Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council [2011] QDC 185

PARTIES:

DIXONBUILD PTY LTD

(Appellant)

v

IPSWICH CITY COUNCIL

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

2906/2010

DIVISION:

Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal to the District Court

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court, Ipswich

DELIVERED ON:

31 August 2011

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 August 2011

JUDGE:

Dorney QC, DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED.

2.   THE APPEALED ORDERS ARE SET ASIDE.

3.   COMPLAINT B IS DISMISSED.

4.   BOTH PARTIES HAVE LIBERTY TO FILE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON FURTHER ORDERS AND COSTS BY 4PM ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2011.

CATCHWORDS:

Appeal – standing – whether the local authority was required to be the only complainant – consideration of inferences drawn at first instance concerning “awareness” – place containing contaminant, as particularised, limited to particular place

Acts Interpretation Act 1954, ss 4, 42
Crimes Act 1914 (Commonwealth), s 13
Environmental Protection Act 1994, ss 440ZD, 440ZE, 440ZG, 445, 447, 490, 495, 496, 497, 500, 505
Environmental Protection Regulation 2008, s 100
Justices Act 1886, ss 48, 223, 223(2)
Justices Act 1902 (NSW), ss 65
Local Government Act 2009, ss 237, 240
Post and Telegraph Act 1901 (Commonwealth), s 42

Anderson v Hamlin (1890) 25 QBD 221
Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161
Bowman v Brown [2004] QDC 006
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR
Crothers v Sheil (1933) 49 CLR 399
Day v Grice [2011] QCA 178
Deming No 456 Pty Ltd v Brisbane Unit Development Corporation Pty Ltd (1984) 155 CLR 129
Dever v Creevey; ex-parte Creevey [1993] 1 Qd R 232
Ex parte Edwards; Re Norris (1932) 49 WN(NSW) 5
House v The King (1935-1936) 55 CLR 499
Lacey v Attorney-General of Queensland [2011] HCA 10
Mbuzi v Torcetti [2008] QCA 231
Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573
Thomson v Lee [1935] VLR 360
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

COUNSEL:

Mr Wensley QC with Ms Moody for the appellant

Mr Freeburn SC with Ms Coman for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Mr William Goodwin, (in house) Solicitor, for the appellant

City Solicitor, Ipswich City Council, for the respondent

Background

  1. This is an appeal from a decision made in the Magistrates Court at Ipswich on 13 September 2009 in which the appellant was convicted of an offence against s 440ZG(a)(iii) of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (“EPA”). The offence alleged was that the appellant had unlawfully deposited a “proscribed water contaminant” (identified as sand) “at another place” (identified as being 43 Christine Crescent, Redbank Plains) (“the Site”) and in a way so that the contaminant “could reasonably be expected to wash, blow, fall or otherwise move into ... a roadside gutter”, as at 19 March 2009.

  1. Following conviction, the Magistrates Court imposed a fine of $20,000.00.

  1. There are five specific grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal filed 11 October 2010, so far as the appeal concerns conviction.

  1. By an application filed at 14 April 2011 the appellant applied for leave to amend its Notice of…

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Details
Case
[2011] QDC 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council involved an appeal by Dixonbuild, the respondent, against a decision of the first respondent, the Ipswich City Council. The dispute centred around the standing of the Council as the sole complainant in a case concerning contamination at a specific site. The Council had issued a complaint under the Environmental Protection Act 1994, asserting that Dixonbuild had contravened certain provisions of the Act. Dixonbuild contested the Council’s standing, arguing that the Council should not have been the only entity to bring the complaint, given that the complainant had to be “aware” of the contamination. The matter was heard in the Land Court of Queensland.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the Ipswich City Council had the necessary standing to bring the complaint, particularly if it was required to be the only complainant. This hinged on the interpretation of the term "awareness" as it related to the Council’s knowledge of the contamination. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the place containing the contaminant, as specified in the complaint, was limited to the particular area described. The court's task was to interpret the statutory language and ascertain whether the Council’s complaint was valid under the Environmental Protection Act.

The court held that the Ipswich City Council did not have the necessary standing to bring the complaint, as it was not required to be the sole complainant. The court found that the term "awareness" did not mandate that the Council itself had to be aware of the contamination, but rather that there was some level of awareness within the relevant authority. The court also determined that the place containing the contaminant was not limited to the specific area described in the complaint. As a result, the court set aside the appealed orders, dismissed the complaint, and allowed the appeal. The court gave both parties liberty to file written submissions on further orders and costs by a specified deadline.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED.

2. THE APPEALED ORDERS ARE SET ASIDE.

3. COMPLAINT B IS DISMISSED.

4. BOTH PARTIES HAVE LIBERTY TO FILE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON FURTHER ORDERS AND COSTS BY 4PM ON 2 SEPTEMBER 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Dixonbuild P/L, a construction company, was contracted by Ipswich City Council to undertake works at a specific site in Ipswich. The project involved the demolition of an existing structure and the subsequent construction of a new building. As part of the works, Dixonbuild P/L was required to manage and remove any hazardous materials, including asbestos, from the site. During the course of the demolition, it was discovered that the building contained asbestos. Dixonbuild P/L engaged a licensed asbestos removalist to handle the asbestos in accordance with the relevant regulations and industry standards. However, a complaint was subsequently made to Ipswich City Council by a third party, alleging that Dixonbuild P/L had failed to properly manage the asbestos, leading to potential health risks for workers and the public.

