DOD v Commissioner of Victims Rights

[2018] NSWCATAD 249

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	DOD v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2018] NSWCATAD 249
Hearing dates:	5 October 2018
Date of orders:	24 October 2018
Decision date:	24 October 2018
Jurisdiction:	Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Before:	M Riordan, Senior Member
Decision:	Pursuant to s 63 (3) (a) of the ADR Act the review decision dated 24 July 2018 is affirmed.
Catchwords:	Victims Rights and Support – administrative review –act of violence – whether the arrest of the applicant was lawful – whether the discontinuance of the arrest was lawful - no jurisdiction to review decisions regarding financial assistance for immediate needs or economic loss – no entitlement to a recognition payment
Legislation Cited:	Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) Police Act 1990 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182 CIC Insurance Limited v Bankstown Football Club Limited (1997) 187 CLR 384 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 Clyne v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265 Dowse v State of New South Wales (2012) 226 A Crim R 36 Jones v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 189 FCR 390 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569 Robinson v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 231 Stephen Edward Foster v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 550 SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 936 Sirakas v Alstom Limited & Ors [2012] NSWCA 203 Thompson v Vincent (2005) 153 A Crim R 577 Vikramdeep Singh v Department of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2006) 164 A Crim R 284 Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278 Wilson v State of New South Wales (2010) 278 ALR 74 Wright v Court (1825) 107 ER 1182 Zaravinos v State of New South Wales; State of New South Wales & Ors v Zaravinos (2004) 62 NSWLR 58
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	DOD (Applicant) Commissioner of Victims Rights (Respondent)
Representation:	Solicitors: DOD (Applicant in person) S Sabesan, Victims Services (Respondent)
File Number(s):	2018/00246484
Publication restriction:	A Non-Publication Order is made under section 64 (1) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) in respect of the names of private individuals, and other information which might identify them.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Introduction

1. This case involves a claim for victims support in the form of counselling, financial assistance and a recognition payment that was made by the applicant, who is known by the pseudonym DOD, upon the Commissioner of Victims Rights (the Commissioner). It was made under the provisions of the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (‘the Act”) and was received by the Commissioner on 2 October 2013.

2. DOD alleges that he was the primary victim of an act of violence that occurred on 13 December 2012, at Yagoona NSW, and that was assaulted by two uniformed police officers. He alleges that the police officers breached their duty of care, unlawfully arrested him and assaulted him, causing him to suffer a “broken ankle, handcuffing and spreading blood over body” and a psychological injury.

3. DOD’s application also indicates that he is suing the State of New South Wales in the District Court of NSW and has also made a claim under Total and Permanent Disability Insurance in relation to these injuries.

4. On 1 June 2017, an Assessor (Client Claims) determined that on the balance of probabilities, the evidence does not establish that DOD was the primary victim of an act of violence and dismissed the application.

5. On 2 June 2017, the Commissioner emailed a copy of the Notice of Decision to DOD under cover of a letter dated 1 June 2017.

6. On 5 June 2017, DOD sent an email to the Commissioner in which he requested an internal review of that decision and submitted further evidence, namely: (1) a further statement; (2) a report from his General Practitioner; and (3) a HESTA Permanent Incapacity form.

7. The Commissioner acknowledged receipt of the request for review by letter to DOD dated 14 June 2017, which was emailed to DOD.

8. On 17 July 2017, the Senior Assessor deferred the review decision because further information was required regarding DOD’s civil proceedings against NSW police and his TPD insurance claim. The decision was deferred until 25 May 2018.

9. On 18 July 2017, the Commissioner emailed a copy of the Notice of Deferral Decision to DOD and a hard copy was posted to him on 18 July 2017.

10. On 19 July 2017, the Commissioner wrote to NSW Police asking whether it had any record of DOD attending Dapto Police Station to report the incident on 13 December 2012.

11. On 20 July 2017, DOD sent a letter to the Commissioner by email, in which he stated that his claim against NSW police was listed for hearing on 26 February 2018.

12. On 15 August 2018, Henry Davis York, the Law Firm representing NSW Police, responded to the Commissioner’s letter dated 19 July 2017, providing copies of the statement of claim and defence. However, they declined to produce any statements as these were prepared as part of an internal investigation and they were privileged under s 170 of the Police Act 1990.

13. On 9 October 2017, the Senior Assessor further deferred the review decision pending the outcome of the civil proceedings and observed that the release of any further relevant information after that hearing may assist in determining the review. On 11 October 2017, the Commissioner emailed a copy of the Notice of Deferral to DOD.

14. On 2 March 2018, the Commissioner advised DOD advising that the review was listed for determination before the Senior Assessor on the first available date on or after 11 June 2018 and that any submissions, or request for an extension of time, should be received by 11 June 2018. However, on 5 June 2018, the Commissioner asked DOD to advise the outcome of the civil proceedings and DOD replied that those proceedings had been further adjourned to 4th March 2019. He also alleged he was suffering financial hardship and requested urgent financial relief submitted copies of the transcripts of the 000 phone calls that were made on 13 December 2012.

15. On 24 July 2018, the Senior Assessor issued a Notice of Review Decision, which affirmed the decision at first instance. The Senior Assessor held that on the face of the narrative to the COPS Event report, it was not apparent that the police officers’ conduct breached their powers under the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA), which include powers that, where necessary, allow them to engage in conduct of a violent nature that might otherwise be considered a criminal offence. It also suggested that DOD engaged in violent conduct that could be considered criminally offensive. The Senior Assessor concluded that if an act of violence was established on the balance of probabilities, the evidence raises potential issues regarding s 44 (1) of the Act regarding contributory behaviour that may have resulted in the injuries that DOD sustained.

16. On 30 July 2018, the Commissioner posted a copy of the review decision was posted to DOD.

17. On 10 August 2018, DOD applied for administrative review of the Senior Assessor’s decision on the following grounds:

We are victims of corruption.

Justice Victims Services was unable to investigate the matter.

