Director of Public Prosecutions v Snowden-Crowhurst
[2025] ACTSC 73
•5 March 2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | DPP v Snowden-Crowhurst |
Citation: | [2025] ACTSC 73 |
Hearing Date: | 4 March 2025 |
Decision Date: | 5 March 2025 |
Before: | McCallum CJ |
Decision: | (1) For the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis, offender convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 9 months commencing on 5 March 2025 and ending on 4 December 2025. (2) For the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis (methamphetamine) offender convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months commencing on 5 December 2025 and ending on 4 June 2027. (3) For the offence of money laundering, offender convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months commencing on 5 March 2027 and ending on 4 September 2027. (4) For the transferred summary offence of driving whilst licence suspended, I make a non-conviction order directing that the charge be dismissed. (5) Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I direct that the sentence of imprisonment be served by intensive correction on the following conditions: (a) The core conditions as listed in s 42 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT); (b) A community service condition that the offender perform 249 hours of community service; and (c) A condition that the offender continue to attend psychological counselling as recommended by his treating psychologist. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – Trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis – money laundering – consideration of objective seriousness – where offender has demonstrated good prospects of rehabilitation – demonstration of remorse – whether appropriate to make intensive correction order |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 114B Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 603(7) Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 10, 11, 33(1)(h), 33(1)(m), 33(1)(o), 33(1)(t), 33(1)(v), 33(1)(w) Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), s 42 Road Transport (Driver Licencing) Act 1999 (ACT), s 32(2)(a) |
Cases Cited: | Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 Fernando v Nicholas [2019] NTSC 19 R v Cole [2019] ACTSC 228 |
Texts Cited: | Mizzi J et al (2024) Beyond Bars: Exploring Challenges and Solutions to the Problem of Short Custodial Stays in Regional South Australia. Centre for Social Impact, Flinders University, Adelaide. |
Parties: | Director of Public Prosecutions Garry Snowden-Crowhurst (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel D Swan (DPP) FJ Purnell SC (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions CODA Law (Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 369 of 2024 SCC 344 of 2024 |
McCALLUM CJ:
EX TEMPORE REASONS (REVISED)
1․Garry Snowden-Crowhurst stands to be sentenced after pleading guilty to one offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis, being methylamphetamine, contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT); one offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other cannabis, being MDMA, contrary to s 603(7) of the Criminal Code; and one offence of money laundering, contrary to s 114B of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). He is also to be dealt with for a transferred offence of driving whilst his licence was suspended, contrary to s 32(2)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licencing) Act 1999 (ACT).
2․The maximum penalty for each of the offences of trafficking and money laundering is imprisonment for a period of 10 years. A fine is also available but plainly would not be appropriate in the present circumstances.
3․The offender was arrested after being stopped by police in a traffic stop on 12 January 2024. It is apparent from the statement of facts that police had prior notice of the likelihood of the offender having drugs in his possession, having observed him on 30 December 2023 at a nightclub coming to and from his vehicle on a number of occasions and apparently consuming cocaine in the vehicle.
4․On the strength of those observations, police obtained a search warrant for the offender, his vehicle and his home. As already indicated, he was stopped in traffic and his vehicle was searched. Police then went to his premises where they located the quantities of drugs which are the subject of the two charges, being 308.9 grams of methylamphetamine and 209.3 grams of MDMA. They also found cash in the sum of $34,590, which is the basis of the money laundering offence.
5․The statement of facts includes material obtained from the offender’s mobile phones including messages indicating that he had been engaged in the sale of drugs for some considerable period. The messages included multiple conversations with multiple users regarding price lists and the supply of illicit drugs; multiple conversations in which the offender discussed being engaged in the business of selling illicit drugs; multiple conversations regarding his attempts to transition to the use of cryptocurrency and conversations in which he asserted he was no longer engaged in personal drug use. The offender gave evidence about those messages and I will return to that issue.
6․The offender was arrested on 12 January 2024 and was remanded in custody until 19 January 2024. He has spent a total of eight days in custody attributable solely to these offences.
7․Pleas of guilty were entered in the Magistrates Court after the brief was served. The prosecution submitted that the offender should receive a discount of 20% on that account as the pleas were entered late in the process in the Magistrates Court. The offender submitted that there should be a discount allowed of 25%. In my view, pleas being entered shortly after the service of the brief are to be regarded as early pleas and warrant a discount of 25% on the sentences to be imposed.
