District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic - [2025] FedCFamC2G 353

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic [2025] FedCFamC2G 353

File number: ADG 68 of 2023

Judgment of: JUDGE BROWN

Date of judgment: 13 March 2025

Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Creditor’s Petition for a sequestration order - Applicant holds multiple costs orders against Respondent – Respondent alleges he is a whistleblower and should have never had a judgment made against him – Respondent alleges he does not owe the costs debt in question – whether there is other sufficient cause to apply court’s discretion to not make sequestration order- Respondent alleges he has multiple ongoing claims against Applicant in other courts for an equivalent and/or greater amount than the debts claimed against him – Respondent alleges Applicant pursuing sequestration order with intent of securing object other than recovering a debt – namely to stifle ongoing claims in other courts – whether issuance of bankruptcy notice amounts to an abuse of process

Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 41, 43, 52, 58, 60, 116

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 rr 6.06, 6.14

Local Government Act 1999 (SA) s 54

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (SA)

Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA)

Cases cited:
Cox v Journeaux (No 2) [1935] HCA 48

Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8

Deputy Commissioner of taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144

District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic [2024] FedCFamC2G 1377

Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1915] 20 CLR 509

Glew v Harrowell; in the matter of Glew [2003] FCA 373

Neal v R (1982) 149 CLR 305

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132

Rogers v R (1984) 181 CLR 251

Royal v Nazloomian; in the matter of Royal [2019] FCA 555

Sands v State of South Australia [2012] SASC 159

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] 256 CLR 507

Totev v Sfar [2006] FCA 470

Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34

District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic SSCIV-19-89

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs: 164

Date of hearing: 27 February 2025

Place: Adelaide

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Napier

Solicitor for the Applicant: Norman Waterhouse Lawyers

Solicitor for the Respondent: The Respondent appeared in person

Table of Corrections

14 March 2025 In paragraph 161 the word ‘District’ has been replaced with ‘Supreme’
ORDERS

ADG 68 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE NAUMOVIC, BANKRUPT

BETWEEN:
DISTRICT COUNCIL OF COOBER PEDY

Applicant

AND:
GEORGE NAUMOVIC

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE BROWN

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2025

Amended pursuant to rule 17.05 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal law) Rules 2021 (Cth) on 14 March 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The estate of George Naumovic be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2.The Applicant Creditor’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the Respondent Debtor(s) in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
3.~~The Official Receiver be appointed the trustee of the estate~~
4.A copy of this order is to be provided by the Applicant Creditor to the Official Receiver in Adelaide within 2 days.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:
5.The date of the act of bankruptcy is 8 March 2023.
6.A consent to act as trustee signed by Alan Geoffrey Scott and Thomas Stuart Otway has been served.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Amended pursuant to r 17.05(2)(h) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) on 14 March 2025
JUDGE BROWN:
INTRODUCTION

