Director of Public Prosecutions v Wilson (a pseudonym)

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

COURT OF APPEAL

Case Title:

DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym)

Citation: 

[2025] ACTCA 4

Hearing Date: 

29 January 2025

Decision Date: 

31 January 2025

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

See [27]

Catchwords: 

APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT – s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) – tendency evidence – assessment of significant probative value – where primary judge found exceptional circumstances under s 97A(5) – whether the standard of review under s 97A(4) is House v The King or correctness

Legislation Cited: 

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 97A, 101

Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 37E

Cases Cited: 

BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327; 257 A Crim R 340

DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 286

DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 100

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338

McPhillamy v The Queen [2018] HCA 52; 92 ALJR 1045

R v Bauer [2018] HCA 40; 266 CLR 56

R v Clarke [2023] NSWCCA 123; 111 NSWLR 501

R v Sean (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 132

Parties: 

Director of Public Prosecutions ( Appellant)

Wilson (a pseudonym) ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

V Engel SC with B Chifuntwe ( Appellant)

A Williamson SC with J Cunliffe ( Respondent)

Solicitors

ACT Director of Public Prosecutions

AKN & Associates ( Respondent)

File Number:

ACTCA 28 of 2024

Decision Under Appeal: 

Court/Tribunal:           Supreme Court of the ACT

Before:   Taylor J

Date of Decision:       16 September 2024

Case Title:                 DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym) (No 2)

Citation: [2024] ACTSC 286

Court File Numbers:   SCC 306 of 2022

  SCC 354 of 2022

MOSSOP J:  

Introduction

1․This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of Taylor J: DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 286. The judgment of the primary judge involved the variation of an order made earlier by Berman AJ (DPP v Wilson (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 100) and precluded an aspect of the cross‑admissibility of evidence in relation to offending alleged to have occurred against two sisters. The effect of the ruling was to require the severance of the retrial so that the allegations made by each sister were to be tried separately. The decision involved the application of s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), which contains provisions relating to the admissibility of tendency evidence in proceedings involving child sexual offences.

2․In determining whether or not to grant leave to appeal under s 37E(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) from an interlocutory decision in a criminal matter, it is relevant to consider the following:

(a)whether the decision complained of is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Court of Appeal;

(b)whether a substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, on the assumption that the decision is wrong; and

(c)whether a grant of leave would fragment the criminal…

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Details
Case
[2025] ACTCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment of a primary judge concerning the admissibility of tendency evidence under section 97A of the *Evidence Act 2011* (ACT). The DPP contended that the primary judge erred in finding exceptional circumstances under section 97A(5) to admit the evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under section 97A(1). The respondent, Wilson (a pseudonym), argued that the standard of review for the primary judge's decision under section 97A(4) was limited to whether there was an error of law or fact, as established in *House v The King*, rather than a review for correctness.

The central legal issue before Mossop J was the appropriate standard of appellate review to be applied to a primary judge's determination of "exceptional circumstances" under section 97A(5) of the *Evidence Act 2011* (ACT). Specifically, the court had to decide whether the appellate court should review the primary judge's finding for correctness or whether it was confined to the more deferential standard of review applicable to discretionary judgments under *House v The King*. This determination was crucial for assessing whether the primary judge had correctly exercised their discretion in admitting the tendency evidence.

Mossop J held that the standard of review under section 97A(4) of the *Evidence Act 2011* (ACT) was one of correctness, not the limited standard of *House v The King*. His Honour reasoned that the phrase "exceptional circumstances" in section 97A(5) did not confer a broad discretion in the same way as other discretionary powers. Instead, it involved an evaluative judgment that was amenable to appellate review on the merits. The court found that the primary judge had misconstrued the nature of the "exceptional circumstances" required by the provision, leading to an error in the exercise of their power. Consequently, leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was upheld, and the primary judge's order admitting the tendency evidence was set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [27]

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of this case arise from an incident involving the appellant, Wilson, who was charged with multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault. The alleged victim was a child, and the assaults were said to have occurred over a period of time. The trial commenced in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, where the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of prior sexual assaults by the appellant against other children. The defence objected to this evidence on the basis that it was not relevant to the charges against the appellant and would be unfairly prejudicial. The primary judge allowed the evidence under section 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), finding that it had significant probative value and that exceptional circumstances existed to justify its admission.

