Director of Public Prosecutions v Vergez

[2023] VCC 1057

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT BENDIGO

CRIMINAL DIVISION

 Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

CR 23-00534

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

v

AMELIE VERGEZ

---

JUDGE:	HIS HONOUR JUDGE BAYLES
WHERE HELD:	Bendigo
DATE OF HEARING:	31 May 2023
DATE OF SENTENCE:	23 June 2023
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v Vergez
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2023] VCC 1057

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
---

Subject:CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence.

Catchwords:              Criminal law – Plea of Guilty – Sentence – Dangerous Driving Causing Death – Youth – Community corrections order – Inattention while driving – Whether community corrections order is appropriate – Assessment of moral culpability– Victim impact statements – Psychological and personal challenges – Verdins principles – Boulton principles

Legislation Cited:      Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).

Cases Cited:Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169; Boulton v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 308; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269.

Sentence:                  30 months community corrections order with 200 hours of unpaid community work. 

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Director of Public Prosecutions	Mr D. Cordy	Solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr P. Matthews	Pascoe Criminal Law

HIS HONOUR:

1In October of 2022, Lindsay Smyrk was 75 years old. He lived in Gisborne. He was an avid cyclist and a member of the Macedon Ranges Cycling Club. He was the husband of Caroline Smyrk, and father to three daughters Lucia, Katherine and Anna; and grandfather two children, Charlie and Max.

2On Sunday 9 October 2022, Lindsay Smyrk had completed a group ride in Woodend with other members of the Macedon Ranges Cycling Club. He was then riding alone, as I understand it, on his way home to Gisborne along the Black Forrest Drive, a road that travels from Woodend to Gisborne.

3The road was a four lane, two direction bitumen road running generally in a north/south direction. The road had a hard bitumen shoulder, separated from the left-hand driving lane by a solid white fog line with audio tactile line markings.

4Lindsay Smyrk was cycling in the south bound direction on the hard bitumen shoulder. You, Amelie Vergez, were travelling in your vehicle, being a white 2013 Renault Megane hatch. You were travelling south in the left-hand lane of Black Forrest Drive.

5At the time of these events you were 19 years old. You held a Victorian Probationary driver’s licence. You were driving south bound and were traveling from your home in Fern Hill towards Macedon where you were due to start work at 12pm.

6As you were driving in the left-hand lane of the road, you drifted to the left, and your vehicle crossed over the solid white painted fog line and collided with the rear wheel of Lindsay Smyrk’s bicycle. The collision caused Lindsay Smyrk to mount the bonnet of your vehicle, striking the windscreen and the roof, before being thrown forward and coming to rest on the road surface.

7Paramedics attended at the scene. They provided emergency care to Mr Smyrk, who was transported via helicopter ambulance to the Alfred Hospital. However, he did not survive the collision and was declared deceased.

8After the collision, you got out of your vehicle and you approached Mr Smyrk. You were described as being extremely distressed. Other drivers stopped and you were comforted by witnesses Elissa Carter and Licia Kokocinski.

9A reconstruction of the collision scene, conducted by Detective Leading Senior Constable Michael Hardiman of the Major Collision Investigation Unit, determined that the bicycle of Lindsay Smyrk was being ridden on the bitumen shoulder, between approximately 17 and 33 cm to the east of the solid white painted fog line.  At impact, your vehicle was most likely travelling at between 73 and 75 kilometres per hour. I note that the stretch of road had a speed limit of 80 kilometres per hour.

10Lindsay Smyrk was wearing light visible club colours and a flashing light. A witness, Elissa Carter, who was travelling in a vehicle behind your car, stated: “As we and the white car in front of us closed the gap on the cyclist, I watched as the white car just drifted to the left. It wasn’t a hard fall to the left, it was a gradual drift.”

11You were arrested by police and interviewed. There was no evidence of any drugs or alcohol in your system. There was no evidence of phone use at the time of the collision. You were cooperative with police. You stated that you had been “really tired, more so than usual.” You said that you did not remember seeing him before you struck him, and the first time you realised he was there was when you hit him.