Please investigate and help us! We wish to seek financial support for our mum – (name provided), my wife – (name provided) and myself.

We want social justice.

18. This Tribunal’s powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (‘the ADR Act’), which provides:

(1)   In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(a)   any relevant factual material,

(b)   any applicable written or unwritten law.

(2)   For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

(3)   In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:

(a)   to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or

(b)   to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or

(c)   to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or

(d)   to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

The issues

19. I am required to determine the following issues:

1. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the application?

2. Was the application lodged within time?

3. Was DOD the primary victim of an act of violence under ss 19 and 20 of the Act?

4. Are there any factors under s 44 of the Act that justify a decision to not approve victims support or to reduce the amount of support that is approved? and

5. What amount of victims support should be awarded to DOD?

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the application?

20. This Tribunal has jurisdiction to administratively review a decision by the Commissioner regarding the claim for a recognition payment under s 35 of the Act, but it lacks power to review decisions regarding claims for financial assistance for immediate needs or financial assistance for economic loss.

21. To the extent that DOD’s application seeks administrative review of financial assistance claims, the application is dismissed.

Was the application lodged within time?

22. The application indicates that DOD was notified of the review decision on 30 July 2018. Therefore, the current application has been lodged within time.

Was DOD the primary victim of an act of violence?

23. DOD alleges that he was the primary victim of an act of violence, being an assault that was perpetrated by unfirmed police officers. He alleges that they “breached their duty of care”, unlawfully arrested him and assaulted him and caused him to suffer a “broken ankle, handcuffing and spreading blood over body”.

24. Section 19 (1) of the Act defines act of violence as, “an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons: (a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and (b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and (c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.” S 20 of the Act defines primary victim as, “a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act.”

25. There is no dispute that DOD suffered a fractured ankle as a direct result of the incident on 13 December 2012. The evidence also indicates that he suffered a psychological injury, which the Commissioner has not addressed in her decisions to date and submissions in these proceedings. I have therefore assumed that this injury is not disputed. However, DOD is only eligible for victims support if his injuries resulted from an act of violence.

26. In determining this issue, I have considered the evidence that was before the Commissioner, which is contained in the documents produced under s 58 of the ADR Act, as well as the documents that DOD lodged in support of the current application.

27. I conducted a Directions Hearing in this matter on 17 September 2018, at which DOD appeared in person by telephone and Ms Martin appeared for the Commissioner. DOD stated that his Mother-in-Law wished to attend the hearing and as she does not speak English he requested that an interpreter attend to assist her to understanding what was happening. He sought leave to participate in the hearing by telephone and stated that he did not wish to obtain and lodge any further evidence in support of his application. I listed the matter for hearing on 5 October 2018 and granted DOD leave to participate in the hearing by telephone.

28. At the hearing on 5 October 2018, DOD participated in by telephone, Ms Sabesan appeared for the Commissioner and DOD’s Mother-in-Law was present in the hearing room, accompanied by a Vietnamese interpreter. DOD did not apply to call any oral evidence from his Mother-in-Law and the matter proceeded based upon the evidence that had been filed and submissions.

29. There is a significant dispute in this matter regarding the accuracy and veracity of the COPS Event report dated 13 December 2012. As a result, in determining this dispute, I consider it necessary to set out both the narrative of that report and DOD’s evidence in response.

COPS Event Report

30. The narrative of the COPS Event Report states:

The victim in this matter is a builder who is currently working on a construction site next to the (address provided) location. Prior to this the victim claims that he had permission from the female occupant of (address provided) to park his vehicle in the driveway of those premises whilst it was unoccupied.

On this date the victim did indeed park his vehicle in that driveway believing that he still had permission to leave his vehicle there while he undertook construction next door. About 6:00pm the victim attempted to remove his vehicle and return home when he noticed that another vehicle (licence plate provided) was parked hard up behind his own vehicle preventing his exiting. Owing to the shape of the driveway being a battle axe the victim was unable by any other means to remove his vehicle without damaging his or other property.

The victim knocked on the door of (the address) and was answered by the POI (DOD), who instantly became very abusive towards the victim. The victim requested that the POI move his vehicle so that he could remove his own but the POI refused angrily. The victim claims that during this time the POI threatened to use a knife against the victim and threatened to kill him, although at no time was the POI seen to wield a knife.

Both parties have contacted Police several times throughout the space of about 6 hours. The author acknowledged the job but was unable to attend speedily owing to an onerous workload. The author contacted the POI and advised that there would be a delay, to which the POI repeated that the situation was in his opinion “very dangerous” and refused to answer further questions, demanding that police attend quickly.

The author contacted the victim who advised police that he was waiting for hours for the POI to allow him to remove his vehicle from the premises. He claimed that the POI’s aggression toward him had resulted in a female occupant within screaming out to the POI and a younger female also. He stated that he had walked away from the scene fearing a violent confrontation and would wait for police to attend prior to returning.

The author contacted the POI and advised that if he removed his vehicle from the driveway the victim would have no further reason to remain at the property, however the POI simply demanded that police attend and terminated the call.

The author called the POI several times to try and resolve the situation reasonably and calmly, but the POI responded with hostility towards him, terminating calls and making further that police attend. The author advised the POI by phone that if the matter should not be resolved by the time the police attendance the POI would be the subject of a police investigation regarding the threats he allegedly issued to kill the victim, which might result in his own arrest. At this time the POI again terminated the call.

Eventually police were released for other duties and attended the scene. The author saw that the victim’s vehicle was effectively parked in with no other means of being removed as the POI’s vehicle had completely blocked all exit.

Police knocked on the door and introduced themselves. The POI answered the door and was seen to be highly aggravated. The author asked the POI to move his own vehicle so that the other vehicle could be removed from the driveway to which the POI replied “No. No. No. No. The car stays here”.

