Director of Public Prosecutions v Venier-Moro

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST

S CI 2015 03939

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(on behalf of Jason BARRY-BASSETT)
Plaintiff
v
JAMANE VENIER-MORO First Defendant
and
THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Second Defendant

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JUDGE:

J FORREST J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

1 December 2015

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

15 December 2015

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Venier-Moro & anor

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2015] VSC 704

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JUDICIAL REVIEW – Jurisdiction – Sentencing – Order for diversion – Consent as precondition for ordering diversion – Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), s 59 – Orders quashed – Remitted back to County Court.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr D A Trapnell QC Ms V Anscombe,
Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the First Defendant Mr P G Nash QC with
Mr J Lavery
Tony Danos Lawyers
For the Second Defendant No appearance

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

  1. The first defendant, Jamane Venior-Moro, was charged with possession of prohibited substances (methylamphetamine and ecstasy). On appeal from the Magistrates’ Court, the County Court judge ordered that he attend a diversion program, seemingly acting under s 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) (CPA).  The plaintiff, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), now applies for judicial review under O56 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules) 2015, arguing that the County Court judge had no power to order diversion, and thus lacked jurisdiction to make that order.

  1. Although there were several side issues concerning the regularity of the County Court judgment, the DPP’s primary argument went to subject matter jurisdiction: that, without the consent of the prosecution, as required by s 59(2)(c) of the CPA, the County Court judge had no power to order that Mr Venier-Moro participate in a diversion program. 

  1. For reasons which I will set out below, I am satisfied that:

(a)        the County Court judge did not have the jurisdiction to make the orders;

(b)        his Honour’s orders should be quashed; and

(c)        the appeal should be remitted to be re-heard in the County Court according to law. 

  1. It is necessary to examine what transpired in the Magistrates’ Court at the original hearing, the hearing at the County Court on appeal, and the orders made by the County Court.  

Division 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act

  1. The relevant sections of the CPA are as follows:

59       Adjournment to undertake diversion program

…

(2)If, at any time before taking a formal plea from an accused in a criminal proceeding for a summary offence or an indictable offence that may be heard and determined summarily—

(a)the accused acknowledges to the Magistrates' Court responsibility for the offence; and

(b)it appears appropriate to the Magistrates' Court, which may inform itself in any way it considers appropriate, that the accused should participate in a diversion program; and

(c)both the prosecution and the accused consent to the Magistrates' Court adjourning the proceeding for…

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Details
Case
[2015] VSC 704
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Venier-Moro, the appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, sought judicial review of sentencing decisions made by the County Court. The respondent, Venier-Moro, was convicted of an offence and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment. The County Court ordered that the sentence be diverted to a non-custodial alternative, without obtaining Venier-Moro's consent. The Director of Public Prosecutions argued that the County Court lacked jurisdiction to order diversion without the consent of the defendant, as required by section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic).

The central legal issue before the court was whether the County Court had the authority to impose a diversion order without the defendant's consent, and if not, whether such an order could be quashed. The court examined the statutory framework provided by section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), which explicitly states that a court may not make a diversion order unless the defendant consents. The court had to determine whether the County Court's failure to obtain consent rendered the diversion order invalid.

The court concluded that section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) is clear in requiring the defendant's consent before a diversion order can be made. As the County Court did not obtain Venier-Moro's consent, the orders for diversion were beyond the court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the orders were quashed, and the matter was remitted back to the County Court for reconsideration of the sentence without the imposition of a diversion order. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to statutory requirements in sentencing to maintain the integrity and legality of the judicial process.

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