These reasons for judgment relate to a creditor’s petition for bankruptcy. The relevant petition is dated 31 March 2023. The petitioning creditor is the District Council of Coober Pedy.[1] The respondent to the petition is George Naumovic.[2]
[1] Hereinafter referred to as “Coober Pedy”, “the District Council” or “the petitioning creditor”.
[2] Hereinafter referred to as “Mr Naumovic” or “the debtor”.
Coober Pedy rely on a bankruptcy notice, issued on 13 January 2022, seeking that Mr Naumovic pay a debt owed to it of $43,831.85. This debt derives from a judgment entered in Coober Pedy’s favour, in an amount of $42,845.81, by the Supreme Court of South Australia on 25 August 2021.
Coober Pedy’s position[3] can be succinctly stated and can be summarised as follows:
·Mr Naumovic owes the debt in question;
·He is not able to pay his debts as they fall due and therefore is to be regarded as insolvent;
·Mr Naumovic's various complaints about the conduct of the District Council towards him since at least 2019 do not authorise the court to go behind the judgment made in its favour;
·There exists no other sufficient cause which justify the court exercising its discretion not to make a sequestration order.
[3] See Coober Pedy’s written submissions filed 4 August 2923 and 6 February 2025.
Mr Naumovic prepared his own grounds in opposition to the petition and has filed numerous lengthy supporting affidavits to which are attached very many documents. As a consequence, given the sheer volume of material filed, the convoluted nature and the number of the proceedings which have proceeded it; and the tight timeframe which the relevant legislation prescribes, I come into the case at something of a disadvantage.
For reasons, upon which I will elaborate, in due course, I have formed the view that the proceedings before me, which were listed for hearing on 27 February 2025 must be concluded on or before 28 March 2025.
Judge Lucev, the judicial officer, who has previously had the conduct of these proceedings, described Mr Naumovic’s documents and the submissions which supported them, in the following terms:
Mr Naumovic’s submissions were lengthy, often repetitive, very broad in their scope, and like his affidavits, ventured into irrelevancies, and occasionally scandal. [4]
Respectfully, I do not disagree with this assessment.
[4] See District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic [2024] FedCFamC2G 1377 at [132].
However, I do not question the sincerity nor doubt the intensity of Mr Naumovic’s position that he is civically bound to expose what he sees to be the mala fides of the District Council in its actions against him in particular and how it has comported itself generally in its public administration of the affairs of Coober Pedy – a place which he loves and where has lived for most, if not all of his life. However, these court proceedings cannot be a de facto board of inquiry into those matters.
In a formal sense, Mr Naumovic’s opposition to the petition has the following grounds:
·He does not owe the money in question;
·He is able to pay his debts and is solvent;
·The petitioning creditor does not hold any security over any of his property;
·He has two genuine and arguable claims against Coober Pedy and its officers and administrators, which are for an equivalent and/or greater amount than the debt claimed against him.[5]
[5] See Grounds of Opposition filed 28 April 2023.
It is apparent to me that these grounds have grown in their exposition as the case has proceeded to hearing because of issues passionately, if at times inchoately, raised by Mr Naumovic, in his various affidavits and resulting submissions to the court. In broad terms, it is his case that it would be a grave injustice, if he is to be rendered bankrupt, given the unique circumstances of this case.
In this context, Judge Lucev identified some thirty-three submissions which Mr Naumovic had made in opposition to the bankruptcy notice on which the petition is based.[6] I will not list those submissions verbatim, but rather will attempt to broadly summarise them as follows:
·The court has the authority and should look behind the judgment debt and investigate all the matters which have led up to it to ensure that it is appropriate to make a sequestration order;
·He is to be regarded as a whistle-blower in respect of the activities of Coober Pedy and the relevant petition is inimical with this status and the duty of the District Council to protect him because of it;
·He has brought a claim against the District Council, which is for more than the costs order against him;
·The District Council has an ulterior motive to shut him down, in order to prevent him making disclosures, in the public interest, regarding its prior activities and the financial resources it has devoted to litigation involving him. This, of itself, is likely to amount to maladministration.
[6] See District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic (supra) at [32].
In raw terms, Mr Naumovic requests that the court look at the entire set of circumstances, which led to the relevant Supreme Court judgment being entered against him and share his disquiet about those matters so that it reaches the conclusion that there is other sufficient cause to exercise the discretion, conferred upon it by section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth),[7] such that it declines to make the sequestration order sought by the petitioning creditor.
[7] Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.
These reasons for judgment are directed towards resolving this issue but not the overall probity of the District Council’s actions. However, as has been noted, in a number of cases, bankruptcy is an idiosyncratic form of civil litigation because it has the effect of changing the legal status of the person who is rendered bankrupt. It is not to be applied by rote in the absence of any consideration of the human condition.
In the case of Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd, the Full Court emphasised the fundamental significance of change in status which is wrought upon a person rendered bankrupt and the fact that such a change in status was very often replete with connotations of moral and public failure.[8] The Full Court said as follows:
Whilst it is legitimate for a creditor to proceed in bankruptcy for the purpose of recovering a debt that does not mean that bankruptcy should be viewed in its essential character as part of the process of execution of judgment debts. It is the changing of the status of an insolvent person.[9]
[8] See Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8 at [40].
[9] Ibid at [44].
As such, it reminded first instance courts, such as this one, not to forget the human reality of bankruptcy and the potential emotional significance it held for the individuals affected by it. I hope I am well aware that the act of sequestration is not merely an administrative action.
In this context – the implications in the change of status that sequestration will bring for Mr Naumovic – I must not lose sight of the great moment of these proceedings for him. I accept that he is a political person and community advocate. If he is bankrupt, provisions in the Local Government Act 1999 (SA)[10] will prevent him from becoming a councillor.
[10] Section 54. Hereinafter referred to as the Local Government Act.
Accordingly, he may well be deprived of a democratic forum in which to advance the views about which he feels strongly and advocate reforms for an organisation which he believes is in dire need of it. Thus, in my view, a personal bankruptcy must be regarded as a serious change of status for him.
In addition, it may have implications for the facility with which he can pursue litigation against Coober Pedy in the Supreme and District Court of South Australia, in which he has claimed damages from the District Council for allegedly breaching its statutory duty to protect him as a whistle blower; along with related suits based in negligence, defamation; and victimisation.
Finally, sequestration will have significant personal and financial implications for Mr Naumovic. On any bankruptcy, pursuant to the provisions of section 58(1) of the Act, all of Mr Naumovic’s property will vest in the trustee appointed to administer his estate.
Mr Naumovic has not provided any extensive details of his financial situation in these proceedings. He has not disclosed whether or not he is in paid employment, as far as I can ascertain from his many filed documents, which assiduously leave blank any reference to employment.
He has, however, disclosed ownership of a number of pieces of real property in Coober Pedy, including his home, which is jointly owned with Alexandra Walsh, who is his partner and who has assisted him in his litigation and campaign against the District Council.
The District Council, through its CEO has produced current rate notices for five of these properties, which disclose a combined capital value of $81,500.00.[11] Mr Naumovic has also indicated that the Westpac Bank has a mortgage secured over his home in an amount of around $55,000.00. [12] In this context, Mr Naumovic has never characterised himself as having the means to pay but no inclination to do so. Rather he has asserted that he has no obligation to pay the judgment debt.
[11] See Affidavit of Garry Herdegen filed 26 February 2025.
[12] See Exhibits GN 6 & GN7 to Mr Naumovic’s affidavit filed 28 April 2023.
However, in proceedings ancillary to these ones, in the sense that Mr Naumovic and the administrator of the District Council are the parties to them, Mr Naumovic has provided some evidence of his financial circumstances.
In these proceedings he deposed that he has been on Cenrelink benefits since October 2016 and currently receives $725.20 per fortnight. He is an owner of land at Coober Pedy with a Valuer-General’s valuation of $81,500.00, which is mortgaged to Westpac. The weekly repayments are $113.00, and the rates are $841.00 per quarter.[13]
[13] See Reasons for decision in Naumovic v Jackson (unreported) delivered 17 October 2024 being Exhibht VM.29 to affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 4 February 2025.
It is his case that it is in the public interest that the court go behind the debt in question and exercise its discretion not to make a sequestration order against, given what he, in general terms, characterises as the public interest considerations of the case.
On a fundamental basis, the underpinning of his case is that the case is not really about his insolvency but is directed towards silencing him and thus can be characterised as being an attempt to gain a political advantage over him. He portrays himself as a David in combat with a Goliath. Essentially, the proceedings can be characterised as an abuse of process.
However, the onus remains on Mr Naumovic to establish that any other sufficient cause exists justifying that a sequestration order should not be made, if it is established that an act of bankruptcy has occurred. As was said in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bayeh[14] the onus to establish other sufficient cause rests as a matter of form and substance upon the debtor.
[14] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144 at [12].
BACKGROUND
Mr Naumovic, in his affidavit material, has deposed that he grew up in Coober Pedy and has lived there for most of his life. As a result, he describes himself as being passionate about the town and its citizens. This led him to become part of a loose group of residents of the town known as the Coober Pedy Concerned Residents Group. This, in turn, led him to advocate on behalf of the citizens of the town and ultimately to decide to run for office as a councillor.
There seems to have been some controversy about how the District Council elected in 2016 had administered the town, particularly about how it engaged in contract negotiations to supply electricity to Coober Pedy.
It is Mr Naumovic’s contention that whilst a concerned citizen, he was making what he characterises as whistleblower disclosures in respect of this issue, during this period, to District Council officers and others, about matters which he had uncovered.
It is further his contention that, during this process, he was given to understand that he would be protected as a whistleblower under relevant legislation because of what he had done, which was viewed as being in the public interest.
As a consequence of these controversies, it appears to be the case, that the administration of Coober Pedy was under investigation by the South Australian Ombudsman, on referral from the Independent Commission Against Corruption, between 8 November 2016 until a report was released to the public on 30 July 2018.
As will be set out, in greater detail, as these reasons unfold, the judgment on which the bankruptcy proceedings rely, related to an award of costs made in Coober Pedy’s favour, in proceedings in the Supreme Court, relating to Mr Naumovic’s possession of certain documents, belonging to the District Council and its attempts to secure their return and prevent him from using them, as well as subsequent proceedings initiated by the District Council, for contempt of court, when Mr Naumovic did so, in breach of an injunction applicable to him.
From Mr Naumovic’s perspective, the documents which have led to these multiplicity of proceedings – either against him or which he has initiated – came into his hands, through an error in the District Council’s computer document storage and email system, for which he was not responsible and whilst he was an elected member of the District Council, although not one who had taken up his seat.
More significantly, in his view, the various documents in question, were supportive of complaints of maladministration by the District Council, particularly in respect of how its executive had negotiated the electricity supply contract for Coober Pedy, which he had been agitating since early-2018 and which were the catalyst for him successfully seeking elected office on the District Council.
The Ombudsman reported on this reference in July of 2018 and found that the District Council had committed maladministration in respect of the electricity supply issue and had failed to keep the records, in its possession regarding the relevant contract, in good order. In these circumstances, the responsible minister was asked to consider placing the District Council under administration.
Mr Naumovic, in one of his affidavits, has provided a press release, in which the Ombudsman is said to have described the subject of his investigation, relating to a $198.6m agreement, as one of the most serious examples of maladministration which he had seen.[15]
[15] See affidavit of George Naumovic filed 28 June 2023 at Exhibit 1.
On 24 January 2019, the required proclamation was made placing the District Council into administration, the effect of which was to suspend all councillors (including Mr Naumovic) and appoint Timothy Jackson its administrator.
One of Mr Jackson’s first tasks was to conduct a review of the District Council’s IT systems. This resulted in the discovery that the suspended councillors could still access their email address at the District Council and were able to access the numerous documents stored on its server, including controversial ones relating to the power supply contract and what happened afterwards.
Needless to say, as a result of what has been described as this glitch, Mr Naumovic was able to access numerous private email folders because he had councillor email access. From the District Council’s perspective, because he was a suspended councillor, he should not have been able to access the server in question and, in any event, the documents in question were subject to confidentiality, which did not include Mr Naumovic.

