Director of Public Prosecutions v Spencer

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Unrestricted

AT SHEPPARTON AND MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S ECR 2024 0211

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
JORDAN SPENCER	Accused

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JUDGE:	TINNEY J
WHERE HELD:	Shepparton and Melbourne
DATES OF HEARING:	30 June, 21 and 25 August 2025
DATE OF SENTENCE:	8 October 2025 (First Revision 10 October 2025)
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v Spencer
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VSC 635

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Causing serious injury intentionally in circumstances of gross violence – Plea of guilty - Petrol thrown on the head and upper body of victim, who was then set alight with a jet lighter - Full thickness burns to head, neck, chest, and arms and to 30% of total body surface area – Claim of having acted out of fear rejected – Relevance of Bugmy and Verdins principles – Childhood disadvantage - Some reduction in moral culpability on account of general Bugmy principle, but moral culpability still high – Limb 5 of Verdins enlivened, to modest effect - Head sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment, with non-parole period of 9 years.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel

Solicitors

For the Crown

Mr J Dickie

Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

For the Accused

Mr J McQuillan

Marshall Jovanovska

Ralph Criminal Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

Jordan Spencer, you have pleaded guilty to causing serious injury intentionally in circumstances of gross violence (‘ICSIGV’)[1] to Paris Carpio, and have admitted the prior convictions contained in the criminal record filed in this case.
[1]Contrary to s 15A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).

You inflicted serious injury upon Ms Carpio by dousing her head and upper body with petrol and then deliberately setting her alight using a jet lighter.[2] Ms Carpio sustained shocking, life-threatening and life-changing injuries from which she will never fully recover. Ms Carpio was very intoxicated at the time of your attack upon her, and her drunken and over-the-top behaviour towards you and your property, in the context of growing anger which you felt towards your partner Rob McLaren (‘McLaren’), caused you to lose your temper and attack Ms Carpio in anger. Having said that, Ms Carpio did nothing to cause you to be in fear immediately prior to your attack, and indeed, had refused your invitation to come inside your house and moved away from your front door shortly before you launched your attack. For reasons which I will spell out later, I reject the claim made on your behalf during the plea hearing that fear had any part to play in your offending. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you acted solely out of anger.
[2]A jet lighter is a small hand-held lighter which resembles a small blowtorch, emitting a flame at a right-angle from the body of the lighter under pressure upon operation of the mechanism.

The circumstance of gross violence relied upon by the Crown in relation to the charge and acknowledged by you by your plea, is that you planned in advance of the attack to have with you an offensive weapon, constituted by the lighter and the bowl of flammable liquid, and used those to cause the serious injury.

Section 10(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (‘the Act’) dictates that in sentencing you, I am required to impose a term of imprisonment and fix a non-parole period of not less than 4 years unless I find under s 10A that a special reason exists. Understandably, it was not argued on your behalf by Mr McQuillan, who appeared for you on the plea, that a special reason exists in your case.

It is perfectly clear that in your case, notwithstanding the matters upon which you were able to rely in mitigation, the considerable gravity of your offending requires that your crime be met with a very substantial term of imprisonment.

Background

Ms Carpio was only twenty years old at the time of your attack upon her. She moved to Victoria from Western Australia when she was 7, and attended boarding school at Worawa Aboriginal College in Healesville. She moved to Shepparton when she was 16, and in the ensuing years, moved between Shepparton, Melbourne and Western Australia. She completed Certificates II and III in Community Services in Western Australia and Victoria respectively, and was studying a Diploma of Community Services at the time of your crime. She had no criminal convictions. She was visiting relatives in Shepparton on the day of these events. She had apparently met you once in the past, and knew your boyfriend, McLaren.

You were 33 years old at the time of your crime. You had longstanding mental health issues, and a problem with illicit drugs. You lived at 17 Yorkshire Crescent, Shepparton, on the corner of Middlesex Crescent. You had a tempestuous, off-and-on relationship with McLaren, repeatedly harbouring and expressing concerns as to his faithfulness and apparent deceptions towards you. I will turn to your personal background and criminal history in more detail at [48] below.

Lead-up events on day of offending

From the early afternoon of the day of your crime, 15 January 2024, you were exchanging text messages with McLaren about your unhappiness with him, and your suspicions about his conduct. Having been out during the afternoon, you arrived home shortly after 4.00 pm. By that time, McLaren had departed the premises on a pushbike. He went to the nearby Rigg Reserve, where he met up with Ms Carpio and Ebony Chatfield (‘Chatfield’), both of whom were known to you. Ms Carpio and Chatfield had travelled to the reserve a little earlier on Ms Carpio’s e-scooter, having purchased a bottle of bourbon on the way. Ms Carpio was noticed by Chatfield to be very drunk when she first saw her that afternoon. At the reserve, the two women consumed more alcohol.

When McLaren met Ms Carpio and Chatfield at Rigg Reserve, they talked about obtaining drugs to use. At one point, McLaren gave Ms Carpio some money to purchase some cigarettes from a nearby store. She walked off to do this, and while she was away, McLaren took her e-scooter and he and Chatfield rode to a derelict house nearby, where Chatfield used some methylamphetamine. McLaren then rode off on the e-scooter, leaving Chatfield at the house. From that point onwards until your attack upon her, Ms Carpio was trying to recover her e-scooter from McLaren, but was unsuccessful in doing so.

At 5.34 pm, Ms Carpio knocked on the front door of your premises. Her attendance there and the conversation she had with you were captured on a CCTV camera positioned above the door. She asked you if McLaren was there, and told you that he had her scooter. Ms Carpio was clearly intoxicated, upset and volatile. She threatened to smash some glass window panes. You told her it was your house, not McLaren’s. She told you that McLaren was with Chatfield. You told her that you did not know and did not care, and that you and McLaren were not together. Ms Carpio became increasingly agitated, culminating in her threatening to kill McLaren, kicking and hitting the front door, and throwing a rubbish bin at the front door. She then entered the rear yard by knocking over a part of the fence. As a result, your dogs were able to escape the yard. While in the rear yard, Ms Carpio removed a fly screen from a window and shouted out to you, indicating that she believed McLaren was in the house. She then picked up a shovel from the garden and walked off.

During and after this interaction, numerous further messages were exchanged between you and McLaren. The exchanges reflect your increasing anger at him.

At 5.48 pm, you dialled triple 0 and spoke to the operator, requesting police attendance as a result of what Ms Carpio had done at your property.

At 5.57 pm, McLaren arrived at you premises on the e-scooter. After you opened the door and told him the ‘Jacks’ were coming, he rode off. You told him, ‘Enjoy. Bye, don’t come back’.

At 6.01 pm, two uniformed police arrived at the premises and spoke to you. The interaction was recorded on the CCTV camera at the front door, and on their body worn camera (‘BWC’) footage. You told them what Ms Carpio had earlier done at the premises. The police checked the rear yard to see if she was still there. She was not. You confirmed you knew Ms Carpio. You said that she was ‘off her head’ and that you could smell alcohol through the door. You said that you did not want any police action, but just wanted to make sure that she was gone. The police told you to call again if Ms Carpio returned. They then left the scene.

