Dixon v Isis Central Sugar Mill Company Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Dixon v Isis Central Sugar Mill Company Ltd & Ors [2022] QSC 185

PARTIES:

DARRYL JAMES MUN DIXON

(applicant/plaintiff)

v
ISIS CENTRAL SUGAR MILL COMPANY LIMITED
ACN 009 657 078

(first defendant)
LYANTA HAULAGE PTY LTD
ACN 155 393 061
(second defendant)
CENTRAL HARVESTING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 8181 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

19 September 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 August 2022

JUDGE:

Cooper J

ORDER:

1.    The plaintiff’s application is dismissed. 

2.    The court will hear the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF A DECISIVE CHARACTER – KNOWLEDGE – REASONABLE STEPS TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN FACTS – where the plaintiff commenced proceedings claiming damages for personal injuries sustained during his employment – where the plaintiff applies for leave to join the respondent as a further defendant – where the limitation period for any action against the respondent has expired – where the plaintiff applies for an order extending the limitation period – where the plaintiff alleges that the identity of the respondent as a defendant to the proceedings was unknown – whether the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the respondent – whether a material fact of a decisive character was not within the means of knowledge of the plaintiff

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 11, s 30, s 31
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 9(7), s 44(8)(b), Part 1 Chapter 2
Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulation 2014 (Qld), r 6
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 222
Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld)

Castlemaine Perkins Limited v McPhee [1979] Qd R 469, cited
NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110, cited
Randel v Brisbane City Council [1984] 2 Qd R 276, cited

COUNSEL:

C Newton for the applicant/plaintiff
A P Collins for the first defendant
K Weber (solicitor) for the second defendant

A C Harding for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Hall Payne Lawyers for the applicant/plaintiff
Barry.Nilsson. Lawyers for the first defendant
Jensen McConaghy Lawyers for the second defendant

HBM Lawyers for the respondent

  1. The plaintiff has commenced proceedings against the first and second defendants claiming damages for personal injuries.  He now applies for leave to join the respondent as a further defendant to the proceeding and for consequential orders under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA). Further, in circumstances where the limitation period for any action against the respondent has already expired, he applies for an order extending the limitation period for the action under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (the Act).

  2. When the matter came on for hearing, I was informed that the respondent opposed the application to extend the limitation period but, if the extension was granted, did not oppose…

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Details
Case
[2022] QSC 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dixon v Isis Central Sugar Mill Company Ltd involved a plaintiff who sought damages for personal injuries sustained during his employment. The plaintiff applied to join the respondent as a further defendant and to extend the limitation period, which had expired. The plaintiff alleged that the identity of the respondent as a defendant was unknown to him, and sought an extension of the limitation period on this basis. The court was required to decide whether the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the respondent and whether a material fact of a decisive character was not within the plaintiff’s means of knowledge.

The court found that it was not unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to make inquiries or instruct his solicitors to make inquiries where the plaintiff did not know the identity of the employer of the loader. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not know that the respondent was the employer of the loader until at least 30 September 2021, the date of the compulsory conference. However, the court was not satisfied that the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to find out that fact before the date specified in s 31(2)(a) of the Act. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the identity of the respondent as the employer of the loader was not within his knowledge until after the date specified in s 31(2)(a) of the Act and that the power to order that the limitation period be extended was not enlivened. The plaintiff's application was dismissed, and the court will hear the parties as to costs.

The court's decision was based on the principle that whether an applicant for an extension of time has taken all reasonable steps to find out a fact can only be answered by reference to what can reasonably be expected from the actual person in the circumstances of the applicant. If the person has taken all the steps that he or she is able to take to find out the fact, and has not found it out, that fact is not within the person’s knowledge for the purposes of s 30(1)(c) of the Act. Conversely, if the person has not taken all the steps that he or she is able to take to find out the fact, then the person will not have established that the fact was not within his or her means of knowledge.

In this case, the court found that the plaintiff had not taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the respondent as the employer of the loader. The plaintiff had been put on notice on 18 June 2018 of the need to identify the employer of the loader, but he did not know the name of the person who loaded his truck or who employed the loader. Although the plaintiff's solicitor had taken steps to identify the employer of the loader, the court found that the plaintiff himself had not taken all reasonable steps to find out that fact. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the identity of the respondent as the employer of the loader was not within his knowledge until after the date specified in s 31(2)(a) of the Act and that the power to order that the limitation period be extended was not enlivened.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s application to extend the limitation period. The court found that the plaintiff had not taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the identity of the respondent as the employer of the loader and that the identity of the respondent was not within the plaintiff’s knowledge until after the limitation period had expired. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the identity of the respondent was a material fact of a decisive character that was not within his means of knowledge. The court will hear the parties as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff’s application is dismissed.