12You were charged with the offence of dangerous driving causing death. After a number of short adjournments in the Magistrates' Court, you pleaded guilty, or at least indicated an intention to do so. You then pleaded guilty before this court to an indictment containing one charge of dangerous drive causing death. That offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. You are now 20 years old. You have no prior convictions of any kind. 

13Four victim impact statements were provided to the court. From Lindsay Smyrk’s wife Caroline, and from his three daughters Lucia, Catherine, and Anna. Three of those four documents were read to the court at the plea hearing. They each provided a vivid description of the impact of this incident, of the grief, the loss, and the trauma experienced by family members and I am sure many others.

14They were, if I may say, dignified and restrained statements. It is impossible for me to do justice to what is contained in each of those statements. They convey vividly, although I am sure only in part, something of the man that Lindsay Smyrk was, and I am sure that the full impact of this loss is not possible to put into words, but those four statements also convey something of the grief, the loss and the trauma of this experience for the immediate family members of Mr Smyrk. They also convey a sense of the broader community and what I am sure is a loss that extends far beyond the immediate family. I have read each of those statements carefully and I take them into account.

15Lindsay Smyrk was the loving and devoted husband to his wife Caroline, and father to his three daughters Lucia, Catherine and Anna, and grandfather to his two grandsons Charlie and Max. Despite his age of 75 years, he was fit and healthy and described as having the fitness of a man decades younger. There was every expectation that he would have lived for decades longer and continued to be a valued member of his family and community.  

16Mr Matthews appeared on your behalf at the plea hearing.

17He submitted that this case can be characterised as one of momentary inattention.  It is not a case involving excessive speed, there was no deliberately abnormal or erratic driving, there were no drugs or alcohol involved and no deliberate distraction such as by way of mobile phone use.

18Mr Matthews referred to the observations of witnesses. Andrew Angwin stated that your car would have been about four to six car lengths ahead of him, he said that he saw your car very slightly veer to the left and then hit the cyclist. He told police at the scene that “it happened so quickly.” Elissa Carter, who was the front seat passenger in Mr Angwin’s car said that she saw your car gradually drift to the left before striking the cyclist.

19The police expert accident reconstruction witness stated that you were likely travelling at a speed of between 73 and 75 kilometres per hour, where the speed limit was 80 kilometres per hour, and as I have already stated, he also noted that the bicycle was between around 17 and 33cm to the left of the fog line. Mr Matthews submitted that these matters indicate that your car was only marginally outside of the left hand lane at the point of collision.

20Mr Matthews submitted that this was a case of momentary inattention, that it can be characterised as being at the low end of seriousness of this offence, and that your moral culpability for the offence can also be characterised as at the low end, relative to other examples of this offence.

21You were described by witnesses immediately after the collision as being “in complete and utter distress…Clearly very shaken up and distraught” and “visibly in a highly distressed way.”

22Dangerous driving causing death is a category 2 offence, and as such, I must impose a custodial sentence, not in combination with a community corrections order, unless certain exceptions are made out pursuant to section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act.[1]

[1] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) (‘Sentencing Act’).

23Mr Matthews submitted that the following matters are relevant to an exception.

24You were assessed by Dr Matthew Bath, psychologist. Dr Bath diagnosed you with post-traumatic stress disorder. He noted intense trauma related symptoms that you have experienced since the incident, including intrusive re-experiencing of the moment of the collision and seeing the deceased’s man’s body, panic attacks, intense fear when travelling in a car, sleep disturbance and suicidal ideation. You were observed to be in an intense emotional state at interview with Dr Bath, and presented with significant anxiety related symptoms.

25You have also been treated by Dr Kate Briggs, psychotherapist, for symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, specifically dissociation and flashbacks of the incident. You have also been prescribed medication by a general practitioner to treat anxiety.

26Mr Matthews submitted that these descriptions and diagnoses are consistent with the descriptions of witnesses of your state at the scene immediately after the collision. A number of personal reference letters written by friends of yours describe the continuing intense emotions that they have observed you to be experiencing since the incident. You are described as struggling with the emotions those close to the deceased would be feeling. You experience pain and stress about being responsible for this incident. You are described as being engulfed in guilt and despair, tormented by guilt, devastated and struggling with being responsible for the death of another person.