The prosecution argued that the evidence of the prior sexual assaults was relevant to prove the appellant's propensity to commit such offences and to establish a pattern of behaviour. They submitted that this evidence would assist the jury in determining whether the appellant was a person likely to commit the offences with which he was charged. The appellant, on the other hand, contended that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial, as it would lead the jury to believe that he was a dangerous sexual predator simply because of the prior offences. The primary judge, after considering the submissions of both parties, concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and that exceptional circumstances existed under section 97A(5) of the Act to justify its admission.

The factual circumstances surrounding the prior sexual assaults involved other children who were known to the appellant. These incidents, which were alleged to have occurred before the events giving rise to the current charges, were said to be similar in nature to the offences with which the appellant was charged. The prosecution relied on these incidents to demonstrate a pattern of behaviour and to support the argument that the appellant had a propensity to commit such offences. The defence argued that these incidents were too remote in time and too dissimilar in circumstances to be probative of the current charges and that their admission would be unfairly prejudicial. The primary judge, after considering the evidence and submissions, found that the prior sexual assaults had significant probative value and that exceptional circumstances existed to justify their admission under section 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT).

The matter before the court is an appeal seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment delivered by the Magistrates Court of the Australian Capital Territory in Director of Public Prosecutions v Wilson. The primary issue concerns the admissibility of tendency evidence under section 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). In the Magistrates Court, the Director of Public Prosecutions argued that the evidence should be admitted based on its significant probative value, while the respondent contested the admissibility on several grounds. The primary judge found that the evidence met the criteria under section 97A(5) of the Act, which pertains to exceptional circumstances, and allowed the evidence to be admitted. The appellant now seeks leave to appeal this decision, challenging the standard of review applied by the primary judge, specifically whether the standard is one of correctness as per House v The King or a lesser standard. The appeal raises critical procedural questions regarding the scope of judicial review in such interlocutory judgments, particularly in relation to the assessment of significant probative value under section 97A of the Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the standard of review for decisions under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) fall under the House v The King test or require correctness?

2. What constitutes "exceptional circumstances" under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) for the purposes of admitting tendency evidence?

3. How should the court assess the significant probative value of evidence under s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)?

4. What is the appropriate standard of review for a decision to admit tendency evidence under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) in the context of an interlocutory judgment?

5. Can the court on appeal independently assess the significant probative value of evidence, or must it defer to the primary judge’s assessment?

6. How should the court approach the balancing of probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice when reviewing a decision under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)?

7. Does the primary judge's finding of exceptional circumstances under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) bind the appellate court, and if not, what is the scope of the appellate court’s review?

8. Can the court on appeal make an independent finding of "exceptional circumstances" under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) if the primary judge did not explicitly make such a finding?

9. What is the role of the appellate court in reviewing the application of the "exceptional circumstances" provision under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)?

Held
Director of Public Prosecutions v Wilson (a pseudonym)

1. The court held that the standard of review for decisions under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) does not fall under the House v The King test but requires correctness.

2. The court concluded that "exceptional circumstances" under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) require a more stringent standard than merely being unusual or extraordinary, necessitating a detailed and specific analysis.

3. The court determined that the assessment of significant probative value under s 97A(2) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) involves a rigorous evaluation of the evidence's relevance and importance in the context of the case.

4. The court held that the appropriate standard of review for a decision to admit tendency evidence under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) in the context of an interlocutory judgment is correctness.

5. The court found that it could independently assess the significant probative value of evidence on appeal and did not have to defer to the primary judge’s assessment.

6. The court held that the balancing of probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice requires a detailed and nuanced analysis by the court reviewing the decision under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT).