During his oral presentation of the prosecution opening during the plea hearing, Mr Dickie, who appeared for the prosecution, asserted that the CCTV footage of the attendance by police showed you to seem relatively calm, as indeed you had been when you spoke earlier to Ms Carpio. My viewing of the footage bore out that contention.

Numerous text messages were exchanged between you and McLaren between the time of the departure of the police and the time of the attack. In spite of McLaren professing his love for you, you told him you were not attracted to him and could not love him, and wanted him out of your life.

At 6.25 pm, Ms Carpio attended the nearby home of Gavin Forrester. He saw her crying and staggering around outside his home and asked what was going on. She told him about her missing scooter. Shortly after this, Ms Carpio saw McLaren riding her scooter on Yorkshire Crescent. She yelled out to him to return the scooter, and threatened him. He rode towards and past her on the scooter, an action some witnesses considered to be him ‘baiting’ her.

Circumstances of the offence

Ms Carpio returned to your property. She pulled a flywire screen away from one of the front windows before throwing a rock and a brick at the window, smashing it. She yelled out to McLaren to give her back her scooter.

By this stage, in circumstances that I am satisfied you have never truthfully related, you had a metal bowl containing petrol with you near the front door of the house, and a jet lighter which you had previously been using to light an ice pipe you had been smoking. You had these items with you in preparation for attacking Ms Carpio.

While Ms Carpio was near the front door of the premises, you yelled out to her, ‘Come fucking here, you tip rat whore’. She approached the door, and kicked the locked security door, telling you to shut the fuck up, and that McLaren had taken her scooter. You and Ms Carpio traded insults. At one point, you told her that her Dad had probably knocked himself (implying that he had committed suicide), for having a daughter like her. Ms Carpio kicked the bottom glass panel to the side of the front door, causing it to break. You repeatedly told Ms Carpio to come in, saying at one point, ‘Come in. The door’s open, come through the door, and I’ll give you what you deserve’. I am satisfied that at least by the time you made this veiled threat to Ms Carpio, you had armed yourself with the bowl of petrol and the jet lighter in preparation for attacking Ms Carpio.

Through the mist of her intoxication, Ms Carpio understood the note of menace in your invitation. She retreated back towards the footpath, and told you to come outside. You told her to come inside where it would all be on camera. She pointed to the outside cameras and said it was all on camera out there.

Just before 6.30 pm, you opened the security door and walked outside, carrying the bowl of petrol and the jet lighter. You moved directly and towards Ms Carpio, who was standing on the footpath some metres from the front door. She asked, ‘Where’s your man now?’, and you replied, ‘Where’s my man?’, before throwing the contents of the bowl directly onto her face and hair. As the two of you grappled, you moved the lighter towards her face, operating the mechanism, but the lighter did not ignite. She tried to push you away. You used your left hand to grab Ms Carpio’s hair, pulling her head back as you made further unsuccessful attempts to ignite the lighter. The two of you fell towards the ground, while you were still holding onto her hair. Just before you hit the ground, the lighter ignited, setting fire to Ms Carpio’s hair, head and upper body clothing. You landed on top of her on the ground, causing you to be partially set alight. You rolled off Ms Carpio, watched her burning, then got up, picked up your lighter from the ground, and went inside your home.

Immediate aftermath

After being set on fire, Ms Carpio climbed to her feet and ran in a panic towards the nature strip where she crashed into a tree and fell into the gutter. She got up again before falling in the middle of the road, screaming in agony. She moved over to the far side of the road and fell in the opposite gutter, rolling around on the road trying in vain to put the flames out. She remained alight for about 64 seconds, before one of the bystanders succeeded in pulling her upper garment from her body. A garden hose was then used by a resident to fully extinguish the flames. Emergency services were called. The CCTV camera from above the front door of your property captured all of these events in their horrific detail.

Upon entering your house, you talked to McLaren on your mobile phone, which was connected to him at the time of the incident. You told him to call the police, said that you had burnt Ms Carpio, having set her on fire, and that you were burnt yourself. You asked for help. About one minute later, after having placed the lighter on the kitchen table and wrapped your hand in a cloth, you walked out of the front door and away from the scene. At this time, the flames on Ms Carpio had only just been extinguished. A neighbour who saw you leaving the scene told you that Ms Carpio needed an ambulance. Your response was to say that she had just smashed up your house.

You walked to an address in Poplar Avenue where you asked for help from the occupants. Upon questioning about what had happened, you said that petrol had been thrown at you by Ms Carpio.

Emergency treatment of Ms Carpio and initial investigation

Emergency services arrived. Ms Carpio was intubated and placed in an induced coma before being airlifted to Melbourne for emergency treatment.

You were found by police at the Poplar Avenue address at about 6.50 pm. You were airlifted to Melbourne for treatment for your burns.

The next day, 16 January 2024, police executed a search warrant at your address. They found the bowl still on the path to the front door, a jerry can on the kitchen bench containing 2 litres of petrol, and the jet lighter on the dining table.

Your arrest and admissions made by you

You remained in The Alfred Hospital being treated for your burns. You were formally arrested on 19 January 2024, and having had your rights explained to you, when asked if you knew why you were in custody, you said, ‘Yeah, because that bitch came onto my property’. When speaking on the phone to your grandfather on the same day, you told him that Ms Carpio had smashed up your house, that petrol had somehow gotten on her when she kicked in the door, and that the jerry can was near the door.

You were discharged from the hospital into police custody on 30 January 2024. You made no comment when formally interviewed by the police.

On 21 February 2024, when speaking to McLaren from prison, you claimed that when Ms Carpio had been trying to kick the dog, petrol from the open jerry can had accidentally got into the dog’s water bowl. You said that you then threw the petrol on Ms Carpio, having snapped and gone outside. You said you had the lighter in your hand from a pipe you had been lighting. You denied having clicked the lighter.

On 21 April 2024, in another conversation with McLaren, you told him that you blamed him for what had happened. You told him that you were sitting in gaol because of his actions, as he had caused the argument with Ms Carpio. He pointed out that it was your actions which had you in custody, and that he did not make you do what you had done. You told him that he did not come to fix what he had started, so you had to fix it.

In a later phone conversation with a friend on 5 June 2024, you said that you were on the phone to McLaren at the time of the incident, but that he did not come to your aid. To top it off, in spite of having gone to your residence to collect his ice pipes and clothing, he had not collected the CCTV hard drive from your residence, and this was what had ‘fucked’ you.

Suffice it to say, in the immediate aftermath of the offending and the months since, you have proffered several implausible explanations for how the petrol got into the bowl, and who was to blame for your actions. This pattern of minimising your responsibility for this heinous offence persisted at the time of the plea hearing, when you offered a further implausible explanation for how the petrol got into the bowl, which I turn to at [41]. Notwithstanding this observation, your guilty plea of course reflects some acknowledgment by you of your responsibility for this offence.

