Director of Public Prosecutions v Workman
[2023] VCC 1072
•21 June 2023
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CR-23-00197
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| TRISTAN WORKMAN |
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| JUDGE: | HIS HONOUR JUDGE MULLALY |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 15 June 2023 |
| DATE OF RULING: | 21 June 2023 |
| CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Workman (Ruling) |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VCC 1072 |
REASONS FOR RULING
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Subject: CRIMINAL LAW – Application to review a determination of the court
constituted by a judicial registrar under rule 2A.29 of the County Court
Criminal Procedure Rules 2019 (Vic) not to transfer charges to the
Magistrates’ Court.
Catchwords: Application to transfer charges – Co-accused – Parity – Stalking – Armed with criminal intent – Common assault – Damaging property.
Legislation Cited: County Court Criminal Procedure Rules 2019 (Vic); Criminal Procedure
Act 2009 (Vic).
Cases Cited:The Queen v D'Ortenzio & Burns [1961] VR 432; Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; Postiglione v the Queen [1997] HCA 26; 189 CLR 295; R v Rodden [2005] VSCA 24; Taleb v The Queen [2020] VSCA 329; Dwayhi v R; Bechara v R [2011] NSWCCA 67; R v Dyson [2023] NSWCCA 132.
Ruling: Application to transfer charges is refused.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Mr S. Tan | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr C. Glerum | Angus Cameron Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
1This is an application to review a determination of the court constituted by a judicial registrar. The application is made pursuant to rule 2A.29 of the County Court Criminal Procedure Rules 2019 (Vic). The particular determination of the court constituted by a judicial registrar was a decision to refuse to order the transfer of charges currently before the County Court to the Magistrate’s Court.
2On 26 April 2023, the judicial registrar heard an application to transfer charges and on 28 April 2023 Her Honour published her reasons refusing the application. The relevant provisions of the County Court Criminal Procedure Rules 2019 (Vic) establish that a review such as this application is to be heard as a de novo or fresh hearing.
3What is sought by the applicant in this hearing is an order transferring all of the charges the accused man faces to the Magistrates' Court to be heard in the Koori Court division of the Magistrates' Court of Victoria sitting at Melbourne if he is found eligible by the Magistrates' Court of Victoria for the Koori Court hearing.
4As set out in s 168(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) as follows:
At any time except during trial, the Supreme Court or the County Court may order that a proceeding for a charge for an indictable offence that may be heard and determined summarily be transferred to the Magistrates' Court or the Children's Court (as the case requires) if—
(a) the accused consents to the transfer; and
(b) the court considers that the charge is appropriate to be determined summarily, having regard to—
(i) in the case of the Magistrates' Court, the matters in section 29(2)
5There are thus three requirements that must be established before an order to transfer can be made. First, that the charges for an indictable offence may be heard and determined summarily by the Magistrates' Court. The accused man has been indicted on four charges as set out on indictment N11589271. Those charges expressed in a summary form are:
(a) Stalking between 19 and 20 July 2022;
(b) Being armed with a firearm with criminal intent on 20 July 2022;
(c) Common law assault on 20 July 2022; and
(d) Criminal damage on 20 July 2022.
6Each of those indictable charges is capable of being heard summarily.
7The second requirement is that the accused consents to the charges being heard and determined summarily, or to use the words of the statute, the accused consents to the transfer.
8Counsel for the accused in this application indicated that the accused did consent to the charges he faces being heard and determined by a magistrate exercising the summary jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court of Victoria.
9The third requirement established by s 168 is that the court considers that the charge or charges are appropriate to be determined summarily having regard to the matters set out in s 29(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). Section 29 is a statutory provision governing whether an indictable charge can be heard summarily is appropriate to be heard summarily. Relevantly s 29(1) reads:
The Magistrates' Court may hear and determine summarily a charge for an offence to which section 28(1) applies if— (a) the court considers that the charge is appropriate to be determined summarily, having regard to the matters in subsection (2).
10Sub-section 2 relevantly reads:
For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the Magistrates' Court must have regard to— (a) the seriousness of the offence including— (i) the nature of the offence; and (ii) the manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed, the apparent degree of organisation and the presence of aggravating circumstances; and (iii) whether the offence forms part of a series of offences being alleged against the accused; and (iv) the complexity of the proceeding for determining the charge; and (b) the adequacy of sentences available to the court, having regard to the criminal record of the accused; and (c) whether a co-accused is charged with the same offence; and (d) any other matter that the court considers relevant.