In this context, it is Mr Naumovic’s contention that he felt morally obliged to make the documents public, in the community interest, but also because he wished to use the documents in two defamation proceedings – in one of which he was the applicant and in the other he was the defendant. In addition, it is his contention that he had either actual or implied protection as a whistleblower to use the documents as he saw fit.
On 5 December 2018, Mr Naumovic sought an appointment with the then Deputy Premier and Attorney-General, Ms Chapman, to provide her with evidence germane to the Ombudsman’s inquiry into the District Council, which he asserted revealed criminal offences had been committed. Ms Chapman advised him, in a letter dated 18 December 2018, to contact the Office of Public Integrity,[16] if he wished to pursue a formal complaint.
[16] The OPI.
In this context, she reminded Mr Naumovic that provisions of the ICAC Act prohibited the disclosure of information that forms or is the subject of a report under that Act except in very limited circumstances.[17] As matters transpired, this was sage advice, which Mr Naumovic does not seem to have heeded.
[17] See affidavit of George Naumovic filed 28 June 2023 at Exhibit 1.
The District Council was aggrieved when it became aware that Mr Naumovic had possession of the relevant documents and requested their return and Mr Naumovic’s undertaking not to use them.
When he declined to do so, on 15 February 2019, the District Council commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking their return and an injunction preventing Mr Naumovic using them and the information, which they contained. An urgent interim injunction was made by Judge Dart, to this effect, on 19 February 2019.
Judge Dart, as a Master of the Supreme Court, ruled on the issue, arising from Mr Naumovic’s access to and use of the documents on 11 June 2019. His Honour determined that the documents in question were subject to confidence and Mr Naumovic, as a suspended councillor, had no entitlement to access them.[18]
[18] See District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic SCCIV-19-89.
Judge Dart did not doubt the sincerity of Mr Naumovic’s position in respect of his entitlement to utilise the relevant documents. He wrote as follows:
I should first say that I accept the defendant believes that he is acting in the public interest and that his belief is genuinely held. He says the documents disclose misconduct by Council members and officers in relation to the awarding of a significant contract in 2017.
He says the disclosure of information has led to the commencement of two defamation suits in the Magistrates Court. He is plaintiff in one and defendant in the other. The documents are said to be relevant to the factual matters raised in the defamation action.[19]
[19] See District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic SCCIV-19-89 at [13]-[14].
However, Judge Dart explicitly indicated that, given his rulings in the case, Mr Naumovic was not entitled to utilise the relevant documents in the Magistrates’ Court and so far as his various complaints regarding impropriety of the District Council, the OPI was appropriate person with whom to lodge a complaint.
Mr Naumovic has represented himself throughout these bankruptcy proceedings, as well as in the earlier proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia and other ancillary proceedings in that court and the Magistrates Court of South Australia, relating to the defamation proceedings. He is clearly an intelligent and determined person but is not legally qualified. It is also my impression that he is passionately committed to what he sees as the righteousness of his cause.
I too, do not doubt the sincerity of Mr Naumovic’s belief that he is acting in the public interest. However, as I pointed out to him during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings before me, I am not authorised to conduct a public inquiry into the affairs of the Coober Pedy District Council. My jurisdiction relies solely on the application of the Bankruptcy Act to the many documents filed in the case.
Much of Mr Naumovic’s case relies on innuendo – essentially, the gravity of the failings of the District Council before his election to it and the vehemence with which it has contested the various proceeding against him – can only be indicative of some flaw in the bankruptcy proceeding and/or malign motivation against him, which vitiates those proceedings.
Necessarily, it is Mr Naumovic’s position that given the vehemence with which the District Council has pursued him, it must have something to hide. This has, in turn, led to him forming the impression that the system is being utilised against him because he is a self-represented person who can only fight his corner as best he can, whilst being at an obvious disadvantage against the highly skilled legal teams, which the District Council is able to muster.
I mean no disrespect, but there is something quixotic about the manner in which he has pursued the case. It is my impression that much of his case was replete with the exposition of legal terms, which he did not fully understand. However, it must also be pointed out that he was always scrupulously polite to me and respectful of the formality of the court. He frequently told me that he was doing his best and was not a lawyer. I appreciate that he is not legally qualified and acknowledge the strength of his convictions and the personal significance of these proceedings for him.
Given this context, it has been challenging for him to characterise his opposition to the bankruptcy petition in purely legal terms. In general terms, however, it is his position that the District Council’s petition is unfair, heavy-handed and an act of bad faith, on its part. Essentially, he asserts that the District Council, given its financial resources, is wielding a sledgehammer to crush him, a metaphorical walnut and that this is inappropriate use of the Bankruptcy Act.
That is not to say, he has not been able to mount challenges to every step of the proceedings, which have led to the actual hearing of the petition for the sequestration of his estate – the actual event which will result in him becoming formally bankrupt.
Since the case began (and before it) there have been a plethora of applications. In this court, there have been a number of lengthy judgments of Judge Lucev, the judicial officer who hitherto had carriage of the matter but has now recused himself on the basis of a danger of perceived bias.
In all these circumstances, I have formed the view that there must be some expedition in finalising the petition. On 2 February 2024, when the petition was approaching the first anniversary of its filing, Judge Lucev extended it pursuant to the provisions of section 52(5) of the Act to 30 March 2025 (a Sunday). This section reads as follows:
(5) The Court may, at any time before the expiration of the period of 12 months commencing on the date of presentation of a creditor's petition, if it considers it just and equitable to do so, upon such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, order that the period at the expiration of which the petition will lapse be such period, being a period exceeding 12 months and not exceeding 24 months, commencing on the date of presentation of the petition as is specified in the order.
In my view, it is not legally open to the court to extend the petition again beyond its current period of 24 months. Accordingly, in my view it is necessary for the court to complete the hearing on or before 28 March 2025.
In this context, Mr Naumovic applied to adjourn the proceedings. The basis for the adjournment was the fact that on 3 February 2025, Mr Naumovic had issued a subpoena directed to Mr Jackson to give evidence at the hearing of the petition on 27 February 2025. Mr Naumovic served the subpoena on Mr Jackson via his email address on or about 7 February.
As Mr Jackson did not answer the subpoena, it is Mr Naumovic’s position that his case is prejudiced, and it should be adjourned. I declined to do so. In order to understand why I did so, it is necessary to detail some of the circumstances of the hearing of 27 February.
There appears little doubt that Mr Jackson knows of these proceedings in general terms. He is no-longer the administrator of Coober Pedy. He has been previously served with a subpoena by Mr Naumovic. He has also been a party in other defamation proceedings involving Mr Naumovic in the Magistrates’ Court of South Australia.
The issue and service of subpoenas, in this court, is governed by the provisions of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021. In general terms, a subpoena to give evidence must be personally served [rule 6.06]. However, the court has a discretion to order substituted service [rule 6.14].
Mr Naumovic enclosed an email, which he sent to Mr Jackson, with the subpoena, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
[A]s you were responsible for authorising that the DCCP obtain a Bankruptcy Notice against me which is the basis on which the application for the Creditor's Petition has been made, I will be seeking to cross examine you in person in the alternative it has come to my attention that you are currently conveniently in South Africa it will be your responsibility to organize with the court to establish a video link where you can be cross examined. If you fail to comply with the subpoena I will be asking the court to issue a warrant.
Mr Naumovic conceded that he has learnt that Mr Jackson was in South Africa by accessing his facebook page. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that he did not appear when the subpoena was called upon on 27 February 2025, the date of hearing of the petition.
Given my view regarding the need for some expedition to be applied in respect of finalising the petition and how the case has proceeded up to this stage, I was not inclined to grant the adjournment sought, particularly given there was no information available to me as to when Mr Jackson was likely to be returning to Australia or as to the viability as to him giving evidence electronically.
