Doan v Health Insurance Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Doan v Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 1160

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – Professional Services Review Scheme created by Part VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) – 1999 amendments to Part VAA – medical practitioner - investigative referral – whether an investigation instigated by the Director, Professional Services Review under s 89(1) following an investigative referral is a “decision” to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) applies - whether the investigative referral made by the first respondent referring the conduct of the applicant to the second respondent contains reasons in accordance with s 86(4)(b) – whether the investigative referral specifies conduct in accordance with s 86 – whether non-compliance with the statutory requirements for investigative referrals entails invalidity of a referral - whether the first respondent had power to make the investigative referral in circumstances where an earlier referral had been made – whether the first respondent was estopped from making the investigative referral – abuse of power.

Health Insurance Commission Act 1973 (Cth)

Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) ss 3,10, 81, 82, 86,87, 88, 89, 89A, 89B, 90, 91, 92, 93, 93A, 93B, 94

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5,6

Health Insurance Amendment (Professional Services Review) Act 1999 (Cth)

Health Insurance (Professional Services Review – Contents of Investigative Referrals) Guidelines 1999

Adams v Yung (1998) 83 FCR 248, referred to

Pradhan v Holmes [2001] FCA 1560, distinguished

Health Insurance Commission v Grey [2002] FCAFC 130, applied

Grey v Health Insurance Commission [2001] FCA 1257, referred to

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193, referred to

Edwards v Guidice (1999) 95 FCR 561, 573, referred to

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, cited

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, applied

DR TUAN NGOC DOAN V HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION & ANOR
V 202 of 2002

MARSHALL J

18 SEPTEMBER 2002

MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V202 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

DR TUAN NGOC DOAN

APPLICANT

AND:

HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION

FIRST RESPONDENT

  DR ALAN JOHN HOLMES (in his capacity as the Director of Professional Services Review)

SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 SEPTEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V202 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

DR TUAN NGOC DOAN

APPLICANT

AND:

THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION

FIRST RESPONDENT

DR ALAN JOHN HOLMES (in his capacity as the Director of Professional Services Review)

SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

18 SEPTEMBER 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. There are three parties to this proceeding. The applicant, Dr Tuan Ngoc Doan, is a medical practitioner in…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Doan v Health Insurance Commission involves Dr Doan, a general practitioner in Victoria, challenging decisions made by the Health Insurance Commission (HIC) concerning an investigation into his conduct. The primary dispute pertains to whether the HIC had the lawful authority to investigate Dr Doan's practice and the validity of the referral that triggered the investigation. The court was tasked with determining if the decision to conduct the investigation and to serve Dr Doan with a Notice to Produce Documents or Information was reviewable under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. Additionally, the court had to assess various grounds of review, including whether the referral complied with statutory requirements, the appropriateness of the referral's scope, and the legitimacy of the referral process.

The court examined the statutory obligations under the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the Health Insurance (Professional Services Review) Act 1995, focusing on the conditions under which the HIC could initiate an investigation. It also considered whether the referral complied with the specific statutory provisions regarding its content and scope. Furthermore, the court scrutinized the grounds of review presented by Dr Doan's counsel, including the failure to consider relevant factors, the purpose of the referral, and whether the referral process constituted an abuse of power or an estoppel. The court analysed whether Dr Doan's reliance on representations made by the HIC led to a legitimate expectation that changes in his practice would prevent referral.