27The psychological report of Dr Bath, dated 25 May 2023 describes that you were tearful during interview and have difficulty maintaining your composure. You became very distressed and presented with significant anxiety related symptoms.

28In the assessment with Dr Bath, you repeatedly expressed horror, distress and guilt regarding the collision. You described constant ruminations about Mr Smyrk, his family, his friends and others in his life. You understood that the loss would resound throughout those who had known him and that its effects would be long lasting. You stated to Dr Bath that you would like to reach out to his family and apologise.

29At the time of assessment, you continued to experience ongoing trauma related symptoms consistent with post-traumatic cluster of ruminating on the traumatic event, a heightened state of agitation and anxiety, repeated attempts to avoid reminders of the event and the associated symptoms of depersonalisation and detachment from the world around you. Dr Bath also stated that detailed psychological examination indicates that as a result of your continuing response to this event, you suffer bouts of intense anxiety across the physical, cognitive, emotional and interpersonal domains of your experience.

30You continue to experience a comprehensive range of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, sufficiently intense to meet the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr Bath expressed that ongoing psychological treatment is unequivocally warranted. He stated that you are likely to remain vulnerable to further bouts of depression and anxiety at times of significant stress. You would be particularly vulnerable in a custodial context to a deterioration in mood and vulnerable to significant mood disturbances. Dr Bath stated that it is likely that you would experience a lengthy period of adjustment to a custodial environment and would be at considerable risk of deterioration in mood. Dr Bath noted that any prisoner facing a custodial disposition would find it distressing, but in your case, your mental disorder combined with your history and fragile personality adjustment all suggest that your level of distress would be more severe than that of a prisoner not facing your psychological and personal challenges.

31Mr Matthews submitted that on the basis of these opinions, the court can find on the balance of probabilities that you suffer from impaired mental functioning such that the exception under section 5(2H)(c)(ii)[2] is made out in this case, in that your post-traumatic stress disorder is such that it would result in you being subject to “substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment.”

[2] Sentencing Act

32Significantly in this matter, Mr Cordy, on behalf of the prosecution, conceded that this exception is made out on the basis of the material before the court. Based on that material before the court and the concession made by the prosecution, I am prepared to accept that the exception advanced by Mr Matthews is made out. Consequently, the court is relieved of the mandatory obligation to impose an order under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act in relation to this charge. Mr Cordy also conceded that it follows that the fifth limb in Verdins[3] is enlivened, in that a term of imprisonment is likely to weigh more heavily upon you than it would a person of normal mental health.

[3] R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 (‘Verdins’).

33You are now 20 years old. You have no prior convictions of any kind. I was informed that your father is French and your mother is Australian. Your mother is an architect and works for the Victorian Health Building Authority. You have a younger sister, Elise, who is 16 years old. You are close to your sister, she has had significant mental health difficulties over the years and I understand that this experience has impacted upon you.

34Mr Matthews described a somewhat complex personal history of yours, in terms of family and also your schooling. You completed VCE in 2021 and received an ATAR score of 75. In 2022 you commenced a degree in law and global studies at the Australian Catholic University. I was informed that you have now deferred that course in the aftermath of this incident, although you remain keen to become a lawyer in the long-term.

35You have worked extensively since the age of 16, in hospitality, at a winery, and in retail. You have now been working for about six months at the Macedon Lounge in Macedon, and I received a reference letter from your employer there.

36You commenced seeing psychologist, Dr Kate Briggs, in August 2020, and I also received a report from Dr Briggs.

37I also received a number of personal references written on your behalf. Those references speak of certain difficulties that you have faced in your life. They speak very highly of your character and your potential. You are compassionate, empathetic, conscientious and hard-working. They also speak consistently of the intense feelings of guilt and remorse that you have experienced about this incident.  One reference from Georgina Kearney describes you as a changed person, with overwhelming feelings of guilt and remorse, and the responsibility for having caused such distress to others.