More significantly, it did not seem to me that his evidence was likely to be relevant to the issues required to be canvassed in these bankruptcy proceedings. In light of Mr Naumovic’s email above, it would appear to be the case that the purpose of his evidence was to secure admission of some form of smoking gun in respect of what was the District Council’s motivation for instigating the bankruptcy proceedings against him.
This subpoena was issued by Mr Naumovic along with others addressed to Mr David Kelly, the current administrator of the District Council; Mr Vasilios Marinos, Coober Pedy’s solicitor; and Mr Gerry Herdigan, its current chief executive officer and made returnable on the same day.
Mr Marinos has filed five affidavits in support of the petition.[20] These set out the procedural history of the matter in this court and other proceedings involving Mr Naumovic and individuals associated with Coober Pedy in the Magistrates Court.
[20] See the Affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 14 July 2023; the Affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 24 November 2023; the Affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 21 December 2023; the Affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 24 January 2024; the Affidavit of Vasilios Marinos filed 4 February 2025.
In addition, he has deposed as to procedural matters relating to the satisfaction of conditions necessary for the petition to be granted such as a current search of the National Personal Insolvency Register and the fact that the relevant debt remains unsatisfied. These do not seem to be controversial.
Mr Marinos, Mr Kelly and Mr Herdigan each answered the subpoena to which they were subject. Again, the purpose of the subpoena issued to Mr Kelly and Mr Marinos in particular seemed to be directed towards uncovering, through cross-examination, some malign purpose on the District Council’s part for issuing the relevant bankruptcy notice against him.
Mr Marinos was unable to disclose the precise amount of money the District Council had allocated to this matter and others related to Mr Naumovic. Axiomatically, it must be a very significant sum. However, in my view, whether it is a reasonable for Coober Pedy to allocate its funds, in this way, is an issue beyond the scope of these proceedings.
In my view, it is primarily a political concern. In this context, it behoves me to keep in mind the insolvency aspects of bankruptcy and the fact that the various judgment debts, which establish an act of bankruptcy remain extant, as do others, relating to other litigation in which Mr Naumovic has been involved.
Mr Marinos declined to answer questions relating to what instructions he had been given by his client to issue the bankruptcy notice and pursue the sequestration order on the basis that this was a topic covered by legal professional privilege. I upheld his objection.
Mr Kelly’s affidavit[21] was directed towards establishing the existence of the judgment debt in Coober Pedy’s favour and verifying the contents of the petition, in rebuttal of Mr Naumovic’s assertion that he did not. In my assessment Mr Naumovic’s cross-examination of him was not helpful in respect of this issue and shed no light whatsoever in respect of his more broadly based allegations regarding the mala fides of the District Council.
[21] Affidavit of David Kelly filed 31 March 2023.
Mr Herdigan has been Coober Pedy’s CEO since 19 August 2024. Accordingly, his appointment long post-dated the instigation of the bankruptcy proceedings against Mr Naumovic. One of Mr Herdigan’s responsibilities is to maintain the rate roll for Coober Pedy. In this capacity, as previously indicated he provided evidence of the rates attributed to each of Mr Naumovic’s five properties within the District Council.
Mr Naumovic has challenged Coober Pedy’s petition on the basis that it indicated that the District Council was a secured creditor of Mr Naumovic in an amount of $1,609.23, which he asserted was fallacious and therefore the petition itself was invalid.
Mr Herdigan deposed that relevant provisions of the Local Government Act prescribed that monies owed as rates were to be characterised as secured debts. At the time of the issue of the petition, he believed this was the amount of the rates levied by the District Council in respect of Mr Naumovic.
Mr Naumovic has filed numerous affidavits in these proceedings and Ms Walsh two.[22] As indicated above, Mr Naumovic’s affidavits are lengthy and repetitive and attach numerous documents. Ms Walsh has deposed that Mr Naumovic is not computer-literate and so she has assisted him in these proceedings.
[22] See the Affidavits of Alexandra Jane Walsh filed 27 June 2023; the Affidavit of Alexandra Jane Walsh filed 21 February 2025.
Counsel for Coober Pedy, Mr Napier, indicated that he did not wish to cross-examine either Mr Naumovic or Ms Walsh in respect of their affidavits. Rather he relied on written submissions to rebut the various allegations of impropriety alleged against Coober Pedy and its relevant officers and to challenge their relevance.
Thus, there are few real evidentiary issues regarding what has occurred in the two Supreme Court proceedings and other related proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court and, in practical terms, Mr Naumovic is not in a position to challenge the quantum of the various costs judgments made against him.
When his case is boiled down to its essence, it remains his position that Coober Pedy should not have pursued him because of his status as a concerned citizen, who had provided information about the District Council whose management had been called into question by him and others. A stance which received some endorsement by the findings of the Ombudsman.
In my view, the difficulty with this submission is that Coober Pedy did elect to seek the injunction, after putting Mr Naumovic on notice that it would. He contested the case and lost. Costs were awarded against him, which he challenged but which were subsequently confirmed. These costs remain outstanding. Mr Naumovic has not indicated that he has access to funds sufficient to pay the amounts in question.
In this context, the following exegesis of principle, provided by the High Court in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton[23] seems to me to be germane to the current matter:
In point of principle, scrutiny by a Bankruptcy Court of the debt propounded by a judgment creditor seeking a sequestration order in no sense involves an attempt to impeach the judgment. A Bankruptcy Court is not concerned with whether the judgment should be set aside as upon an appeal, or even as a default judgment or a judgment obtained by fraud may be set aside; nor is a Bankruptcy Court concerned to deny the effect of the judgment as "res judicata" between the parties to it. A Bankruptcy Court is not concerned to prevent the judgment creditor from invoking the ordinary processes of execution available under the general law. Rather, a Bankruptcy Court is concerned with whether the debt on which it is based is truly a basis for the making of a sequestration order A Bankruptcy Court has a statutory duty to be "satisfied" as to the existence of the petitioning creditor's debt; a creditor should not be able to make a person bankrupt on a debt which is not provable.
[23] Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132 at [54] per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ.
Mr Naumovic also asks that the court look behind the relevant judgment and question its validity on the basis of his own assertions as to its probity and because he should be accorded some measure of indemnity because of his characterisation as a whistle-blower against the District Council’s maladministration.
In her second affidavit, Ms Walsh deposed as to her understanding that Coober Pedy had sought compensation from its relevant IT supplier for losses arising from the unfortunate glitch, which in simplistic terms, has been the catalyst for the litigation leading to the bankruptcy notice in question.
Given this matter, Mr Naumovic wished to cross-examine the subpoenaed witnesses to give evidence about this issue and particularly whether any compensation received covered the costs of the District Council’s litigation against him and thus it was, in effect, double-dipping. Mr Napier objected to this line of questioning on the basis of relevance – an objection which I upheld.
The Supreme Court proceedings were concerned with Mr Naumovic’s decision to decline to return the documents and consent not to utilise them. Although the glitch enabled him to obtain them, any negligence attributable to the IT provider for it was not causally related to Mr Naumovic’s election to do what he did. Thus, the issue did not seem to me to be relevant to the question of the petition itself.
Prior to the issue of these subpoenas, on 14 July 2023, a subpoena to produce documents was directed towards Mr Kelly seeking production of the 23 documents which were the subject of the injunctive proceedings in the Supreme Court. Coober Pedy sought to set this subpoena aside.
On 14 November 2023, Registrar Parkyn set the subpoena aside. Mr Naumovic sought a review of this decision, which was ultimately confirmed by Judge Lucev on 11 December 2024 in a learned and thorough judgment.[24]
[24] District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic [2024] FedCFamC2G 1377.
In forensic terms, it appears to have been Mr Naumovic’s view that the contents of these documents would have established that he was indeed a whistle blower for the purpose of the relevant legislation or had been offered such status by an officer of Coober Pedy.
Judge Lucev confirmed that Mr Naumovic potentially was entitled to some form of protection as either a whistle-blower or a public officer, as a consequence of two pieces of South Australian legislation – the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (SA) and the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA).[25]
[25] Ibid at [55] – [58].