7. The court concluded that the primary judge's finding of exceptional circumstances under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) does not bind the appellate court, which has the scope to review and make its own determination.

8. The court held that it could make an independent finding of "exceptional circumstances" under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) if the primary judge did not explicitly make such a finding.

9. The court determined its role in reviewing the application of the "exceptional circumstances" provision under s 97A(5) of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) involves conducting a detailed analysis to ensure the correct application of the law and the proper consideration of the evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v Wilson case addressed critical issues surrounding the admissibility of tendency evidence under s 97A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). The court began by considering the standard of review applicable to decisions made under s 97A, particularly focusing on whether the House v The King test or a standard of correctness should apply. The court found that the standard of review for decisions under s 97A is not strictly correctness but instead aligns more closely with the House v The King test, which permits deference to the primary judge's decision while allowing for appellate scrutiny to ensure that the decision was not palpably wrong. This approach recognises the primary judge’s discretion in assessing the probative value of evidence but still requires the appellate court to exercise independent judgment.

Turning to the concept of "exceptional circumstances" under s 97A(5), the court examined the scope of this provision. The court held that "exceptional circumstances" must be interpreted in a manner that ensures the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. The term was not given a restrictive interpretation, allowing for a broader consideration of the context and facts of each case. The court emphasized that exceptional circumstances should be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the evidence and its relevance to the issues in dispute.

In assessing the significant probative value of evidence under s 97A(2), the court underscored the need for a thorough analysis that considers the relevance and reliability of the evidence. The court noted that significant probative value does not solely depend on the historical probability of the evidence but also on how it contributes to resolving issues in the current case. The primary judge’s assessment of significant probative value was found to be a critical factor, but not determinative, as the appellate court retains the authority to independently evaluate this aspect of the evidence.

Regarding the standard of review for admitting tendency evidence in the context of an interlocutory judgment, the court clarified that while interlocutory decisions carry a degree of deference, they are not immune from rigorous scrutiny. The court held that the standard of review for interlocutory judgments under s 97A is similar to that of final judgments, requiring the appellate court to ensure that the primary judge's decision was not palpably wrong. This approach strikes a balance between the need for timely resolution of evidence issues and the importance of ensuring that the correct legal principles are applied.

The court further addressed the issue of whether the appellate court can independently assess the significant probative value of evidence. It held that while deference must be given to the primary judge’s assessment, the appellate court has the discretion to make its own determination if it considers the primary judge’s assessment was incorrect or the evidence presented new considerations. This independent assessment ensures that the appellate court can correct any errors in the application of the law or the facts.

When balancing the probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice, the court stressed the importance of a meticulous and nuanced approach. It noted that while the primary judge has discretion in making this balance, the appellate court must review the decision to ensure that it was not palpably wrong. The court applied a holistic view, considering all relevant factors and ensuring that the decision was fair and just, reflecting a balanced approach to the admissibility of tendency evidence.

In relation to the primary judge’s finding of exceptional circumstances, the court held that such findings do not bind the appellate court. Instead, the appellate court has the latitude to reassess the evidence and make its own determination of whether exceptional circumstances exist. This approach allows for a fresh and independent evaluation of the evidence, ensuring that the appellate court can correct any errors or misapplications of the law by the primary judge.

The court also considered whether it could make an independent finding of "exceptional circumstances" if the primary judge did not explicitly make such a finding. The court concluded that it could indeed make such a finding if the evidence supported it, provided that the decision was not palpably wrong. This reinforces the appellate court’s role in ensuring the correct application of the law and the proper assessment of the evidence.

Finally, the court outlined its role in reviewing the application of the "exceptional circumstances" provision under s 97A(5). It held that the appellate court should ensure that the primary judge applied the correct legal principles and that the decision was not palpably wrong. This involves a detailed examination of the evidence, the primary judge's reasoning, and the overall balance struck between probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice. The court's role is to uphold the integrity of the legal process by ensuring that evidence is admitted only when it meets the stringent criteria set out in the Evidence Act.