The POI would not listen to reason and despite the author’s attempts to peacefully negotiate the removal of the victim’s vehicle the POI simply yelled over the top of the officer’s voice. The author turned to the female occupants to elicit help in removing the vehicle, to which the POI physically took hold of the author’s appointment belt by the handcuff holder. The author issued a firm warning to the POI to not touch him, which resulted in the POI letting go. The POI then began yelling in another language towards the female occupants which had the result of causing them to withdraw into the inner rooms of the premises.

Fearing that the situation was deteriorating rapidly, and now finding merit in the allegations raised by the victim in relation to the POI’s behaviour, the author advised the POI that he was now under arrest on suspicion of intimidation. He was cautioned with all safeguards to section 201 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 applied and adhered to. The POI immediately took a step back and the author seized upon the POI’s wrists, who reacted by twisting his torso away. However, he was quickly restrained and led into the rear of the waiting police caged vehicle, being resisted every step of the way.

The POI was searched prior to being placed into the caged section, which resulted in the keys to the POI’s vehicle being located. When the POI saw that the keys were in the author’s hand the POI began yelling loudly in another language towards the house, which resulted in the female occupants exiting the front and outside the premises and beginning to wail and scream uncontrollably.

The author offered the keys to either female occupant to remove the vehicle, however they both declined. The author thus entered the vehicle and without incident reversed out of the driveway and parked it directly outside the premises sufficient to allow the victim’s vehicle to be removed. The victim removed his vehicle with police remaining nearby to prevent a breach of the peace, parking it onto the street.

The victim was asked if he wished to provide a statement to police in relation to this matter. Having regard to the proactive outcome the victim himself at the disposal of police but apologised that he was very tired, having had to wait at the scene for hours as a result of the POI’s actions. He stated that if police requested at a later stage he would happily provide a statement.

The victim left the location and police advised the POI was advised that he was no longer under arrest and charges would not be laid on this date. With no other reason to detain him and no further breaches of the peace occurring, the POI was advised that he was free to leave. The POI replied “No, I’m staying here, you take me to the station and charge me.” The author said “Get out of the car”, to which the POI said “No.”

The author attempted to physically remove the POI from the rear of the caged vehicle, but the POI snatched his hands away causing a bleeding injury to the author as a result of being cut by the handcuffs.

The author took hold of the POI by the clothes and right arm and dragged him from the police vehicle, with the POI dropping his weight to the roadway. The POI was pulled onto the footpath and directed to sit down so that the handcuffs could be removed. The POI refused, and as such the author used a “take-down” manoeuvre to gently place the POI on the footpath.

About this time the author noticed that he had a freely bleeding 1cm laceration to his right thumb. The POI yelled out in another language towards the female occupants who then ran towards police also yelling in another language. They were directed to “get back”, with police drawing a canister of OC spray. This had the desired effect of keeping the females at bay while the POI was able to be un-handcuffed.

With the handcuffs removed police attempted to leave the area but were hampered by the POI and the females who stood in front of police, opened the police passenger door, and stood in front of the police vehicle as it attempted to leave. As the author was suffering an injury which, and the situation having deteriorated due to the POI’s incitement, hostility and aggression, police disengaged tactically to consider other options and seek medical attention.

The POI was at all times wholly unreasonable and displayed a complete disregard towards police authority. The author will seek to determine what charges if any are to be laid in relation to this matter. Warnings added to vehicle location and POI.

Sergeant Campton appraised. Minor cut to thumb of author treated with first aid bandage.

31. DOD alleges that the COPS Event report “is all lies” and he lodged his own version of what occurred in a document headed “Chronology”. He alleges that the aggressor in the incident on 13 December 2012 was “the Neighbour”, but during the hearing he stated that he did not know whether that person was “the neighbour” or a person doing building work on the neighbouring property. I note that he referred to the other party alternatively as “the neighbour” and “the trespasser”, but for the purposes of this decision I have described them as “the other party”.

32. DOD alleges before the incident on 13 December 2012, the other party asked his Mother-in-Law if he could use water from her property. She allowed him to use it, but he left the tap running and she then revoked her permission. About two weeks later, at around 9pm, he asked “whether he may use our electricity”, but they refused. He stated, “…He was upsetting and wanted to attack us on that night, by asking: “Can you talk to me outside?” We replied: “if you don’t leave, we have to call police”. Then he left.” About one month later, the other party put up a new fence and “destroyed the concrete” on their side of the fence and it “encroached a little bit” onto their land, but they did not say anything to him because they were “so scared of him.” He stated, “However, he was still upsetting with us. Because he believed that we had made a complaint, which we had not, to the council about the problem, with the fence. Or he might want us to move elsewhere.”

33. On 13 December 2012, DOD’s fiancée telephoned him and asked him to come to her house urgently and when he arrived, he saw a car parked, “in the way that was very intimidating, trespassing, and blocked her front door”. He stated:

I was trying to ask the driver (or trespasser) to remove his car from our property.

I came to this person and just asked politely “is this your car?” this person was immediately angry and disregarded for the rights of others.

He aggressively approached to me and said, “you upset?” as he was coming toward me.

I said, “I want you to remove your car otherwise I call the cop!”

He defied “call the cop! call the cop!”

I was panicky and ran into the house and initiated a call to 000 at 7:53pm.

The Operator had asked for what was happening… and advised us to stay indoors, lock the doors and wait for them.

At 9:01pm as the aforementioned trespasser was coming toward us and knocking on our door viciously, we were so scared, thought this could be a life-threatening situation and then called 000 again and asked for protection urgently due to fear of the situation getting worse.

At 9:12pm the operator called and advised that as they were busy and had no car available but they will send someone to us for help as soon as possible.

At 10:40pm the trespasser came and banged violently on our door as he had been trying to break our door. We’d had to call 000 again.

At 10:45 to 11:01 pm, several blocked callers called our mobile phone to assess the situation. We requested that we need police’s presence and help urgently and I also mentioned that I need a rest as I had had a full list of patients to serve … We requested the police’s presence and insisted for an urgent family protection.