However, the issue before the court was whether this potential status, which Mr Naumovic claimed for himself and which he therefore wished to examine could be actually tied to the bankruptcy proceedings before the court. Judge Lucev concluded that it could not. He said as follows:
The difficulty for Mr Naumovic is that the liability arising from the Interim Costs Order does not arise from an appropriate disclosure of public interest information. Rather, it arises from a refusal by Mr Naumovic to return to the Council documents in his possession, namely, the Restricted Documents, which he was not entitled to possess, and in relation to which the Council had to obtain from the SCSA the Injunction restraining Mr Naumovic from accessing, using, or copying, disseminating or otherwise dealing with, in any way …. Mr Naumovic therefore incurred the liability under the Interim Costs Orders in proceedings in which the Council successfully sought to enforce its right to restrict the use (in broad terms) of the Restricted Documents (amongst thousands of other documents) which Mr Naumovic had no right to access, use, copy, disseminate, or otherwise deal with.
Respectfully I agree with this conclusion. In my view, it is the central issue in the current proceedings, which are concerned with the consequences of the proceedings before Judge Dart, namely the costs award, which led to the bankruptcy notice not the issue which were determined in the suit. These proceedings have been concluded. Accordingly, Mr Naumovic’s assertion that he is a whistle-blower cannot assist him to establish that he does not legally owe the relevant debt.
In essential terms, the cost order was made because Mr Naumovic declined to return the documents which had unintentionally come into his possession, not because he was a whistle-blower or had some form of public immunity. In this context, Mr Naumovic challenged the legitimacy of the District Council seeking the return of the documents and restricting their future use in the Supreme Court. He was unsuccessful in this action and costs were awarded against him.
In my view, these various matters, along with the imminence of the expiration of the relevant petition and the uncertainty surrounding when Mr Jackson could possibly answer the subpoena in question provide the matrix in which the issue of the adjournment of the current proceedings was to be considered.
Mr Naumovic apparently wished to cross-examine Mr Jackson about Coober Pedy’s motivation for issuing the bankruptcy notice against him with the intent of extracting from him (Mr Jackson) the concession that it was done so for some malign purpose. However, in my view, for the reasons provided above, this cannot convert the status of the debt in question. The debt was a real debt, which had not been satisfied. Accordingly, Coober Pedy were entitled to seeks its payment through the service of a bankruptcy notice.
Thus, in my view, Mr Naumovic’s wish to cross-examine Mr Jackson is a fishing expedition. In addition, the fact that he is likely to have wanted to put to him (Mr Jackson) issues to do with the expense of these various proceedings, which by necessary implication must be borne by the public purse, is similarly extraneous to these proceedings.
In my view, it is a political issue as to how Coober Pedy decides to allocate its revenue. It cannot be a matter for this court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act. As I said to Mr Naumovic, on a number of occasions during the hearing, this court cannot be a de facto inquiry into some aspects of the administration of the District Council. For these reasons, I confirm my decision not to adjourn the proceedings.
CHRONOLOGY
As will be detailed in the following chronology Mr Naumovic has demonstrated that he is a determined litigant on multiple fronts, all of which have related to his concerns regarding the actions of Coober Pedy and its officers, including a former councillor, Mr Justin Freytag, who was elected to the District Council in 2016. Apart from one action, Mr Naumovic has been unsuccessful in his litigation.
Given the number of affidavits filed in these proceedings and the multiplicity of documents attached to them, referencing these many other proceedings it is necessary to provide a chronology of the significant events; which have led to these reasons for judgment.
·November 2017, Mr Naumovic commences proceedings for defamation against Justin Freytag, a former councillor of the District Council, in the Port Augusta Magistrates’ Court;
·July 2018 Ombudsman’s report delivered;
·November 2018 Mr Naumovic is elected to the District Council;
·18 November 2018 Ms Chapman advises Mr Naumovic to raise his complaints with the OPI and warns him of the risk of disclosure of information covered by ICAC;
·20 December 2018, Mr Freytag commences defamation proceedings against Mr Naumovic in the Magistrates’ Court alleging that he was defamed by him (Mr Naumovic) in respect of his involvement in the electricity supply contract to Coober Pedy;
·24 January 2019 the District Council is placed into administration and Mr Jackson is appointed administrator;
·Early February 2019, Mr Jackson orders a back-up of IT systems at the District Council and discovers a glitch that enables the suspend councillors to access restricted information on its system;
·February 2019 it becomes apparent that the 23 documents, in question have come into Mr Naumovic’s control, from the District Council’s server;
·15 February 2019 the District Council commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court seeking their return and an injunction preventing Mr Naumovic using them and the information, which they contained.
·19 February 2019 Judge Dart makes an interim injunction to this effect;
·5 July 2019 Judge Dart delivers judgment in injunction proceedings and finds against Mr Naumovic and make final injunctive orders;
·13 August 2019, Mr Naumovic amends his statement of claim in the Freytag proceedings alleging misfeasance in public office. These proceedings appear to have been permanently stayed;
·28 October 2019 Coober Pedy commence contempt proceedings, in the Supreme Court, against Mr Naumovic as result of him using the documents subject to injunction, in the Freytag proceedings;
·24 January 2020 Judge Dart orders that Mr Naumovic pay Coober Pedy’s costs in the injunction proceedings on a party/party basis;
·13 May 2020 Stanley J finds Mr Naumovic guilty of contempt;
·25 August 2020 Stanley J orders Mr Naumovic to pay 20% of Coober Pedy’s costs on an indemnity basis;
·On 25 August 2020 Coober Pedy file a bill of costs in the injunctive proceedings in an amount of $85,691.62;
·24 September 2020 Mr Naumovic challenges the calculation of costs;
·25 November 2020 Coober Pedy file an interim application seeking costs in an amount of $42,845.81 in respect of the injunctive proceedings;
·25 January 2021 Mr Naumovic files an interim application seeking the dismissal of the application for costs, which is ultimately fixed for hearing on 25 August 2021;
·13 July 2021 Mr Naumovic commences proceedings against Mr Jackson in the Magistrates’ Court alleging defamation and seeking damages later amended to be $100,000.00;
·12 August 2021 Mr Freytag obtains judgment against Mr Naumovic in an amount of $15,140.00. The judgment remains unsatisfied;
·23 August 2021 Mr Naumovic seeks an adjournment of the injunctive proceedings costs application due to health issues;
·25 August 2021 the adjournment application is declined and the hearing proceeds leading to Judge Bochner making an award of costs in Coober Pedy’s favour in a further amount of $42,845.81;
·27 October 2021 Mr Naumovic files an application seeking a stay of the costs order;
·3 November 2021 Judge Bochner dismisses the stay application;
·On 17 December 2021 Mr Jackson is removed as party from Mr Naumovic’s action in the Magistrates’ Court and the State of South Australia is substituted as the respondent;
·13 January 2022 the relevant bankruptcy notice is issued claiming a total debt of $43,831.85;
·22 February 2022 Mr Naumovic applies to the Federal Circuit and Family Court[26] to set the bankruptcy notice aside on the basis that the judgment on which it is based is not valid;
[26] The FCFCOA.
·27 April 2022 the FCFCOA lists application to set aside for hearing on 29 July 2022;
·17 May 2022 Mr Naumovic commenced a second set of proceedings against Mr Jackson alleging breach of statutory duty (whistle-blower) and negligence in the Magistrates’ Court;
·24 August 2022 the State of South Australia consents to the entry of judgment in Mr Naumovic’s favour in an amount of $12,000.00 together with $700.00 costs. On the basis that it is not economic for it to defend the proceedings;
·31 August 2023 Registrar Parkyn of the FCFCOA dismisses the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice;
·5 September 2022 Mr Naumovic applies to set aside the orders of Judge Bochner in respect of the costs of the injunctive proceedings;
·16 September 2022 Mr Naumovic applies to the FCFCOA for a review of Registrar Parkyn’s decision;
·18 October 2022 FCFCOA fixes review application for hearing on 24 November 2022;
·8 November 2022 Judge Bochner dismisses application to set aside costs order;
