Director of Public Prosecutions v Sharma
[2015] VCC 1523
•30 October 2015
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
CR-13-01924
CR-15-01615
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| V |
| SAVADA SHARMA |
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JUDGE: | HER HONOUR JUDGE HAMPEL | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 14 September 2015 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 30 October 2015 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Sharma | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VCC 1523 | |
REASONS FOR RULING
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Ms E. Ruddle (application to change plea) Ms A. Coomber (ruling) | OPP |
| For the Defendant | Self-represented |
HER HONOUR:
1 On 8 October 2013 Mr Sharma was committed to this court on 94 charges of theft and obtaining by deception. All charges arise out of the alleged misappropriation of tax refunds and superannuation funds of clients of Mr Sharma’s accounting practice.
2 On 7 February 2014 Mr Sharma was arraigned and pleaded guilty in this court to 50 charges of theft (the first plea indictment). A separate trial indictment containing 19 charges of theft and 11 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception was filed. The plea hearing, and the date for trial on those remaining charges was fixed for 1 March 2015.
3 On 23 February 2015, a second plea indictment was filed, and Mr Sharma was arraigned and pleaded guilty to a further 5 charges of theft and 5 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception. A new trial indictment, containing 14 charges of theft and 6 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception was filed over the original trial indictment.
4 The trial was listed in the reserve list on 1 March 2015, and stood over until the following day.
5 On 2 March 2015 a third plea indictment, containing a further 4 charges of theft was filed, and a further trial indictment, now reduced to 6 charges of theft and 5 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception was filed over. Mr Sharma was not arraigned on either of those indictments, and the matter was stood over again until the following day.
6 On 3 March 2015 Mr Sharma terminated the services of his solicitors, and the following day the trial date was vacated. No new trial date was fixed, but 27 April 2015 was fixed as the plea date.
7 The plea date of 27 April 2015 was vacated on 22 April 2015, and refixed for a month later, 22 May 2015.
8 A week before the refixed plea date, Mr Sharma applied to adjourn the plea hearing. The application was stood over for a number of days, and on 19 May 2015, the adjournment application was refused.
9 On 21 May 2015, the day before the plea was due to be heard, Mr Sharma filed an application to change his plea. As a result, the plea date was again vacated, and the change of plea application listed for 20 August 2015. That date was later changed, on the prosecution application, to 14 September 2015. As Mr Sharma was not arraigned on the third plea indictment, this application is confined to the pleas entered on the first and second plea indictments, that is the 50 charges of theft on the first, and the 5 of theft and 5 of obtaining a financial advantage by deception on the second.
10 Mr Sharma was self-represented on the hearing of the application to change plea. He has been effectively self-represented since he terminated the services of his solicitors in March this year. Although he had been granted legal aid for his plea and trial, VLA has refused to transfer his matters to another solicitor, as it maintains its guidelines for the transfer of an aided matter to another solicitor have not been met.
11 Although he is clearly an intelligent and educated man, and was able to make his submissions, and question the witnesses he had subpoenaed, Mr Sharma made it clear he was unrepresented, not by choice, but by reason of the impasse with VLA.
12 And, it became clear to me, that had he been represented, and by lawyers in whom he had confidence, this application would likely have been avoided.
13 Mr Sharma has filed two outlines of submission in support of his application, which he supplemented with oral submissions at hearing. In addition, he subpoenaed, and questioned on oath his former counsel, Mr Alan Marshall, and his former solicitor, Mr Adrian Paull. He had also been provided, as a result of a subpoena, with the file and appointment records kept by his former solicitors. He gave evidence himself, and was cross examined, as were Mr Marshall and Mr Paull, by Ms Ruddle, on behalf of the prosecution.
