receiver of Harris Health Care Pty Ltd ("HHC") and HHC, which has been joined as party to the proceedings pursuant to an order that I made this morning, as a necessary and plainly a proper party to the proceedings, seeks summary judgment on two alternative bases.

2. The first is an order that relief be given in the form of prayers 3 to 6 of a Further Amended Summons also filed on 1 June 2022. Prayer 3 seeks, in effect, judgment in favour of Mr Calabretta for HHC in the amount of $450,000; prayer 4 seeks an order compelling a money payment within seven days; prayer 5 seeks an order that the First Defendant, Mr French, pay Mr Calabretta's remuneration and costs; and prayer 6 seeks an order for interest on the judgment debt.

3. The alternative basis on which summary judgment is sought, more ambitiously, is for relief in the form of prayers 9 and 10 of the Further Amended Summons. Prayer 9 seeks a declaration that, on 18 November 2021, Mr Calabretta and Mr French entered into a binding settlement agreement to resolve the proceedings between them. Prayer 10 seeks an order for specific performance of that binding settlement agreement, by execution of a Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt and Forbearance.

4. Before turning to the wider history of the proceedings, and the evidence on which the parties rely, I should note that Mr Fernon, who appears for Mr Calabretta and HHC, has confirmed that summary judgment is sought on the basis that it will finally dispose of all issues in the proceedings and that, if summary judgment is given, the proceedings would otherwise be dismissed. I have proceeded to hear the application on that basis, with the result that if either I accede to the application in respect of summary judgment as to the loan and interest, or if I accede to the application in respect of specific performance of the suggested settlement agreement, the balance of the proceedings will be dismissed. That confirmation was important for the conduct of the proceedings, first, as to the question whether this motion should be heard now or deferred to be heard together with the substantive proceedings; and, second, as to whether summary judgment should be given, in the Court's discretion, because there might be little utility in summary judgment if it would merely determine a single aspect of the dispute prior to the determination of the remaining issues in the proceedings.

History of proceedings and affidavit evidence

5. With that background, I should now turn to the lengthy history of this application, which is in some respects unfortunate, and will have an impact on the question of costs below. By Summons filed on 12 November 2021, Mr Calabretta, in his capacity as receiver of HHC, sought interim and final relief against Mr French and Ms Gabrielle Bakey, including orders voiding an alleged transfer of certain cattle to Ms Bakey. Some of the substantive relief sought in that Summons is no longer pressed, and none of it is the subject of the application for summary judgment.

6. Mr Calabretta reads, in the summary judgment application, his affidavit dated 11 November 2021. Mr Calabretta there addresses his appointment as receiver and manager of HHC and refers to an amount due by Mr French under a loan agreement dated 11 April 2019 (“Loan Agreement”) between HHC and Mr French, to which I return below. He refers to negotiations between a solicitor acting for HHC, Mr Amirbeaggi, and Mr French, and to Mr Calabretta's investigations as to the position in respect of certain cattle which were said to be security for the loan, which as I have noted above are not in issue in this summary judgment application. An exhibit to that affidavit (Ex DAC-1) was tendered.

7. By notice of motion filed on 2 December 2021, Mr Calabretta then sought judgment as against both Mr French and Ms Bakey in the amount of $450,000; an order for the delivery of cattle said to be security for the Loan Agreement; an order that Mr French and Ms Bakey pay Mr Calabretta's remuneration and costs then quantified as more than $210,000; and other orders. It was not immediately apparent why Ms Bakey should, at that point, either be held liable for the amount of the loan, or for Mr Calabretta's remuneration, where she does not appear to have been party to the Loan Agreement or the settlement discussions on which Mr Calabretta relies, although she was a proper party as to other aspects of the substantive proceedings, including the relief sought as to the allegation of the transfer of cattle to her.