Sometime later on, the trespasser knocked on the door and assured that police won’t come and he then asked us to talk to the police via his mobile phone.

At 11:58pm, he came again and jumped into his car. He turned on his car’s engine and head light and he accelerated the car as he tried to run us over! We were too terrified by his behaviour. We called 000 again.

At 00:04am 14 December 2012, someone said on the phone that he was a police and ordering us to go out and remove our car. We were not sure that the order from the police or from others. We just dared not to do so and requested police’s presence for help.

The man on the phone said that he swears to God that he will come and arrest us. Although he has not been at our premises and not understanding the dangerous circumstances that we have been going through. As the reasons mentioned earlier, we could not do that. We had to follow the previous police’s advice and also much terrified about the trespasser’s behaviours. Therefore we could not go out!

We had a wedding rehearsal on that night. I wanted to go home early for a rest: we again requested the police’s presence urgently.

Prior to police’s arrival, we had been waiting too long! The longer it took the danger it might become. Our family could have been killed by the neighbour on that night…

Around 1:00am, 2 police officers came and knocked on the door, ordered us to remove the car without asking for what had been happening – since our mum does not speak English, I tried to help our Mum to report to the police for what was happening and we requested police to make a report.

When the police arrival, they saw the way to which the car had been parking. It had blocked our front door. They should be seen clearly where the source of the problem was. However, regardless, they had aimed at us, as the people who caused the trouble, and arrested me instead!

Police officers did not listen and just handcuffed me, the entire arresting process lasting about 10 seconds, without telling us who they were and the reason for arresting me.

While the policeman dragging me across the road, he said “you are intimidating”, “do not tell me how to do my job”, “are you trying to be a hero tonight?”

The authorities could ask me to voluntarily come to police station without handcuffing me but they had failed to do so.

He dragged me out of our property, crossed the road like a criminal, and locked me in the police’s car; and then they went into our house and searched the property.

Police had the car’s key and removed my car.

They had been omitting the evidence and let the trespasser driving away.

As the police officer came back to me and said, “I don’t charge you this time”. And while I was going to alight from the police’s car, I calmly requested that I wish to go to police station to make a statement to protect my family.

The policemen then dragged me out of the police’s car and said, “I don’t want to hurt you in front of your family” but then, “immediately kicked to my leg, broke my left ankle and then pushed me to the ground.”

My Mum said “why? Why?”

The policewoman said, “I really appreciate that you are very calm, madam.”

It was not a takedown manoeuvre. Was it necessary to make me lie down on the ground and pull me up… just for unlocking me! I neither have showed contumelious attitude nor resist the police. I only requested that I wish to go to the police station to report the incidence and to protect my family!

Next the policeman pulled me up, suddenly he had a cut with bleeding and then he smeared his blood all over my body!

The policeman’s actions had been recorded by CCTV footage and witnessed by my mum and wife.

While he was unlocking me, we requested the police’s contact details or business card. Once again, they ignored the request, jumped on the car and drove away.

As we came back inside the house, we called 000 again and tried to report the incidence over the phone. The policeman on the phone said: “I don’t care. If you call again, I will come and arrest you. (This is the second time that this police officer had threatened to arrest me.)

34. DOD asserted that on 14 December 2012, he went to Dapto Police Station to report the incident, but he was advised to report it at either Bankstown or another nearby station. On 15 December 2012, he went to Cabramatta Police Station to report the incident and “request helps within police authorities the following: 1. Protect our family. 2. Ask for a written explanation why did the police arrest me. 3. Report the personal and psychological injuries. I also reported the incident to the local Member of Parliament and he forwarded the case to the NSW Police Commissioner and Ombudsman. He concluded:

I, (DOD), as a HealthCare professional, from the bottom of my heart, contend NSW Police Force has failed to undertake any preventative or protective measures to protect its citizen. It had failed to ensure a social environment free from discriminative, bullying, harassment and corrupted act. Additionally, they had arrested, beat-up and caused us severe personal and psychological injures. I strongly consider these treatments have been unlawful.

It is our hope that in reporting such a terrified experience, we will not be subjected to any detriment or detrimental treatment. We would like to appeal for justice, hope to live under more positive circumstances, and look forward to serving people.

35. However, there are no other police reports or statements from DOD’s Mother-in-Law and Wife in evidence before me.

36. In his further statement dated 5 June 2017, DOD alleged that he is no longer able to work, because of his psychological injury, and he is now reclusive can cannot leave his house “due to fear of the police and the neighbour”. He also alleged that: his mother passed away “partly because of this incident”; his wife and mother-in-law “are greatly in shock and they are now very ill”: and he concluded, “Consequently, we have all been going through an unbearable ordeal for over five years. It has been a gruelling process and exacerbating our medical conditions. Predictably, we have been going through such a great hardship and harrowing times…”

37. I have also perused the transcripts of the 000 emergency calls that were made by both DOD and the other party on 13 December 2012, and I make the following observations:

000 Calls logged before DOD was arrested

• At 19:53, DOD told the operator that someone had “invaded” his property and he stated, “Could you send, send the police right away otherwise there’s a murder. Please… This guy is just parking me in so many times. Can you come…” The operator asked DOD whether the man on the property had any weapons? DOD replied, “I don’t think so”, and in response to further questioning by the Operator, he said that the man was, “sitting in a black ute in front of the house”. The operator stated, “…I’m organising to get police out there to you… Don’t approach him. Don’t go outside. I’m sending police out. Okay…”

• At 21:01, DOD again asked the police to come to the scene and he now stated, “This guy been driving, driving, threatening us so many times and now he got his car really going and drive into our house and this is… escaping… we can’t tolerate this. It’s dangerous. It’s very dangerous… I think he try to get the car right into our house… not in the house, right through the door. Even took it very close to the door… This is very dangerous. Please.”

• At 22:40pm, DOD told the Operator that the other party had damaged the front door.

