| CITATION: | DME [2012] QCAT 233 |
| PARTIES: | DME |
| APPLICATION NUMBER: | GAA4163-12 |
| MATTER TYPE: | Guardianship and administration matters for adults |
| HEARING DATE: | On the papers |
| HEARD AT: | Brisbane |
| DECISION OF: | C Endicott, Senior Member |
| DELIVERED ON: | 25 May 2012 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
| ORDERS MADE: | 1. The Enduring Power of Attorney dated 9 September 2005 appointing DAG as attorney for personal and health matters is valid. 2. The Tribunal declares that the powers given to DAG as attorney under the Enduring Power of Attorney dated 9 September 2005 have begun. |
| CATCHWORDS: | ENDURING POWER OF ATTOTNEY – where nominated attorney did not accept the grant of power until after principal lost capacity – where allegations made that Enduring Power of Attorney was invalid Powers of Attorney Act 1998, ss 33(4), 44, 109A, 113, 115 Whitney v National Australia Bank [2007] QSC 397 |
APPEARANCES and REPRESENTATION (if any):
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (QCAT Act).
REASONS FOR DECISION
DME is a resident in a nursing home at Manly. Her daughters, AB and CD, have made arrangements to remove DME from the nursing home on 25 May 2012. DME cannot give her consent to this proposed change of residence as she no longer has decision making capacity.
Another daughter, DAG, opposes the change of DME’s residence. DAG was appointed by DME to be her attorney for personal and health matters in 2005. DAG has not consented to the change of residence for DME.
AB and CD contend that the enduring power of attorney appointing DAG is invalid. They contend that the nursing home should not have any regard to the instructions of DAG.
QCAT has authority under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 to decide about the validity of an enduring power of attorney and can declare when a power under an enduring power of attorney can commence.[1]
[1] Sections 113 and 115 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998
The attack on the enduring power of attorney granted to DAG by DME arises from the fact that DAG did not accept the grant of power until 23 May 2012. CD has submitted that the document is not valid as DAG has signed the acceptance of the grant of power after DME has lost capacity. CD submitted that DAG has never been an attorney for DME and cannot now become her attorney as the only type of formal decision maker who can make decisions after DME has lost capacity would be a guardian appointed by this tribunal.
To consider that submission I have looked at the information provided to the tribunal about DME’s current decision making capacity for personal and health matters. According to a report from XZ dated 22 May 2012, DME has been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease and a subdural haematoma. An assessment of DME’s cognitive functioning has revealed a severe impairment of her functioning.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DME and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] QCAT 233
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the EPA, dated 9 September 2005, was valid given that the nominated attorney, DAG, did not accept the grant of power until after the principal had lost capacity. The court was required to consider the effect of this delay on the EPA's effectiveness and whether it could still confer authority on the attorney.
In its decision, the court held that the EPA was valid and that the powers given to DAG as attorney had begun. The court reasoned that the acceptance of the grant of power by DAG, despite occurring after the principal had lost capacity, did not invalidate the EPA. The court found that the EPA was effective from its execution and that the principal's loss of capacity did not affect the authority of the attorney to act under the EPA. This decision was based on the principle that the EPA was intended to provide for future incapacity and that the acceptance of the grant of power, while subsequent to the loss of capacity, did not negate the EPA's validity.
The court's decision affirmed the validity of the EPA and declared that the powers given to DAG as attorney under the EPA dated 9 September 2005 had begun. This ruling provided clarity on the issue of acceptance timing in relation to EPAs and reinforced the importance of these documents in ensuring that individuals can have their affairs managed in accordance with their wishes when they are unable to do so themselves.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Enduring Power of Attorney dated 9 September 2005 appointing DAG as attorney for personal and health matters is valid.
2. The Tribunal declares that the powers given to DAG as attorney under the Enduring Power of Attorney dated 9 September 2005 have begun.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.