8. By a second affidavit dated 3 December 2021, Mr Calabretta referred to several acknowledgements of the debt owed by Mr French to HHC said to have been given by Mr French. In particular, he referred to an acknowledgment, in a conversation between Mr French and Mr Amirbeaggi, that there was no dispute as to the amount of the debt and, by extension, that it was owed to HHC, but that Mr French required a period to get the money together. He referred to a further conversation, on 16 November 2021, where Mr French is said to have said to Mr Amirbeaggi that Mr French did not dispute the debt, would take immediate steps to pay it, would raise finance over his properties, and could repay it over the next seven to fourteen days.

9. That conversation is confirmed in a contemporaneous email, sent on 16 November 2021, where Mr Amirbeaggi referred to the conversation on that day and confirmed that Mr French had acknowledged the debt to Mr Amirbeaggi's client, HHC, and wished to take immediate steps to have it repaid, and also referred to the suggested timing of that repayment. I bear in mind that Mr French suggested, in submissions, that he disputed the conversation, and that Mr Amirbeaggi had sent confirmations of conversations, after they occurred, which did not reflect what was said. It is notable, however, that Mr French sent an email on 17 November 2021 providing a personal finance statement to Mr Amirbeaggi but, notably, raised no complaint as to the accuracy of Mr Amirbeaggi's summary of the conversation on the previous day.

10. Mr Calabretta also refers, in his 3 December affidavit, to the terms of the Loan Agreement, which is included in Ex DAC-2 to Mr Calabretta's affidavit. That Loan Agreement records, in identifying the parties, that it is a loan agreement between HHC and Mr French. It refers to an acknowledgment of debt entered into between HHC as lender and Mr French who is described, in error, as the “guarantor”. The loan is in the amount of $450,000, the period of loan is recorded as being a period of twelve months from 21 May 2018, and the loan period has long expired.

11. Clause 4 of the Loan Agreement provides that no interest is payable on the loan, but the loan is to be repaid in one instalment of $450,000, the total amount lent, after twelve months or a litigation payout, whichever occurs first. The reference to a litigation payout appears to be to a successful result in certain litigation which was then being undertaken by Mr French against a third party or third parties. Clause 5 provides for a bonus payment to HHC upon successful completion of the litigation, which did not arise because the litigation was not successful. Clause 6 provides for security, being an unlimited guarantee and indemnity from Mr French, although it is not apparent that a guarantee and indemnity would have much advanced HHC's position in respect of a loan made to Mr French personally. The Loan Agreement also refers to a lien over the cattle, but that issue does not arise in the summary judgment application. There is an entire agreement clause, which confirms that the Loan Agreement contains the full terms of the agreement.

12. I have not neglected the fact that, in the signature page of the document, it describes the lender as William Harris of HHC. However, it seems to me that there is no basis for a contention that the lender is Mr Harris rather than HHC, having regard to the earlier terms of the Loan Agreement. The signature page would, in my view, be understood as doing no more than confirming Mr Harris' authority to sign the agreement on behalf of HHC, which is what he did. That is of some relevance, because of a later suggestion, to which I will refer below, that Mr Harris rather than HHC may have been the lender.

13. Returning to Mr Calabretta's affidavit 3 December 2021, he refers to further communications between Mr Amirbeaggi and Mr French concerning the terms of a suggested settlement of the claim under the Loan Agreement, and to an email dated 18 November 2021 sent by Mr Amirbeaggi to Mr French setting out the proposed terms of settlement in nine points, which is exhibited to Mr Calabretta's affidavit. Mr Calabretta observes that, by a subsequent email dated 19 November 2021, Mr French confirmed his agreement to that proposal, but then identified some "questions", or possibly comments, including that he only owned four properties which might be the subject of a security arrangement; that the previous interest rate was 5%, although the basis of that comment is not apparent; and raising a question as to the substantial amount of legal fees which Mr Amirbeaggi had foreshadowed would be payable as part of the proposed settlement. Further correspondence followed, including discussion as to how the amount of the receiver's fees and legal fees were quantified, and as to what would be done to confirm those fees.