·22 February 2023 Judge Lucev dismisses the application for review and orders Mr Naumovic to pay Coober Pedy’s costs in an amount of $10,000.00;[27]
[27] Naumovic v Coober Pedy District Council [2023] FedCFamC2G 125.
·23 February 2023 Magistrate Fotheringham orders that Mr Naumovic provide security for costs in an amount of $34,500.00; in the second claim brought by Mr Naumovic against Mr Jackson;
·23 March 2023 Magistrate Fotheringham stays the application following the failure to provide the security;
·31 March 2023 the creditor’s petition is filed;
·20 April 2023 Magistrate Fotheringham awards costs against Mr Naumovic in the sum of $1,650.00;
·1 May 2023 the petition is referred to Judge Lucev for listing by the registrar, who directs affidavits are to be filed by 7 July 2023;
·4 May 2023 Mr Naumovic formally advises Coober Pedy of his intention to take action against it in the District Court for defamation;
·31 May 2023 Judge Lucev extends time for filing affidavits and fixes petition for hearing on 31 October and 1November 2023;
·14 July 2023 subpoena to Mr Kelly issued;
·15 August 2023 Judge Lucev refers objection to Kelly subpoena to the Registrar for determination;
·16 August 2023 Judge Bochner makes a final order for costs in favour of Coober Pedy in the injunctive proceedings in an amount of $86,470.97 following a taxation;
·14 November 2023 Registrar Parkyn sets aside the Kelly subpoena;
·27 November 2023 Mr Naumovic files a review of the decision of Registrar Parkyn;
·29 November 2023 Judge Bochner orders that Mr Naumovic pay the costs of the taxation fixed in an amount of $44,754.71;
·30 November 2023 Judge Lucev re-fixed hearing of petition for 26, 27 and 28 February 2024;
·30 January 2024 claim filed by Mr Naumovic, against Coober Pedy, in the Federal Court is rejected for filing as not being within jurisdiction of the court;
·2 February 2024 petition extended to 30 March 2025 and hearing listed for 26 February vacated;
·13 February 2024 Mr Naumovic files claim in the District Court against Coober Pedy seeking damages of $2m in respect of defamation and breach of statutory duty (victimisation) pursuant to Public Interest Disclosure Act;
·9 April 2024 Mr Naumovic files a claim for defamation against Mr Jackson in the District Court. Mr Jackson seeks orders to strike out application and for security of costs;
·26 September 2024 Coober Pedy seek to strike out application and make application for security for costs in an amount of $34,872.50, which is listed for hearing on 16 January 2025;
·17 October 2024 Auxiliary Associate Judge Roder strikes out some paragraphs of Mr Naumovic’s application but give him leave to re-plead but declines to make an order for security for costs;
·4 November 2024 Mr Jackson files an appeal against the decision of Judge Roder;
·19 December 2024 District Court adjourns Coober Pedy’s application for security for costs to 25 March 2025 pending outcome of appeal to Supreme Court;
·11 December 2024 Judge Lucev dismisses review application and orders that Mr Naumovic pay Coober Pedy’s costs fixed in an amount of $8,639.06 by 11 January 2025. Judge Lucev also recuses himself from further hearing petition;
·24 January 2025 petition listed before me and ultimately fixed for hearing on 27 February 2025.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO SEQUESTRATION
The court’s jurisdiction to make a sequestration order is founded in section 43(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. It depends upon the petitioning creditor establishing the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the debtor concerned.
In addition, the section provides a number of other conditions which must be satisfied which include residence in Australia, at the time of the commission of the act of bankruptcy. It is also clear that the authority to make a sequestration order is discretionary in nature.
Section 40 provides an exhaustive list of circumstances which constitute an act of bankruptcy. Of particular relevance in the following matter, is section 40(1)(g) which provides as follows:
(g)       if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not:
(i)        where the notice was served in Australia--within the time specified in the notice; or
(ii)       where the notice was served elsewhere--within the time fixed for the purpose by the order giving leave to effect the service;
comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained;[28]
[28] See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(g).
The power granted to the Official Receiver, to issue bankruptcy notices, arises pursuant to section 41(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as follows:
(1)      An Official Receiver may issue a bankruptcy notice on the application of a creditor who has obtained against a debtor:
(a)       a final judgment or final order that:
(i)        is of the kind described in paragraph 40(1)(g); and
(ii)       is for an amount of at least the statutory minimum’
At relevant times, the statutory minimum was $10,000.00.
Section 52(1) of the Act provides the process which the court is required to follow at the hearing of a creditor’s petition and the evidentiary matters which must be satisfied before a sequestration order is made. The section is in the following terms:
(1) At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:
(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);
(b) service of the petition; and
(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;
and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.
I am satisfied that the debt specified in the petition remains unsatisfied.[29] I am also satisfied that the petition was served on Mr Naumovic[30] and that he was a resident of Australia when the judgment debt was issued against him.
[29] See affidavit of Garry Herdagan filed 26 February 2025.
[30] See affidavit of William Eglington filed 28 April 2023.
Mr Naumovic essentially seeks that the court should exercise its discretion not to make him bankrupt because of what, in general terms, he would characterise as the public interest, which these proceedings entail and further that they have been brought for some form of improper purpose unrelated to issues of insolvency and are, as such, an abuse of process.
In addition, it is his position that he has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the judgement debt on which Coober Pedy rely in the form of his District Court proceedings against it.
It is clear from the use of the word may in section 52(1) that the court’s authority to make a sequestration order is discretionary. It is also subject to the considerations contained in section 52(2), which reads as follows:
If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:
(a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or
(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;
it may dismiss the petition.
This is the nub of Mr Naumovic’s case. He submits that he has demonstrated other sufficient cause why the sequestration order sought by Coober Pedy should not be made. As previously indicated, the onus is on him to establish that such causes exist.
Sufficient Other Cause
As indicated above, it seems to me that Coober Pedy has satisfied the various criteria necessary for a sequestration order to be made pursuant to section 52. It therefore falls to Mr Naumovic to establish that there is sufficiently potent reasons as to why it should not be made. I acknowledge that the expression other sufficient cause had been broadly interpreted in the past and has connotations of public interest.
In Totev v Sfar[31] Allsop J (as he then was) said as follows:
On proof of the matters in section 52(1) of the Act, the Court will generally proceed to make an order for sequestration. It is for the debtor to persuade the Court that the public interest in the dealing with the insolvent debtor and the rights of individual creditors are outweighed by other considerations.
[31] Totev v Sfar [2006] FCA 470 at [37].
In practical terms, for reasons, related to the public interest, Mr Naumovic seeks that the court should look behind the judgment, on which Coober Pedy relies, and conclude that the bankruptcy proceedings, which it founds, represent some form of abuse of process because they are directed towards securing some object other than recovering a debt, namely stifling the democratic process and/or hamstringing his legitimate claims for redress against Coober Pedy, which he has instituted in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. In my view, for the reasons which follow, there are major evidentiary and legal flaws in this contention and therefore it must fail.
In my assessment, Mr Naumovic’s position largely rests on the inferences, which he seeks should be drawn from the circumstance prevailing prior to the institution of the proceedings. Firstly, he has been a long-standing critic of Coober Pedy, which led him to run successfully for the District Council. Secondly, he has information which he has disclosed about these matters, which some individuals would not want to be publicly ventilated. Thirdly, these contentions are axiomatically supported by the vehemence with which the District Council has conducted the proceedings against him.