In its ruling, the court found that the HIC's decision to investigate was indeed reviewable and was made in accordance with the statutory framework. The referral met the necessary statutory requirements, and the scope of the investigation was within the powers conferred by the Health Insurance Act. The court rejected the contention that the referral was made for an improper purpose or that it constituted an abuse of power. It also held that there was no estoppel preventing the HIC from referring Dr Doan's conduct. Consequently, the court dismissed Dr Doan's application and ordered him to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the event that the second respondent refers the practitioner to a PSRC and the final report of the relevant PSRC contains a unanimous or majority finding of “inappropriate practice” against the practitioner, the Determining Authority, also established under Pt VAA of the HI Act, will make draft determinations. Those determinations may include reprimand, counselling, repayment of Medicare benefits and complete or partial disqualification of the provision of services for which a Medicare benefit is payable (in the case of complete or partial disqualification, the practical ramifications may be that the practitioner will be inhibited in attracting patients). Once the draft determinations have been submitted to the relevant practitioner and the practitioner has been afforded an opportunity to make submissions on the draft determinations, the Determining Authority will give its final determination.Factual background Dr Doan commenced practice as a medical practitioner in general practice in Victoria in November 1994. Since that time, he has been in continuous practice as a solo practitioner. In July 2000, Dr Peter Karlik, a general practitioner employed by the first respondent as a Medical Adviser, contacted Dr Doan, and advised him that he and another officer of the first respondent would approach him for counselling for the purposes of the PSR Scheme. The counselling meeting was scheduled for 2 August 2000. In the letter to Dr Doan, dated 24 July 2000, which confirmed the interview set for 2 August, Dr Karlik said: “As discussed on the telephone the purpose of the meeting is to discuss the pattern of your Medicare statistics and to provide information about the Professional Services Review Scheme.…Specifically the [first respondent] requested us to provide feedback regarding:· Clarification of your practice· Volume of services (annual and daily)· Average Services per Patient/year· Acupuncture· PBS prescribing…” In preparation for the meeting with Dr Doan, Dr Karlik obtained a copy of the first respondent’s file of Dr Doan’s Medicare profile and statistics. The file included a report of interview dated 16 August 1996 between Dr Doan and a Dr Mak, an officer of the first respondent. At the meeting, the first respondent’s concerns in relation to Dr Doan’s high volume of services and high services per patient had been discussed. The file also contained a letter to Dr Doan, dated 18 October 1999, from the first respondent’s then Medical Director of the Professional Review Division, in relation to Dr Doan’s practice profile for the year 1998. In addition, Dr Karlik obtained the first respondent’s Medicare services profile in relation to Dr Doan for a twelve-month period, 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000. On 2 August 2000, Dr Karlik and Mr Broadbent, a Pharmaceutical Adviser, attended the counselling meeting with Dr Doan. In relation to the counselling meeting, Dr Karlik gave evidence that:“I am unable to remember the precise words used in this meeting but the substance of our discussions during that counselling interview were the possible concerns that [the first respondent] had identified based on Dr Doan’s Medicare services profile which were atypical when compared to other general practitioners in Australia. In my presence, Mr Broadbent discussed issues of a PBS prescribing nature with Dr Doan.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By his amended application, Dr Doan seeks the issue of a writ of mandamus concerning what are termed, in his application, as the “first decision” and the “second decision” of the second respondent, being respectively the “decision” of the second respondent to conduct an investigation in respect of Dr Doan’s conduct in relation to the services referred by Investigative Referral 312 and the “decision” to serve Dr Doan with a Notice to Produce Documents or Information pursuant to s 89B(2). Dr Doan also seeks related declaratory and injunctive relief against both respondents. The challenge to the second decision is dependent upon the success of Dr Doan’s case concerning the first decision, given that the validity of the “second decision” depends on the unassailability of the “first decision”.Is the decision to conduct an investigation a reviewable decision at law Counsel for Dr Doan, Mr Monotti, conceded that the terms of s 89(1), when considered in isolation, would support the view that the second respondent is statutorily obliged to investigate when an Investigative Referral is made. Mr Monotti submitted, however, that the second respondent had stated in his letter of 11 March 2002 to Dr Doan that he had “decided pursuant to subsection 89(1) of the [HI Act] to investigate [Dr Doan’s] conduct