000 calls made by the other party before DOD was arrested

38. I have perused transcripts of the 000 telephone calls were made the other party, which indicate that he had knocked on the front door of the house where DOD was and asked him to move his car so that he could leave the property and that DOD refused to do so.

000 calls made after DOD was arrested and the arrest was terminated

39. At 23:58, after DOD was arrested and his arrest was terminated, DOD called 000 and stated, relevantly:

Ah the, the, I don’t know, the builder or something I don’t know any before, he just went to my property and he tried to attack me. I close the door, I called up the police, police asked me to stay in the door and lock and then, and it takes about 3 hours. 2 police officers come to my place instead of (illegible) give us the report… they’ve just been here, just 5 minutes ago. I asked, I want to know did the police take him with them so that I can report to the supervisor or the whoever to hire rank and they just you know, I got the (illegible) get the, he got damage on his finger somewhere. He put blood on my body and also he really (illegible) make me fall on the street… He’s got the handcuff me or the handcuff me for about 15 minutes outside…Um he also complain and I want to have someone to come here urgently tonight so we can have formal report about this…the first thing is this stranger get his car right in front of my house… and um, he tried to bang, damage the door and that’s why I called the police, ask the police to come over to help and it took about like 3 hours or so before the police coming and actually instead of give us the report what happened is that I, they just arrest me…

DOD’s submissions

40. On 5 October 2018, DOD submitted that the other party had a long history of bullying and harassment towards his family. On 13 December 2012, he went out the back of their house and saw the other party watering his garden. He asked him if it was his car in their driveway? The other party replied, aggressively, “you upset?”. He said, “no, please move the car or I will call the police”. He replied, “Call the police”. He then panicked and called 000 and told them that the other party was “very dangerous”.

41. I asked DOD why he told the 000 Operator that the other party was “very dangerous”? He replied in a loud voice by repeating the contents of his Chronology regarding the past history with the other party and his family, which were not relevant to the issues that I needed to determine. I asked him, several times to confine his submissions to the incident on 13 December 2012, but he ignored my requests and began a loud tirade about the other party and the police and talked over the top of me.

42. Eventually, and after I had asked him several times about the incident on 13 December 2012, DOD said that he was ‘very scared’ because of the other party’s past behaviour and that ‘we thought he was very aggressive’. He said that the “police”, by which he appeared to refer to the 000 Operator that he first spoke to, advised him to lock the front door and to wait for police to arrive and that this was the reason why he did not open the door when the other party knocked on it. He said that at about 9:00pm, the other party ‘banged on the door’ and he ‘got scared because he had been trying to break our door’.

43. I asked DOD to describe how the other party had tried to break the door, but he failed to respond. I note that the transcript from his 000-call logged at 9:01pm indicates that he said, “This guy been driving, driving, threatening us so many times and now he got his car really going and drive into our house and this is [##] escaping [33] we can’t tolerate this. It’s dangerous. It’s very dangerous… I think he try to get the car right into our house.” I asked him why he believed that ‘the other party was ‘trying to get the car right into their house.’ However, he replied to the effect that ‘it was very blurry outside’.

44. I noted that the COPS Event report indicates that the reporting police officer spoke to DOD on the telephone, several times, and that he asked DOD to move his vehicle so that the other party could exit the property and the situation would be resolved, but he refused to do so. I asked DOD why he refused the reporting police officer’s requests? He replied that he did not want to move his car because ‘he wanted to keep the evidence and make a complaint to the police when they arrived’. He then began a lengthy and rambling tirade during which, amongst other things, he accused the police and the MAFIA of corruption. This tirade continued for several minutes despite my repeated requests that he should confine his submissions and comments to the incident on 13 December 2012. He then repeated that the COPS Event report is “all lies” and he denied that the police officers asked him to move his car when they arrived at the house.

45. I noted that in his Chronology, DOD alleged, relevantly, “Police officers did not listen and just handcuffed me, the entire arresting process lasted about 10 seconds, without telling us who they were and the reason for arresting me”. I asked him to clarify what he meant by that statement and he replied to the effect that the police officer spoke to his mother-in-law and told her that he was to move the car. He told the police officer that his mother-in-law did not speak English and that the other party ‘is a dangerous man who needs to be held accountable’. He was then immediately arrested by the police officer and he was taken across the road and “put in the van”. The police officer his car keys from his pocket and he did not know what happened after that.

46. However, I noted that in his Chronology, he stated that after he was locked in the police car, “…they went into our house and searched the property. Police had the car’s key and removed my car. They had been omitting the evidence and let the trespasser drive away.” I noted that this was an inconsistency in his evidence, but I did not pursue this further as I considered that it was not relevant to the issues that I am required to determine.

47. DOD stated that after the other party left the property, the police officer told him that he did not want to charge him with an offence. However, he told the police officer that he wanted to go to the police station “to make a report” and that he believed that he could not make a report to police unless they took him to the police station. He stated, “I thought that this was the only way to do that. I didn’t want them to charge me”. He submitted that the police officer then dragged him out of the police car and kicked him, during which he cut his thumb and he then “spread his blood all over me”. The police officer also took his mobile phone so that he could not take any photos.

48. DOD also alleged that the police officer beat him because he told him that he wanted to make a complaint against him. However, I noted that DOD had not previously made that allegation in any of the documents that were in evidence before me.

Commissioner’s submissions

49. The Commissioner lodged written submissions in which she sought to raise for the first time that the application for victims support did not satisfy the requirements of s 39 of the Act. She stated:

21. The only reports of a Government Agency provided in this matter are the police report and transcripts of the emergency calls made by the applicant and the builder. While they indicate that police attended the applicant’s home, and he injured his ankle, the respondent submits these reports do not verify the applicant was injured in the course of the commission of an offence. It is therefore not possible to rely on these reports to establish that an act of violence has been committed. Accordingly, the respondent submits that the documentary requirements under section 39 of the Act are not satisfied.