8․It is necessary to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences. The offences must be regarded as serious ones. While the trafficking offences are alleged to have been committed on a single date, the text messages to which I have referred indicate that the offender’s dealing was not isolated and that he had been dealing for some time. Indeed, that was the effect of his evidence given in Court yesterday.
9․It is necessary to consider the offender’s role in the commission of the offences. The prosecution referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 at [41], where the Court referred to principles identified in the authorities concerning the assessment of the seriousness of drug trafficking offences. They include, first, the proposition that “the role of the accused is an important consideration”. It is clear enough that the offender in the present case played the role of something more than a mere street level dealer. He was engaged in purchasing and selling substantial quantities of drugs over some period. I must of course remember that he is charged only in respect of trafficking on a single day. That contours the extent to which I can have regard to those earlier circumstances.
10․Secondly, the Court in Bui noted that, contrary to earlier authority, the weight of the drug found is not determinative but it is a relevant factor. In the present case there were two different kinds of drugs. I regard the sale of methylamphetamine as more serious than the sale of MDMA, based on the Court’s experience and knowledge of the harm that drug in particular can cause, because of the impact it has on people’s behaviour.
11․Thirdly, the motivation for the offence is, as the Court stated in Bui, “highly relevant, the purpose of profit being a more serious matter”. The prosecution submitted in the present case that the offender was motivated by profit. The submission was based on the fact that a large amount of cash was found in his home and the quantities in which he evidently dealt, based on the quantity found and also the content of the text messages. In one text message, he told the recipient that he deals in large amounts. The text in question was dated July 2023 and included this quote, “ … depending on prices we are looking at 10 - 20k deals every time so hard to get that kind of money through the banks”.
12․It may be accepted that financial gain was a purpose of the offender in dealing in drugs. Indeed, on his own admission on the evidence he gave yesterday, he stated that he had reached a point where he was so dependent on drugs that he had no other source of income. He used the proceeds of his dealing to pay for rent and other expenses. That said, I do not regard him to be in the category of a cynical dealer who is selling to others while having no addiction himself.
13․The offender explained that the text messages in which he stated that he does not use were taken out of context and that at that time of his life he was trying to avoid spending time with other users because it was something he understood contributed to his own addiction. I accept his evidence on that issue. In my assessment, he is to be regarded as a person who, while plainly dealing for the purpose of profit, reached that position for the reasons explained at length in the material before the Court concerning his subjective case, to which I will return.
14․I accept, as submitted by the Crown, that the offending involved actual trafficking (as opposed to deemed trafficking based only on the amounts involved) for the reasons I have indicated. I accept, as submitted by the Crown, that the offender appears to have been at an intermediate level of the trafficking hierarchy, with the qualification that I have already given that I also accept his evidence that he found himself in those circumstances as a result of his spiralling addiction.
15․As to the money laundering offence, the Crown referred to the decision of Murrell CJ in R v Cole [2019] ACTSC 228. In that decision at [16]-[19], her Honour listed factors relevant to assessing the objective seriousness of a money laundering offence. Those factors include, first, the purpose and nature of the dealing. In the present case, the dealing was intimately involved in the other offences. Accordingly, I must be careful not to double count. It is clear enough that the cash found at the house was the proceeds of sale of the trafficking.
16․Murrell CJ also referred to the nature of the proceeds of crime. It is not clear to me how that factor would influence the present sentence. Thirdly, the value of the proceeds of crime is an important consideration. I accept that the amount here is relatively high, although not of the highest order the Court sees in cases of this kind. Finally, her Honour referred to the consideration of whether the position was transitory. The offender accepted in his evidence yesterday that it was not. His dealing was ongoing and his dealing in cash as the proceeds of crime presumably was also a constant feature of his household at that time.
17․I turn then to consider the other factors to which I am required to have regard in accordance with s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT).
18․Section 33(1)(h) refers to the issue whether a person has taken any action to make reparation for the harm caused by their offending. The offender wrote a lengthy letter to the Court for the purposes of sentencing. It is a significant document. It sets out, in what I could only describe as painful detail, the circumstances of his life and how, as he put it, he ended up in my courtroom. It is plain that the offender put a great deal of thought into that document. He gave evidence that it had taken him seven nights to write.
19․I will not recite all of the detail of the letter. For present purposes, having regard to the terms of s 33(1)(h), it indicates that the offender has taken every step he could have taken to address his drug addiction and make reparation for the harm he accepts his offending has done to the community and, more specifically, to his own family. Within two days of being released on bail, he engaged with rehabilitation services and became a regular participant in Narcotics Anonymous. He has persisted in his engagement with that organisation to the point of being promoted to a role of leadership within the organisation.
20․The evidence tendered in his case included a letter from an organisation called Canberra Alliance for Harm Minimisation & Advocacy, describing his involvement in his rehabilitation and the willingness he has shown to “confront difficult truths with honesty and courage”.
21․There was also a letter from Narcotics Anonymous indicating that he has been involved in the Canberra Narcotics Anonymous Hospitals and Institutions program, which involves his attending hospital detox units to support clients with alcohol and drug difficulties. A letter from that organisation notes that he joined the Hospital and Institutions subcommittee and began participating in monthly committee meetings and that he has made significant contributions which are of great assistance to that organisation.
22․The offender also tendered a letter from Directions Pathways to Recovery, which testifies to his having participated in the SMART Recovery program and been successful in that program. The letter states:
Garry has often been a support for several group members on their recovery journeys in SMART group meetings. In our professional opinion, Garry’s contributions at these meetings are highly valued, by group members and facilitators alike.
23․In short, the material tendered by the offender has persuaded me that he has taken significant steps towards making what reparation he can for the impact on the community of his having dealt in drugs for a period of time.
24․Section 33(1)(m) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires the Court to have regard to the cultural background, character, antecedents, age and physical or mental condition of the offender. There was extensive material before the Court on that issue as well.
25․It is appropriate to begin with the matters revealed in the offender’s letter, to which I have referred. In short, that letter discloses that the offender had a childhood which he experienced as being traumatic, although he has probably only recently come to recognise that. His biological father was an alcoholic and was hit by a car leaving a pub when the offender was six. At that time, the offender’s mother and biological father were separated. It is clear that those circumstances had a significant impact on him.
26․The offender’s mother re-partnered. He regards his stepfather as his real father, although he had unfortunately become estranged from that man at the time of that man’s death, which was also a source of further trauma to the offender. The offender married quite young and has two children. I will return to the significance of the children and his ex-partner in the sentencing exercise.
27․Perhaps most compellingly, the experience of being arrested is one that has had a significant and salutary effect on the offender. He describes having been relieved when he was arrested and thinking that was the only way that he could have stopped his drug habit and his offending behaviour. Shortly after being released from custody, he engaged with psychological treatment with Ms Tabitha Frew. She gave evidence and was cross-examined at the proceedings on sentence.
28․Ms Frew has seen the offender on a number of occasions. She has given a diagnosis of the following conditions:
(a)autism spectrum disorder;
(b)attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD);
(c)post-traumatic stress disorder;
(d)major depressive disorder;
(e)stimulant use disorder in sustained remission; and
(f)anxiolytic use disorder also in sustained remission.
29․Ms Frew describes the major depressive disorder as being in partial remission. She was careful in her evidence yesterday to qualify her opinions by an acknowledgement that, as a treating practitioner, she has a degree of bias towards the offender which she describes in her report as being a factor that causes her to view him in a positive light. That said, her opinion of the offender is positive.
30․Ms Frew expressed the opinion that the offender’s three permanent and untreated conditions had a moderate causal relationship to the commission of the offences. She said that, if the offender had not had those untreated conditions (autism spectrum disorder, ADHD, and depression), he would likely have been able to process the traumatic bereavement from the deaths of his father and stepfather a lot earlier in his life, which would have built the emotional and psychological coping resources needed to adapt to the stressors of everyday life.
31․Ms Frew was cross-examined about that aspect of her opinion, particularly in light of the text messages indicating or suggesting that the offender had been involved in his dealing inspired by a desire to make a profit. That did not qualify her opinion.
32․Ms Frew was also cross-examined by the prosecutor as to whether the timeline given by the offender for his use of drugs was accurate. It was suggested that he had started taking drugs a lot earlier than reported in her report. The offender’s evidence addressed that issue. He expressed the view, which makes sense by reference to the report of Ms Frew and another report before the Court, that the psychologists tend to focus on the most serious period of drug use. I do not have any difficulty accepting the offender’s evidence that he had an addiction to prohibited substances for a lengthy period and that the problem really began to spiral out of control within the timeframe that he told the psychologists, namely, after the breakdown of his marriage to his long-term partner.
33․Ms Frew was asked whether there is a serious risk of full-time imprisonment having a significant adverse impact on the offender’s mental health. She said, “Mr Snowden-Crowhurst’s mental health will be likely to decline in custody as he is already vulnerable to episodes of decompensation across his lifespan”. In her oral evidence, she expanded upon that opinion by reference to the example or analogy of a person who repeatedly sprains their ankle. In the written report, she continued:
The greater challenge will be whether he can remain abstinent from substance use in custody, as this would be a plausible method for coping with the loss of meaningful connection to his children. If he is substance-dependent on release from custody, clinically there is a high risk of the post-traumatic stress disorder becoming untreatable, and a subsequent increase in the frequency of major depressive episodes across his lifespan.
34․I do not have any difficulty accepting the evidence given by Ms Frew in her report and in her oral evidence.
35․In addition to the report of the treating psychologist, there was also an expert opinion report from a forensic psychologist, Angeline Swan. Ms Swan did not give the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder but otherwise broadly agreed with the diagnoses reached by Ms Frew.
36․As to autism spectrum disorder, Ms Swan evidently thought that there was some evidence of that and suggested follow up consultation. She noted that the offender described a complex trauma background, including exposure to family violence, and that he reported a history of intrusive thoughts, feelings and memories relating to his early childhood experience and the death of his stepfather in 2021. She said that he disclosed negative thoughts about himself and others across his lifespan.
37․Ms Swan recorded that the offender reported that all of his current offences were committed in order to generate money to fund his escalating and out-of-control drug habit. She said he had stated he was using drugs to self-medicate against declining mental health symptoms. That history was confirmed by the offender in his evidence before me yesterday. Ms Swan also reported that the offender had described his relief when he was arrested. She said:
When I asked Mr Snowden-Crowhurst how he felt during the arrest, he reported “relieved”. He stated that he felt powerless to change his life situation and cease illicit substance use and required a “catastrophic event to end the situation”.
38․Ms Swan assessed the offender’s risk of reoffending as low, but said that this will be highly contextual to his mental health and substance use status. She said:
Warning signs that could signal the possibility of Mr Snowden-Crowhurst re-offending include any rupture of attachment bonds, increased depressive symptoms, increased low frustration tolerance, increased trauma symptoms, avoidance of friends and family, engagement with anti-social peers, ceasing employment, alcohol use, substance use, or gambling behaviour.
39․I note in that context the offender’s evidence that, during the short time that he was in custody on remand, he observed drugs to be readily available in the Alexander Maconochie Centre. Having regard to the combination of factors referred to by Ms Swan, there is plainly a significant risk that, if the offender is sentenced to a term of full-time imprisonment, he will relapse into substance abuse.
40․Ms Swan gave an account in her report of the offender’s attitude to the sale of illicit substances. She wrote:
His macro views on the sale of illicit substances were somewhat limited, and related to individual responsibility of adults to manage their choices, and that illicit substance use should be decriminalised to support drug dependent people in more holistic ways than legal punishment alone.
41․She was cross-examined about that paragraph of the report which, it was put to her, must inform her view of the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. She maintained her opinion that he has good prospects of rehabilitation because of the impact that his offending has had on his children. She said, “he didn’t demonstrate criminal attitudes”.
42․The offender also gave evidence about that issue. He did express the opinion that the use of illicit substances should be decriminalised. He is not alone in that opinion. He is joined by respected medical practitioners and politicians.
43․I do not think the offender’s personal opinion on that issue indicates that he is at risk of reoffending. I accept the explanation given by Ms Swan. I also accept the offender’s evidence on that issue. What he said was that, whilst he was in favour of decriminalisation, he also accepts that people are responsible for their behaviour. In my assessment, he is highly motivated to comply with the law because of the very dramatic impact his offending has had and could still have on his children.
44․I turn in that context to the other subjective material before the Court in addition to the two psychologists’ reports. The material was extensive. There is a letter from the offender’s mother, who also gave evidence in the proceeding. She was an impressive witness. She is plainly an intelligent woman who has thought deeply about the impact of addiction on people’s lives, having experienced it herself and spent a considerable amount of time supporting her other son with his drug addiction. She became involved in NA Anon, an organisation like Narcotics Anonymous which is directed to family members to assist them to support persons with addictions. She offered reflections about the offender which I will not repeat here but which gave me cause to think that, to the extent that a mother can support a child in remaining drug free, she will be that mother.
45․There is also a letter from the offender’s ex-partner. While they are separated, it is plain that they have a close emotional relationship and remain supportive towards each other. She spoke about their children, who both have special needs. I will not in this judgment go into the detail of those, save to say that it is clear from her letter and other material before the Court that the offender’s two sons depend heavily on him, as does his ex-partner, for support in dealing with their difficulties. That is leaving aside the support that children need from parents generally.
46․There is a letter from the offender’s sister, which also spoke highly of his character.
47․There is a letter from his employer, who took the offender on knowing about his drug trafficking charges but willing to give him a chance. The employer says:
Since his employment with us, I have been consistently impressed by Garry’s character. He is incredibly polite, respectful to all his colleagues, and maintains great relationships within the team. He meticulously keeps me and the team informed about his appointments and responsibilities outside of work, which reflects his honesty and integrity. Moreover, he is diligent in his time tracking for remuneration, ensuring that everything is transparent and accurate. In terms of work performance, I can genuinely say that Garry has been a lifesaver for our team. His ability to manage tasks efficiently while supporting his colleagues has made a significant positive impact on our operations. He has proven time and again to be a dependable and dedicated worker whose contributions are invaluable. I'm truly grateful for the opportunity to have him on my team
48․The employer confirmed the offender’s understanding that, if he is not sentenced to a term of full-time imprisonment today, he is due to be promoted to the role of foreman “due to his outstanding reliability and work ethic”.
49․Section 33(1)(o) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to have regard to the probable effect on the offender’s family if he was sentenced to a full-time term of imprisonment. It is clear from the evidence to which I have already referred that any term of imprisonment would have a devastating effect on the two young boys to whom the offender is a father, and also on his ex-partner.
50․Section 33(1)(t) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act refers to whether an offender has voluntarily sought treatment. I have recited in detail the extensive efforts the offender has made to that end.
51․Section 33(1)(v) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to have regard to the reasons for which the offence was committed. I am satisfied that the offender turned to the use of prohibited substances as a method of self-medication. He also has, by his family history, a propensity to addiction, a matter confirmed by Ms Swan.
52․In my assessment, the offender has demonstrated remorse, which is a relevant factor under section 33(1)(w) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. Indeed, his conduct for the year since he was released following his arrest is a demonstration of remorse.
53․Section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act permits the Court to sentence an offender to imprisonment if the Court is satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate. Mr Purnell SC, who appears for the offender, acknowledges that the offences in the present case cross that threshold, in other words, that no other penalty than imprisonment is appropriate.
54․However, s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act provides that, if an offender is convicted to an offence and the Court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, the Court may make an intensive correction order (an order that the term of imprisonment be served by intensive correction in the community). If the sentence is for not more than two years, there is no hurdle to that determination. However, if the sentence is for more than two years but not more than four years, the Court may only make an intensive correction order if the Court considers it is appropriate to do so, having regard to the level of harm to the victim and the community caused by the offence, whether the offender poses a risk to one or more people or the community and the offender’s culpability for the offence having regard to all the circumstances.
55․Those are mandatory considerations but they must of course be assessed in the context of the purposes of sentencing set out in s 7(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act:
7 Purposes of sentencing
(1)A court may impose a sentence on an offender for 1 or more of the following purposes:
(a)to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence in a way that is just and appropriate;
(b)to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences;
(c)to protect the community from the offender;
(d)to promote the rehabilitation of the offender;
(e)to make the offender accountable for his or her actions;
(f)to denounce the conduct of the offender;
(g)to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
56․As noted at the outset of these reasons, the central issue in the present sentencing exercise was whether, it being accepted that the offender should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, I should order that he serve his sentence by intensive correction order.
57․The Crown submitted that only a sentence of full-time imprisonment would adequately reflect the purposes of sentencing. That submission was supported by the contention that “this is particularly so where the offender has expressed no insight into the offending”. I do not accept that submission. In my assessment, the offender has expressed deep insight into his offending, as articulated in his letter to the Court.
58․The Crown also referred to the consideration of denunciation and ensuring that the offender is adequately punished. He submitted that those purposes of sentencing are highly relevant in sentencing for drug trafficking offences. So much may be accepted. In my view, however, the purposes of sentencing would not be well-served by sentencing the present offender to a sentence of full-time imprisonment. Accordingly, I propose to direct that he serve his sentence by way of intensive correction order.
59․I have reached that conclusion after giving careful consideration to the authorities in this jurisdiction. The authorities reflect a practice of imposing what has been referred to in one decision (to which I will return) as “a short, sharp, and nasty taste of prison”, or “a short, sharp sentence”. In my assessment, the present offender experienced a short, sharp shock in his arrest and the eight days he spent in custody. During that time, he effectively went cold turkey. He suffered significant symptoms of drug withdrawal and deliberately did not report them to the authorities as he “didn’t want to be forced to take medication”, he “wanted to go through the pain”. Since then, according to all of the evidence before me, he has remained drug-free. I consider there is a significant risk that, if I were to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment, that would derail his rehabilitation. That serves no interest of sentencing and would cause significant harm to his family.
60․The parties overnight provided additional material on the topic of short sentences. Mr Purnell provided a copy of a report, “Beyond Bars: Exploring Challenges and Solutions to the Problem of Short Custodial Stays in Regional South Australia”. To the extent that I have been able to consider that report it in the short time that I have had it, it appears to be mostly critical of the practice of imposing short sentences. The report concludes:
This research has shown that short custodial stays now constitute the overwhelming share of all custodial stays in Port Augusta and Port Lincoln prisons (>over 80% stays) and that they are not going to reduce without sustained and concerted attention. The research also highlights that short custodial stays are causing significant challenges for prisons, health and social service providers and the regional communities to which people exit.
61․The Crown rightly noted that the study was limited and related to regional prisons. Those circumstances are not directly comparable with the present case. Perhaps of more assistance is the authority to which I was referred being an extremely helpful decision of Grant CJ in Fernando v Nicholas [2019] NTSC 19. In that decision at [35] to [45], his Honour considered the deployment of “short, sharp” sentences, saying that such sentences were “designed to provide the shock sometimes thought to act as a powerful personal deterrent which compels offenders to consider the consequences of their actions rather than to recidivate”.
62․Grant CJ set out the history of such a form of sentence and noted that, in some jurisdictions, the imposition of short sentences has been constrained by legislation. His Honour said:
The imposition of “short, sharp” sentences remains a lawful and legitimate sentencing tool and disposition in jurisdictions where there is no statutory prohibition. The availability of that disposition is subject to the ordinary principles. First, the head sentence cannot be disproportionate to the gravity of the offending, and imprisonment must be the appropriate penalty in the circumstances bearing in mind that imprisonment is a penalty of last resort. Secondly, if imprisonment is the appropriate penalty, the court must give consideration to the question of suspension having regard to all of the objective and subjective features of the matter.
63․Most importantly, what I draw from his Honour’s judgment is the passage I have cited, namely, that the purpose of sending a person to jail for a short time is that it is thought to act as a powerful personal deterrent. In my assessment, the present offender does not need a powerful personal deterrent. He has had that in the process of his arrest, having to reckon with the consequences of his offending and to face his family, particularly his powerful mother and his vulnerable children, and inform them of the reason he was in custody for eight days. He has been honest with them and is rightly terrified of the consequences it would have on them if he were to be sent to gaol now.
64․For those reasons, I have determined that the sentences to be imposed will be served by intensive correction order. As I have indicated, I regard the offence involving the trafficking of methylamphetamine to be more serious. The sentence I would have imposed for that offence but for the plea is a sentence of imprisonment for two years. The discount of 25% takes that down to 18 months. For the trafficking of MDMA, the sentence I would have imposed is a term of one year, which is reduced to nine months on account of the discount. The sentence I would have imposed for the money laundering offence is a term of eight months reduced to six months by the discount.
65․In respect of the offence of driving whilst his licence was suspended, the offender explained that, because of the state of turmoil he was in at the time owing to his significant drug addiction, he was not even aware that his licence had been suspended. I accept that evidence. I also note that I have not backdated his sentence to reflect the eight days during which he was in custody bringing himself down from his drug addiction. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate to make a non-conviction order directing that the charge be dismissed.
66․Garry Snowden-Crowhurst, please stand:
(1)For the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis (MDMA) (CAN 699/2024), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 9 months commencing on 5 March 2025 and ending on 4 December 2025.
(2)For the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug other than cannabis (methylamphetamine) (CAN 698/2024), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 18 months commencing on 5 December 2025 and ending on 4 June 2027.
(3)For the offence of money laundering (CAN 3839/2024), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for six months commencing on 5 March 2027 and ending on 4 September 2027.
(4)For the transferred summary offence of driving whilst licence suspended (CAN 095/2024), I make a non-conviction order directing that the charge be dismissed.
(5)Pursuant to s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, I direct that the sentence of imprisonment be served by intensive correction on the following conditions:
(a)The core conditions listed in s 42 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT);
(b)A community service condition that the offender perform 249 hours of community service; and
(c)A condition that the offender continue to attend psychological counselling as recommended by his treating psychologist.
(6)I direct that the 249 hours of community service be performed within the term of the sentence, which is a period of two and a half years from today.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-six [66] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum Associate: Date: |
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