14. On 21 November 2021, a form of orders was signed by Mr French and Ms Bakey which noted that the parties had reached terms of settlement; Mr French would enter a Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt and Forbearance with Mr Calabretta in his capacity as receiver of HHC; Mr French would provide security over his real property assets to secure payment of the debt; the parties would execute a Deed of Settlement and Release; and contemplated that a previous order made on 12 November 2021 may then be discharged. Further proposed short minutes of order that were circulated by a solicitor within Mr Amirbeaggi's office on 26 November 2021 again referred to the proposed terms of settlement. In subsequent correspondence, questions again appear to have arisen between the parties as to the basis of the very substantial amounts of costs claimed against Mr French.

15. I should add that Mr French's affidavit dated 1 April 2022 (to which I refer below) annexes further correspondence concerning the entry into the proposed settlement, which takes events further forward beyond Mr Calabretta's earlier affidavit. On 29 November 2021, Mr Amirbeaggi reported to Mr French as to the outcome of proceedings in Court on that day, and Mr French then asked Mr Amirbeaggi whether he had sent the proposed settlement deed to Mr French, because Mr French wished to obtain advice about it. On 30 November 2021, Mr Amirbeaggi foreshadowed that he would send the draft settlement deed to Mr French that afternoon, although it appears that did not occur, and Mr French again followed up on the draft settlement deed on 2 December 2021.

16. An affidavit of Ms Bakey dated 1 April 2022 then takes events further, beyond Mr Calabretta's and Mr French's affidavits. On 4 December 2021, Mr French again followed up as to the draft settlement deed and complained, with some justification, as to the fact that he had not yet received that deed, although Mr Calabretta was then seeking summary judgment to require his execution of it. Mr Amirbeaggi responded, on 5 December 2021, by sending a proposed Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt and Forbearance to Mr French and Ms Bakey for review. Presumably, that deed was sent to Ms Bakey because it sought to impose obligations upon her, although that matter was not expressly drawn to her attention by Mr Amirbeaggi in his covering email. There is a significant degree of overreach in that deed, so far as Mr Bakey was joined as a party, and that deed provided (in cl 4.1) that Ms Bakey would give security in respect of the properties and also that she must execute and deliver to HHC evidence that she had validly entered into and become bound by the terms of the security. Clause 5 in turn provided for Ms Bakey to give certain representations and warranties, in addition to Mr French, and cl 6 provided for her, as well as Mr French, to give certain acknowledgements. Clause 7 provided for Ms Bakey, as well as Mr French, to release and discharge HHC from claims against it. Again, it is not apparent the basis on which such commitments were sought from Ms Bakey, where there is no suggestion that she was party to the earlier settlement negotiations between Mr French and Mr Amirbeaggi.

17. By a further affidavit dated 8 December 2021, Mr Calabretta indicates his belief that Mr French has no defence to the Statement of Claim filed by HHC in the proceedings, and seeks orders, apparently by way of summary judgment, in respect of paragraphs 1 to 7 of the notice of motion filed on 2 December 2021. It is not clear whether HHC has filed a Statement of Claim in the proceedings, but nothing turns on that so far as the summary judgment application is concerned.

18. By an Amended Summons on 23 December 2021, Mr Calabretta appears to have further varied the relief which was sought, now seeking additional final relief, including a claim that Mr French pay his remuneration and costs fixed in the amount of $210,162.33 within seven days, which must depend on the suggested settlement, because there was no requirement that Mr French do so under the Loan Agreement, as well as an order for the payment of the principal amount lent by HHC under the Loan Agreement. He also sought a declaration that a binding and enforceable agreement had been made between Mr Calabretta, as receiver of HHC, and Mr French on 18 November 2021, and an order for specific performance of an obligation to execute that agreement in a specified form.

