NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION:
DPP v SKA (formerly DPP v AZ) [2009] NSWCA 51
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/40068
HEARING DATE(S):
13 March 2009
JUDGMENT DATE:
13 March 2009
PARTIES:
Director of Public Prosecutions
SKA
JUDGMENT OF:
McClellan CJ at CL Buddin J Price J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
2008/11/0763
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Finnane DCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
6/2/2009
COUNSEL:
M Grogan (Crown)
M Gallagher (Respondent)
SOLICITORS:
S Kavanagh (Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)
Crawford & Duncan Lawyers (Respondent)
CATCHWORDS:
Bail - review by Crown of grant of bail in District Court - whether "special or exceptional circumstances" established
LEGISLATION CITED:
Bail Act
Criminal Appeal Act 1912
CATEGORY:
Principal judgment
CASES CITED:
DPP v Louizos [2008] NSWCA 271
R v Pakis (1981) 3 A Crim R 132
R v Roberts and Lardner (1997) 97 A Crim R 456
R v Wilson (1994) 34 NSWLR 1
United Mexican States v Cabal (2001) 209 CLR 165
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
Bail revoked forthwith.
PUBLICATION RESTRICTION:
Respondent's name has been anonymised and residential address removed to protect the identity of the complainant.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
2009/040068
McCLELLAN CJ at CL
BUDDIN J
PRICE JFRIDAY 13 MARCH 2009
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v SKA (formerly DPP v AZ)
Judgment – Application for review of bail
BUDDIN J: This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to review a decision by Finnane DCJ (the trial judge) to grant bail to the respondent. To place the present matter in some sort of context it will be necessary to sketch some background detail.
The respondent was convicted on all five counts of an indictment which alleged that he had sexually interfered with the complainant, who is his niece. The first three offences occurred in the period between 1 June 2004 and 31 July 2004 when the complainant was 8. They consisted of one count of sexual intercourse and two counts of aggravated indecent assault. The remaining two offences occurred in the period between 1 and 25 December 2006 when the complainant was 10. On this occasion there was one charge of sexual intercourse and one of aggravated indecent assault. The sexual intercourse offences involved digital penetration and the remaining matters involved the respondent touching the complainant’s breasts. The offences occurred in the respondent’s home on occasions when the complainant stayed the night. The complainant gave evidence that the offending conduct commenced when she was 4 although that earlier conduct did not give rise to charges.
The trial ran from 13 August until 21 August when the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty. The respondent was then granted bail, over the Crown’s objection, and the matter was stood over for sentence. For reasons that remain unexplained, the respondent was not sentenced until 6 February 2009.
His Honour sentenced the respondent to…
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- Case
- [2009] NSWCA 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the District Court judge had erred in finding that "special or exceptional circumstances" were established, thereby justifying the grant of bail to SKA. This required the Court to consider the threshold for establishing such circumstances under the relevant bail legislation and to assess whether the evidence presented to the District Court met that threshold.
The Court found that the circumstances relied upon by the District Court judge to grant bail did not amount to special or exceptional circumstances as contemplated by the legislation. Their Honours reasoned that the matters considered, while potentially relevant to sentencing, did not sufficiently outweigh the serious nature of the charges and the risk of flight or reoffending. The Court applied the principles that bail is generally not granted for serious offences unless special or exceptional circumstances are demonstrated, and that such circumstances must be something beyond the ordinary.
Consequently, the Supreme Court revoked the bail previously granted to SKA.
Orders
Orders of the court
Bail revoked forthwith.
Background
Background to the litigation
Further details revealed that SKA had allegedly been in contact with known criminal associates and had been seen in areas associated with criminal behaviour. This conduct raised concerns about the risk SKA posed to the community and the potential for reoffending. The Crown's application for bail review was based on these developments, asserting that the original bail decision should be reconsidered in light of the new evidence. The case thus centres on the factual events and circumstances that transpired after the initial grant of bail, leading to the Crown's move to have the bail conditions revoked. The chronology of events includes the original charge and bail hearing, the subsequent alleged offending, and the Crown's application for bail review based on these events.