2. The court will hear the parties as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

What follows are my reasons for refusing the application to extend the limitation period.Background The plaintiff claims to have suffered personal injuries as a consequence of an accident which occurred when he was transporting sugar cane to the mill owned by the first defendant on 14 August 2016. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was employed by the second defendant. The accident is alleged to have occurred when a 40 foot trailer carrying three sugar cane bins overturned and disconnected from the prime mover being driven by the plaintiff. The prime mover left the road and collided with a power pole and shed. The bins had been loaded with sugar cane at a siding where they were placed onto the trailer. The person who loaded the bins is referred to in the plaintiff’s pleading, and in the other material before me, as “the loader.” The plaintiff alleges that the loader overloaded the bins and loaded them unevenly, and that it was this conduct which caused the accident. Pursuant to s 11 of the Act, the limitation period for the plaintiff’s action ended on 14 August 2019, three years after the date of the accident. On or about 20 June 2019, the plaintiff’s solicitors served:(a)a notice of claim under PIPA on the first defendant; and(b)a notice of claim for damages under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCR Act) on WorkCover Queensland as the second defendant’s workers’ compensation insurer. In the PIPA notice of claim the plaintiff was required to identify the reasons why he believed that the first defendant caused the incident. This required the plaintiff to identify, in particular, the step, process or acts of the person that caused the incident and the link to the first defendant. The response to that requirement was set out in Annexure D to the notice of claim. Annexure D asserted that (among numerous more generally expressed failings) the first defendant failed to ensure that the cane bins were loaded in accordance with relevant guidelines, and failed to ensure the safe loading and/or positioning of the cane bins on the semi-trailer. It did not, however, assert that the accident had been caused by the manner in which the loader had loaded the cane bins. Nor did it identify any connection between the loader and the first defendant. The PIPA notice of claim informed the first defendant that within one month after having received it, it must:(a)if it considered itself a proper respondent to the claim, give the claimant written notice of whether it was satisfied that the notice of claim complied with the PIPA requirements;(b)if it was unsure whether it was a proper respondent to the claim, give the plaintiff written notice of the further information it reasonably needed to decide whether it was a proper respondent; or(c)if it considered it was not a proper respondent to the claim, give the plaintiff written notice of the reasons why it held that view and any information it had that may have helped the plaintiff identify a proper respondent to the claim.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not consider it unreasonable to expect that a person in the plaintiff’s position make inquiries of the type just discussed, or to instruct his solicitors to make such inquiries, where the plaintiff does not know the identity of the employer of the loader.Conclusion I am satisfied that the plaintiff did not know that the respondent was the employer of the loader until, at the earliest, the compulsory conference held on 30 September 2021. However, where the plaintiff had been put on notice on 18 June 2018 of the need to identify the employer of the loader, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff had taken all reasonable steps to find out that fact before the date specified in s 31(2)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the identity of the respondent as the employer of the loader was not within his knowledge until after the date specified in s 31(2)(a) of the Act and the power to order that the limitation period be extended is not enlivened. The plaintiff’s application is dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Expressed another way, whether an applicant for an extension of time has taken all reasonable steps to find out a fact can only be answered by reference to what can reasonably be expected from the actual person in the circumstances of the applicant. If that person has taken all the steps that he or she is able to take to find out the fact, and has not found it out, that fact is not within the person’s knowledge for the purposes of s 30(1)(c) of the Act.[3] Conversely, if that person has not taken all the steps that he or she is able to take to find out the fact, then the person will not have established that the fact was not within his or her means of knowledge.[4][3]NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110 at [29].[4]Castlemaine Perkins Limited v McPhee [1979] Qd R 469 at 472.Consideration The plaintiff affirmed an affidavit on 3 August 2022 in which he addressed the question of the identity of the loader and the employer as follows:“5.I do not know who was loading the cane bins at the siding on 14 August 2016.6.I am unable to assist the Court with who the people were that were loading the cane bins at the siding. I do not know who employed these people, but I have no reason to doubt the now made assertion that they were employed by the [respondent], but I was not aware of that fact.” Otherwise, the plaintiff simply confirmed the contents of an affidavit affirmed by Kym Greinke, his solicitor, on 2 August 2022. In that affidavit, Ms Greinke deposed to: (a)service of the notices of claim under PIPA and the WCR Act and the responses to those notices;(b)the compulsory conference held on 30 September 2021 and the reference by the solicitors for the first defendant at that conference to the possibility that the respondent employed the loader; and(c)subsequent steps undertaken by Ms Greinke to identify the employer of the loader. Ms Greinke then affirmed a further affidavit on 15 August 2022 which addressed the period prior to the expiry of the limitation period in the following terms:“2.I had a conversation with the Plaintiff on 9 February 2017 in relation to another incident and at this time he mentioned to me about an incident he had on 14 August 2016. A copy of his worker’s compensation file was obtained to review.3.On 14 May 2018 I received a call from the Plaintiff advising he was still in receipt of WorkCover benefits for the incident on 14 August 2016 and that his claim was probably going to close soon.4.On 7 June 2018 I received a call from the Plaintiff and he advised that his workers compensation claim had been closed. A copy of his workers compensation claim file was requested from WorkCover Queensland and the Plaintiff advised that he would obtain a statement from his co-worker.5.The Plaintiff provided a Statement from his co-worker by email on 17 June 2018.6.I requested the Plaintiff to provide the name of the person that loaded his truck and the name and address of the employer of that person and the address of the property where he was loaded on 18 June 2018. The Plaintiff advised that he did not have that information but thought it would be the Childers Mill.7.On 18 June 2018 I telephoned the Plaintiff and he advised that the Mill at Childers basically runs and organizes everything. I received further communication from the Plaintiff advising that the Mill is in fact Isis Mill.8.On 12 July 2018 I telephoned the Plaintiff and advised that Hall Payne Lawyers were willing to act on his behalf in relation to a claim for damages.9.A Client Agreement was forwarded to the Plaintiff on 16 July 2018 for his signature and this is the day that is shown in the PIPA Notices of Claim.10.Consistent with the existing evidence the Plaintiff did not know the name of the person that loaded his truck or who employed the loader, but after discussions with the Plaintiff it was assumed the Isis Central Sugar Mill, because the Plaintiff was being loaded to cart to the Isis Sugar Mill and the Plaintiff understood his employer’s contract was with the Isis Sugar Mill and on that basis a PIPA Part 1 Notice of Claim was issued against the Isis Central Sugar Mill Company on 20 June 2019 and a Notice of Claim for Damages was issued against the Plaintiff’s employer on 20 June 2019. …11.At that point there was no reason to suspect we didn’t have the relevant party.”