14 The thrust of the application to change his pleas is Mr Sharma’s dissatisfaction with his legal advisers. His complaints fall into a number of categories. First, so far as his solicitors are concerned, he complained of the limited contact with them, and lack of continuity of personnel within the firm. He considered their preparation for committal, trial and plea was inadequate, and that he was disadvantaged because he did not have access to all his records, as they had been taken by the police under search warrant. Secondly, he was unhappy with aspects of his representation by his counsel Mr Marshall. He was critical of the decision not to contest any evidence at committal. He was, he said, unsure, at the time he entered his guilty pleas, what charges he had pleaded guilty to. He felt he had been “abandoned” by Mr Marshall, without explanation, days before date fixed for the plea, and the trial on the unresolved charges. Thirdly, his confidence in the level of preparation for plea and trial had been undermined by what he was told by Mr Skehan, who replaced Mr Marshall. He said Mr Skehan told him the spreadsheets prepared by the prosecution contained many errors, and he believed they affected the charges to which he had pleaded guilty as well as the outstanding charges. He said he believed he had defences of claim of right, or payment in cash to many of the charges, although he was hampered by lack of access to the original documents.
15 Dealing first with the complaints about the committal preparation. Mr Sharma said he was told by Mr Paull, the solicitor from James Dowsley and Associates who originally had carriage of the matter, the evidence in at least 12 cases would be tested at committal, but that none of the 12 alleged victims were called at committal. In his evidence, Mr Paull said he had had a number of conferences with Mr Sharma, and went through the hand up brief to assess the charges. He considered whether certain charges should be tested at committal. He said he there were a number of adjournments, to obtain further documents before he could complete and file the Form 32 for the attendance of witnesses at committal. When questioned by Mr Sharma about the fact he did not attend at the committal, Mr Paull said it was not unusual for the instructing solicitor not to attend the committal, when counsel had been briefed.
16 Mr Paull’s evidence indicates he read, and assessed the brief, sought instructions, and additional materials from the prosecution as a result, before making a final assessment about the charges which may have been contestable. He retained experienced counsel to represent Mr Sharma at committal.
17 Mr Sharma complained that the evidence of the 12 witnesses was not tested at committal by Mr Marshall. In his written outline, he said of the committal.
We decided to proceed straight to trial and I was assured [by Mr Marshall] of the following: “We'd plead guilty to some and negotiate the rest to ensure a guilty plea is recorded at the earliest opportunity.”
18 Mr Paull said he was not surprised the matter resolved at committal. This confirms his earlier evidence he was well aware of the content of the hand up brief, and additional material, and of his instructions, and was exercising a professional assessment of the prospects of acquittal, and the benefits of an early plea of guilty. Similarly, I am satisfied the advice given by Mr Marshall, as to the benefits of an early guilty plea, and negotiation as to the remaining charges is sound in principle. The prosecution summary of submissions on the change of plea application notes the matter resolved at committal by the entry of guilty pleas to all charges save those concerning 4 clients, Damiano, Damiano Super Fund, Urbano and Onezime. This again indicates a careful case by case consideration had been given to the charges and the prospects of conviction, by Mr Sharma’s legal advisers. The materials also indicate that the court was informed the prosecution would withdraw certain charges of obtaining a financial advantage by deception relating to the provision of bad cheques, and that Mr Sharma would, without the need to cross examine any witnesses, consent to being committed to this court on all remaining charges. It also indicates an additional benefit to Mr Sharma, which had been negotiated on his behalf with the prosecution, namely the withdrawal of certain charges relating to the passing of bad cheques, and the further additional benefit attaching to a guilty plea, that no witnesses had been cross examined.
19 Dealing then with the circumstances leading up to the filing of the 50 charge plea indictment, the materials before me indicate that on 9 October 2013, the day following the committal, Mr Sharma, represented by Mr Marshall, attended a 24 hour Initial Directions Hearing in this court. The court was told plea negotiations were underway. They continued, with further mentions on 26 November 2013, 19 December 2013, and 5 February 2014. Finally, on 7 February 2014, the 50 charge plea indictment was filed and Mr Sharma was arraigned, and entered guilty pleas to all 50 charges. On the same day, the 30 charge trial indictment, containing the charges on all unresolved matters was filed.