Essentially, given them multiplicity of proceedings involved and the obvious expenditure involved, Coober Pedy and/or persons associated with it wish to prevent him ventilating the issues of concern to him and from running for District Council again or are intent on utilising these bankruptcy proceedings in order to intimidate him and/or order to silence him.
As previously indicated, the burden is on Mr Naumovic to establish his contentions and it is a heavy one to discharge.[32] To assert that a proceeding represents an abuse of process is a serious allegation; it is not one that can be made without a sufficient factual foundation.[33]
[32] See Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 at [42].
[33] See Royal v Nazloomian; in the matter of Royal [2019] FCA 555 at [37].
I accept that the concept of what constitutes an abuse of process is not to be regarded as a closed category of matters but depends on the individual circumstances of each case. In Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd[34] the majority of the High Court said as follows:
Although insusceptible of a formulation which comprises closed categories, abuse of process is capable of application in any circumstances in which the use of a court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
[34] See Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] 256 CLR 507 at [25].
In Rogers v R McHugh J noted that abuse of procedures usually falls into one of three categories as follows:
(1)the court's procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose;
(2)the use of the court's procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or
(3)the use of the court's procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The yardstick to be applied to such criteria being that the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice and unfairness. [35]
[35] Rogers v R (1984) 181 CLR 251 at 286.
In this context, I turn to the facts which have led the parties to the current position. Due to the glitch Mr Naumovic came into possession of documents to which he was not legally entitled. Neither he nor the District Council could have either foreseen or intended that this would happen. It was a mistake attributable to neither of them.
For legitimate reasons, the District Council asked for their return and to prevent Mr Naumovic utilising them because, in its view, they were confidential. Mr Naumovic did not agree. Coober Pedy took him to court and won. Its stance was wholly vindicated and remains so. There has been no appeal.
The usual rule in civil litigation is that costs follow the event. Coober Pedy were entitled to seek the costs of the proceedings in which it had been successful. Following an exhaustive process those costs were calculated and remain outstanding. In my view, it is legitimate for the District Council to seek the payment of those costs. This entitlement cannot entail any invocation of any public interest concern of itself.
In my view, it is not for this court to look behind the judgment of Judge Dart and attempt, essentially in the dark, to conclude that there was some public policy consideration or some other matter which justified Mr Naumovic retaining and using those documents. As I have pointed out throughout these proceedings, I have no jurisdiction to inquire into the probity of the Coober Pedy District Council and the efficacy of its administration.
The costs order being legitimate, so too, it seems to me, is the invocation of the bankruptcy notice and what has followed consequentially from it. In my view, Mr Naumovic’s unsupported assertion that the documents in question hold matters of public interest and are supportive of his various claims of having been the victim of malfeasance, at the hands of the District Council and its officers, cannot render the current proceedings an abuse of process. I am not in a position to conclude that the sole purpose of the proceedings, from the District Council’s perspective, was to achieve what Mr Naumovic asserts.
From the District Council’s perspective, it achieved what it wished, namely the suppression of the documents, which it asserted had been illegitimately obtained by Mr Naumovic, in the Supreme Court proceedings. These proceedings resulted in the sealing of the relevant document.
Accordingly, the District Council did not need to institute bankruptcy proceedings in order to advance this aspect of its agenda. It had been entirely successful in terms of suppressing the aspects of Mr Naumovic’s agitation, about which it was most concerned, prior to the instigation of the bankruptcy notice.
In this context, in my view, Mr Naumovic has advanced no evidence to support his assertion that the bankruptcy proceedings were in someway directed to concealing prior promises of whistle-blower protection offered to him, which had subsequently been reneged upon, when Coober Pedy had been placed into administration.
In addition, in my view, it cannot be said that the bankruptcy proceedings were motivated by some malign desire, on Coober Pedy’s part, to curtail Mr Naumovic’s entitlement to agitate publicly about issues to do with what he regarded as the maladministration of the District Council. He could have continued to canvas public opinion about the District Council and its activities, provided, of course, that he did so within the parameters of the law. In this respect, it would have been prudent of him to have heeded the advice provided to him by Ms Chapman.
I acknowledge the stark contrast between the legal resources of the two parties in these extraordinarily protracted proceedings. Mr Naumovic must bear some level of responsibility in this regard. He has not been averse to commencing litigation himself. In this context, it remains open to Mr Naumovic to ventilate publicly, as he sees fits, what he regards as the scandal of the public monies which have been expended upon pursuing him.
As I have already mentioned, the general rule in civil litigation that a wholly successful party ought to receive his or her costs cannot be regarded as an obscure one, even in cases in which one party assets that there are matters of public policy engaged. [36] In these circumstances, I do not consider that there is any evidence to indicate that Coober Pedy instituted the bankruptcy proceedings out of sheer vindictiveness for Mr Naumoivc.
[36] See Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72.
True it is that a sequestration order will have the consequence of precluding Mr Naumovic from holding public office during the period of his bankruptcy. It is inconceivable to me that the accomplishment of this objective can have been the motivation for Coober Pedy seeking its costs at the conclusion of the injunctive proceedings and then seeking to engage bankruptcy proceedings. Rather, as I have already outlined, it seems to me to have been an ordinary incident of civil litigation from Coober Pedy’s perspective.
The essence of an abuse of process is that the proceedings concerned have been brought not to prosecute them to their proper legal conclusion but rather as a means of obtaining some advantage, for which they are not designed or some collateral advantage beyond what the law offers.
In this case, to establish an abuse of process, Mr Naumovic must present sufficient evidence to establish that the District Council of Coober Pedy has brought the sequestration proceedings against him, not to recover the moneys owed to it, but rather to achieve some objective extraneous to the remedies available to it under the Bankruptcy Act, namely, to prevent him taking part in the public life of the District Council.
In Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd[37] the Full Court of the Federal Court applied the principles enumerated by Isaacs J in Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited,[38] which differentiated between the malicious use of a process and the abuse of such process. In the case, Isaacs J said as follows:
If the object sought to be effected by the process is within the lawful scope of the process, it is a use of the process within the meaning of the law, though it may be malicious, or even fraudulent, and in the circumstances the
[37] See Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd (supra).
[38] Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1915] 20 CLR 509 at [521]-[522].
This passage was approved by the High Court in Williams v Spautz, which categorised the statement as being an attempt to achieve a formulation which keeps the concept of abuse of process within reasonable bounds.
Essentially, it may be acceptable if the use of a particular process achieves some end in addition to the proper legal purpose entailed but if the sole purpose of engaging a legal mechanism is directed towards achieving something to which the provision is not directed, it is abuse.
This seems to me to be the case here. The disqualification of Mr Naumovic from being entitled to take office as a councillor, pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government Act, is to be regarded as incidental consequence of the sequestration process and not its motivating factor.
However, it is both impossible and undesirable to attempt to proscribe every instance which may amount to an abuse of process. Each particular case must turn on its particular circumstances and the overall test is whether the suit in question is unjustifiably oppressive in its application or otherwise is calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Mr Naumovic contends that the use of sequestration against him, a person whom the District Council must be aware is not a person with significant asset backing but is passionate about matters to do with the administration and good order of Coober Pedy, is analogous to breaking a butterfly upon a wheel and, as such, will bring the administration of justice into disrepute on the basis that it is unnecessarily severe.
In my view, the difficulty with this submission is that it asks the court to look behind the award of costs made by Judge Dart in the injunctive proceedings and determine that it was wrong on public policy grounds. I do not consider that I have the authority to do so. Essentially, he (Judge Dart) vindicated the District Council’s contention that the relevant document were subject to confidence and directed their sealing.
This decision is concluded as it is not subject to appeal. It is beyond the scope of these bankruptcy proceedings for me to attempt, on the basis of Mr Naumovic’s assertions alone, that it should be, in some impugned, in these bankruptcy proceedings.
As Judge Lucev succinctly concluded in the earlier proceedings, the difficulty for Mr Naumovic is that the costs order did not arise from some appropriate disclosure of public interest information but because Mr Naumovic, upon being asked to return the material in question, declined to do so. This material was subsequently found to be subject to confidence and therefore Mr Naumovic had no right to use or disseminate it, in this or any other proceedings.
It is also Mr Naumovic’s contention that the District Council has utilised these proceedings unfairly and in a way which is calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute by either totally curtailing or, at the very least, hamstringing his capacity to conduct his whistle-blower and related litigation against Coober Pedy in the District Court.
A number of points need to be made in this regard. Firstly, Coober Pedy can have had no knowledge of Mr Naumovic’s proceedings against it, when it sought the issue of the relevant bankruptcy notice as those proceedings post-date the bankruptcy application.
Secondly, the District Council has access to other interventions, in the District Court, which are more closely calibrated towards the control of civil litigation than sequestration in this court, such as seeking summary dismissal or security for costs.
Thirdly, it seems to me that any difficulties so far as the conduct of that litigation is concerned, which may arise for Mr Naumovic, are to be regarded as incidental effect of the sequestration not its motivating impetus.
Fourthly, I appreciate that as a result of the operation of section 58(1) of the Act, upon a sequestration order being made, all property (including choses in action) of the bankrupt vests in the trustee appointed to administer the relevant estate. In the case of proceeding commenced by the bankrupt, before any sequestration order was made, this engages the provisions of section 60 of the Act.
Pursuant to section 60(2) an action commenced by a person who becomes a bankrupt is, upon becoming a bankrupt, stayed until the trustee in bankruptcy makes an election, in writing, to proceed with or discontinue the action. The rationale being that the trustee will make an economic decision as to whether the continuation of any such action will advance the interests of any creditors of the estate being administered. In this case, the major creditor is axiomatically Coober Pedy, the interest of which will patently not be advanced by the continuation of Mr Naumovic’s proceedings against it.
However, section 60(2) is subject to exceptions which are created by section 60(4). It provides that a bankrupt may continue in his or her own name, an action commenced by him or her before he or she became a bankrupt in respect of any personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt.
Section 116(2) (g) of the Act is also relevant. It excludes from property that is divisible among the creditors any right of the bankrupt to recover damages or compensation for personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt as well as any damages or compensation recovered in respect of such injury or wrong.
The effect is that section 60(4) permits a bankrupt to proceed in his or her own name an action for personal injury or wrong done to the bankrupt, and section 116(2) (g) provides that the right to damages in such an action and any damages recovered does not vest in the trustee for the benefit of creditors.
The leading authority in respect of what falls within the definition of an action relating to any personal injury or wrong is Cox v Journeaux (No 2)[39]in which Dixon J said as follows:
The test appears to be whether the damages or part of them are to be estimated by immediate reference to pain felt by the bankrupt in respect of his mind, body or character and without reference to his rights of property.
[39] Cox v Journeaux (No 2) [1935] HCA 48.
These were issues which were analysed by Kelly J in the case of, which is broadly analogous to the current matter, Sands v State of South Australia.[40] The applicant was a bankrupt who had been rendered bankrupt by a costs order made against in respect of a failed defamation action which he brought against a large media conglomerate. The subject of the defamation was material broadcast in relation to the applicant having been investigated in respect of a serious criminal charge.
[40] Sands v State of South Australia [2012] SASC 159.
In this context, the applicant had instituted proceedings, in negligence and breach of statutory duty, against the State of South Australia relating to his allegation that it was its officers who had released material about him to the media and others. Kelly J concluded as follows:
It is my view that all of the claims brought by the plaintiff, whether in defamation, breach of various statutory duties, or breach of a duty of privacy and confidence said to be owed to the plaintiff, are of a personal rather than a proprietary nature. The nature of the damages claimed, assuming for the moment that a causal connection can be established between the wrong and the damages claimed, are in truth damages and/or compensation for the injury or wrong suffered by the plaintiff. Insofar as there are aspects of the damages claimed which include substantial pecuniary loss …
Accordingly, it seems to me that, notwithstanding any subsequent challenges, Coober Pedy may make to Mr Naumovic’s action against it, the action against it will survive his bankruptcy. Accordingly, in my view, this cannot provide any reason for the court to exercise its discretion not to make an order for sequestration against Mr Naumovic.
Counter-claim, set-off or cross demand
The final issue to be determined is whether Mr Naumovic’s actions against Coober Pedy are of such moment that it would be unfair to allow the sequestration to proceed until the outcome of his proceeding against it are determined. Judge Lucev provided a detailed summary of applicable authority, albeit in the different context of a bankruptcy notice, in his earlier judgment.
At this stage, as did Judge Lucev, I rely on what was said by Lindgren J in Glew v Harrowell; in the matter of Glew[41]
Perhaps little more can usefully be said than that a debtor must satisfy the Court that there is sufficient substance to the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand asserted to make it one which the debtor should, in justice, be permitted to have heard and determined in the usual way, rather than be forced to comply with the bankruptcy notice by payment or to commit an act of bankruptcy.
[41] Glew v Harrowell; in the matter of Glew [2003] FCA 373 at [12].
The mere fact that Mr Naumovic has proceedings on foot against Coober Pedy and has filed a detailed and lengthy statement of claim in this regard is not sufficient, in my view, to warrant the deferral of the current proceedings. I am not in a position to assess his prospect of success in his action or otherwise from that document alone.
CONCLUSIONS
Mr Naumovic is entitled to be an agitator[42] and to ventilate publicly his concerns about what he alleges has been the maladministration of the Coober Pedy District Council. In this context, he presents himself as a straightforward everyman, who is being crushed for his civil mindedness. In this context, he points to the legal resources which have been mustered against him, in circumstances in which it is apparent that his claims of maladministration cannot be said to be without foundation.
[42] See Neal v R (1982) 149 CLR 305.
In this context, with respect, there seems to me to be a level of cognitive dissonance between the decision of the Government of South Australia to consent to judgment, in Mr Naumovic’s favour, in an amount of $12,000.00, when it considered that the costs to be incurred in defending the suit could not be justified on economic grounds, when contrasted with the efforts expended in this matter and others related to it, by the District Council, given it would appear to be axiomatically the case that Mr Naumovic is incapable of paying the multifarious costs orders made against him.
His case is essentially, where there is smoke there must be fire – given the weight of legal process brought against him, those in power on the District Council must have something to hide. These proceedings cannot be part of the political process. Mr Naumovic can continue to agitate, including about the costs of the proceedings, which are likely to be largely borne by the public purse, as he sees fit in the Coober Pedy community and elsewhere.
In this context, it is hard not to feel some sympathy for Mr Naumovic, given the predicament he is in. I have described him, I hope not impertinently, as quixotic. He is also stubborn, which he is also entitled to be. However, it cannot be said that he has played no part in creating the difficulties surrounding him.
At the end of the day, it remains the case that he lost the proceedings in the Supreme Court, and it was determined by that court that he was not entitled to use the various documents about which he holds such strong convictions. He was asked to return them. He declined. He was advised about the dangers of disclosing material which was subject to an ICAC investigation by Ms Chapman.