38Mr Matthews acknowledged the need for a sentence that gives considerable weight to denunciation and general deterrence, but submitted that a community corrections order is capable of serving all of the purposes of sentencing in this case. This submission was made with reference to the principles in Boulton's case.[4]

[4] Boulton v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 308 (‘Boulton’).

Prosecution submissions

39I turn to the submissions of the prosecution. Mr Cordy, on behalf of the prosecution, as I have noted, conceded that the exception to the mandatory provisions in section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act[5] is made out, and that limb 5 of Verdins[6] is also enlivened. However, Mr Cordy took issue with the characterisation of the offence as being caused by momentary inattention. Mr Cordy submitted that when all of the matters are analysed closely, some seconds must have elapsed when you were not concentrating as you should have been.

[5] Sentencing Act (n 1).

[6] Verdins (n 3).

40He submitted that it is true that there is a gentle curve in the road, and this is not a case where you are likely to have seen the cyclist for hundreds of metres in advance, but, it was submitted that even allowing for the curve in the road, there was some distance where Mr Smyrk would have been visible to you and you should have seen him. Mr Cordy submitted that this is not just a question of when you deviated from the lane, but you must have been in a position to see Mr Smyrk for some number of seconds before you drifted from your lane, and that this incident should not be characterised as one of momentary inattention.

41Whilst it was accepted that it may have only been a few seconds, and it was conceded by Mr Cordy that your moral culpability is relatively low, it was submitted that it is not at the lowest end, it is somewhat higher than that, and that general deterrence needs to be a primary sentencing objective.

42Mr Cordy acknowledged that immediately upon impact you realised what happened, you stopped and did everything that you could, realistically, to assist. However, it was submitted that Mr Smyrk was wearing bright clothing, his light was flashing, it was broad daylight, there were no significant topographical difficulties, there was ample time to see him in advance, and there must have been a level of inattention for at least some number of seconds before your vehicle veered out of the lane and struck Mr Smyrk’s bicycle.

43Mr Cordy submitted that the principle of general deterrence must be expressed in a meaningful way in the sentence. Whilst of course you did not go out to commit a crime, drivers on the road must understand how serious their obligations are, and understand the potential catastrophic consequences that can result from not paying proper attention.

44Having said that, Mr Cordy did acknowledge that this incident has also impacted upon you heavily, you are a young person, there is a psychological vulnerability, you have done everything you possibly could in response to this. You cooperated with police, you entered an early plea of guilty, it was accepted that you are remorseful and Mr Cordy acknowledged that I have the advantage of having seen and heard you give evidence in court at the plea hearing in what must have been harrowing circumstances for you, following the reading of the victim impact statements in this matter.

45The prosecution position on sentence is that given the importance of general deterrence, the appropriate sentence here, notwithstanding the concession in relation to section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act, is a term of detention in a Youth Justice Centre.[7]

[7] I note for completeness, that it was not raised at the plea hearing that the requirement of section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act is that unless an exception is made out, the court must make an order under Division 2 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act. Division 2 of Part 3 is titled: “Custodial Orders”, and includes section 32, which contains provision for Youth Justice Centre Orders, thus a Youth Justice Centre Order is to be considered a custodial order under Division 2 of Part 3. Nevertheless, I took the prosecution submission to be that a Youth Justice Centre Order was the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding the concession made about the exception.

Analysis

46I turn to the analysis of these matters. Dangerous drive causing death is, by its nature, a serious offence, as it involves the loss of human life. The seriousness of the offence is reflected in the maximum penalty set by Parliament being 10 years imprisonment. However, it is also an offence that is capable of being committed in a wide range of circumstances and with a range in moral culpability. The circumstances of the offence must be assessed in order to determine the gravity of the offence and your moral culpability for it.

47The dangerousness of your driving on this occasion was your inattention which caused you to drift to the left and out of your lane. This occurred at a point where Lindsay Smyrk was riding his bicycle on the hard shoulder of the road to the left of the solid white fog line with audio tactile line markings.

