DIV16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIV16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1451

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: DIV16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3349
File number: NSD 2359 of 2018
Judgment of: JAGOT J
Date of judgment: 9 October 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time – applicable principles – application dismissed  
Legislation:  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03
Cases cited:

CEA16 v Minister for Immigration of Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2444

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 13
Date of hearing: 2 October 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: B Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 2359 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DIV16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JAGOT J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 OCTOBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for extension of time filed on 18 December 2018 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JAGOT J:

  1. This is an application for an extension of time to file an appeal. The proposed appeal is against orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 November 2018: DIV16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3349 (the primary decision).

  2. In accordance with r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), as it was at the relevant time, the applicant was required to file a notice of appeal within 21 days of the primary decision, that is, by 14 December 2018. However, the applicant did not file his application until 18 December 2018. In his supporting affidavit the applicant stated that he attempted to commence proceedings on 13 December 2018 and applied for a fee waiver however that application was refused on 14 December 2018 as the applicant had not disclosed sufficient documentation evidencing financial hardship. For this reason an extension of time is required.

  3. At the commencement of the hearing the applicant sought an adjournment of the proceedings in order to obtain legal assistance.  In support of the application for adjournment, the applicant submitted that he was under financial hardship.  The first respondent (the Minister) opposed the application on the basis that these proceedings were commenced in December 2018 and that no such application had been previously made.  I accepted the Minister’s submissions and did not allow the adjournment as sought by the applicant.  The hearing of the application for the extension of time continued. 

  4. In his written submissions the Minister highlighted the relevant factors that should be taken into account when…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1451
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant in this case sought an extension of time to file an appeal against orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 November 2018. The Federal Court was required to decide whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file an appeal against the primary decision. The applicant was required to file a notice of appeal within 21 days of the primary decision, however, the application was not filed until 18 December 2018. The applicant sought an adjournment of the proceedings in order to obtain legal assistance and submitted that he was under financial hardship. The Minister opposed the application for an adjournment on the basis that the proceedings were commenced in December 2018 and that no such application had been previously made. The Minister also opposed the application for an extension of time on the basis that the proposed appeal was not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an extension of time.

The court considered the relevant factors that should be taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted. These factors include the extent of and explanation for the delay, any prejudice a respondent might suffer because of the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal. The Minister conceded that the extent of the delay was short and that the applicant’s explanation for the delay weighed in the applicant’s favour. The Minister further conceded that he will not be prejudiced by the grant of an extension of time. The court found that the proposed appeal was not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an extension of time. The applicant’s draft notice of appeal contained the ground that the primary judge erred by dismissing ground 1 of the further amended application for review of the Tribunal’s decision. The court found that this ground was not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an extension of time.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed. The court found that the proposed appeal was not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an extension of time and that the applicant’s explanation for the delay and the Minister’s concession that he will not be prejudiced by the grant of an extension of time did not outweigh the lack of merit in the proposed appeal. The court did not allow the adjournment as sought by the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time filed on 18 December 2018 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

This is an application for an extension of time to file an appeal. The proposed appeal is against orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 November 2018: DIV16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3349 (the primary decision). In accordance with r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), as it was at the relevant time, the applicant was required to file a notice of appeal within 21 days of the primary decision, that is, by 14 December 2018. However, the applicant did not file his application until 18 December 2018. In his supporting affidavit the applicant stated that he attempted to commence proceedings on 13 December 2018 and applied for a fee waiver however that application was refused on 14 December 2018 as the applicant had not disclosed sufficient documentation evidencing financial hardship. For this reason an extension of time is required. At the commencement of the hearing the applicant sought an adjournment of the proceedings in order to obtain legal assistance. In support of the application for adjournment, the applicant submitted that he was under financial hardship. The first respondent (the Minister) opposed the application on the basis that these proceedings were commenced in December 2018 and that no such application had been previously made. I accepted the Minister’s submissions and did not allow the adjournment as sought by the applicant. The hearing of the application for the extension of time continued. In his written submissions the Minister highlighted the relevant factors that should be taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted. These include the extent of and explanation for the delay, any prejudice a respondent might suffer because of the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal: Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–349. The Minister conceded that the extent of the delay was short and that the applicant’s explanation for the delay weighed in the applicant’s favour. The Minister further conceded that he will not be prejudiced by the grant of an extension of time. Accordingly, at issue is whether the proposed appeal is sufficiently meritorious to warrant an extension of time. The applicant’s draft notice of appeal to this Court contains the following ground:1.The primary judge erred by dismissing ground 1 of the further amended application for review of the Tribunal’s [sic] decision. Ground 1 of the further amended application for review of the second respondent’s (the IAA) decision reads as follows:1.The Authority failed to lawfully consider whether the applicant faced a well founded fear of persecution, or a real risk that he would suffer significant harm, upon return to the Kurram Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.Particulars(a) Despite purporting to consider the foreseeable future, the Authority;(i)In reality only considered the situation in Kurram Agency at the time of its decision, and,(ii)Failed to take into account country information before it directly relevant to the chances of increased Sunni militant insurgency into the Kurram Agency.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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