Ms Carpio’s injuries and medical treatment

Ms Carpio sustained 50% full thickness burns to her head, neck, chest, left arm and right arm and to 30% of her total body surface area. This included burns to her face and ears, anterior scalp, left and right upper arms (all deep dermal/full thickness burns), neck and upper chest (full thickness) and shoulders. The burns endangered her life. The injuries and consequences were substantial and protracted.

After her admission to The Alfred Hospital, screws were put in place to secure Ms Carpio’s airway because of her facial burns. Escharotomies were performed on her left arm, neck and chest. She was admitted to the intensive care unit (‘ICU’). She underwent debridement of her back, shoulders, arms, chest and neck. Her back, shoulders and arms were grafted. She was found to have a grade 2 injury to her airway. She underwent multiple operations in part due to grafting failures, and was required to undergo additional grafting. On 7 February 2024 she had skin grafting to her left ear, right shoulder, thumbs and to both eyelids. On 15 February she had an IVC filter inserted due to lower limb deep vein thrombosis.

On 19 March 2024 Ms Carpio was transferred from the ICU to a ward. She returned to the ICU days later, as a planned admission, with later decannulation of her tracheostomy. On 2 April she was transferred from The Alfred Hospital to Caulfield Hospital for inpatient rehabilitation. On 24 April 2024 she was discharged home. She continues to receive ongoing treatment. This includes another round of laser treatment to her neck and major neck release surgery, where tissue from Ms Carpio’s leg will be placed into her neck to try to assist with her range of motion.

The injuries Ms Carpio suffered have caused significant physical disfigurement, as well as substantial psychological distress.

What I have said thus far is insufficient to properly describe the complete devastation that your actions caused in the life of Ms Carpio. That was very graphically and tragically illustrated in her victim impact statement, to which I will later turn.

Factual matters in dispute

Two disputed aspects of the circumstances surrounding your offending were the subject of discussion before me, and are worthy of comment at this stage of my reasons. One of these matters in particular was an important matter relied upon by Courtney Steffens, the clinical psychologist who assessed you in preparation for the plea hearing, and who gave evidence before me, in her formulation of a theory or opinion why your mental condition contributed to your offending.

The first disputed matter concerned how it was that you came to have with you, when you attacked Ms Carpio, a bowl full of petrol. Your account, given to Ms Steffens, was that in the lead-up to the day of your crime, McLaren had told you to use the liquid and the lighter which you eventually used in committing this crime if you needed to protect yourself.[3] You claimed in your discussions with her not to know what the liquid was. In a consistent account which you gave earlier to another psychologist, David Ball, whose report was relied upon by Ms Steffens, and was provided to the Court, you said that there was a container permanently at the front door, that McLaren had instructed you, ‘If anyone causes trouble, throw this at them’, and that you did not know what the liquid was in the container. In your instructions to your counsel, as indicated in his submissions before me,[4] you claimed that you had been told by McLaren that he was leaving the bowl of petrol on the floor by the door, in readiness for you to use as a weapon should someone come uninvited to your door.
[3]Report of Courtney Steffens, 28 April 2025 (‘Steffens Report’) [78].
[4]Transcript of Plea Hearing, DPP v Spencer (Supreme Court of Victoria, Tinney J, 30 June, 21 and 25 August 2025) 91 (‘Plea Transcript’).

The second disputed matter concerned what was in your mind at the time of your attack upon Ms Carpio. It was submitted on your behalf, consistently with what you have claimed to Ms Steffens, that at the time of your actions, you were in fear of an attack upon yourself from Ms Carpio.

In respect of the first matter, as I made clear during discussions with Mr McQuillan, there was an air of implausibility to the claim you made, unsupported by any evidence other than what you said after the event, that McLaren had equipped you with the bowl of petrol, and encouraged you to use it, in conjunction with a flame source, in attacking an intruder at your premises, should the threat arise. The experience of the Court, and in recent times my own experience in this role, has sadly been that the use of an accelerant lit by a flame source as an impromptu weapon, causing death or serious injury, has not been an unusual mode of attack. But the proposition that your partner left you with a bowl of petrol and the suggestion that you use it to attack and set fire to an unwelcome intruder at your home at some indeterminate time in the future is unrealistic, and I reject it. I don’t think there is any truth to your claim.

If your claim would, in fact, amount to a mitigatory fact, which may be questionable in any event, then it would be incumbent on you to prove it on the balance of probabilities. You have not done so. If the identification of you as the person who placed that fuel in the bowl with a view to using it at some time to carry out an attack is properly viewed as an aggravating feature, then it would be for the prosecution to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.

In his submissions before me, Mr McQuillan persisted in the contention that I should not act on the basis that you placed the fuel in the bowl. He submitted that there is no evidence that you did that, and that to reach that conclusion would be no more than speculation. It would be correct to say that there is no direct objective evidence indicating who put the fuel in the bowl, but Mr McQuillan’s submissions, respectfully, paid no regard to the inference which could properly be drawn from the known facts that you must have been the person who put the petrol in the bowl. There is no other reasonable explanation, in my view.

Having considered your claim in the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you are the person who poured the fuel into that bowl, in preparation for using it to attack Ms Carpio. The point at which you did that is not clear on the evidence, and nor is it important. I am also satisfied that the decision to arm yourself with the bowl of petrol and the lighter, with a view to using the items as a weapon to attack Ms Carpio, was entirely yours. Your claim about McLaren being the instigator of this idea is, as I have already said, unrealistic, and I reject it.

Turning to the second disputed matter, your claim of having acted, in part, out of fear, was as I said, an important consideration in the reasoning of Ms Steffens. Your claim of being in fear at the time you launched your attack upon Ms Carpio is unsupported by any credible evidence, and flies in the face of all available objective evidence. A simple viewing of the CCTV footage makes that entirely clear. I have looked carefully and repeatedly at the footage. What it reveals is that half an hour before your offending, when police attended in response to your call, you showed no indication of being in fear. You were perfectly content to let them leave, and knew full well that they would promptly return should you call triple 0 again. When Ms Carpio did, in fact, return, and behave in a manner which was certainly over the top and very annoying to you, you made no effort to again summon the police. Rather, when things became too much for you, you insulted Ms Carpio in a hurtful fashion, and invited her inside so she could ‘get what she deserved’. By the time of your attack, she had kicked in the window panel to the side of your front door, but she did not persist in any attempt to enter. When Ms Carpio did not take you up on your suggestion that she come inside, and stepped away from your door, that is when, armed with the bowl of petrol and the jet lighter, you opened the locked security door and moved from the safety of your home to approach and attack Ms Carpio. In his submissions before me, Mr McQuillan continued to maintain that I should conclude, notwithstanding the matters I have outlined above, that you acted on the occasion in question out of fear. I do not accept that contention. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no truth at all to your claim of having acted in fear. I am satisfied that far from fear on your part being any part of your thinking when you carried out this heinous attack, you acted predominantly out of anger, with no component at all of fear.

