SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Director of Public Prosecutions v TAL [2019] QCA 279
PARTIES:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(applicant)
v
TAL
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 8688 of 2018
DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Miscellaneous Application – Criminal
DELIVERED ON:
3 December 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
6, 7, 8 August 2019
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Fraser and Morrison JJA
ORDER:
Application refused.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – GENERAL MATTERS – CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – GENERALLY – where the Director of Public Prosecutions made an application under s 678B of the Criminal Code to the Court of Appeal to order a retrial of the respondent for murder – where a woman was found stabbed to death in the bedroom of her flat in 1987 – where the respondent was charged and tried for her murder in 1988 – where the respondent admitted that he had gone with the deceased to her unit and spent time inside the unit on the night she was believed to have been killed – where the respondent said that he could not remember whether he had been in her bedroom on the night – where the respondent provided samples of his blood and hair to authorities – where there were blood stains on a pillow lying with the deceased and on underwear lying in the bedroom – where the pillowcase and underwear were sampled and tested for blood grouping – where the samples were consistent with the blood group of the respondent – where hairs found on the deceased’s jacket and blouse were consistent with the respondent’s pubic hair – where the jury at the 1988 trial found the respondent not guilty of the murder – where after the acquittal it become possible to generate a DNA profile from a sample of blood and compare it to another DNA profile – where the bloodstained samples were tested to produce DNA profiles in 1990, 1999, 2000 and 2015 – where the results showed DNA profiles consistent with that from a sample of the respondent’s blood – where it is common ground that the evidence is “fresh” – where the Court may allow the application only if the evidence is also “compelling” and it is, in all the circumstances, in the interests of justice to order a second trial – whether the evidence is compelling – whether it is in the interests of justice to order the respondent be retried for the murder
Criminal Code (Qld), s 678, s 678B, s 678D, s 678F
Criminal Code (Tas), s 402A
Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA), s 159
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), pt 10Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429; [1933] HCA 41, applied
Crown Prosecution Service (Newcastle) v D [2009] EWCA Crim 1423, cited
Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392, [1986] HCA 26, applied
R v Andrews [2009] 1 WLR 1947; [2008] EWCA Crim 2908, cited
R v Dobson [2011] EWCA Crim 1255,…
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- Case
- [2019] QCA 279
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the fresh DNA evidence was compelling enough and whether ordering a retrial was in the interests of justice. The court had to assess if the DNA evidence provided by the new technology was sufficiently compelling to warrant a retrial and if doing so would serve the interests of justice. The court also considered whether the application was made in good faith and if there were any factors that could potentially prejudice TAL's right to a fair trial if a retrial were ordered.
The court found that the fresh DNA evidence, while compelling, did not automatically warrant a retrial. The compelling nature of the evidence must be assessed in the context of the entire case, including the circumstances of the original trial and the potential impact on the fairness of any retrial. The court considered that a retrial might prejudice TAL's right to a fair trial due to the passage of time and the potential unavailability of witnesses and evidence from the original trial. The court also found that the application was not made in good faith, as there was an unreasonable delay in seeking the retrial.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the DPP's application and refused the order for a retrial. The court held that despite the compelling nature of the fresh DNA evidence, it was not in the interests of justice to order a retrial due to potential prejudice to the respondent's right to a fair trial and the unreasonable delay in making the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Director of Public Prosecutions made an application under section 678B of the Criminal Code to the Court of Appeal to order a retrial of the respondent for the murder. The application was based on the new DNA evidence which became available after the acquittal. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the evidence was compelling and if it was in the interests of justice to order a retrial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the evidence is compelling.
2. Whether it is in the interests of justice to order the respondent be retried for the murder.
Held
1. The court concluded that the evidence presented was compelling.
2. The court determined that it was not in the interests of justice to order the respondent be retried for the murder.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered the application made under s 678B of the Criminal Code by the Director of Public Prosecutions to order a retrial of the respondent for the murder of a woman found stabbed to death in her flat in 1987. The respondent had been tried and acquitted of the murder in 1988. The court examined the circumstances under which the respondent had been present in the deceased’s flat on the night of the murder and the evidence that had been presented during the trial, including blood and hair samples that matched the respondent’s DNA. The pivotal point of the case was the advent of DNA profiling, which allowed for more precise testing of the evidence after the respondent’s acquittal.
The Court noted that compelling evidence was defined as evidence that was so strong that the jury should have convicted the accused had they been properly directed. The Court found that, while the DNA evidence was compelling, it was not so overwhelming that it would have led the jury to convict if they had been properly directed. This was because the evidence, while significant, did not negate all other possibilities and scenarios that could have occurred during the events of that night. The jury had acquitted the respondent based on the evidence before them and the directions they received.
Further, the Court considered whether it was in the interests of justice to order a retrial. The Court emphasised that double jeopardy was a fundamental principle of criminal law, protecting individuals from being retried for the same offence after having been acquitted. The Court weighed the compelling nature of the new evidence against the principle of double jeopardy and the potential prejudice to the respondent if retried. The Court concluded that the interests of justice did not favour a retrial, given the significant time that had elapsed since the original trial and the potential for prejudice to the respondent.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while compelling new evidence may justify a retrial, the interests of justice must also be considered, including the principle of double jeopardy and the potential prejudice to the accused. The Court found that in this case, the compelling evidence did not override the interest in preventing a retrial due to the risk of prejudice to the respondent.