19. Mr Fernon now accepts that the draft Deed of Acknowledgment of Debt and Forbearance as to which an order for specific performance was then sought in that Amended Summons also overreached, so far as, among other things, it sought to impose obligations upon Ms Bakey, who was not party to the suggested settlement agreement. That overreach went somewhat further because that agreement not only provided for Mr French to make available specified properties to secure payment of the amount outstanding, which may have been warranted under the suggested settlement agreement, but also provided for Ms Bakey to consent to Mr French giving that security. It is not apparent why Ms Bakey, who was not party to the suggested settlement agreement, should have had any obligation to do so. That draft deed also required Ms Bakey to discharge HHC from any claims against it. It seems to me that that overreach could not be described, on any view, as minor, where it had a real capacity to prejudice Ms Bakey's interests, where both Mr French and Ms Bakey, so far as she was involved in the proceedings, were not then legally represented.

20. Mr French in turn reads his and Ms Bakey’s affidavits in defence of the summary judgment application, and also tenders two documents to which I will refer below. By his affidavit dated 1 April 2022, Mr French addresses a number of the issues in the wider proceedings. He gives evidence of an agreement made between him and Mr Harris, which was at first informal, which provided for funding of the litigation then brought by Mr French against third parties, which I have noted above was subsequently unsuccessful. Mr French also indicated, in oral submissions, that the original (and implicitly, informal) agreement to which he referred, was made by Mr Harris. However, importantly, Mr French also there acknowledges the fact of execution of the Loan Agreement between HHC and Mr French, which included the reference to the "bonus payment" in respect of the litigation and the lien over the cattle, to which I have referred above.

21. There is nothing in Mr French’s affidavit dated 1 April 2022 which suggests any contest as to the execution of the Loan Agreement, or as to its binding effect, or as to the fact that HHC was party to that agreement, and indeed Mr French appears there to acknowledge those matters. He does there assert that a "partnership" was also formed between Mr Harris and him with the goal being the successful litigation, but it is not apparent that any such partnership had any impact upon the terms of the Loan Agreement as between HHC and Mr French. Mr French there also refers, at some length, to the issues raised in Mr Calabretta's affidavit, particularly in respect of dealings with the cattle, but it is not necessary to address those matters where the summary judgment application does not extend to any question of dealings with the cattle.

22. Mr French also reads the affidavit of Ms Bakey dated 1 April 2022, which is relevant to the chain of correspondence in respect of the proposed settlement deed to which I referred above, but does not otherwise take matters forward.

23. Mr French also tenders (Ex F1), a letter dated 9 June 2022 to Mr French, from the trustee in bankruptcy for Mr Harris, Mr Pascoe, who records the fact that Mr Harris had stated, in his statement of affairs in the bankruptcy, that Mr French is indebted to Mr Harris pursuant to a loan agreement dated 11 April 2019 and the loan funds were due to be repaid on 21 May 2019. Mr Pascoe there expresses the view that the loan, on the basis it was made to Mr Harris, vests in Mr Pascoe as the bankrupt's trustee. Mr French also tenders (Ex F1) the certificate of appointment of Mr Pascoe as trustee in bankruptcy for Mr Harris. Those documents are tendered in support of a submission that there is doubt as to whether the loan is owed to HHC or Mr Harris. Those documents do not raise any basis for such a doubt. Mr Pascoe does no more than record that Mr Harris has asserted, in his statement of affairs, that the debt is owed to Mr Harris. However, that statement is made by reference to the Loan Agreement, and I referred above to the terms of that Loan Agreement, and to Mr French's own evidence that he ultimately executed the Loan Agreement with HHC, albeit that arose from earlier informal discussions with Mr Harris. There seems to me to be no basis to doubt that the Loan Agreement provides for a loan between HHC and Mr French in these circumstances. I also note that Mr Pascoe has taken no steps to intervene in these proceedings in order to establish any entitlement to the amount which would otherwise be held to be due by Mr French to HHC, if the summary judgment application is successful.

The parties’ submissions

24. I have referred above to the relief which is now sought, by Mr Calabretta and by HHC in the Further Amended Notice of Motion and Amended Summons filed on 1 June 2022. Mr Fernon makes detailed written submissions in support of that relief, referring to the history of the dealings between the parties, which I have addressed above, including the events prior to and surrounding the entry into the suggested settlement agreement between Mr Calabretta, and by extension HHC, and Mr French. He refers to the circumstances in which the Court may enforce a settlement agreement under s 73 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), without the need for commencement of separate proceedings. He also refers to the circumstances in which a binding legal agreement may arise, although it is contemplated that a more formal agreement will later be executed, referring to the decision in Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 and the many cases which have dealt with that matter. He also refers to the circumstances in which the Court may make an order for specific performance in respect of the execution of documents, although it is not necessary to address the case law in any detail given the conclusions that I have reached below.