in relation to the referred services”. Furthermore, Mr Monotti contended that, having regard to the chronology of events, the “decision” to conduct an investigation was clearly a decision under s 91, being a decision to not dismiss Investigative Referral 312. Mr Monotti submitted that, by letter dated 18 December 2001, the first respondent had invited Dr Doan to make written submissions to the second respondent why Investigative Referral 312 should be dismissed without setting up a PSRC. Subsequently, Dr Doan put forward submissions to which a reply was forwarded, stating that “the [second respondent’s] full consideration will be given to your submission before he makes any decision as required by the Health Insurance Act 1973”. Therefore, the “decision” to investigate Dr Doan’s conduct as notified in the letter of 11 March clearly encompassed a decision to not dismiss the investigative referral. In the alternative, it was submitted that the “decision” to investigate was conduct within the meaning of s 6 of the AD(JR) Act.Grounds of review Various grounds were raised in respect of the attack on the “decisions”. A number of the grounds attack the actual making of Investigative Referral 312. Indeed, the first, second and third grounds of attack on the “first decision” are so premised, asserting that:·Investigative Referral 312 does not comply with the requirements of s 86(1) in that it is not a referral of conduct and is too wide, vague and uncertain;·Investigative Referral 312 does not comply with s 86(4)(b) in that it does not set out the reasons why the first respondent considers that Dr Doan may have engaged in inappropriate practice, and rather just sets out “bare assertions” that could not be considered reasons within the meaning of the HI Act;·the terms of Investigative Referral 312 are outside the scope of the HI Act because they raise questions for investigation beyond the scope of the powers in the HI Act; and/or·Investigative Referral 312 was made in purported reliance on s 93B as a “further referral” when there was no power to do so because Investigative Referral 277 was still extant. It was only on the second respondent’s view that Investigative Referral 277 was invalid.Does Investigative Referral 312 contain reasons and identify conduct?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of the argument on whether Investigative Referral 312 was made as a “further referral” when there was no power to so make a further referral, Mr Monotti contended that the conditions in s 93A had not been met, in that the second respondent had not made a decision to not investigate because he was unable to so investigate. Rather, the second respondent had made a decision on the validity of the first referral. That is not a power conferred by the HI Act on the second respondent. Therefore s 93B could not operate because the requirements in that section, that is, a decision pursuant to s 93A had not been met. The practical outcome of this submission is that Investigative Referral 277 would be still on foot, but for it having lapsed in accordance with s 93C. Therefore it was said that there was no valid referral to the second respondent in respect of Dr Doan and that any ensuing investigation would be a nullity.Relevant considerations and estoppel/abuse of power As the fourth ground of review, Mr Monotti contended that the “first decision” was an improper exercise of power conferred by the HI Act because:·the conferral of power involved a failure by the first respondent to take into account relevant considerations, including that Dr Doan had made “substantial” changes to his practice to meet the concerns of the first respondent;·it was an exercise of power for a purpose other than for which the power was conferred, namely a purpose of enabling a wide-ranging enquiry into services rendered by Dr Doan rather than the services actually referred which s 89(1) empowers the second respondent to do; and/or·it was an exercise of power in a way that constituted an abuse of power in that the second respondent was estopped from making the “first decision”. Mr Monotti contended that Dr Doan had formed a belief, based on a representation made by the first respondent in the July 2000 publication concerning the PSR Scheme (see [17] above), and on statements made to him during the counselling period, that if he managed to implement the changes discussed in counselling, his conduct would not be referred to the second respondent. On the basis of the representation, Dr Doan made “substantial changes” to his practice to meet the concerns of the first respondent. Those changes were costly to him (he had therefore acted to his detriment) and inconvenient to his patients. As a consequence, his levels of servicing were reduced during the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001. Furthermore, so the argument ran, the referred services in Investigative Referral 312 should not include the services in the post-counselling review period, as Dr Doan would not have a reasonable opportunity in that time to address the issues raised in the counselling meeting. Mr Monotti contended that fairness demands that Dr Doan be given a reasonable opportunity to address the matters raised and that necessarily means the first respondent is estopped from referring the services in the post-counselling review period.