Personal background

Your personal history was set out in some detail in the report of clinical psychologist Courtney Steffens dated 28 April 2024. That account was relied upon on your behalf during the plea hearing. The account was seemingly largely reliant upon your self-report to Ms Steffens.

You were born on 23 October 1990, and were hence 33 years old at the time of your offending, and are now 34. You are the only child of your parents, although you have two step-siblings. You have no meaningful relationship with your father, having not seen him since you were 13. You describe a home environment which was chaotic and lacking in structure. You were looked after by your mother, and at times, by your maternal grandparents. You claim to have witnessed your mother being beaten by her father and other men. Your mother frequently became emotionally dysregulated and chased you around the house. She was often absent, spending time in gambling establishments. You and your mother frequently moved house. You commenced running away from home when you were seven. You report having been sexually abused by the friend of a family member over a period of several years, commencing when you were five. The abuse ceased when you and your mother moved away. When you were 14, you were asked to leave the family home when your mother entered a new de facto relationship. You describe this event as having deepened the profound feelings of abandonment and rejection you already felt as a child. Following this, you experienced significant housing instability, alternating between living with grandparents, staying with friends, and living with partners.

You had a very disrupted education history, attending numerous primary and secondary schools. You experienced emotional and behavioural difficulties at school, and a high level of bullying. You completed Year 8, but were expelled during Year 9 due to your poor behaviour and non-attendance. You received no specialised learning support in school and received no relevant diagnoses, although you report there was a query as to a possible diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (‘ADHD’).

You have an extremely limited employment history. During your adult life, you have periodically worked as a sex worker. You were employed for 12 months at a fish and chip shop.

You have engaged in several episodes of vocational training post-secondary school. You completed VCAL while in juvenile detention, and have undertaken Certificate II qualifications in hairdressing, information technology, fashion and hospitality. You also commenced Certificate III in beauty therapy and fashion.

At the age of 15, you began a relationship with your former partner, Sean, who was then 19. You are the mother of five children, all from that relationship.

Your history in relationships is characterised by reports of abuse, high levels of coercive control, and ongoing exposure to danger. You report that when you were 16, Sean compelled you to engage in sexual activity with others for payment, and you were injected with heroin to promote compliance. The relationship was a tumultuous and abusive one, and proceeded until you were 31. You required support from a family violence service to eventually leave the relationship.

You then commenced a relationship with McLaren. You claim that McLaren was abusive and controlling.

You commenced using alcohol when you were 14, progressing to cannabis use at 16, which increased to daily use. You started using heroin when you were 16, and progressed to daily use for a period of about 4 years. You have participated in treatment programs over the years. At the time of your offending, you were using high levels of methylamphetamine (‘MA’), having relapsed into drug use in the aftermath of your children being taken into care, in around 2020. You were affected by MA at the time of your attack on Ms Carpio.

Since being in custody, you have had some contact with each of your children, including face to face visits, though this has been limited.

Criminal history

Your criminal history in the adult jurisdiction commenced when you were 19 years old and received a sentence of detention for 6 months in a youth training centre for burglary and theft. The history comprises convictions for a variety of offences including violence, dishonesty, drug and driving offences over a further 11 appearances. Most seriously, in 2011, you received a sentence in the County Court of 15 months in a youth justice centre for armed robbery and robbery. The crimes were described by the sentencing judge, Judge Montgomery, as ‘particularly serious incidents of armed robbery and robbery in the street on soft targets’. Two months after the sentence in that matter, you received a period of detention in a youth training centre for threatening to inflict serious injury and possessing a controlled weapon without excuse.

Mental health history

You have a history of mental health concerns and diagnoses, although these are not spelt out in great detail in the reports of Ms Steffens.[5] In her most recent report, she indicated that her review of the Justice Health file indicated previous diagnoses of bipolar affective disorder (‘BPAD’), complex post-traumatic stress disorder (‘C-PTSD’), and some features of borderline personality disorder. Diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder have been considered in the past as a result of psychotic symptoms you have intermittently exhibited. You have apparently been treated in the past with antipsychotic medications and antidepressants, although only for relatively limited periods of time. When you spoke with Ms Steffens, you reported chronic depressed mood. She carried out an array of psychometric and other tests upon you. The results of testing and her professional evaluation led her to opine in her first report that you met the criteria for a diagnosis of C-PTSD and major depressive disorder (‘MDD’), that you present with dependent personality traits, and that at the time of the events in question, you would have met the criteria for stimulant use disorder. In her second report, Ms Steffens noted a number of previous diagnoses contained in the Justice Health file to which she then had access. She added borderline personality disorder to conditions suffered by you.

Relevance of mental health condition to offending, and other Verdins considerations

[5]Steffens report (n 3); and Supplementary report of Courtney Steffens, 24 June 2025 (‘Supplementary Steffens report’).

Mr McQuillan primarily relied on the two reports of Ms Steffens, as well as her oral evidence on the second day of the plea hearing, in support of his submissions on the effect of your mental health conditions on your offending, and the application of Verdins and Bugmy principles in this case.

Ms Steffens spoke to you in detail about what was happening in your life in the weeks leading up to and at the time of your crime. You claimed to be suffering a degree of distress at being left alone at your home, in circumstances where you felt anxious and without protection in light of your dependence on McLaren. You claimed to have attempted suicide on two occasions due to being made to feel worthless by McLaren. You were fearful that he was cheating on you, and the fear was amplified by his frequent and unpredictable absences from home. Ms Steffens opined that all of those factors played a role in amplifying your vigilance and emotional dysregulation at the time of your offending, while eroding your sense of autonomy and being able to protect yourself.

You told Ms Steffens that McLaren had told you to use the liquid in the bowl and the lighter if you ever needed to protect yourself. This was an account in which you persisted during the plea hearing. As I have already indicated, I am satisfied that your claim in this regard was false.

In terms of what you said to Ms Steffens about the immediate lead-up to your crime, and the crime itself, this is set out in the following passages from the report of Ms Steffens:

On the day of the current offending, Ms Spencer reported that her partner had been out of the house and she had been distressed about his whereabouts. She reported a prominence of feelings of abandonment and aloneness at the time of offending. She had been using methamphetamine in the days prior and on the day of the offending. She stated that this was with the intention of staying awake and she had had limited sleep for several days.
When the victim in the current matter presented to the house in an agitated state, Ms Spencer reported not knowing what to do and fearing for her safety. She tried to call her partner, and also called the police due to this fear. Ms Spencer reported that the police attended her property. She stated “they made me search the backyard”, but were unable to locate anyone. Ms Spencer stipulated that she told them how concerned she was about the situation, and that she was worried that she might “do something bad” if the victim came back. The police reportedly advised her to call them if the threat returned, and left the property.
After the police left the property, the victim reportedly returned and commenced smashing windows. Ms Spencer also reported seeing another antisocial peer driving past the house, elevating her fear level. She reported hearing comments that her partner was cheating on her. Ms Spencer reported experiencing emotion dysregulation and increasing fear for her safety due to the smashed windows. She reported a belief that her life was at risk, but fearing that she had “nowhere to go” due to the victim being in the yard, and worrying that she may be followed if she left the property.
As it relates to the circumstances of setting the victim on fire, Ms Spencer reported a lack of consequential thinking. She described a need to escape, and that her partner’s instructions came to mind, so she impulsively acted on them. She reported not knowing what would happen, which she maintained even when confronted about this. When questioned about the proportionality of her response, Ms Spencer stated “My head went into overdrive. I thought “I need to protect myself. Where’s a pole? How do I get out of here? [Referring to the fluid and lighter] It was just there and it just happened. I was in zombie land. There was no thought for even my safety”. She reported feeling “too many emotions”, reporting fear, anger and protectiveness over her children’s rooms at the house. She described a belief that her partner may have set her up to kill her.[6]

[6]Steffens report (n 3) [79]-[82] (emphasis in original).