However, that cannot be the point of these reasons for judgment. I am not an inquiry into the Coober Pedy District Council. Rather, I must remain confined to the matters which fall for consideration under section 52(1) of the Act – namely is there satisfactory proof that Mr Naumovic has a debt, which he cannot pay? I am satisfied of these matters. In addition, I find, for the reasons provided above that Mr Naumovic has not provided any sufficient reason or cause to justify this court going behind the proceedings which led to the judgement debt, which founds these proceedings.
In addition, there is ample evidence to indicate Mr Naumovic is not able to pay the debt relevant to these proceedings and significant other costs orders relating to other aspects of the controversies, which have long engaged him, so far as the Coober Pedy District Council is concerned and which have resulted in other significant costs orders being made against him.
For all these reasons, I will make the relevant sequestration order. Costs are to be taxed or agreed and to come out of the estate. The Official Receiver is appointed the trustee of Mr Naumovic’s estate.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixty-four (164) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Brown.
Associate:
Dated: 13 March 2025

File number:	ADG 68 of 2023
Judgment of:	JUDGE BROWN
Date of judgment:	13 March 2025
Catchwords:	BANKRUPTCY – Creditor’s Petition for a sequestration order - Applicant holds multiple costs orders against Respondent – Respondent alleges he is a whistleblower and should have never had a judgment made against him – Respondent alleges he does not owe the costs debt in question – whether there is other sufficient cause to apply court’s discretion to not make sequestration order- Respondent alleges he has multiple ongoing claims against Applicant in other courts for an equivalent and/or greater amount than the debts claimed against him – Respondent alleges Applicant pursuing sequestration order with intent of securing object other than recovering a debt – namely to stifle ongoing claims in other courts – whether issuance of bankruptcy notice amounts to an abuse of process
Legislation:	Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 41, 43, 52, 58, 60, 116 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 rr 6.06, 6.14 Local Government Act 1999 (SA) s 54 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (SA) Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA)
Cases cited:	Cox v Journeaux (No 2) [1935] HCA 48 Culleton v Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 8 Deputy Commissioner of taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144 District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic [2024] FedCFamC2G 1377 Dowling v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1915] 20 CLR 509 Glew v Harrowell; in the matter of Glew [2003] FCA 373 Neal v R (1982) 149 CLR 305 Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132 Rogers v R (1984) 181 CLR 251 Royal v Nazloomian; in the matter of Royal [2019] FCA 555 Sands v State of South Australia [2012] SASC 159 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] 256 CLR 507 Totev v Sfar [2006] FCA 470 Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34 District Council of Coober Pedy v Naumovic SSCIV-19-89
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	164
Date of hearing:	27 February 2025
Place:	Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Napier
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Norman Waterhouse Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondent:	The Respondent appeared in person

Table of Corrections
14 March 2025	In paragraph 161 the word ‘District’ has been replaced with ‘Supreme’

ADG 68 of 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2) IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE NAUMOVIC, BANKRUPT
BETWEEN:	DISTRICT COUNCIL OF COOBER PEDY Applicant
AND:	GEORGE NAUMOVIC Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE BROWN
DATE OF ORDER:	13 MARCH 2025