Director of Public Prosecutions v TGW

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania against a ruling by a single judge that the introduction of a victim's penis into the accused's mouth did not constitute sexual intercourse for the purposes of the offence of rape under section 126 of the *Criminal Code* (Tas). The central dispute concerned the interpretation of the definition of "sexual intercourse" within the *Criminal Code*.

The Full Court was required to determine whether the definition of sexual intercourse, as it applied to rape, encompassed the act of oral sex where the victim's penis was introduced into the accused's mouth. This involved an analysis of the statutory definition and its application to the specific factual circumstances presented.

The Court held that the definition of sexual intercourse in section 126 of the *Criminal Code* was broad enough to include the act in question. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "sexual intercourse" did not exclude oral sexual contact. The Court found that the legislative intent behind the definition was to cover a wide range of sexual acts, and that the act described fell within this scope. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, finding that the act could constitute rape under the *Criminal Code*.