20 Mr Sharma put to Mr Marshall he was not involved in the plea negotiations following his committal to this court. Mr Marshall said everything he did was on his (Mr Sharma’s) instructions. He said they had had a number of conferences during that period. Mr Sharma asked whether he should have been given anything in writing, and notified in writing when for example, a rolled up charge was substituted for a number of discrete charges. Mr Marshall said he had given documents to Mr Sharma as the negotiations continued, reflecting the charges to which guilty pleas had been offered and accepted.
21 I am satisfied Mr Marshall negotiated the pleas with the active participation of Mr Sharma. The 50 charge plea indictment excluded more than the 4 clients, Damiano, Damiano Super Fund, Urbano and Onezime whose charges had been specifically excluded from the guilty pleas entered in the Magistrates court. That in itself indicates Mr Marshall was taking Mr Sharma through the charges to which guilty pleas were to be entered on a case by case or charge by charge basis, as he indicated. More significantly, Mr Sharma’s pleas to the 50 charges were entered in accordance with s 216 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. This was not a case where a short form arraignment was conducted, and after Mr Sharma entered a plea of guilty to the first charge, he was simply asked whether he intended to plead guilty to the remaining charges on the indictment.
22 On 5 February 2014, the court was told a large number of charges had resolved, and the matter was adjourned to allow the plea indictment to be settled. On 7 February 2014, the matter returned to court, and the plea indictment was filed. On that day, and in accordance with s 216 of the Criminal Procedure Act, after Mr Sharma pleaded guilty, in open court, to the first charge on the plea indictment, he indicated his intention to plead guilty to the remaining 49 charges on that indictment. The court then accepted written pleas of guilty to the remaining charges. In accordance with s 216, and Rule 2.10, a notice of intention to plead guilty to one or more remaining charges on an indictment was filed. Mr Sharma signed the endorsement confirming his intention to plead guilty to all 50 charges on the indictment, a copy of which was attached to the notice. He signed each of the 50 charges on the copy indictment. The prosecution also signed the notice, confirming its consent to the taking of the written pleas to Charges 2–50.
23 By s 216(3), a guilty plea accepted under s 216 has the same effect as if it were entered on arraignment.
24 Mr Sharma said in his evidence before me he had been asked to sign a document in the corridor of the court, and he was not aware of its contents. I do not accept he was unaware of the content, or significance of the notice of intention to plead guilty, or of the copy of indictment he signed, charge by charge, which was attached to the notice, and which he adopted in open court when arraigned.
25 It would appear that throughout the post committal plea negotiations leading up to the filing of the 50 charge indictment, Mr Sharma’s face to face contact with his legal representatives was with Mr Marshall only. He later discovered Mr Paull had left James Dowsley and Associates some time before he was committed for trial. He never met either of the two solicitors who he understood had, in turn, had carriage of his matter thereafter, and his contact with the firm was through Ms Petti, the practice manager. As Mr Marshall had had carriage of the matter at committal, and had negotiated, as the passage I have quoted above from Mr Sharma’s written outline confirms, with Mr Sharma’s express agreement, the committal with guilty pleas to all charges save for those relating to Damiano, Damiano Super Fund, Urbano and Onezime, I am satisfied he has suffered no disadvantage, in respect of the entry of those guilty pleas, by the limited contact with his solicitors over that period.
26 I note also that Mr Marshall said, when asked by Mr Sharma, that the solicitor he dealt with after Mr Paull left the firm was Mr Kieran Reynolds. When asked by Mr Sharma whether he thought Mr Sharma had an instructing solicitor after Mr Paull left, Mr Marshall said “always”. Mr Marshall, too said much of his contact was with Ms Petti, the practice manager, over that period. I do not consider this unusual. Mr Marshall was properly briefed and instructed by James Dowsley and Associates, had carriage of the plea negotiations, and I am satisfied, acted on instructions in negotiating the pleas to the 50 charge indictment.