48There was some debate at the plea hearing about what findings I could make about the length of time of your inattention. As I have stated, Mr Matthews submitted that this can be appropriately characterised as momentary inattention and therefore assessed as being at the lower end of the range of moral culpability. Mr Cordy took issue with the submission about momentary inattention, and submitted that although there was a gentle curve in the road, Lindsay Smyrk would have been visible for some period of time, and your inattention must have been for at least some number of seconds before your car drifted to the left of your lane. He submitted that that assessment raised the objective seriousness of the offence and raised your moral culpability.

49This difference in the submissions led to some discussion at the plea hearing about the scope of the term “momentary inattention.”  Mr Matthews submitted that it does not necessarily mean inattention only for a split-second, and may encompass the passage of some seconds. In any event, the tension at the plea hearing arose around the assessment of what period of time did you drive your car with inattention to the road and its conditions.

50I note that after the conclusion of the plea hearing, I received a further submission by from the prosecution by email, with two photographs attached and a reference to Exhibit 8 from the depositions. As I have indicated, I mark that email and the two photographs attached as Exhibit P6 on the plea hearing. I received a reply submission by email from Mr Matthews which I will mark as Exhibit D7.

51I have considered the matters contained in each of those emails. I am cautious about making a finding with any precision about the period of time of inattention, or the precise distance for which Mr Smyrk would have been visible, as I do not view the evidence before me as precise or detailed enough, or sufficiently tested, to determine this issue with any precision. It seems that the drift to the left and the collision happened quickly, and took witnesses at the event by surprise. I have viewed some of the photographs on the brief, including Exhibit 8 from the depositions that I have referred to above and it does appear that there is a curve in the road such that the point of collision may not have been visible for a lengthy distance in advance. As I say, I make that observation with reference to the photographs contained in Exhibit 8 from the depositions. Nevertheless, it also seems clear from all of the circumstances before me that Mr Smyrk would have been visible to you for at least some number of seconds, and he would have been seen had you been paying proper attention at that time.

52I do not see it as entirely necessary to resolve completely the question of whether the term “momentary inattention” can encompass a number of seconds of inattention. As I have said, it is clear from the available evidence that what happened here was more than a split second, but could be described still as a relatively short period of time of inattention.

53Of course, the tragedy in incidents such as this is that a relatively short period of inattention is entirely capable of leading to catastrophic consequences. That is a situation that is not uncommon in the offence of dangerous drive causing death. The very nature of driving a motor vehicle is such that a brief period of inattention is capable of leading to catastrophic consequence, such as is seen in this case.

54I have regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in DPP v Neethling[8] where the court in that case identified factors which may aggravate the seriousness of the crime of dangerous drive causing death. A non-exhaustive list of the matters considered by the court in that case include: whether excessive speed was involved; whether there was intoxication or substance use; whether the driving was erratic or aggressive; whether there was competitive driving or showing off; the length of the journey during which others were exposed to risk; ignoring of warnings; escaping police pursuit; degree of sleep deprivation and failing to stop.

[8] Director of Public Prosecutions v Neethling [2009] VSCA 116.

55Of course, each case will turn on its own facts and I must make an assessment of your moral culpability by reference to the facts of this case, however in determining where this sits in the range of offences of its kind, it is useful to have regard to the range of circumstances in which the offence of dangerous drive causing death may be committed.

56When having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I am prepared to assess both the objective gravity of the offending and your moral culpability as being towards the low end of the range in which this offence can be committed. It may not be at the lowest end, but in my view, it is appropriately assessed as towards the low end.

57Mr Cordy is of course correct in his submission that the sentence that I impose upon you must be one that is capable of sending a message to the community that drivers on the road must understand how serious their obligations are, and that potentially catastrophic consequences can result from not paying proper attention. In other words, the sentence must factor in general deterrence as a significant sentencing purpose. This much was accepted by Mr Matthews on your behalf. The tension in this case being whether a period of detention in a Youth Justice Centre is required to achieve this purpose, or whether the sentencing objectives can be achieved through the imposition of a community corrections order.