50. The Commissioner also submitted, relevantly:

13. As per the evidence provided, the respondent accepts that the applicant was injured as a result of the incident. The injuries the applicant sustained suggest violent conduct has occurred. The question for consideration is whether it is apparent that the violent conduct occurred in the course of the commission of an offence.

14. Under Part 18 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA) it is lawful for a police officer to use such force as is reasonably necessary to exercise a function under that Act. Under section 99 of LEPRA police are given power to arrest a person if satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary to, among other things, stop a person committing or repeating an offence, and in order to protect the safety or welfare of any person. Under section 105 of LEPRA an arrest can be discontinued at any time.

15. Given the builder’s report to police that the applicant has threatened to kill him with a knife, the applicant’s refusal to allow the builder to remove his car after an extended period of time and in defiance of police instructions, and his “highly aggravated” state when police attended, the respondent submits that the police had reasonable grounds for suspecting the applicant of the offence “intimidation” against the builder and arresting him.

16. In addition, the applicant’s state of mind at the time is revealed by his own account in which he suggests that he was uncertain of police both when they telephoned him to resolve the matter, and when they attended his home in uniform in a marked police vehicle. In the respondent’s view, the applicant’s account suggests he had a poor attitude towards the police who were trying to resolve the matter.

17. the police report that the applicant refused to comply with their directions, including when they attempted to remove his handcuffs and release him from the caged vehicle. The injury one of the officers sustained during the incident supports police claims that the applicant was non-compliant.

18. In order for a criminal offence to be made out against the police officers who attended the incident, it would need to be shown that their actions in dealing with the applicant were unreasonable and unnecessary, and that any force they used was excessive. It is regrettable that the applicant sustained a fractured ankle during the incident, however in the context of the applicant’s highly aggravated state, the alleged threats made against the builder by the applicant, the applicant’s refusal to recognise police authority and follow their instructions, and his refusal to alight from their vehicle, the respondent submits that it is open to find on the balance of probabilities that police action was reasonable in the circumstances.

19. The respondent therefore submits that the police officers’ actions in this matter cannot be found on balance to amount to the commission of an offence and therefore section 19 is not satisfied. Accordingly, an act of violence is not established and the applicant is ineligible for victims support.

51. After hearing oral submissions from both DOD and Ms Sabesan on 5 October 2018, the Tribunal reserved its decision. However, after the decision had been reserved, DOD’s Mother-in-Law approached the Bar Table with the Interpreter and the Interpreter stated that she wanted the Tribunal to view a photograph on her mobile telephone that allegedly showed the location of the other party’s car on the property on 13 December 2012.

52. I declined that application and gave an ex-tempore decision in which I expressed the reasons to the following effect:

1. The hearing of the application proceeded based upon evidence that was lodged with the Tribunal and DID not make any application to adduce any further evidence in support of the matter;

2. DOD had not provided any explanation as to why the proposed further evidence could not have been obtained for use in support of the application for victims support and I was not satisfied that the evidence could not, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained at an earlier time; and

3. There is no dispute regarding the location of the other party’s vehicle and the proposed further evidence is not relevant to an issue that I am required to determine.

The s 39 defence

53. Section 39 of the Act provides, relevantly:

39   Documentary evidence

(1)   An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form.

(2)   Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required:

(a)   for an application for financial assistance for immediate needs under section 26—is documentary evidence (such as a medical or police report) sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant’s claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and

(b)   for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment—is a police report or report of a Government agency and a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence.

54. Neither the Assessor at first instance, nor the Senior Assessor upon review, notified DOD that his evidence failed to satisfy s 39 of the Act. I note that s 39 appears in Div. 6 of the Act, under the heading “Applications for Victims Support”, and that it prescribes the documentary evidence that must be submitted in support of an application. In my view, if the Commissioner considered that the application was defective because it did not comply with s 39 of the Act, she should have notified DOD of that defect before the application was determined. However, she did not do so.

55. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the Commissioner can validly rely upon s 39 of the Act as a defence to the current application. However, if I am wrong in this regard, I am satisfied that the evidence satisfies s 39 (2) (b) of the Act as the COPS Event report and transcripts of the 000 telephone calls describe the alleged act of violence and there are reports from medical practitioners and psychologists regarding DOD’s injuries.

Was DOD’s arrest lawful?

56. It is necessary to consider ss 99 and 105 of LEPRA as it existed on 13 December 2012. These provided:

99   Power of police officers to arrest without warrant

(1)   A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if:

(a)   the person is in the act of committing an offence under any Act or statutory instrument, or

(b)   the person has just committed any such offence, or

(c)   the person has committed a serious indictable offence for which the person has not been tried.

(2)   A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person if the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence under any Act or statutory instrument.

(3)   A police officer must not arrest a person for the purpose of taking proceedings for an offence against the person unless the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that it is necessary to arrest the person to achieve one or more of the following purposes:

(a)   to ensure the appearance of the person before a court in respect of the offence,

(b)   to prevent a repetition or continuation of the offence or the commission of another offence,

(c)   to prevent the concealment, loss or destruction of evidence relating to the offence,

(d)   to prevent harassment of, or interference with, a person who may be required to give evidence in proceedings in respect of the offence,

(e)   to prevent the fabrication of evidence in respect of the offence,

(f)   to preserve the safety or welfare of the person.

(4)   A police officer who arrests a person under this section must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person, and any property found on the person, before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law.

105   Arrest may be discontinued

(1)   A police officer may discontinue an arrest at any time.

(2)   Without limiting subsection (1), a police officer may discontinue an arrest in any of the following circumstances:

(a)   if the arrested person is no longer a suspect or the reason for the arrest no longer exists for any other reason,

(b)   if it is more appropriate to deal with the matter in some other manner, including, for example, by issuing a warning or caution or a penalty notice or court attendance notice or, in the case of a child, dealing with the matter under the Young Offenders Act 1997.