25. Mr Fernon submits that, here, the suggested settlement agreement provided for the essential terms of a compromise, by which Mr French acknowledged the debt and agreed to repay it, and agreed to secure his obligations by a mortgage over several properties, and to pay the legal costs of the proceedings, as well as the costs of the receiver, in circumstances that he was then aware of the claim for the amount of those costs. Mr Fernon submits, in somewhat greater detail than I have summarised, that the Court should now make an order to give effect to execution of a settlement deed and mortgages to implement that agreement, now in its third iteration in the form now annexed to the Amended Summons filed on 1 June 2022, superseding the two earlier versions which included Ms Bakey as a party.

26. Mr Fernon alternatively submits that, irrespective of the position in respect of specific performance of the settlement agreement, the Court should give summary judgment in respect of the debt due and interest payable under the Loan Agreement, and fairly acknowledges the matters which are necessary to grant summary judgment, including the fact that a clear case is required, the Court must have a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, and the Court will not make an order for summary judgment if a defence exists with a real prospect of success. Mr Fernon submits, on that basis, that an order for summary judgment should at least be made in respect of the debt due under the Loan Agreement and interest on it.

27. By submissions dated 29 May 2022, reply submissions dated 1 June 2022, and further oral submissions made before me, Mr French in turn addressed several issues, some of which extended beyond the issues which are the subject of the summary judgment application. He refers to the steps which were taken in respect of the earlier conduct of the proceedings, and to a range of aspects of constitutional law and wider human rights. It is not apparent to me that either the Constitution or any fundamental principle of human rights would be infringed by granting summary judgment in respect of a debt due under a loan agreement, if there is no defence to the claim under the agreement. He also refers to the provision for notices to the Attorneys-General under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and suggests that proceedings should be adjourned so that notice can be provided to them. Again, it is not apparent to me that the Attorneys-General are likely to have any significant constitutional interest in the question whether summary judgment is given on a debt due under a loan agreement, if no defence is available.

28. By reply submissions dated 1 June 2022, Mr French in turn refers to the changes which he believes have occurred in the case, since it was first initiated. He submits that it is difficult to follow those changes. Although there have been changes in the form of settlement agreement which has been sought by Mr Calabretta, Mr Calabretta has at all times sought judgment for the debt and interest in favour of HHC, although he has only recently joined HHC to perfect that relief, and the Loan Agreement is a straightforward document.

29. Mr French also submits that there is no binding agreement between HHC, or possibly Mr Calabretta, and him. That submission is presumably directed to the settlement agreement, and need not be determined given the conclusions that I reach on other grounds. Plainly, there is a binding agreement between HHC and Mr French in respect of the Loan Agreement, which has been acknowledged by Mr French on several occasions in the evidence to which I have referred above. Mr French also indicates that he is sending notices under s 78A of the Judiciary Act, a matter to which I have referred above. I am not satisfied that such notices are necessary since the proceedings involve a straightforward application for summary judgment, at least in respect of the loan, and no constitutional issue arises in that respect. He also refers to the demand by the "court appointed receiver," which appears to be a reference to Mr Pascoe in his capacity as trustee in bankruptcy for Mr Harris, for payment of $450,000, but I have referred to the fragile basis of that demand above.

Determination

30. With this lengthy history, I now turn to the determination of the summary judgment application. As I have noted, summary judgment is sought under r 13.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), which is available where there is evidence of facts on which a claim or part of a claim is made and evidence given by a plaintiff or a responsible person of a belief that the defendant has no defence to the claim or part of the claim. I have referred to Mr Calabretta's evidence to that effect above. Where the requirements for summary judgment under UCPR r 13.1 are satisfied, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff as the case requires. I recognise, that Mr Fernon conceded in submissions, that that is a power to be exercised with care, and only where there is no real question to be tried by way of defence, and would not be open to be exercised if there was a real question of fact or law to be determined.