58Mr Matthews referred me to the principles in Boulton's[9] case, which I have reread closely in coming to this decision. I am reminded of the very strong statements made in that case by the Court of Appeal about the availability of the community corrections order as a sentencing option that is capable of giving effect to multiple sentencing purposes, whilst allowing an offender to remain in the community to maintain the continuity of personal and family relationships and to benefit from the support they provide.

[9] Boulton (n 4).

59Whilst a community corrections order is not imprisonment and, self-evidently, is never going to be as punitive as a term of imprisonment or detention, it should not be viewed as a light or easy option. A community corrections order is capable of being punitive through its length and through the conditions attached to it and is therefore also capable of sending a message of general deterrence to the community. The imposition of a community corrections order is also not necessarily the end of the matter, as it hangs over the person's head for its duration. If the order is breached, either by non-compliance, or by reoffending, then the offender can be brought back before the court and resentenced for the original charge. In that regard, it is very much a form of conditional release into the community.

60You are still a very young person and perhaps at something of a juncture in your life. Given the nature of the offence, youth plays less of a role as against the need for general deterrence, given the age group most likely to be vulnerable to this sort of offending. Nevertheless, it seems to me that youth is not completely extinguished as a factor and I must have regard to your prospects of rehabilitation and the likely effect of a period of detention in a youth justice facility, even if not in adult prison.

61You pleaded guilty at an early opportunity after cooperating with police. The principles in Worboyes[10] apply to your plea. There is still a significant backlog in criminal trials before this court, particularly in the regional areas. I will not repeat those principles here, they are now well-known. Suffice to say that I take the view that those principles must still be applied with meaning and force. They will not necessarily lead to the difference between a custodial and a non-custodial sentence, but they must still lead to a significant reduction in a sentence due to the additional utilitarian value of a plea of guilty at the present time.

[10] Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169.

62You have done everything you could in response to this offending incident. At the plea hearing, you took a step that is not often seen in these matters. After hearing the victim impact statements in court, which it must be said, was an affecting experience, you got into the witness box and you faced the family of Lindsay Smyrk and you apologised for what you did, for the pain that was caused, and for what you have put the family through. I accept that you are truly sorry for your offending and deeply remorseful and that remorse is clearly self-punishing, and I am sure it will stay with you.

63I want to pause here and say this to the family of Lindsay Smyrk and to all those who supported them at the plea hearing. I want to acknowledge and thank you for your participation in these proceedings. The victim impact statements were documents that were written and read to the court with dignity. Everyone in the courtroom at the plea hearing was touched and affected by the reading of those statements at a personal level and as I have stated, they convey vividly, although I am sure only in small part, something of the man that Lindsay Smyrk was and the ways in which he will be missed. I also want to acknowledge the sympathy that was expressed towards Ms Vergez in the victim impact statements. This is something that is not often seen in these matters and in my view, it reflects enormous capacity to be able to see beyond your own suffering and show compassion for the person whose acts led to your own grief and loss.

64There is little that this court can say or do that will heal or ease that grief and loss.  No sentence imposed by this court can be seen in any way as a measure of the life of Lindsay Smyrk, or a reflection of the loss of his life. The sentence that I must impose in this matter is a reflection of a large number of factors that I must take into account in this process. I hope that the conclusion of these proceedings and your participation in them is able to bring a measure of closure for you, at least to this part of the process.

65Turning back to you Ms Vergez, I accept the psychological material and the opinions expressed by Dr Bath, of which I have already summarised. Based on this material, I accept that limbs 5 and 6 of Verdins[11] are enlivened and perhaps by extension also limb 2. Although these principles may have slightly different application when considering a period of detention in a youth justice facility. In my view, they are not entirely removed from consideration.

[11] Verdins (n 3).

66I also have regard to current sentencing practices for this offence. I was provided with a number of sentences by Mr Cordy, and I have reviewed other sentences imposed by this court for this offence. Whilst terms of imprisonment are usually imposed for this offence, in certain circumstances, particularly where the objective gravity and the moral culpability are assessed as towards the lower end of the range, community corrections orders are on occasion viewed as appropriate sentences. At the conclusion of the plea hearing and based on the submissions of the parties, I adjourned this matter for sentence and had you assessed for your suitability, both for a Youth Justice Centre order and a community corrections order. I have received those reports and you were assessed as suitable for both orders.