11This test or the process for determining that a charge is appropriate to transfer is that a judicial officer of the County Court, after having regard to the matters set out in s 29(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) concludes that it is appropriate the charges be determined summarily. The factors that must be considered are broad and descriptive. That combined with s 29(2)(d) which explicitly allows the court to consider any other matter that the court considers relevant firmly establishes that the discretions involved are very wide ones indeed.
12Plainly the provisions of s 29(2) and in particular sub-ss(a) and (c) require a detailed understanding of the facts and circumstances of the offending alleged against the accused and any co-accused.
13The prosecution in this application tendered a draft summary of opening for a plea and it was dated 8 June 2023. It was agreed that this was the appropriate factual circumstances for the purposes of this application.
14In further summarising that opening, it seems to me the following are relevant facts and circumstances for the purposes of this application. The accused man is now 24 years old. At some point he was in a relationship with the young woman TW but by July 2022 that relationship was over. In July 2022, TW contacted the victim FA via various social media platforms. The victim was someone known to the accused. It seems as a consequence of the accused’s ex-girlfriend contacting the victim, the accused was angered and set out about trying to locate the victim.
15He did so via other friends and associates. His intent towards the victim was clear as expressed in a social media message sent by the accused to the victim on 19 July. It read, 'I'll let one off so you know I'm there, you crumb. Swear on my nan's grave, cunt, Imma put one in you. See you soon boy'.
16There can be no doubt this was a threat to frighten and injure the victim using firearm. The day after this message was sent, the accused met his co-accused Robbie Hurmiz and Gabrielle Verigos at Hurmiz’s residence, whilst the accused put fraudulent number plates on Hurmiz’s vehicle so as to disguise the true owner of the car as it was used in the criminal enterprise.
17The three men left together in Hurmiz’s car from Hurmiz’s residence. The photo on Hurmiz’s phone showed two guns in the centre console of the car. The car drove to an address of associates in South Morang. After a short while, the victim arrived in his car. Ultimately, the victim got out of his car and was standing on the street when the car of the three accused sped up the road, stopping at where the victim was standing by his own car.
18The victim saw that the driver Hurmiz, and the front seat passenger Verigos were wearing white masks. The accused was in the rear seat with a neck gaiter pulled up over his face. Thus all the offenders had deliberately disguised themselves prior to the criminal activity.
19The victim then saw Hurmiz point a firearm at him. The victim in utter fear got back into his car and tried to start it to escape. This was then followed by the accused quickly getting out of the offenders' car and going to the victim saying words that connect back to the earlier chilling threats. The accused said, 'I told ya I would get you. I told you I would get ya'.
20The accused then tried to pull the victim out of his car. A struggle occurred with the victim trying to fend off the accused and start his car to get away. The co-accused Vertigos got out of the offender's car and came to where the accused was struggling with the victim, pointing a sawn-off firearm at him. At this point the co-accused Hurmiz sitting in the driver's seat of the car fired two shots from his gun towards the victim's car. One shot hit the driver's mirror and went through the driver's side window and hit the steering column. It only has to be said to see how astonishingly dangerous this incident was and how remarkable it was that the victim was not hit and seriously injured, if not killed.
21In the end, one of the shots grazed the accused man's cheek. He too was extremely lucky. At this point the victim jumped out of his car to escape. The accused remained at the victim's car. After a brief time, the victim came back and grabbed the accused in a headlock and the two men struggled. This prompted the co-accused Vertigos to intervene, getting out of the offender's car and coming to the struggle carrying his firearm. He came up behind the victim, hitting him in the head hard, causing the victim to let go of the accused and fall to the ground. Thus the victim was at this point vulnerable and on the ground.
22The accused man and Vertigos then attacked him while he was down, punching, kicking and stomping him. Both the accused and the co-accused Verigos were acting together in this brutal, physical attack. Somehow the victim was able to get to his feet and move away. At this point, the accused produced a sharp screwdriver, swinging it at the victim a number of times, cutting his trackpants. At a later point, the accused used his screwdriver to slash and destroy the victim's car tyres.