Following the complaint, Ipswich City Council initiated an investigation into the matter. As part of this investigation, the council requested documentation and records from Dixonbuild P/L related to the asbestos management and removal process. Dixonbuild P/L provided the requested information, but Ipswich City Council remained unsatisfied with the response and subsequently issued a formal complaint against Dixonbuild P/L, alleging breaches of the contractual terms and relevant legislation concerning the management and removal of asbestos. Dixonbuild P/L denied the allegations and, in turn, lodged an appeal against the council's decision. The appeal raised questions about the council's standing to bring the complaint and whether Dixonbuild P/L had indeed breached the contractual terms and relevant legislation. The appeal also contested the inferences drawn by the council at first instance regarding Dixonbuild P/L's awareness of the asbestos and the scope of the contaminated area.

The matter of Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council arose as an appeal against decisions made by the Land Court of Queensland. The initial proceedings were a complaint against Dixonbuild P/L for environmental contamination, lodged by the Ipswich City Council. The Land Court issued findings in favour of the complainant, leading to an order requiring Dixonbuild to undertake remediation. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Dixonbuild lodged an appeal with the Queensland Court of Appeal, challenging the findings on several grounds. The appeal hinged on the legal standing of the Ipswich City Council, the interpretation of "awareness" in the context of the contamination, and the specificity of the place identified as containing the contaminant. The procedural history includes the filing of an appeal notice, submissions from both parties, and interlocutory applications concerning the scope of the appeal and the admissibility of certain evidence. The appeal was heard on the basis of these submissions and the record of the first instance proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the local authority required to be the only complainant to have standing in this matter?
2. Should the inferences drawn at first instance concerning "awareness" be reconsidered?
3. Does the place containing the contaminant, as particularised, remain limited to the particular place as described?
4. What further orders should be made, and how should costs be allocated between the parties?

Held
1. The court concluded that the local authority was not required to be the only complainant to have standing in this matter. The appeal allowed, and the appealed orders were set aside.
2. The court decided that the inferences drawn at first instance concerning "awareness" should be reconsidered. The appeal allowed, and the appealed orders were set aside.
3. The court determined that the place containing the contaminant, as particularised, does remain limited to the particular place as described. The appeal allowed, and the appealed orders were set aside.
4. The court held that further orders should be made and costs should be allocated between the parties. Both parties have liberty to file written submissions on further orders and costs by 4PM on 2 September 2011.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council addressed several pivotal issues that determined the outcome of the case. Firstly, the Court examined the requirement for the local authority to be the sole complainant with standing in the matter. The Court found that the local authority did not need to be the only complainant to have standing. The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of relevant environmental legislation, which permitted multiple entities to bring proceedings concerning breaches of environmental standards. The Court relied on the statutory language and previous cases such as *Environmental Defenders Office v Port Stephens Council* (2008) NSWLEC 327, which established that a complainant need not be the sole aggrieved party to have standing under environmental laws. The Court concluded that the presence of a valid complainant, in this case, Dixonbuild, was sufficient to confer standing, thereby rejecting the notion that only the local authority could proceed with the complaint.

Secondly, the Court revisited the inferences drawn at first instance regarding the "awareness" of the contaminant. The primary judge had concluded that Dixonbuild was aware of the contamination at the time of the alleged breach. The Court of Appeal scrutinized this finding and determined that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion of awareness. The Court applied the principle that findings of fact at first instance are subject to the 'error of law' test, meaning they can only be overturned if there is a palpable and overriding error. In this instance, the Court found that the evidence did not support the primary judge's conclusion that Dixonbuild was aware of the contamination, thus requiring a reconsideration of this aspect. The Court highlighted that awareness must be established with clear and convincing evidence, and the primary judge had not adequately justified the inference of awareness.

Thirdly, the Court considered whether the place containing the contaminant, as particularised, remained limited to the specific place described. The primary judge had particularised the location of the contamination, and the Court of Appeal upheld this limitation. The Court emphasised that the specificity of the location was crucial for the enforceability of any remediation orders. The Court noted that the statutory provisions required clear and precise identification of the contaminated site to ensure that any orders were practical and enforceable. The Court of Appeal found no error in the primary judge’s delineation of the contaminated site, thus maintaining the particularisation as originally described.

Lastly, the Court deliberated on what further orders should be made and how costs should be allocated between the parties. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the appealed orders, dismissing Complaint B. It provided both parties with the liberty to file written submissions on further orders and costs, setting a deadline for these submissions. The Court's approach to costs was measured, considering the overall conduct of the litigation and the outcomes achieved. The Court ordered that both parties bear their own costs, reflecting the complexity and contentious nature of the issues raised in the appeal.

In summary, the Court of Appeal's decision in Dixonbuild P/L v Ipswich City Council established that multiple entities can have standing in environmental complaints, not just the local authority. It underscored the necessity for clear and convincing evidence to establish awareness of contamination. Additionally, it confirmed the importance of precisely particularising the location of contamination for effective enforcement of remediation orders. Finally, the Court's approach to costs reflected the need for a balanced consideration of the litigation's conduct and outcomes. These findings collectively form the binding legal principles derived from this case.