DOE18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DOE18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1596

Appeal from: DOE18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3317
File number: NSD 2212 of 2018
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 30 September 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal against judgment of Federal Circuit Court – whether Immigration Assessment Authority permitted to consider new information  – meaning of “personal information” – whether Authority considered appellant’s claim that at risk of arrest and detention for a defined period  – whether unreasonable for Authority to fail to get more information from appellant – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 473DD and 473EC

Privacy Act1988 (Cth) s 2A, 6 and 13, Schedule 1

Cases cited:

Certain Lloyd Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 148

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67; [2014] FCAFC 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

MZYTS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 230 FCR 431

Plaintiff M174 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600; [2018] HCA 16

Date of hearing: 23 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Zipser
Solicitor for the Appellant: Stamford Law Firm
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 2212 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DOE18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The decision of the second respondent made on 12 June 2018 is quashed.

3.The second respondent must consider the first respondent’s referral according to law.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. This is an appeal against a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 15 November 2018.  The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority). The Authority had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Subclass 790) Visa (“SHEV”). 

    The appellant’s claims for protection

  2. The appellant arrived in Australia on 31 October 2012 from Iran.  On 4 November 2015, he applied for a SHEV. 

  3. The appellant claimed to fear harm in Iran on the basis of his race,…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1596
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of DOE18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, an Iraqi national of Kurdish origin, sought a protection visa from Australia, which was denied. The appellant's appeal against the refusal of his application for a protection visa was heard by the Federal Circuit Court, and subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) was permitted to consider new information that was submitted after the delegate's decision, and whether the IAA unreasonably failed to obtain further information from the appellant.

The appellant argued that the IAA should have considered his claim that he was at risk of arrest and detention for a defined period if returned to Iraq. The court examined the meaning of "personal information" and whether the IAA was permitted to consider the new information provided. The appellant contended that the IAA unreasonably failed to get more information from him. The court held that the IAA was not permitted to consider the new information provided by the appellant as it did not satisfy the criteria of being personal information and was not relevant to the appellant's case. However, the court found that it was unreasonable for the IAA to fail to obtain further information from the appellant regarding his claim that he was at risk of arrest and detention for a defined period if returned to Iraq.

The court allowed the appeal and quashed the decision of the IAA. The court ordered that the IAA must reconsider the appellant's referral according to law. The appellant was also awarded costs for the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. This decision highlights the importance of providing relevant and personal information when making an application for a protection visa and the need for the IAA to consider all relevant information when making a decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The decision of the second respondent made on 12 June 2018 is quashed.

3. The second respondent must consider the first respondent’s referral according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 August 2017, a delegate of the Minister made the decision refusing to grant the appellant a SHEV. The Authority’s decision On 28 August 2017, the appellant’s matter was referred to the Authority. The appellant’s legal representative provided a submission to the Authority on 25 September 2017. That submission, inter alia, quoted lengthy extracts from a previous decision made by the Authority concerning an unidentified Faili Kurd. In its decision-record published on 12 June 2018, the Authority began by considering whether it was permitted to have regard to the extracts from the previous decision. The Authority said:5.Additionally, the submission makes reference to a previous IAA decision which has been published on the IAA website. The decision is dated prior to the delegate’s decision. No reasons have been provided as to why this new information either could not have been provided before the date of the delegate’s decision or why it should be considered credible personal information when the decision is de-identified. There is no information before me to indicate the applicant in the previous IAA decision is in any way related to the applicant in this matter. The applicant has not satisfied me that s.473DD(b) is met with regard to the new information provided. Further, the applicant and his representative had already been provided with ample opportunity to provide information on all the matters in question, and had been made aware by the delegate that he would have regard to any information which was provided to him before a decision was made. The Authority then considered the merits of the appellant’s application. The Authority accepted much of the appellant’s evidence. It accepted that the appellant was born in Iraq, that his country of former habitual residence was Iran and that he was of Kurdish ethnicity. The Authority accepted that the appellant was a registered Iraqi Kurdish refugee prior to his departure from Iran in December 2012, and that he would be an unregistered, undocumented, stateless person if he were returned to Iran. Under the heading, “Did the applicant reclaim his Iraqi citizenship?”, the Authority considered whether the appellant had already regained or, could regain, Iraqi citizenship. The Authority stated:35.DFAT advises that a legal framework is in place in Iraq for Faili Kurds to reclaim their citizenship. Article 18 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution provides that anyone born to an Iraqi father or Iraqi mother shall be considered an Iraqi. It further provides that anyone who has had their Iraqi citizenship withdrawn has the right to demand its reinstatement. The Iraqi Nationality Law of 2006 provides for the restoration of citizenship to Iraqis whose citizenship was revoked. Faili Kurd representatives told DFAT in early 2014 that officials are now generally sympathetic to their claims for citizenship, and that in cases where all the necessary documentation was held, any Faili Kurd who wanted to, could regain citizenship. DFAT provides further information about the process which it describes as currently “a difficult and lengthy’ one, but assesses that reclaiming Iraqi citizenship is possible for the majority of Faili Kurds.36.The applicant claims that he was born in Wasit, part of the southern governorates of Iraq on the border with Iran. Country information confirms that this is an area where Shia Faili Kurds reside. The applicant has consistently claimed that his parents were both born in Iraq, and I consider it reasonable to assume that they were Iraqi citizens prior to their departure in 1980. I had regard to various sources which have reported that Faili Kurds have been returning to Iraq since 2003 and many have been able to reclaim their Iraqi citizenship, particularly since 2006 when the Iraqi government actively encouraged Faili Kurds to return and reclaim their citizenship. I am therefore satisfied that it is possible that the applicant could or already has regained his Iraqi citizenship.…..38.Therefore, for the purposes of assessing the applicant’s claim for protection, I am satisfied that the applicant’s former habitual country of residence is Iran and Iran is the receiving country in his case. However, I have taken into account the above country information in respect of the applicant’s claim that he fears deportation to Iraq should he be returned to Iran now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.(Underlining added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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