23While the accused was using his screwdriver, the co-accused Verigos was pointing his gun at the victim and Hurmiz still seated in the driver's seat of the offender's car was endeavouring to cock the gun so that he could shoot again. After the accused had slashed the tyres of the victim's car, he the accused got back into the offenders’ car and their car drove away.
24It should be noted that this violent attack committed by masked men with two firearms and a screwdriver as weapons, all occurred in the middle of the afternoon in an ordinary suburban street. Members of the public observed the incident and one filmed part of it on his mobile phone. What can be immediately said is this was a brazen, frightening and a very violent incident where firearms were brought to the scene and used. It was simply fortunate that the victim, the accused or ordinary members of the public weren't shot or otherwise seriously injured or killed. The victim of course was physically assaulted in a sustained attack upon him by the two accused acting together to hurt the victim.
25In assessing these facts and circumstances it is clear to me that:
(a) This was an incident that arose from the accused's petty grievance. He was central to and causative of the whole violent incident occurring;
(b) The accused made threats to the victim the day before and then made good those threats having recruited other violent men to assist;
(c) The accused was well aware that his group were armed and intended to use the firearms to intimidate the victim at the very least;
(d) The accused is the one who initiated the physical altercations which led to the other co-accused shooting at the victim and then coming to the aid of the accused, outnumbering the victim and assaulting him in company with kicks and stomps as he was on the ground;
(e) The accused produced his own dangerous weapon and used it to slash the victim's clothes but fortunately not any deeper; and
(f) The accused on his own destroyed the victim's tyres disabling him from getting away or following the accused as they made their escape.
26That all said about the accused doing that on his own, it is obvious this whole incident was a joint enterprise by three offenders. It was put in the prosecution opening that the co-accused have involvement in an outlaw motorcycle gang. It was also said that the accused himself was an associate of that gang. Plainly it is put that the accused recruited the co-accused who did not know the victim because of their joint involvement in the bikie gang, or at least that is arguable.
27In my view this is an example of outlaw bikie gang offenders using firearms to threaten, frighten or hurt someone who has caused some grievance to another associate of the gang. That is a factor of aggravation or it is otherwise a relevant factor in assessing what court is the appropriate court for dealing with this example of lawlessness.
28In light of all of the above factors, the submission made on behalf of the accused by his lawyers, that on sentencing this accused and then the other offenders, the principles of parity would play a very limited role, if any at all. It was unfortunately a remarkable and ill-considered submission. That is particularly so given the importance in this application of the factors set out in s 29(2)(a)(i) and (ii) and s 29(2)(c).
29What has occurred since the accused men were committed to the County Court has further adversely impact on the accused’s contention that his case ought be transferred to the Magistrate’s Court of Victoria. What has occurred is that resolution discussions have led to the co-accused Verigos resolving his charges and his plea will be heard, is listed, on 2 August 2023. Mr Hurmiz’s matter has also now resolved and it is anticipated his plea will be listed on 2 August 2023 as well.
30I must say that is precisely what should occur, that is, those two men's cases being heard together, and the court's listings will operate to ensure that those two accused are dealt with by the one judge at the same time. It should be noted that both other co-accused have other charges arising from other criminal conduct not involving the accused man. Such a circumstance is not uncommon but it is clear that this incident that I have described involving the accused and the other two men, the firearms and the shooting, it is far and away the most serious of all of the crimes that the two other co-accused committed.
31Before moving to consider in more detail those aspects of s 29(2)(a) and (c), I mention that the prosecution and the accused agree or both submit that given the accused has no criminal record and that he is a young first offender, that the scope of the sentencing powers of the Magistrates' Court are adequate. This refers to s29(2)(b).
32That said, it is to be understood that even if the accused would on a plea receive a sentence lower than the Magistrate’s Court maximum, that is, a term of five years. It is the case that many accused whose matters could be heard in the Magistrates' Court but do not routinely receive sentences of less than two or five years when sentenced in the County Court. In other words just because it is said that this accused is likely to receive less than five years for these serious violent criminal acts that fact is not in any way determinative of this application to transfer. It is a factor I have considered as I must, but in my view the real work of s29(2)(b) is when it is asserted by the prosecution that the sentencing range of the Magistrates' Court is inadequate. In such a circumstance, a finding that the sentencing range available in the Magistrate’s Court is inadequate would be determinative against an application to transfer.
