Dojas v TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      DOJAS V. TCN CHANNEL NINE PTY. LIMITED [2001]  NSWCA 398

FILE NUMBER(S):
40028/01

HEARING DATE(S):               31 October 2001

JUDGMENT DATE: 12/11/2001

PARTIES:
Ghada Dojas - claimant
TCN Channel Nine Pty. Limited - opponent

JUDGMENT OF:       Giles JA Heydon JA Hodgson JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          CLD 20182/00

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Kirby J

COUNSEL:
Mr. C. Evatt with Mr. Henness for claimant
Mr. T. Blackburn with Ms. C. King for opponent

SOLICITORS:
Greg Walsh & Co., Chester Hill for claimant
Gilbert & Tobin, Sydney for opponent

CATCHWORDS:
DEFAMATION - Identification - Televised image of plaintiff - Whether such as reasonably to lead persons acquainted with plaintiff to believe it was of the plaintiff - Jury answers "No" - Leave to appeal sought - Whether question appropriate - Whether direction confusing.  D.

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Leave to appeal refused with costs.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40028/01
CLD 20182/00

GILES JA
HEYDON JA
HODGSON JA

Monday 12th November 2001.

DOJAS  V.  TCN CHANNEL NINE PTY. LIMITED
Judgment

  1. GILES JA:  I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Hodgson JA in draft. 

  2. I agree with his Honour’s reasons in relation to amendment of the grounds of appeal and the grounds other than ground 3A.

  3. I respectfully do not share his Honour’s inclination to think that the first additional direction was potentially confusing.  That the hypothetical identification by persons acquainted with the plaintiff had to be reasonable in the circumstances was stated in the questions and was repeated in the directions concerning the identifications by the witnesses.  The first additional direction was plainly enough directed to that matter, as indicated by the reference to applying an objective test.  The complaint then made by counsel for the plaintiff is not entirely clear, but was not that the additional direction was confusing.  In those circumstances, leave to appeal is not appropriate.

  4. If this be incorrect, the second additional direction really did not correct the potential for confusion but counsel for the plaintiff made no further complaint.  Leave to appeal would not be appropriate.

  5. I agree with the orders proposed.

  6. HEYDON JA:  I agree with the reasons of Hodgson JA.

  7. HODGSON JA:  The claimant Ghada Dojas brought proceedings for defamation against the opponent TCN Channel Nine Pty. Limited in respect of a program and promotions of that program telecast by the opponent.  The telecasts depicted scenes secretly filmed in the rooms of a psychiatrist Dr. Osman Ali, and showed images of Dr. Ali and various female patients, embracing, fondling and kissing.  The claimant was not named in the telecast, but she alleged that one of the patients shown was her, and that the telecasts were defamatory of her. 

  8. A trial pursuant to s.7A of the Defamation Act was heard by Kirby J and a jury.  At that trial, there were three issues:  broadly stated, they were (1) was the claimant identified by the…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWCA 398
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from a defamation action brought by the plaintiff, Dojas, against TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited. The dispute centred on whether a televised image of the plaintiff was of such a nature that persons acquainted with him could reasonably believe it depicted him. The jury had answered this question in the negative. Leave to appeal was sought on grounds including the appropriateness of the identification question and the clarity of the judge's directions to the jury.

The court was required to determine whether the trial judge's directions on the issue of identification were legally erroneous or confusing. Specifically, the court considered whether the jury's finding that the televised image did not reasonably identify the plaintiff was perverse, and whether the directions given adequately explained the legal test for identification in the context of a visual image. The court also had to consider the appropriate standard for identification, particularly concerning the degree of acquaintance required for a person to reasonably identify the plaintiff from a visual depiction.

The court found no error of law in the directions given. It reasoned that even if the jury accepted the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses that they believed the person depicted was the plaintiff for specific reasons, this did not necessarily mean the broadcast material was adequate for persons acquainted with the plaintiff to reasonably form that belief. The jury could have concluded that the witnesses, while honest, had jumped to a conclusion based on insufficient material. The court also noted that it would not be perverse for the jury to reach such a view, or to disbelieve the witnesses. Regarding the identification test, the court held that if a visual image can be reasonably identified as being of the plaintiff by even a few people who know the plaintiff extremely well, and publication was made to at least one such person, this would be sufficient identification for the purposes of defamation law.

Leave to appeal was refused with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal refused with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr. Blackburn for the opponent opposed the amendments. He submitted that Kirby J had given an impeccable direction on identification in the last paragraph dealing with identification in the main summing up. He submitted that the first additional direction was not erroneous or confusing; and that even if it had been, it was corrected by the second additional direction. After the second direction, Counsel for the claimant had raised no further objection or comment. DECISION In my opinion, there was no error of law in the direction complained about. If the jury fully accepted the evidence of the three witnesses called for the claimant on identification, this meant that they accepted the following propositions:(1)each witness believed that the person depicted was the claimant;(2)each witness had the reasons for that belief given by that witness; and(3)the person depicted was in fact the claimant.There could be some question as to whether the third proposition was involved in acceptance of the witnesses’ evidence: however, I will assume in the claimant’s favour that it was. Those three propositions together are not inconsistent with the view that the material telecast and the reasons given by the witnesses were not in fact adequate for persons acquainted with the claimant reasonably to have formed the belief which these witnesses formed. To put the same thing another way, the jury could have come to the view, having seen the material which was broadcast, that although the witnesses did reach a correct belief as to the identity of the person depicted, and did so honestly, what they did was nevertheless to jump to a conclusion on the basis of material not reasonably adequate to justify that conclusion. Furthermore, having seen the material myself, it is my view that it would not be perverse for the jury to reach such a view, or indeed not to accept the witnesses’ evidence; and accordingly that the ground of perversity sought to be added could not succeed. It was for that reason that I took the view that leave to add that ground should be refused. The ground relating to causing confusion has more substance, and in any event, may be implicit in the existing grounds 3 to 6. For that reason, I took the view that leave should be given to add that ground. I accept Mr. Evatt’s submission that the approach that has been taken in previous cases in relation to words which might or might not be taken as referring to the plaintiff, as in Canavan and Knupffer and Morgan, may not be the best approach in a case where there is a visual image which is in fact an image of the plaintiff, and the only issue on identification is whether the image conveys enough information for persons acquainted with the plaintiff reasonably to reach the correct conclusion that it is the plaintiff who is depicted. When there is a question of recognition of a plaintiff from a visual image rather than from words, it is not possible adequately to put into words what are the matters known by people acquainted with the plaintiff that enable them to identify the plaintiff from an image. Furthermore, mere acquaintance with a plaintiff is not really an adequate description of the qualification of the persons who must reasonably be able to identify the plaintiff. There are degrees of acquaintance, and plainly people who know a plaintiff very well indeed may reasonably identify that plaintiff from an image which would be inadequate for such identification by other persons who are merely acquainted with the plaintiff. Persons who know a plaintiff very well indeed may be the very persons in relation to whom the plaintiff’s reputation is most precious to the plaintiff; and in my opinion, the law of defamation does protect a plaintiff’s reputation with such people. Accordingly, in my opinion where a visual image of a plaintiff is such that it can reasonably be identified as being of the plaintiff by even a very few people who know the plaintiff extremely well, albeit not by others who are mere acquaintances, and there has been publication to at least one such person, that is sufficient identification.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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