FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DNT17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 978
Appeal from: application for an extension of time and leave to appeal: DNT17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 173 File number: NSD 212 of 2019 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 24 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal and extension of time – where Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed application in a case seeking reinstatement of an application for judicial review – where Immigration Assessment Authority had affirmed the decision of a delegate to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether proposed grounds of appeal have sufficient merit – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.11, 35.12, 35.14
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195
Date of hearing: 20 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 56 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Foster Solicitor for the Applicant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr S Valliappan of DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 212 of 2019 BETWEEN: DNT17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
This is an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application in a case in which the applicant sought an order reinstating an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Authority): see DNT17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 173 (DNT17). The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV).
The primary judge’s decision is interlocutory: see r 1.04 and dictionary (definition of “application in a case”) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (Federal Circuit Court Rules). Accordingly, the applicant requires leave to appeal from it: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act).
On 18 February 2019 the applicant, who was self-represented at the time, filed a notice of appeal (Notice of Appeal) in this…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 978
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the proposed grounds of appeal had sufficient merit to warrant leave to appeal. This involved examining whether the primary judge made an error in exercising discretion, as outlined in House v The King. The applicant argued that the primary judge erred by not addressing the Authority's conclusion that the men who extorted the applicant were not the same men who had threatened him previously and by not considering the accusation that he worked for the LTTE.
The court found that the primary judge had properly considered the evidence and provided a probative basis for the Authority's conclusions. The judge accepted that the visits from the men were for the purpose of extorting money and found no error in the Authority's reasoning. The court concluded that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit and that the primary judge's discretion had not miscarried.
The application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time and leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submitted that the primary judge did not address the question of whether the Authority’s conclusion about the “same men”, as opposed to unidentified men from the CID or the TMVP, was considered.Consideration Common to the application for leave to appeal and application for an extension of time is the question of the merit of the proposed grounds of appeal. It is thus convenient to address that issue first. It was not in dispute that the primary judge’s refusal to make the orders sought by the applicant, namely to set aside the order dismissing his Judicial Review Application, involved the exercise of a discretion. Ultimately then, in order to succeed in his appeal, the applicant will have to establish that in exercising that discretion the primary judge made an error of the type identified in House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 (House v The King). That is, he must establish that the primary judge acted on a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, was mistaken about the facts, did not take into account a material consideration or, if it is not apparent how the primary judge reached his or her result, that it appears, based on the facts, that it is unreasonable or plainly unjust. Counsel for the applicant accepted that in order to succeed in the proposed appeal the applicant would need to establish that the primary judge’s discretion miscarried in one of the ways described in House v The King and that if he could establish error in the way in which the primary judge addressed ground 1 and/or ground 3 that would be sufficient to demonstrate that the primary judge’s discretion had miscarried.Ground 1 Ground 1 of the proposed appeal takes issue with the primary judge’s finding that there was no merit in ground 1 of the Judicial Review Application. That ground alleged that the Authority misinterpreted the claim that the CID and TMVP men came to extort money from the applicant and not for any other reason and ignored the fact that the CID and TMVP men accused him of having worked for the LTTE. The primary judge found that the Authority had a proper basis for reaching its conclusion in [18] of its decision record that the visits from the men were only for the purpose of extorting money from the applicant and that there was nothing illogical or unreasonable in the requisite sense in the Authority’s reasoning in that regard. The primary judge therefore concluded that ground 1 lacked merit such as to support the application for reinstatement. The primary judge set out and considered the evidence relied on by the Authority (at [18] of its decision record) in reaching its conclusion and found that the matters set out there provided a probative basis for the Authority’s conclusions. In particular that on his return from Dubai the applicant was extorted for money probably by paramilitary groups; while it was plausible that one of the men who came to extort the applicant in 2010 may have been one of the men who had threatened him in 2006 or 2007, it was improbable that in 2010 this man came with the specific intent to harm the applicant because the applicant had just returned from overseas with money and neither he nor his family were harmed; and the applicant’s evidence was that these men were more interested in extorting money from him and he thought that they would want more money.