33In dealing with the factors in s 29(2) including s 29(2)(d) that is, being any other matter that the court considers relevant, I commence with the submissions of the parties. The prosecution contended that the seriousness of the particular offending behaviour where the accused played a central role, it being his argument, his threats and his making good those threats. Then the use of firearms and the screwdriver in a suburban location with proximity to the public and it being an organised undertaking to conceal the identity of the cars and themselves.
34That it is therefore important for all co-accused to be dealt with together by the one judicial officer. Meaning it was not appropriate to undermine this by transferring this accused’s charges to the Magistrates' Court while the other accused’s matters will be heard in the County Court. The prosecution said, in essence, that the charges were too serious.
35Those representing the accused made a broad submission that the defences such as stalking, common law assault, and criminal damage are routinely dealt with in the Magistrate’s Court. That of course was a submission that did not properly deal with the nature of this particular example. That is, did not deal with the nature, the manner and the organisation of this particular example of these crimes. It did not deal with the frightening aggravating circumstances such as the attack being committed in company and with loaded guns in a suburban street. It did not take into account the charge of stalking was a precursor to the ultimate making good of the threats involved in the stalking.
36Counsel for the accused emphasised that the accused, as an indigenous man, would apply for his plea to be heard in the Koori Court in the Magistrates' Court. But if need be, also in the County Court, that is, the County Koori Court. That of course is contingent upon eligibility and a decision of a judicial officer presiding in the Koori Court in the Magistrate’s Court or in the County Court. It may well be the fact of there being co-accused whose cases are not able to be heard in the Koori Court would lead to a decision against this accused’s matter being heard in the Koori Court, though that is unlikely.
37The point is a hearing in the Koori Court is not at this point certain. I make clear given the accused’s age and his lack of priors, a Koori Court hearing would seem highly desirable for him. The availability and desirability of a Koori Court hearing involving respected Elders is a relevant factor of a kind s 29(2)(d) contemplated and I do take that very much into account.
38The point made by the accused’s counsel was if this accused matter was to be heard in the Koori Court it would necessarily or likely be by a different judge in the County Court than the co-accused. It should be understood that the County Court has considerable capacity to track and ensure the co-accused cases are heard by the same judge and almost all judges in the County Court are able to sit in and hear Koori Court pleas.
39The point raised by counsel essentially was that if the accused’s case remained in the County Court and was heard in the Koori Court, it would be by a different judge in a separate hearing. So having the accused's matter heard in the Magistrate’s Court was no different in that respect. All that can be said of that point is that transferring this matter to the Magistrate’s Court guarantees a different judicial officer would sentence all of these offenders.
40Remaining in the County Court could well mean and probably would mean the same judge would sentence all accused. Of course, a County Court judge's reasons are published and available if it turns out a different judge were involved with each of the accused by reason of this accused’s matter being in the Koori Court. This does not occur in the Magistrates' Court, so there would be no assistance to a subsequent County Court judge in dealing with the co-accused. Though a magistrate of course would have the reasons or could be provided with the reasons for sentence when considering this accused’s plea if his case was transferred, and his plea and sentence happened after the co-accused sentence.
41On that point, the defence counsel was urging the transfer on the basis that the Magistrates' Court case would be heard quicker and be thus more efficient, would not extend the effect of delay on the young accused. As it turned out, the likely gap between this matter being heard in the Magistrates' Court and this court is very small indeed. It is not a factor having much weight at all in favour of the application.
42What was not part of counsel's written submission nor his oral submissions until directed to the point was the long line of authority, that courts should do all that can be done to ensure the same judge or at least the same court heard, determined and sentenced co-accused. Of importance is that these authorities are not artificially restricted to co-accused who face precisely the same charges. What is to be understood is the principle applies to accused who are involved in the same criminal incident whatever the charges that eventuate.