As I have already indicated in these reasons, I reject the claim you made, in detail to Ms Steffens, that your motivation, or part of your motivation, in carrying out this attack upon Ms Carpio was your fear for your safety, or a belief that it was necessary to do what you did to protect yourself from an attack by Ms Carpio.

The referral request to Ms Steffens asked her to address the applicability of R v Verdins & Ors (‘Verdins’)[7] considerations in this case. She indicated:

there is a clear nexus between Ms Spencer’s severe mental health presentation including trauma-related, depressive and personality symptoms and the offending. These symptoms were exacerbated at the time of the offending due to stressors including recent attempted assault which exacerbated symptoms of C-PTSD; interpersonal separation from her partner which exacerbated her dependent personality traits and maladaptive coping; as well as ongoing exposure to abuse from her partner at the time. This contributed to a disproportionate reaction to the victim on the day of the offending where Ms Spencer disproportionately perceived a threat to her life. In the context of a repeatedly traumatised individual, this can be understood in terms of an over-sensitisation to potential threats in the environment, contributing to a severe decompensation manifesting in extreme emotional and behavioural dysregulation.[8]

[7]R v Verdins & Ors (2007) 16 VR 269 (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) (‘Verdins’).

[8]Steffens report (n 3) [126].

Ms Steffens also indicated in her first report that your mental health conditions and vulnerability would mean that custody would be likely to be a substantially more challenging experience for you than for someone without your conditions.

In his written outline of submission for the plea, Mr McQuillan indicated that reliance would be place on all of the Verdins limbs other than the second.

Ms Steffens gave lengthy evidence during the plea hearing, during which she maintained the position that the mental and personality conditions from which you suffer were causally related to your offending. She indicated that she could find no evidence of any psychotic thinking at the time of your offence, whether drug induced or otherwise. She did not consider that your drug use would have been a dominant factor in what you did.

It became clear on the first day of the plea hearing that at the time of her reports, Ms Steffens had not been provided with or viewed the CCTV footage from the front door of your premises, which depicted these events in clear visual and auditory detail. Prior to giving her evidence, she had the opportunity to view the footage, albeit without sound, a matter which was not explained to the Court.

In examination-in-chief before me, Ms Steffens indicated that her viewing of the footage had not altered her view as to the conditions from which you suffer and their connection with your offending.

She was challenged strongly by the prosecutor, Mr Dickie, as to her opinions. She indicated that she had only viewed the footage from a point immediately prior to you setting Ms Carpio alight, and had not seen the earlier footage showing the attendance of the police, or Ms Carpio’s earlier attendance at the property, which preceded police attendance. Ms Steffens indicated that she accepted what she was told by you, and her understanding was that you were afraid throughout the incident. She stated that her interpretation was that you were in fear at the relevant time, but that if rather than being fearful, you were in fact angry, it would not change her opinion as to the causal connection between your mental conditions and your offending. She indicated that she had not asked you why you baited Ms Carpio before attacking her, and why it was that you stepped out of the house, from behind the screen door, if you were in fear. She conceded, at one point, that her evidence was predicated on her acceptance of what you told her about being fearful at the time of the events. She acknowledged that your saying to Ms Carpio to come inside ‘definitely adds a question mark over the degree to which fear was impacting her in that moment. I think that that’s obviously highly relevant’.[9] She further conceded that your statement to Ms Carpio that you would give her what she deserved, of which she had been previously unaware, would be ‘highly concerning’.[10]
[9]Plea transcript (n 4) 137.
[10]Ibid 138.

Ms Steffens reiterated her opinion that there was a clear nexus between your C-PTSD and borderline personality disorder and your offending, because those conditions have, at their core, significant emotional dysregulation, and when experiencing such dysregulation, people can react in an out of character and disproportionate way. She acknowledged, however, that a perceived threat on your part ‘is definitely the key to the nexus’,[11] and that without such a threat, ‘it would be difficult to stipulate that there was a nexus.’[12]
[11]Plea transcript (n 4) 145.
[12]Ibid.

When asked in cross-examination how you have been coping in custody, Ms Steffens indicated that you have ‘connected with some intervention and engage pretty consistently’.[13] You are receiving medication, and engaging in some therapeutic support for your PTSD, which are improvements on your engagement with treatment and medication from when you were in the community. You have suffered some depressive symptoms.
[13]Ibid 146.

In re-examination, Ms Steffens stated that even if there was no causal link between your mental conditions and your offending, the conditions would have contributed to you having a lowered sense of being able to exercise appropriate judgment or decision-making.

In response to questions from me, Ms Steffens accepted that emotional dysregulation can be a part of normal human behaviour, in the absence of any mental abnormality. Being angry can cause a psychologically normal person to overreact to that anger and become emotionally dysregulated. She confirmed her evidence that if there was, in your case, no ‘sense of threat’, then there would be no nexus between your condition and your offending. When reminded of various features of the circumstances leading up to your offending, Ms Steffens acknowledged that these would definitely call into question the conclusion she had reached as to the nexus, but she said she would not go so far as to say that fear had no relevance on the day and did not contribute to your actions. She stated that you were not psychotic at the time, and were of normal intelligence. She indicated that whilst your conditions did not impair you intellectually, they would have impaired your understanding of the extent of the consequences of your actions. She also indicated that it is well known that MA use is something that can cause people to become irrationally angry.

Following Ms Steffens’ evidence, Mr McQuillan sought an adjournment of the plea to enable him to consider the transcript of the evidence. On the next occasion, unsurprisingly, he abandoned any reliance upon limbs 1 to 4 of Verdins. He submitted, however, that your various mental conditions are nevertheless relevant to sentence, as they may have undermined your ability to emotionally self-regulate.

Mr McQuillan relied on the evidence of Ms Steffens at page 148 to 150 in support of his submission that limbs 5 and 6 of Verdins are enlivened in your case. In respect of the sixth limb of Verdins, he relied upon the evidence of Ms Steffens that there would be an increased risk of negative incidents with other prisoners due to your conditions. The other concern she expressed was that your conditions would raise the risk of you becoming institutionalised in the prison environment.

