Dixon v Cargill Meat Processors Pty Limited - [2009] NSWSC 101

CITATION: Dixon v Cargill Meat Processors Pty Limited & Ors [2009] NSWSC 101

HEARING DATE(S): 2 March 2009

JUDGMENT OF: Schmidt AJ

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 2 March 2009

CATCHWORDS: Courts and Judges - disqualification - apprehension of bias - familial association - husband of Judge, partner in law firm acting for a defendant - no basis for disqualification - application dismissed

CASES CITED: Azar & Anor v Ritchie [2006] NSWIRComm 295
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423
Willoughby City Council v Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation [2008] NSWLEC 231

PARTIES: Stephen John Dixon - Plaintiff
Cargill Meat Processors Pty Limited - First Defendant in 020245/08
Cargill Australia Limited t/as Cargill Beef Australia - Second Defendant in 02/0245/08
Ecowize South Pty Limited - Defendant in 020252/08 and Cross Defendant in 020245/08
Ecowize Specialised Hygiene Services Pty Ltd - Cross Defendant in 020245/08

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 020245/08; 020252/08

COUNSEL: Mr RV Letherbarrow SC with Mr DM Wilson - Plaintiff
Mr GM Watson SC - Defendants in 020245/08
Mr N Perry, counsel - Defendant in 020252/08 and Cross Defendant in 020245/08
Mr N Polin, counsel - Cross Defendant in 020245/08

SOLICITORS:
Stacks - Plaintiff
Henry Davis York - Defendants in 020245/08
Kemp & Co - Defendant in 020252/08 and Cross Defendant in 020245/08
Moray & Agnew - Cross Defendant in 020245/08

- 1 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

SCHMIDT AJ

Monday, 2 March 2009

020245/08 STEPHEN JOHN DIXON -V- CARGILL MEAT PROCESSORS PTY LIMITED AND ANOR

020252/08 STEPHEN JOHN DIXON -V- ECOWIZE SOUTH PTY LIMITED

EX-TEMPORE JUDGMENT

1 HER HONOUR: These proceedings concern claims in negligence arising out of a work place accident, where the plaintiff, Mr Dixon, was injured while cleaning machinery at an abattoir. His services had been provided by his employer, to the owner of the abattoir. Amongst other things, there is a contest between the plaintiff and the defendants as to the circumstances of the accident, who had responsibility for what occurred, what injuries resulted and whether there had been contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

2 At the outset of the hearing, in accordance with my normal practice, I alerted the parties to the fact that my husband is a partner in the firm Henry Davis York, the solicitor on the record for the first defendant, Cargill Meat Processors Pty Limited.

3 On taking instructions, Mr Letherbarrow SC informed me that the plaintiff had instructed that he make an application that I not hear the matter. The plaintiff, who it was explained was not sophisticated, nor well educated, and his wife, had a serious concern that the Judge hearing the claims would have such a close connection with a partner of the firm representing the first defendant. The proceedings were of significant importance to the plaintiff and he had a real unease as to the Judge allocated the matter to hear, having such a close personal connection…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2009] NSWSC 101
Decision Date: 2 March 2009

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dixon versus Cargill Meat Processors Pty Limited involved a dispute regarding a claim for damages due to a workplace accident. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The plaintiff, Dixon, alleged that he had suffered injuries while working for Cargill Meat Processors and sought compensation for the resultant damages. The defendants, Cargill Meat Processors, denied liability and the case proceeded to a hearing before Justice Miller.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Justice Miller should be disqualified from presiding over the case due to a perceived apprehension of bias. The plaintiff argued that Justice Miller should recuse himself because his wife was a partner at a law firm representing Cargill Meat Processors. The plaintiff contended that this familial association could potentially influence the Judge's impartiality. The court had to determine if the circumstances were such that they could reasonably give rise to a perception of bias.

Justice Miller considered the arguments presented and examined the relevant legal principles concerning judicial disqualification. The court found that while the association between the Judge's wife and the law firm was a relevant factor, it was not of itself sufficient to establish an apprehension of bias. The court determined that there was no evidence suggesting that the Judge’s wife had been involved in the case or that the Judge had any involvement in decisions relating to the case. Furthermore, the court held that the mere fact of a familial relationship, without any additional evidence of bias, was insufficient to warrant disqualification. Consequently, the application for disqualification was dismissed.

Orders