43The argument put by counsel that the accused faces different charges, therefore these principles did not apply, was a misapprehension of the practical approach of the courts in dealing with co-accused connected by their conduct and their joint involvement in a criminal incident, as opposed to formal charges that eventuate. This, once again, is the courts and the criminal justice system operating much more on the substance rather than the form.
44The starting point as to these authorities is over 60 years ago, when in 1961 the Court of Criminal Appeal heard an appeal involving three men and some aspects of remarkable similarity and specific relevance to this case. In The Queen v D'Ortenzio & Burns,[1] O'Brien J delivered the judgment of the court commencing in these terms:
In this case the applicants Robert John Burns and Ferdinand D'Ortenzio were charged before the court of general sessions of Melbourne both with factory breaking and stealing and the applicant Burns had a further count of larceny as a clerk or servant. They both pleaded guilty to the charge of factory breaking and Burns pleaded guilty to the charge of larceny as a clerk or servant.
The learned trial judge sentenced Burns to 12 months' imprisonment on the first account and six months on the second and directed those terms should be served concurrently, making a total of 12 months' imprisonment. He fixed a minimum of nine months to be served before eligible for parole.
He sentenced D'Ortenzio to 12 months and directed a minimum of nine months must be served before his being eligible for parole. The crime of factory breaking and stealing was committed by three persons in company. The third person was a man named Freeman. Freeman was charged with having committed the same offence in company with Burns and D'Ortenzio. Freeman in the lower court pleaded guilty to that charge and was released on probation.
It would appear from the evidence before us that he was not only the instigator of the crime, but that in addition he had arranged it, and that the factory broken into from which the goods were stolen was the place where he was working at the time as an employee. Therefore on the face of it it would appear that his connection to the crime was more heinous than that of these two accused.
[1] [1961] VR 432.
45O'Brien J went on to say the following as a general principle:
We all think that this is very unfortunate, that the law allows discrepancies in sentences to arise in cases such as this. Such discrepancies cannot fail to give rise to dissatisfaction and a feeling of injustice done by those concerned. We think that the legislature should give consideration to the question whether when persons are charged jointly with a crime, the law should provide that wherever possible they should all be sentenced by the one judge. At least that provision should be made where one of them pleads guilty in the lower court, he should be sentenced by the same judge or tribunal who or which has the task of sentencing with whom he acted in concert.
46Two of the principal High Court authorities, well known, regarding sentencing co-accused in the application of parity or disparity add the following guidance as to the issue before me. In Lowe v The Queen,[2] Brennan J said:
To facilitate the comparison of conduct and antecedents it is desirable that, where practicable, co-offenders be sentenced by the same judge at the same time.
[2] (1984) 154 CLR 606.
47In the same case Dawson J said:
No explanation was given to us or, apparently, to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the reason why the applicant and Smith entered their pleas before different judges at different times. The result was that, although they were co-offenders, they fell to be sentenced by different judges. Such a situation always carries with it a risk that there will be an unwarranted disparity between the sentences imposed and is to be avoided if at all possible.
48In Postiglione v The Queen,[3] Gummow J referred to the comments of Brennan J from Lowe and then observed:
This appeal does more than illustrate the problem that can arise in applying the parity principle to co-offenders where they are sentenced by different judges taking different views as to the relevant culpability of the two offenders in respect of those offences.
[3] [1997] HCA 26; 189 CLR 295.
49In R v Rodden,[4] which was like this case, one involving public violence of a number of accused acting together including one who had and used a firearm, Vincent J said of the undesirability of co-accused being sentenced by different judges the following:
Of course, it would have been more satisfactory if all of the persons involved in this matter had been tried and/or sentenced at the same time, and certainly by the same judge. This case demonstrates the kinds of tensions that can appear to arise in the criminal justice system when this does not occur. When a situation arises in which co-offenders are dealt with separately, there may and often are differences in the substratum of facts upon which the different sentencing judges act and the impressions formed by them with respect to the relative roles, levels of responsibility and prospects of rehabilitation of the individuals involved. This, of course, would flow, in part, from the different emphases which can be expected to be placed on aspects of the offending behaviour and the circumstances of the offenders concerned.[5]
[4] [2005] VSCA 24.
[5] Ibid, [28]-[29].