57. On 16 October 2018, the Court of Appeal (McColl JA, Basten JA & Emmett AJA) delivered its judgment in Robinson v State of New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 231 (Robinson), in which it considered the interpretation of s 99 of LEPRA, the relevance of pre-existing common law to the construction of the statutory scheme regarding the principle of legality of an arrest and whether an arrest was lawful.

58. In Robinson, the appellant attended a police station at 5pm on 22 December 2013, in response to attempts made by police to contact him. Upon attendance, he was immediately arrested without warrant, for breach of an apprehended violence order. He was offered, and accepted, the opportunity to participate in a record of interview. At 6:18pm, he was released without charge following the conclusion of the interview. He commenced proceedings against the respondent, claiming damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. However, the trial judge dismissed the claim and accepted that the arresting officer’s evidence that a decision whether to charge the appellant depended upon what he said in the interview and that, at the time of the arrest, he had not decided to charge him. The key issue on appeal was whether the appellant’s arrest was lawful under s 99 of LEPRA in circumstances where there was no positive intent to lay charges at the time of the arrest.

59. The Court allowed the appeal and held (per McColl JA and Basten JA):

1. Section 99 of LEPRA must be construed in its context, including general law principles concerning the scope and purpose of arrest: [34] – [35]; [132]. North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory (2015) 256 CLR 569; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, applied.

2. In legal terminology, “arrest” is generally used to identify that deprivation of liberty which is a precursor to the commencement of criminal proceedings against the person arrested, justified as necessary for the enforcement of the criminal law. The power to arrest exists, and must be exercised, for the purpose of bringing the person arrested before a justice as soon as reasonably practicable: [46]; [95]; [136]; [154]. Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278; Zaravinos v State of New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 58; Dowse v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 337; Bales v Parmeter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182; Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, applied; Clyne v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265, not followed.

3. Neither the text nor context of the statute suggests an intention to depart from these general law constraints: [120]; [124]- [127]; [165]- [167]; [173]. Rather, they are embedded in the language of s 99, and expressly preserved by LEPRA, s 4: [35]; [44]; [132]- [134]. As no decision whether to charge the appellant had been made at the time of arrest, the arrest was not for the purpose of commencing the criminal process; accordingly, it was unlawful: [128]- [129]; [194].

60. However, Emmett AJA (dissenting) held:

1. The legislative scheme contemplates a distinction between the decision to arrest and the decision to charge. A positive intent to charge at the time of arrest is not a necessary precondition of the valid exercise of the power of arrest under s 99; accordingly, the appellant’s arrest was lawful: [251]; [253]; [257]; [270]- [274].

61. In Robinson, McColl JA stated that the respondent’s concession that the appellant was unlawfully arrested, and a contextual analysis of s 99, demonstrates that common law principles are embedded in s 99 and particularly ss 99 (1) (a) and 99 (3) and are expressly preserved by s 4. She held that Christie reflects the common law in New South Wales regarding the obligation to notify an arrested person of the reasons for the arrest and this decision was applied in Dowse v New South Wales (2012) 226 A Crim R 36; [2012] NSWCA 337 at [27] (Dowse) where Basten JA (McColl and Hoeben JJA agreeing), held:

An arrest will not be valid merely because the officer believes that an offence has been committed, in circumstances where the officer has no intention of charging the person or having the person charged with that offence.

62. Her Honour said that the power to arrest without a warrant expressed in s 99 (1) (a) LEPRA carries with it the obligation to inform the person arrested of the reason for the exercise of the power of arrest (s 201 (1) (c)) and means that at the time of arrest, the arresting officer must inform the person arrested of the charge to be preferred. To do so, the arresting officer must have an intention to so charge the arrested person.

63. Her Honour also held that the power under s 105 of LEPRA, which enables a “police officer [to] discontinue an arrest despite any obligation under this Part to take the arrested person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law”, depends upon there having been a prior lawful arrest. She held stated (at [80]) that adopting the language of s 99 (2) of LEPRA to the decision in Bales v Parmeter, Jordan CJ’s statement would now be:

There is no doubt that, in an action for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment by a police officer it is a good defence if the defendant proves that he has reasonable and probable cause for his actions. Such reasonable and probable cause may be established by proving that he, on reasonable grounds, suspected the person whom he arrested of having committed a crime or offence [Emphasis added.]

64. Her Honour also stated:

81. The test for “reasonable and probable cause” in this context conforms to the state of mind required to be held by the person arresting the person without warrant pursuant to s 99 (1) (a). There are not two states of mind. Rather, on this approach the state of mind of the arresting officer which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant is also sufficient to found a finding that the arresting officer who charges the person arrested had “reasonable and probable cause” to do so.

65. In applying these principles to this matter, I note that the COPS Event Report indicates that before the DOD was arrested, the reporting police officer spoke to him by telephone several times and asked him to move his vehicle to enable the other party to exit the property. However, he refused and responded with hostility, making further demands that the police attend the property and terminating the calls. The arresting officer then advised DOD that if the matter was not resolved by the time they attended the scene, he would be the subject of a police investigation regarding the threats that he had allegedly made to kill the other party, which might result in his own arrest. After arriving at the scene, the uniformed police officers knocked on the door, DOD opened it and they introduced themselves. The arresting officer asked DOD to move his vehicle so that the other vehicle could exit the property and he again refused. The reporting officer stated:

The POI would not listen to reason and despite the author’s attempts to peacefully negotiate the removal of the victim’s vehicle the POI simply yelled over the top of the author’s voice. The author turned to the female occupants to elicit help in removing the vehicle, to which the POI physically took hold of the author’s appointment belt by the handcuff holster. The author issued a firm direction to the POI not to touch him, which resulted in the POI letting go. The POI then began yelling in another language towards the female occupants which had the result of causing them to withdraw into the inner rooms of the premises.

