FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Doan v Health Insurance Commission [2002] FCA 1160
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – Professional Services Review Scheme created by Part VAA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) – 1999 amendments to Part VAA – medical practitioner - investigative referral – whether an investigation instigated by the Director, Professional Services Review under s 89(1) following an investigative referral is a “decision” to which the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) applies - whether the investigative referral made by the first respondent referring the conduct of the applicant to the second respondent contains reasons in accordance with s 86(4)(b) – whether the investigative referral specifies conduct in accordance with s 86 – whether non-compliance with the statutory requirements for investigative referrals entails invalidity of a referral - whether the first respondent had power to make the investigative referral in circumstances where an earlier referral had been made – whether the first respondent was estopped from making the investigative referral – abuse of power.
Health Insurance Commission Act 1973 (Cth)
Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth) ss 3,10, 81, 82, 86,87, 88, 89, 89A, 89B, 90, 91, 92, 93, 93A, 93B, 94
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5,6
Health Insurance Amendment (Professional Services Review) Act 1999 (Cth)
Health Insurance (Professional Services Review – Contents of Investigative Referrals) Guidelines 1999
Adams v Yung (1998) 83 FCR 248, referred to
Pradhan v Holmes [2001] FCA 1560, distinguished
Health Insurance Commission v Grey [2002] FCAFC 130, applied
Grey v Health Insurance Commission [2001] FCA 1257, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193, referred to
Edwards v Guidice (1999) 95 FCR 561, 573, referred to
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, applied
DR TUAN NGOC DOAN V HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION & ANOR
V 202 of 2002MARSHALL J
18 SEPTEMBER 2002
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V202 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
DR TUAN NGOC DOAN
APPLICANT
AND:
HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENT
DR ALAN JOHN HOLMES (in his capacity as the Director of Professional Services Review)
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 SEPTEMBER 2002
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V202 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
DR TUAN NGOC DOAN
APPLICANT
AND:
THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION
FIRST RESPONDENT
DR ALAN JOHN HOLMES (in his capacity as the Director of Professional Services Review)
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE:
18 SEPTEMBER 2002
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There are three parties to this proceeding. The applicant, Dr Tuan Ngoc Doan, is a medical practitioner in…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory obligations under the Health Insurance Act 1973 and the Health Insurance (Professional Services Review) Act 1995, focusing on the conditions under which the HIC could initiate an investigation. It also considered whether the referral complied with the specific statutory provisions regarding its content and scope. Furthermore, the court scrutinized the grounds of review presented by Dr Doan's counsel, including the failure to consider relevant factors, the purpose of the referral, and whether the referral process constituted an abuse of power or an estoppel. The court analysed whether Dr Doan's reliance on representations made by the HIC led to a legitimate expectation that changes in his practice would prevent referral.
In its ruling, the court found that the HIC's decision to investigate was indeed reviewable and was made in accordance with the statutory framework. The referral met the necessary statutory requirements, and the scope of the investigation was within the powers conferred by the Health Insurance Act. The court rejected the contention that the referral was made for an improper purpose or that it constituted an abuse of power. It also held that there was no estoppel preventing the HIC from referring Dr Doan's conduct. Consequently, the court dismissed Dr Doan's application and ordered him to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of the argument on whether Investigative Referral 312 was made as a “further referral” when there was no power to so make a further referral, Mr Monotti contended that the conditions in s 93A had not been met, in that the second respondent had not made a decision to not investigate because he was unable to so investigate. Rather, the second respondent had made a decision on the validity of the first referral. That is not a power conferred by the HI Act on the second respondent. Therefore s 93B could not operate because the requirements in that section, that is, a decision pursuant to s 93A had not been met. The practical outcome of this submission is that Investigative Referral 277 would be still on foot, but for it having lapsed in accordance with s 93C. Therefore it was said that there was no valid referral to the second respondent in respect of Dr Doan and that any ensuing investigation would be a nullity.Relevant considerations and estoppel/abuse of power As the fourth ground of review, Mr Monotti contended that the “first decision” was an improper exercise of power conferred by the HI Act because:·the conferral of power involved a failure by the first respondent to take into account relevant considerations, including that Dr Doan had made “substantial” changes to his practice to meet the concerns of the first respondent;·it was an exercise of power for a purpose other than for which the power was conferred, namely a purpose of enabling a wide-ranging enquiry into services rendered by Dr Doan rather than the services actually referred which s 89(1) empowers the second respondent to do; and/or·it was an exercise of power in a way that constituted an abuse of power in that the second respondent was estopped from making the “first decision”. Mr Monotti contended that Dr Doan had formed a belief, based on a representation made by the first respondent in the July 2000 publication concerning the PSR Scheme (see [17] above), and on statements made to him during the counselling period, that if he managed to implement the changes discussed in counselling, his conduct would not be referred to the second respondent. On the basis of the representation, Dr Doan made “substantial changes” to his practice to meet the concerns of the first respondent. Those changes were costly to him (he had therefore acted to his detriment) and inconvenient to his patients. As a consequence, his levels of servicing were reduced during the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001. Furthermore, so the argument ran, the referred services in Investigative Referral 312 should not include the services in the post-counselling review period, as Dr Doan would not have a reasonable opportunity in that time to address the issues raised in the counselling meeting. Mr Monotti contended that fairness demands that Dr Doan be given a reasonable opportunity to address the matters raised and that necessarily means the first respondent is estopped from referring the services in the post-counselling review period.