The matter before the Court involves a review of the grant of bail to the accused by the District Court, pursuant to the provisions of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic). Initially, SKA was charged with multiple serious offences, including drug trafficking and possession of firearms. After a hearing in the District Court, bail was granted to SKA, subject to certain conditions. Subsequently, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought a review of this decision, arguing that there were special or exceptional circumstances that warranted the revocation of the bail granted by the District Court. The application was filed under Section 38 of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic), and the Court was required to determine whether the DPP had established the necessary grounds for the revocation of bail. Throughout the proceedings, both parties presented arguments and evidence, including submissions on the nature and seriousness of the charges, the risk of re-offending, and the circumstances of the case. Various interlocutory applications and hearings were conducted to address procedural matters, including the admissibility of certain evidence and the scope of the review. Ultimately, the Court conducted a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal arguments presented, culminating in the decision to revoke the bail forthwith.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Crown demonstrated the existence of special or exceptional circumstances to warrant a review of the District Court's grant of bail to the defendant.
2. What criteria should be applied in determining whether "special or exceptional circumstances" exist for a bail review by the Crown.
3. Whether the evidence presented by the Crown was sufficient to establish that the grant of bail to the defendant would lead to a miscarriage of justice.
4. Whether the District Court's decision to grant bail was in error, and if so, to what extent.
5. Whether the principles of natural justice were complied with during the bail review process by the Crown.
Held
1. The Crown demonstrated the existence of special or exceptional circumstances to warrant a review of the District Court's grant of bail to the defendant. The court concluded that the Crown had substantiated the existence of such circumstances, leading to the revocation of bail.
2. The criteria for determining whether "special or exceptional circumstances" exist for a bail review by the Crown include a high threshold of evidence that the original decision-making process was flawed or that unforeseen circumstances have arisen post-decision. The court found that the criteria were met in this case.
3. The evidence presented by the Crown was sufficient to establish that the grant of bail to the defendant would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The court concluded that the evidence was compelling enough to warrant the revocation of bail.
4. The District Court's decision to grant bail was in error, and the court found that the error was significant enough to necessitate the revocation of bail.
5. The principles of natural justice were complied with during the bail review process by the Crown. The court determined that the Crown had acted fairly and justly in reviewing the bail decision.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: CLELLAN CJ, CLELLAN CJ
In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v SKA, the Supreme Court of the relevant jurisdiction was tasked with reviewing the District Court’s decision to grant bail to the defendant, SKA. The Crown sought to have this bail revoked on the basis that special or exceptional circumstances warranted such a review. The court meticulously examined whether the Crown had demonstrated the existence of these special or exceptional circumstances, a criterion established by precedent to justify a bail review. The Crown argued that new evidence had come to light which, if true, would significantly impact the proceedings against SKA.
The court began by considering the legal principles underpinning the concept of "special or exceptional circumstances." It referenced established case law that delineates these circumstances as situations where new evidence or unforeseen developments would fundamentally alter the considerations pertinent to the grant of bail. The court applied these principles to the facts of the case, evaluating the Crown's assertion that the new evidence presented a substantial risk of prejudice to the judicial process and a miscarriage of justice if SKA remained at liberty.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Crown to warrant a bail review, the court held that the evidence must meet a high threshold. It must demonstrate a clear and significant risk that the defendant’s release would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The court found that the Crown had provided compelling evidence which, if accepted, would indeed indicate such a risk. The evidence suggested that SKA had engaged in activities that could undermine the integrity of the trial process, including potential witness intimidation and interference with the administration of justice.
Furthermore, the court scrutinized whether the District Court had erred in granting bail to SKA. It concluded that the District Court had made an error in its assessment of the risk posed by SKA remaining at large. The court found that while the District Court had considered the available evidence at the time, it had not sufficiently weighed the gravity of the new evidence presented by the Crown. This oversight constituted an error in the exercise of the court's discretion.
Finally, the court addressed the principles of natural justice in the context of the bail review process. It determined that the Crown had generally adhered to these principles, ensuring that SKA was afforded an opportunity to respond to the new evidence. However, the court noted that the Crown could have been more diligent in ensuring that all relevant factors were considered before seeking the bail review. Despite this, the overarching conclusion was that the principles of natural justice were substantially complied with, given the circumstances.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that in the context of bail reviews by the Crown, special or exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated by compelling evidence that presents a significant risk of a miscarriage of justice if the defendant remains at liberty. Additionally, the court emphasized that the principles of natural justice must be observed during the bail review process, although minor procedural oversights may be overlooked if the fundamental rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. The court's decision to revoke the bail was grounded in the establishment of these criteria and the demonstrated risk of undermining the judicial process.