In its submissions on the psychological evidence, the prosecution did not challenge the contention that I should have regard to your mental health issues in a general sense, notwithstanding the absence of any nexus between the conditions and your offending. Mr Dickie also did not challenge the applicability of limb 5 of Verdins, but disputed that limb 6 was enlivened. He pointed out that the evidence of Ms Steffens was that in your period of time in custody up to the point when she assessed you, there was no evidence that there has been any significant deterioration of your mental health conditions. If anything, in the controlled environment of prison, you appear to have responded reasonably well to the treatment you have received.

Conclusion in respect of mental health impacts on sentence

The requirement of cogent expert evidence before the various limbs of Verdins will be enlivened has often been emphasised, as has the need for sentencing judges to conduct the necessary assessment with rigour.[14]
[14]See, for example, DPP v O’Neill (2015) 47 VR 395 [77]-[78].

In this case, unfortunately, there were some unsatisfactory aspects in respect of the material provided to Ms Steffens, the approach she took to her task, and the evidence she gave in Court.

First, it was entirely unacceptable that she was not, from the time she was engaged, provided with, and told to watch in its entirety, the relevant portions of the CCTV footage, complete with sound. That material was of fundamental importance for any person seeking to reach the most informed view possible of the objective circumstances of this case. The material would have equipped her with important objective information against which she could assess the things that you told her as to your motivation and feelings at the time of your offending.

Secondly, even without the CCTV footage and audio, there should have been ample information amongst the material which was provided to Ms Steffens, including the brief of evidence and summary of facts, to have alerted her to the obvious need to be careful about reliance upon your account to her about these events.

Thirdly, the indications are that Ms Steffens did not approach the task of obtaining a history from you with the rigour and care necessary. Her evidence indicated an apparent unwillingness to challenge your account where it conflicted with objective facts, or do anything other than accept what you told her as to factual matters at face value.

Fourthly, her evidence in Court betrayed an inclination by Ms Steffens to rigidly stick to the opinions she had earlier formed, before she had had the opportunity to view any of the CCTV footage. Her evidence that a viewing of the footage had not caused any modification to her opinion about the causal connection between your mental conditions and your offending was surprising. And I don’t think that she made appropriate concessions in response to questioning which challenged her opinions.

When the totality of the evidence of Ms Steffens is considered, it is apparent that her acceptance of your claim of having been in fear at the time of the events in question was an essential component of the opinion she formed as to a causal connection between your mental condition and your offending. In the absence of fear or a perceived threat on your part, the mechanism which she posited and upon which she relied would fall away. In the end, as I have indicated, there was no credible evidence that fear had any part to play in your conduct. The conclusion Ms Steffens reached that fear did play an important part was entirely based on an acceptance of the truthfulness of what you told her. I have concluded that you were not truthful in many of the things you told Ms Steffens, and upon which she relied. Ms Steffens should have been well aware of the danger in simply accepting at face value the things which you told her which did not accord with objective facts.

In the end, it is not surprising that having reviewed the evidence, Mr McQuillan abandoned his reliance upon limbs 1, 3 and 4 of Verdins. The evidence of Ms Steffens was inadequate to lead to any of those principles being enlivened.

I am not satisfied that your moral culpability for your crime is reduced as a result of the conditions from which you suffered at the time of this offence and currently. I do have regard to those conditions and their effect upon you in the general sense.

In respect of limb 5, I am satisfied that your mental condition will have the effect that the lengthy sentence of imprisonment which you will receive will weigh more heavily on you than it would on a person in normal health. I will have regard to that, although it would not have a significant impact on sentence.

As for limb 6, I am not satisfied that the evidence warrants a conclusion that there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on your mental health. Specific concerns relied upon by Mr McQuillan in respect of this limb were the increased risk of negative incidents in custody as a result of your mental conditions, and the increased risk of your becoming institutionalised, as attested to by Ms Steffens. The fact that you may be at increased risk of having negative incidents in custody does not amount to a serious risk of your mental health being adversely affected. Nor does the prospect of your becoming institutionalised. This is a real risk for any person incarcerated for a long period of time, but it would be speculative to ponder whether that might occur in your case. There is no evidence of a significant deterioration during your time thus far in custody. Indeed, the indications are that you are now receiving treatment and medication, are drug free, and are in a more stable and positive state than you were before your incarceration. In my view, the evidence relied upon was not sufficient to enliven limb 6 of Verdins.

Bugmy considerations

Mr McQuillan relied upon the principles in Bugmy v The Queen (‘Bugmy’)[15] in support of a submission that your moral culpability for your offending should be considered to be reduced, due to your childhood deprivation and hardship. He made the submission, ‘if there was ever a situation in which the Bugmy principles should apply, this is one of them…given that personal history’.[16] He submitted that the principles are relevant not just to an assessment of your moral culpability, but also as to the weight to be given to your prior criminal history.
[15](2013) 249 CLR 571 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) (‘Bugmy’).
[16]Plea transcript (n 4) 62.

In his written outline of submissions on the plea, Mr McQuillan relied upon passages from the report of Ms Steffens as concisely and comprehensively summarising your deprived childhood. In his oral submissions before me, Mr McQuillan contended ‘that the application of the Bugmy principles in relation to Ms Spencer is at the higher end.’[17] He relied upon the principles bringing about a reduction in your moral culpability, but acknowledged that your moral culpability would remain significant.
[17]Ibid 179.

The prosecution accepted that the Bugmy principles should have some application in your case, but submitted that your background of deprivation is not in the league of some cases which come before the Court. Mr Dickie also submitted that when assessing the mitigatory relevance of your social disadvantage in reducing moral culpability, the Court should also have regard to the increased need for community protection in your case.

In Bugmy, the High Court dealt with an appeal in respect of an offender, charged with serious violent offending committed in prison, who had been described by the sentencing judge as ‘an Aboriginal man who grew up in a violent, chaotic and dysfunctional environment’.[18] The Court expressed in two different ways the potential relevance of childhood deprivation to the assessment of moral culpability. First, the Court observed:

The circumstance that an offender has been raised in a community surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may mitigate the sentence because his or her moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way.[19]

[18]Bugmy (n 15) [17] (citations omitted).

[19]Bugmy (n 15) [40].

This was described by the Court of Appeal in DPP v Herrmann (‘Herrmann’)[20] as the ‘general approach’ in Bugmy.[21]
[20][2021] VSCA 160, see [36] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA) (‘Herrmann’).
[21]Bugmy (n 15) [41].

The Court in Bugmy also stated:

An offender's childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender's recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender's moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender.[22]

[22]Ibid [44].

This was described by the Court in Herrmann as the ‘specific approach’ in Bugmy.[23]
[23]Herrmann (n 20) [41]

The Court in Herrmann made it clear that whilst evidence to establish a nexus or realistic connection between the offending and the relevant background circumstances will be necessary before the specific approach in Bugmy will apply, the application of the general approach in Bugmy does not depend on the proof of a nexus.

It was the general principle in Bugmy upon which Mr McQuillan relied in this case. I did not understand him to place any reliance upon the ‘specific approach’.

