[2017] TASCCA 1
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)
CITATION: Director of Public Prosecutions v TGW [2017] TASCCA 1
PARTIES: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
TGW
FILE NO: 3080/2016
DELIVERED ON: 6 March 2017
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 28 February 2017
JUDGMENT OF: Blow CJ, Martin and Marshall AJJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Particular offences – Offences against the person – Sexual offences – Rape and sexual assault – Sexual intercourse – Introduction of victim's penis into accused's mouth.
Criminal Code (Tas), s 185(1).
R v JC [2000] ACTSC 72; R v A [2003] 1 NZLR, considered.
Director of Public Prosecution's Reference (Nos 1 of 1992 and 1 of 1993) v M and J (1993) 9 WAR 281, distinguished.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [2238]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: D G Coates SC, M S Wilson
Respondent: K Baumeler
Solicitors:
Appellant: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2017] TASCCA 1
Number of paragraphs: 73
Serial No 1/2017
File No 3080/2016
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v TGW
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
BLOW CJ
MARTIN AJ
MARSHALL AJ
6 March 2017
Orders of the Court
Leave to appeal granted.
Appeal allowed.
Serial No 1/2017
File No 3080/2016
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v TGW
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
BLOW CJ
6 March 2017
I agree with the orders proposed by the other members of the Court, and with their reasons.
File No 3080/2016
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v TGW
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
MARTIN AJ
6 March 2017
Introduction
The Director of Public Prosecutions (the appellant) seeks leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondent of a charge of rape following a direction by the learned trial judge that the jury was required to return a verdict of not guilty.
The charge in question was based upon the evidence of the complainant that, without the complainant's consent, the respondent placed the complainant's penis in the respondent's mouth and sucked it. The learned trial judge was of the view that such conduct did not amount to sexual intercourse for the purposes of s 185 of the Criminal Code (the Code) and directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. The jury subsequently returned a majority verdict of guilty of the alternative offence of indecent assault.
For the reasons that follow, in my opinion the conduct in question did amount to sexual intercourse for the purposes of s 185 and the learned trial judge erred in directing the jury to return the verdict of not guilty. However, while leave to appeal should be granted and the appeal allowed, I would not make any further order.
Facts
The respondent was charged with five sexual offences arising out of a single episode which occurred on 22 December 2013. The charges were based upon statements made by the complainant to police on 23 December 2013 and 18 September 2014. Those statements were supplemented…
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- Case
- [2017] TASCCA 1
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court was required to determine whether the definition of sexual intercourse, as it applied to rape, encompassed the act of oral sex where the victim's penis was introduced into the accused's mouth. This involved an analysis of the statutory definition and its application to the specific factual circumstances presented.
The Court held that the definition of sexual intercourse in section 126 of the *Criminal Code* was broad enough to include the act in question. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the Court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "sexual intercourse" did not exclude oral sexual contact. The Court found that the legislative intent behind the definition was to cover a wide range of sexual acts, and that the act described fell within this scope. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, finding that the act could constitute rape under the *Criminal Code*.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi