IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M16 of 2024B e t w e e n -
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Appellant
and
DAVID JOHN SMITH
Respondent
GAGELER CJ
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
JAGOT J
BEECH‑JONES JTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 18 APRIL 2024, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR L.T. BROWN, SC: If your Honours please, I appear with MS S.C. CLANCY and MS J.R. WANG for the appellant. (instructed by the Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic))
MR P.F. TEHAN, KC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends MR G.J.F. CHISHOLM and MS B.A. MYERS for the respondent. (instructed by James Dowsley & Associates)
GAGELER CJ: Thank you. Mr Brown.
MR BROWN: Thank you, your Honour. If the Court pleases, this appeal concerns whether it was a “fundamental irregularity” in a criminal proceeding for a judge to meet with a child complainant – the principal prosecution witness – outside the court in the presence of both the prosecutor and counsel for the accused.
I would like to start with some brief introductory remarks about the case before I delve into some submissions on the appeal. In summary, the respondent faces trial in the County Court of Victoria on an indictment on charges of sexual assault and sexual penetration of a child under 16. The indictment is in the core appeal book at page 5. As mentioned, the child concerned is the principal prosecution witness and remains a child.
The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) modifies the way evidence is elicited from complainants in sexual offence matters and, in particular, those matters involving child complainants. Accordingly, the child concerned gave evidence at what was called a “special hearing”, and that is one where the evidence is recorded, the public is excluded, and the child is not in the same room as the accused. The day before the child came to give her evidence, the judge who presided over that special hearing, together with the prosecutor and defence counsel, met with the complainant at a location outside the court, known as the Child Witness Service. The meeting accorded with a recommendation that had been made by an intermediary appointed for the complainant. That recommendation was that the judge and counsel meet with the complainant before the complainant gave her evidence. The use of an intermediary in this way also accorded with statutory modifications to the conventional trial process.
After the evidence was taken, the Court of Appeal ruled in the case of Alec (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 208 that where a judge in that case had met with the relevant witness – also a complainant in a similar matter – in the absence of counsel for the parties, that meeting transgressed the principle of open justice, gave rise to a suspicion of partiality, and was a fundamental irregularity in the trial, which meant that there…
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- Case
- [2024] HCATrans 27
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of section 474.17 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth). Specifically, the appeal raised questions about the necessary mental element (mens rea) for an offence under this section, and whether the subjective state of mind of the alleged offender was a relevant consideration for establishing guilt. The Court also considered the scope of the phrase "menace, harass or cause offence" within the context of the provision.
In its reasoning, the High Court held that section 474.17 of the *Criminal Code Act 1995* (Cth) does not require proof of the offender's subjective intention to menace, harass, or cause offence. Instead, the provision is concerned with the objective character of the conduct. The Court clarified that the offence is committed if the conduct, viewed objectively, is such that it would be perceived by a reasonable person as menacing, harassing, or offensive. The Court of Appeal's previous decision, which had focused on the subjective intent of Mr. Smith, was therefore overturned.
The High Court allowed the DPP's appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to be determined in accordance with the High Court's judgment.
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Evidence
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