In Sabbatucci v The Queen,[24] the Court noted:

It will always be a matter for evaluation by the sentencing court whether the circumstances of disadvantage relied on warrant the conclusion that the offender should be viewed, on that account, as less morally blameworthy than another person committing the same offence who did not have the same deprived background. Such a conclusion does not, of course, depend upon the court first being satisfied that the circumstances in question constitute ‘profound disadvantage’ or ‘profound deprivation’. It will be a question of fact and degree in every case.[25]

[24][2021] VSCA 340 (Maxwell P and Emerton JA) (‘Sabatucci’).

[25]Sabatucci (n 24) [22].

In Newton v The King (‘Newton’),[26] the Court, in the course of finding that the sentencing judge had erred in not allowing some reduction in moral culpability to the appellant stated:

The fact that other offenders in other cases may have been subjected to more significant or more profound childhood deprivation does not mean that the appellant’s childhood deprivation should not have been properly considered as having the potential to reduce the appellant’s moral culpability in the general way described in Bugmy. On the uncontested material tendered on the plea, the appellant was entitled to some (albeit a modest) reduction in moral culpability without the need to establish any causal link between his childhood deprivation and his offending.[27]

[26][2023] VSCA 22.

[27]Ibid [45].

In some cases, depending on the circumstances, the reduction in moral culpability accorded to an offender may be significant. As was made clear in Newton, however, in some cases in which the general principle in Bugmy is enlivened, the moral culpability of the offender will be moderated in ‘a limited way’,[28] or ‘at least to some modest degree’.[29]
[28]Bui v The Queen [2015] VSCA 313 [44] (Redlich and Whelan JJA).
[29]Berry v The Queen [2019] VSCA 291 [30] (Maxwell P and Niall JJA).

As indicated earlier, Mr McQuillan submitted that the application of the Bugmy principles in your case, to quote him, ‘is at the higher end.’ I do not accept that submission. Whilst I acknowledge that, as made clear by the Court in Newton, it is not a matter of a judge comparing the circumstances in a particular case with those which were present in Bugmy, and then deciding, in a binary way, whether the Bugmy principles do, or do not, have application, the fact is that the proven history of your life, and specifically, the traumatic background to which you were exposed, is of nothing like the same order as that which was considered by the courts in Bugmy and Herrmann, and, sadly, is commonly seen in this Court.

That is not to say, of course, that your difficult childhood should not be accorded proper consideration as having the potential to reduce your moral culpability for your crime.

In the end, taking account of all of the material before me, and bearing in mind the acceptance by the prosecution that the principles in Bugmy have application, I consider that you are entitled to a modest reduction in your moral culpability for your offending by virtue of your troubled past, consistent with the general principle in Bugmy.

Having said that, your moral culpability for your crime remains high.

Your plea of guilty and the question of remorse

You first offered to plead guilty to the charge for which you are to be sentenced on 24 February 2025, and entered your plea of guilty on arraignment on 28 February 2025. It was submitted on your behalf that your plea of guilty should be seen as being ‘a reasonably early’ one,[30] in light of the lengthy negotiations which took place preceding the entry of your plea, and the fact that previously you had been charged with attempted murder.
[30]Plea transcript (n 4) 45.

Your crime was committed by you on 15 January 2024, and you were charged on 30 January 2024. The case proceeded to a contested committal hearing on 12 September 2024, and you were committed for trial on that day. A directions hearing was heard in this Court on 25 September 2024, and at a mention a month later, the trial was fixed for 4 August 2025. A case conference occurred on 19 February 2025 and your offer to plead guilty to the current charge was made five days later.

Your plea of guilty is an important matter in mitigation. As the above chronology makes clear, yours was not an early plea of guilty, but nor was it one entered at the last minute. Your plea carried with it the substantial utilitarian benefit of rendering a lengthy trial unnecessary, and it showed your preparedness to facilitate the course of justice and accept responsibility for your offending. In addition, your plea of guilty is indicative of some remorse.

As to the matter of remorse more generally, if you are now truly remorseful for your crime, you reached that position after a shaky start. Having set fire to Ms Carpio, you left the scene without endeavouring to provide any assistance to her. You promptly blamed her for being the person who threw fuel on you. When spoken to by police a few days after your crime, and asked if you knew why you were in custody, you said, ‘Yeah, because that bitch came onto my property’.

The expressions of remorse made by you to Ms Steffens and Mr Ball must be seen in the context of your earlier conduct showing a seeming lack of concern for Ms Carpio’s plight, and the fact that in giving your overall account to Ms Steffens, you chose to be untruthful about your motivation at the time of your offending. Having said that, I do accept that you have indicated some remorse.

You have now had the opportunity to listen to the victim impact statements of Ms Carpio and her mother during the plea hearing. The long term of imprisonment which your offending demands will enable you the time to properly reflect on your conduct and its devastating effects on your victim and others. It is to be hoped that in time you will develop a more complete sense of remorse for your offending.

Victim impact statements

Three victim impact statements were placed before the Court. These were by Paris Carpio, her mother Kylie Powell, and a bystander, Kevin Worrall. The first two of these were read aloud in Court by the respective victims, and the third by the prosecutor.

The statement of Ms Carpio represented a powerful and moving picture of the absolute devastation your crime has wrought upon a young woman who had her whole life before her at the time of your attack. As she put it, 15 January 2024 marked a moment in time when her life was changed forever by your act of cruelty and inhumanity. It was the beginning of a long, agonising journey which continues to this day, and will never end. In graphic detail, Ms Carpio explained the agonising pain as her body was consumed by fire, and then the confusion and fear she experienced in hospital when she came out of an induced coma and felt utterly trapped in her damaged body. The horrifying images of what you had done to her replayed over and over in her head. There was no escape and every time she closed her eyes, she relived the attack upon her. She described the gruelling process of rehabilitation, with its pain, frustration, and ever-present fear and sadness. Her life is now filled with anxiety, depression, and isolation. She struggles to leave her home, and when she does, feels as though the whole world is staring at her. She feels like a monster, and constantly fears a further attack upon her. The physical and mental pain never ceases. She has a sense of her life having been stolen from her, and being left to live in a body which is no longer hers. She faces the reality of numerous future operations, but knows that no surgical procedure can ever give her back the life she had before. Every day is an exhausting battle to stay alive and be hopeful.

Kylie Powell’s statement reveals the devastating impact upon a loving mother of being informed of a shocking attack upon her daughter, Paris, and then seeing her spend months in an induced coma in hospital, followed by many painful months of rehabilitation. She detailed how the injuries sustained by her daughter have caused permanent changes to the lives of all of her family members. She has a mother’s acute sense of despair at the fact that her much loved daughter’s life has been ruined, and that things will never be the same again.

Kevin Worrall was visiting his sister who is a resident of a nearby house, when he observed Ms Carpio in the aftermath of her having been set on fire. She looked to him like a melting candle, and he saw her skin peeling off her body. He was extraordinarily traumatised by what he observed, and described the harmful effects upon him in his victim impact statement.