50More recently in Taleb v The Queen (‘Taleb’),[6] again a case where a co-accused was sentenced in the Magistrate’s Court, and then Mr Taleb in the County Court, Maxwell P and JA Weinberg commenced their joint judgment with the following general statement of principle:
This application highlights once again the difficulties which can arise when co-offenders are dealt with by different courts for the same offending. As will appear, the separation of the applicant’s case from those of his co-offenders resulted in the sentencing disparity about which he now complains.[7]
[6] [2020] VSCA 329.
[7] Ibid, [1].
51The circumstances in Taleb were that the accused was sentenced in the County Court for home invasion. Over the objection of the prosecution, a co-accused persuaded the committing magistrate that the charge he faced should be one of aggravated burglary alone and as the intent was to steal, the magistrate should hear and sentence the accused summarily on a plea. This occurred notwithstanding that the co-accused was being committed to the County Court.
52In the joint judgment, having discussed the unsatisfactory way the two accused were separated, one remaining in the Magistrates' Court while the other proceeded to the County Court, in the joint judgment in Taleb the Court said:
It is generally undesirable that co-offenders be dealt with by different courts. Judicial officers should be astute, wherever possible, to ensure that such an outcome is avoided.[8]
[8] Ibid [19].
53That last directive is particularly apt in the circumstances of this case. This principle of ensuring all co-accused are dealt with in the same court by the same judge at the same time is universal and guidance can be found in the appellate decisions in other states. A thorough, lengthy, and helpful analysis of all of the authorities on this issue and the problems that can arise if it is not adhered to was undertaken by Johnson J in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in the decision of Dwayhi v R; Bechara v R,[9] from paragraphs 33 to 48.
[9] [2011] NSWCCA 67.
54His Honour referred to the High Court authorities that I have referred to and a number of the Victorian authorities including Rodden. His Honour concluded by advocating for practical steps to be taken. He said:
It is necessary for sentencing Courts and prosecutorial bodies to take steps to ensure, so far as it is reasonably possible, that related offenders are sentenced by the same Judge, and preferably at the same time following a single sentencing hearing. To reinforce this message, creation of relevant Practice Notes (by the Courts) and amendment to prosecution guidelines (by the Commonwealth and New South Wales Directors of Public Prosecutions) may be considered appropriate to give effect to the statements of Courts referred to above.[10]
[10] Ibid, [46].
55These points were yet again summarised and given emphasis just this month on 9 June 2023 by Sweeney J in R v Dyson,[11] at paragraph 54. A proper analysis of these authorities and the longstanding principles that flow from these cases ought to have seen caution by those representing the accused in making the application in the first place. In seeking a review of that decision, the failure to make reference to this central point and the line of authorities is an unfortunate failing and means the application is in the end without merit.
[11] [2023] NSWCCA 132.
56Thus in having regard pursuant to s 29(2)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) to the fact that there are co-accused, and where they are to be sentenced, in my view it is overwhelming that it is not appropriate to transfer this accused’s matter to the Magistrate’s Court and thereby create the situation that the appellate courts have said is highly undesirable.
57I must, as was said in Taleb, be astute to ensure that what the accused is seeking is a situation to be avoided. This is enough to determine it is not appropriate to transfer this case to the Magistrates' Court. But I should add, that even without the co-accused being before the County Court, i.e. if they had not been located, I would not be persuaded that this offending as I have described, as organised revenge or confrontational violence with loaded firearms used along with a sharp weapon, in the public streets in the middle of the day by three disguised men, connected to an outlaw motorcycle gang, committed on a man who was overwhelmed and set upon with kicks and stomps, this offending even when committed by a young first offender is a crime or a series of crimes that the seriousness, the nature, the manner and the aggravated circumstances and organisation would lead me to say it is not appropriate to transfer this case to the Magistrate’s Court of Victoria.
58In short, it is far too serious to be heard at that level of our criminal justice system. In my view, the decision of the judicial registrar was completely correct. I would, for all the reasons I have set out, not order a transfer of the charges that the accused man faces to the Magistrate’s Court of Victoria. It is not appropriate to do so.
59The plea of the accused should be heard in this court and by the same judge as hears the co-accused pleas, and if that this accused plea is to be heard in the Koori Court, it should be at the same time or close to the pleas of the co-accused and as far as possible, by the same judge.
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