Fearing that the situation was deteriorating rapidly and, and now finding merit in the allegations raised by the victim in relation to the POI’s behaviour, the author advised the POI that he was now under arrest on suspicion of intimidation. He was cautioned, with all safeguards to section 201 of the LEPRA applied and adhered to. The POI immediately took a step back and the author seized upon the POI’s wrists, who reacted by twisting his torso away. However, he was quickly restrained and led into the rear of the waiting police caged vehicle, being resisted every step of the way.

66. While DOD alleges that the COPS Event Report “is all lies”, its description of DOD yelling over the top of the reporting police officer’s voice is consistent with his behaviour during the hearing on 5 October 2018. DOD spoke loudly/yelled over the top of my voice on several occasions when I attempted to clarify aspects of his evidence and submissions regarding the issues and he consistently ignored my requests to focus upon the incident on 13 December 2012. It follows that I do not accept his allegation that the narrative ‘is all lies’.

67. This Tribunal is not required to determine the veracity and accuracy of the narrative in the COPS Event Report, but it necessary to for me to determine whether DOD’s arrest was lawful under s 99 LEPRA to determine whether he was the victim of an act of violence. If the arrest was unlawful, an act of violence may be established on the balance of probabilities.

68. I consider it significant that although DOD asserts that both his Wife and his Mother-in-Law witnessed the incident on 13 December 2012, and his Mother-in-Law was present at the hearing, he did not adduce any evidence from them in support of his claim. He has not offered any explanation for this decision.

69. I note that the decision of the High Court in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 is authority for the proposition that an unexplained refusal by a party to give evidence or to call witnesses or to lead other evidence may, in appropriate circumstances, entitle the tribunal of fact to draw an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted that party’s case.

70. In this matter, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to draw an inference that the uncalled evidence from DOD’s Wife and Mother-in-Law would not have assisted his case in relation to the circumstances leading up to and following his arrest and the discontinuation of that arrest on 13 December 2012.

71. It follows that where there is conflict between DOD’s evidence and the evidence from NSW police and the other party regarding the incident on 13 December 2012, I prefer the evidence of the police and the other party to DOD’s evidence.

72. The evidence that I accept supports a finding that during the period of approximately six hours over which the incident on 13 December 2012 occurred, the other party knocked on the front door of the house and asked DOD to move his car, but he refused to do so. While DOD asserts that he refused because he was “so scared” of the other party and because police told him to wait inside until they arrived, his behaviour caused the situation to escalate to the point where it was necessary for police to attend and intervene to restore the peace.

73. I further note that the 000 Operator issued their advice to DOD based upon the information he provided to them during that phone call, which was to the effect that the other party had “invaded” the property and that he was ‘very dangerous’. However, DOD has not alleged that he was the victim of a home invasion or otherwise claimed victims support for any injury that he allegedly suffered because of a home invasion.

74. I am satisfied that after DOD opened the front door upon the arrival of the uniformed police officers, he heard the arresting police officer’s instruction that he should move his vehicle to allow the other party to leave the property and he refused to comply with that instruction. I reject his explanation, to the effect that he wanted to keep the evidence in place until the police arrived, as the police had observed the position of the vehicles and instructed DOD to move his vehicle after doing so. It is not a reasonable explanation for his refusal.

75. It follows that I am satisfied that the arresting police officer complied with his obligations under s 99 (1) of LEPRA in deciding to arrest DOD and that he duly informed him of the reason for his arrest.

76. As I am not persuaded that DOD’s arrest was unlawful, it follows that I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he was the primary victim of an act of violence with respect to his arrest and detention in the police caged vehicle on 13 December 2012.

77. I am also satisfied that the arresting police officer properly discontinued DOD’s lawful arrest after DOD’s vehicle was moved and the other party had removed his vehicle from the property and exited the property. Based upon the decision in Robinson, the arresting officer was permitted to terminate the arrest under s 105 (a) (a) of LEPRA as the arrest under s 99 was lawful and the reason for the arrest no longer existed.

66. In relation to the events that occurred after the arrest was discontinued, I note DOD’s explanation that he refused to get out of the police caged vehicle after the arresting police officer told him that he was no longer under arrest, because he believed that he could not make a report to police about the incident unless they took him to the police station. However, in my view that is not a reasonable excuse for his conduct in refusing to exit the vehicle and in refusing to allow the police officer to remove the handcuffs from his wrists. His conduct caused an injury to the arresting police officer, namely a laceration to a thumb.

67. While I note that there are photos of blood stains on DOD’s shirt, he alleges that the police officer put his blood ‘all over’ his body. However, there is no evidence that supports a finding to that effect and I reject that allegation.

68. I further reject DOD’s assertions to the effect that he did not resist the arrest and that the police officer beat him because he said that he wished to make a complaint against him. The evidence that I accept does not support them.

69. As a result, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that DOD was the primary victim of an act of violence with respect to the events that followed the police officer’s decision to discontinue the arrest and release DOD from police custody on 13 December 2012.

Section 44 Considerations

82. Section 44 of the Act provides, relevantly:

44   Reasons for not approving the giving of victims support or for reducing amount of financial support or recognition payment

(1)   In determining whether or not to approve the giving of victims support, and in determining the amount of financial support to be given or recognition payment to be made, the Commissioner must have regard to the following:

(a)   any behaviour (including past criminal activity), condition, attitude or disposition of the primary victim concerned that directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death sustained by the victim,

…

(g)   such other matters as the Commissioner considers relevant.

83. I am satisfied that DOD’s behaviour on 13 December 2012, directly contributed to his injuries that he sustained. Accordingly, if I determined that he was the primary victim of an act of violence and that he was entitled to victims support in the form of a recognition payment under s 35 of the Act, I consider that his behaviour would have justified a decision to either not approve the giving of victim’s support in the form of a recognition payment or, alternatively to significantly reduce the amount of any recognition payment.

Orders

84. I make the following order:

1. Pursuant to s 63 (3) (a) of the ADR Act, the review decision dated 24 July 2018 is affirmed.

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 24 October 2018