The victim impact statements of Ms Carpio and Ms Powell portray a vivid and heartbreaking picture of the way in which your crime has dramatically damaged the life of Ms Carpio and her mother and siblings, in a way which can never be repaired. The loss they have suffered is incalculable. The victim impact statement of Mr Worrall is illustrative of the far-reaching consequences of violent crimes upon members of the community.

I take into account, as I am required to do pursuant to s 5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (‘the Act’), the contents of the victim impact statements, and repeat the appreciation I expressed on the day of the plea hearing for the authors having had the courage and fortitude to play their important part in the criminal justice process.

Nature and gravity of your offence

In his submissions before me, Mr McQuillan conceded that your crime ‘is at the higher range for this type of offence’.[31]
[31]Plea transcript (n 4) 62.

Mr Dickie, citing Gencev v The Queen,[32] submitted that the crime of ICSIGV must be viewed as being ‘extraordinarily serious’. In this particular case, the prosecution submitted, correctly, that in using your weapons as you did, you must have appreciated that catastrophic injuries were the likely result. Relevant features of your crime relied upon by the prosecution in support of the contention that yours was a serious example of a very serious offence included:
[32][2021] VSCA 188 (‘Gencev’).

·The horrific nature of the injuries caused to Ms Carpio, which were life-threatening, profound and ongoing;
·Your motivation of anger and a desire for retribution;
·The fact that Ms Carpio was unarmed and unable to defend herself;
·Your persistence in your efforts to set Ms Carpio alight;
·Your focus upon the head of Ms Carpio;
·The fact that your attack was in a public area, where numerous people saw Ms Carpio set alight and struggling in the aftermath; and
·Your lack of concern for Ms Carpio as evidenced by your departure from the scene and efforts to blame her.

The use of an accelerant and a flame source to deliberately set a person alight as a means of inflicting serious harm upon the person is a particularly serious mode of the intentional infliction of serious injury. The use of fire as a means of inflicting serious harm upon another is shocking and heartless conduct. In this case, for some time at least, you planned to do so, in the knowledge of the catastrophic consequences which would follow. Your conduct was vicious, cruel and appalling. This was an offence which would comfortably sit towards the very top of the range of seriousness of the crime of ICSIGV.

Current sentencing practices

One of the matters which I am required by law to take into account in arriving at a proper sentence is current sentencing practices.[33] In seeking to understand these, I have considered, amongst other things, the case summaries for sentences imposed for ICSIGV set out in the Sentencing Manual of the Judicial College of Victoria, and the decisions of which specific mention was made before me.[34] There is a limit to the use of statistics and sentences passed in other cases. Where comparable cases are concerned, it must be remembered that no sentence passed in any other case amounts to a precedent for the sentence I must pass upon you. At best, sentences in so-called comparable cases may provide a general guide or impression of the appropriate range.
[33]Sentencing Act 1991, s 5(2)(b).
[34]Including The Queen v Gencev and Newman [2019] VSC 502; Gencev (n 32); R v Kilic (2016) 259 CLR 256 (‘Kilic’).

The prosecution did not put forward any case as being directly comparable to your crime. Mr Dickie made specific reference to Kilic, a case of ICSI (simpliciter) in which the respondent poured fuel over his pregnant partner and set her alight, resulting in burns to 20 per cent of her total body area and the loss of her unborn child. In Kilic, the High Court stated that offences of ICSI towards the upper end of the range of seriousness are liable to attract a penalty upwards of 15 years’ imprisonment.[35]
[35]Kilic (n 34) [31].

Important sentencing purposes

As I have already indicated, the offence to which you pleaded guilty is a very grave instance of an offence which is always ‘extraordinarily serious’. Paris Carpio was an unarmed and helpless 20 year old woman whom, notwithstanding the excesses of her behaviour on that awful afternoon, you had no reason to fear. Motivated by your extreme anger towards her, which was perhaps further fuelled by your ongoing resentment towards and frustration with your partner, you decided to attack Ms Carpio and punish her for her conduct. You selected the vicious and barbarous method of attack of using fire aided by an accelerant, a method of the intentional inflicting of serious injury almost beyond human contemplation. You set her alight, in the knowledge, and with the intention, that she would suffer shocking pain and serious injury, including permanent and severe disfigurement. Having carried out your atrocious conduct, you left the scene, and later blamed your victim for your crime. Ms Carpio, having experienced the shock and agony of having her head and upper body fully alight for 64 seconds, and having had to endure the pain and torment of a very long period of rehabilitation, faces a future life which in no way resembles her previous life, and remains full of almost unbearable physical and psychological pain.

To my mind, the important purposes for which sentence must be passed on you are just punishment, denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and protection of the community.

Notwithstanding the mental conditions from which you suffer, it is clear that strong punishment constituted by a lengthy term of imprisonment is required to reflect the great seriousness of your crime. Nothing less would be an appropriate response.

The sentence must communicate in clear terms this Court’s condemnation and disapproval of your violent, extreme and heartless conduct.

In respect of general deterrence, the sentence I pass must bring it clearly home to any person who might be minded to inflict serious injury upon another through the most malevolent means of the use of an accelerant and a flame source, that such conduct will be met with very strong punishment.

It is clear that you must be deterred personally from any future violent actions to which you may be disposed. You have a not-insignificant history of prior criminal offending, including a number of convictions for crimes of violence. There is no reason why your criminal history should assume less significance in the sentencing calculus as a result of your mental conditions. In addition, Ms Steffens, having carried out a risk assessment in your case, aided by the use of a well-regarded tool, the Historical, Clinical, Risk Management – Version 3 (HCR-20), considered you to be ‘a moderate to high risk of future physical violence’ if your mental health conditions remain untreated.[36]
[36]Steffens report (n 3) [133].

As for the protection of the community, that, too, is an important sentencing purpose, to which I pay regard.

In respect of rehabilitation, I do not ignore this as a sentencing consideration. Mr McQuillan submitted that your prospects of rehabilitation are ‘at least reasonable’.[37] The prosecution, having mentioned your criminal history, ongoing health issues, and indications of there being a high risk of offending, contended that the Court ‘could be no more than guarded’ about those prospects, which would be poor in the absence of positive engagement with services on offer, and ongoing abstinence from drug use. In my view, there is no reason for particular optimism in your case, but I do have regard to the possibility that you may be able to turn your life around in prison by fully acknowledging the seriousness of your offending, remaining drug free, and taking advantage of the support and services available to you.
[37]Defence outline of plea submissions, 20 June 2025 [30].

Sentence

Jordan Spencer, for intentionally causing serious injury to Paris Carpio in circumstances of gross violence, you are sentenced to be imprisoned for 13 years.

I fix a period of 9 years during which you will not be eligible to be released on parole.

I declare a period of 617 days up to and including yesterday, 7 October 2025, as being a period already served under this sentence. I direct that the fact of the making of that declaration and its details be noted in the records of the Court.

Section 6AAA declaration

I indicate pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 that, but for your plea of guilty, I would have sentenced you to be imprisoned for 16 years with a non-parole period of 12 years.

[2025] VSC 635

8 October 2025 (First Revision 10 October 2025)