67As is so often the case in matters such as this, there are a number of competing principles and sentencing purposes, and the decision about which sentence best reflects all of the relevant purposes is finely balanced. However, there is a discretion open in this case and taking all matters into account, I have come to the view that an appropriate sentence is a community corrections order. As I have stated, I do not view a community corrections order as a light or easy option. It will be lengthy and it may be onerous to complete. I intend to impose a number of hours of unpaid community work as the primary punishment of the order, and also to impose a number of conditions requiring you to participate in rehabilitation courses and programs.

68Accordingly, Amelie Vergez, on the charge of dangerous drive causing death, you will be convicted and sentenced to a community corrections order for a period of two and a half years. You will be required to perform 200 hours of unpaid community work. You must attend as directed for treatment and rehabilitation for mental health assistance. You must attend as directed for programs to reduce the risk of reoffending. I will also order that all of the hours successfully completed for treatment and rehabilitation to count towards the hours of unpaid community work. Pursuant to section 89(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act,[12] your driver licence will be cancelled, and you will be disqualified from obtaining another for a period of 18 months.

[12] Sentencing Act (n 1).

69Pursuant to section 6AAA, I declare that had you not pleaded guilty to this charge, I would have imposed a term of two years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 months. Ms Vergez, I can only impose a community corrections order upon you if you agree to being placed on that order. Do you agree to being placed on a community corrections order?

70OFFENDER: Yes I do, Your Honour.

71HIS HONOUR: All right, thanks, you may be seated. We will have the document prepared. 

72MR CORDY: While that is being done, Your Honour.

73HIS HONOUR: Yes.

74MR CORDY: The licence cancellation should be backdated to the date of the offending.

75HIS HONOUR: Yes, thanks Mr Cordy, I will note that. So the order will remain as it is and it will be backdated to the date of the incident, being 9 October 2022.

76MR CORDY: 9 October.

77HIS HONOUR: Thanks. Mr Matthews, you or your instructor may accompany my associate to Ms Vergez for the signing.

78MR MATTHEWS: Thank you, Your Honour.

79HIS HONOUR: Thanks. All right, thanks. Ms Vergez, I will just say this to you, that in relation to any community corrections order, there are a number of mandatory conditions that attach to every order. They include the following matters. First of all, you must not commit, whether in or outside Victoria, during the period of the order, any offence that is punishable by imprisonment. You must comply with any obligations that are prescribed by the regulations and those will be explained to you by a supervising officer at Corrections. If required to do so, you must report to and/or receive visits from a supervising officer during the period of the order. I note in saying that, that I have not ordered supervision as a condition of the order. The first obligation that you have is, that you must report within two clear working days, being of today's date, to the Bendigo Office of Corrections. You must notify the Office of Corrections of any change of address or employment within two clear working days after the change. You must not leave the State of Victoria, except with the permission of the Office of Corrections and you must comply with lawful directions given to you by Corrections, as are necessary to comply with the order.

80Now, as I say, they are mandatory conditions that attach to every community corrections order. In addition to those, the conditions that I have imposed on this order are that you must perform 200 hours of unpaid community work. You must attend as directed for a mental health assessment and treatment, and you must participate as directed in any programs or courses that are designed to reduce the risk of reoffending. Now, I will just restate that this order will be for a duration of two and a half years, which means that it will hang over your head for that period of two and a half years.

81A community corrections order can potentially be breached in one of two ways. It can be breached if you fail to comply with a condition of the order and it can also be breached if you reoffend. Now, do you understand those conditions?

82OFFENDER: Yes I do.

83HIS HONOUR: All right, thank you. Are there any other matters?

84MR MATTHEWS: No, Your Honour.

85HIS HONOUR: All right, thanks to you both for your assistance in this matter and once again I thank all of those who attended both at the plea hearing and also today. Thanks, we'll adjourn the court.