31. I am satisfied that, in the relevant circumstances, the Court could not grant summary judgment in respect of the relief sought in prayers 9 and 10 of the Amended Summons, in its most recent form, which seeks a declaration as to the entry into a legally binding settlement agreement between Mr Calabretta and Mr French, or specific performance of that agreement.

32. It seems to me that there is a triable issue as to the terms of the alleged settlement, where Mr French denies that the settlement was reached, or at least contends that it was reached in circumstances that it may have involved other commitments by Mr Amirbeaggi, including a suggestion that Mr Amirbeaggi would assist in providing funding, or procuring funders, for the payments to be made by Mr French under that agreement. It is not necessary to decide that issue, where its existence is sufficient to preclude an order for summary judgment on that basis.

33. Both the making of a declaration, and an order for specific performance, also involve the exercise of a judicial discretion. I have referred above to the circumstances in which Mr Calabretta, or at least his legal representatives, significantly overreached in circulating draft documents to give effect to the suggested settlement, and they did so in circumstances where they were dealing with parties that were not legally represented. It seems to me that, in those circumstances, potential defences arise, including at least the prospect that that conduct was unconscionable, or that Mr Calabretta’s and HHC’s delay in entering into a settlement deed, arising from the fact that the documents circulated by Mr Calabretta's legal representatives did not accurately reflect the alleged agreement, have prejudiced Mr French and Ms Bakey, who are now asked to execute agreements months after the original settlement agreement is said to have been agreed. It seems to me that, as a matter of the Court's exercise of a judicial discretion, there is plainly an arguable defence that it should not make the declarations sought, or an order for specific performance, where the documents that were first circulated by Mr Calabretta's legal representatives did not fairly represent the settlement agreement that was said to have been formed, and where substantial delay has resulted from those matters.

34. I am, however, satisfied that no defence is arguable in respect of the debt due to HHC under the Loan Agreement, and its entitlement to interest, and that it should have summary judgment in respect of the amount of the loan and interest.

35. There is no basis for summary judgment in terms of prayer 4 of the Amended Summons, which seeks an order that Mr French pay Mr Calabretta or HHC the judgment debt within seven days of judgment being given. Obviously enough, when granting a monetary judgment, the Court does not make mandatory orders for payment, actionable in contempt, including if the party against whom the order is made is incapable of making payment because he or she has insufficient assets to do so. It will be open to HHC, or Mr Calabretta, to take steps to enforce the money judgment in favour of HHC in the ordinary ways in which monetary judgments are enforceable.

36. There is also no basis for summary judgment in respect of an order that Mr French pay Mr Calabretta his remuneration and costs, since there is no basis for that order under the Loan Agreement, and no basis for summary judgment has been established in respect of the settlement agreement. I proceed on the basis, which was the basis on which Mr Calabretta advanced the application, that the determination of the summary judgment application, to the extent that Mr Calabretta has been partly successful in it, will resolve all other issues in the proceedings.

37. Finally, I am not satisfied that there is any basis for an order that Mr French pay Mr Calabretta's costs of this application, on an indemnity basis or otherwise, where there have been multiple amendments in the course of the application, and where Mr Calabretta has only succeeded in respect of a narrow and straightforward application, having pursued a wide and very complex one. On that basis, there will be no order as to the costs of the application.

Orders

38. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. Judgment in favour of Harris Health Care Pty Ltd (“HHC”) in the amount of $450,000 against Mr Andrew Boyd French.

2. Order that Mr French pay HHC interest on the judgment pursuant to s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) calculated from the date the debt accrued on 20 May 2019.

3. There be no order as to the costs of the Further Amended Notice of Motion or the proceedings.

4. The proceedings otherwise be dismissed.

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Decision last updated: 12 July 2022