27 In the two and a half months between the time of the Final Directions Hearing in December 2014, and 1 March 2015, the date the trial was listed to commence, there was evidence of considerable work done by Mr Marshall to prepare the matter for trial and to negotiate further guilty pleas to some of the outstanding charges. He had been retained by James Dowsley and Associates to appear at trial, and on the plea in respect of the resolved charges.
28 By 19 February 2015, on the third further Final Directions Hearing, the court was told more charges had resolved, and another further Final Directions Hearing, the fourth, was set for 23 February 2015, when the second plea indictment, containing the additional 10 charges was filed. On that day, Mr Sharma was arraigned in open court on all 10 charges and entered his guilty pleas. Again, I am satisfied Mr Marshall was properly retained and instructed by James Dowsley and Associates, and, after consultation with Mr Sharma, and in accordance with his instructions, prepared and filed the defence response in respect of the trial charges, and negotiated the further guilty pleas.
29 Whether there was adequate or appropriate notification by James Dowsley and Associates of the changes in instructing solicitor, from Mr Paull to Mr Garth to Mr Power to Mr Reynolds over that period is not clear to me, nor, importantly, is it to the point. There is nothing to suggest that Mr Sharma was inadequately advised or represented by his counsel, Mr Marshall, or that his counsel needed, and was not receiving the support he needed from his solicitors in the preparation for trial over this period.
30 Indeed the evidence before me indicates Mr Marshall was assiduous in his preparation, taking Mr Sharma through the evidence in respect of each charge, requesting additional documentation from the prosecution which might bear on the strength of the case on a particular charge, advising Mr Sharma on his prospects of success in respect of each charge, and actively seeking instructions to offer guilty pleas to charges where no viable defence was identified from the documents or instructions. I am satisfied Mr Marshall was acting in Mr Sharma’s best interests by assisting him to confront the evidence available on each charge, and to ensure he obtained the maximum benefit available to him under s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (that is, the reduction in the sentence by reason of a guilty plea, and the time at which it was entered).
31 What appears to have precipitated Mr Sharma’s concerns about his representation is the unfortunate, and late withdrawal from the trial by Mr Marshall. In his written outline, Mr Sharma complained that Mr Marshall decided at the last minute not to represent him, and did not give him any reason for doing so. This is illustrated by his question of Mr Marshall “Why did you abandon me, two days before trial?”
32 It is not clear when, or how Mr Sharma was advised Mr Marshall had returned the brief, and Mr Skehan had been briefed in his place. With hindsight, it is clear much of his dissatisfaction with his solicitors, and his concern about the appropriateness of his guilty pleas sprang from the consequences of that late change of counsel.
33 In his written outline, Mr Sharma said he did not meet and confer with Mr Skehan until the day before the trial was due to commence. He said “it was during this meeting that I realised from my conversations with Mr Skehan how inadequately the instructing solicitors had prepared my case”. In particular Mr Sharma complained of the failure to commission a defence expert to analyse the financial records.
34 He said Mr Skehan had identified errors or discrepancies in the 110 page spreadsheet sought to be relied on by the prosecution. He complained his solicitors had not compared his cheque butts or bank statements with the spreadsheet, or commissioned an expert to do so. He had noted the spreadsheet showed significant cash withdrawals. The combination of errors in the spreadsheet, and the amount and frequency of cash withdrawals he said, made him want a full financial analysis of all 7,442 transactions in the spreadsheet to be done. Although Mr Sharma said in his written submissions he was not saying categorically he was not guilty of all charges, the combination of the cash withdrawals and discrepancies in the records led him to doubt his pleas of guilty to the charges on which he had been arraigned, and to demand a full financial analysis before he could decide whether he should plead guilty to any charges.
35 He said these matters had led him to the conclusion the failure to test the evidence at committal, and to accept his counsel’s advice to plead guilty had led to his entry of his pleas of guilty under duress, and induced by his counsel’s advice all would be sorted out after committal by negotiation. There is no evidence to suggest duress, misrepresentation of the process proposed to be followed after committal, or any improper inducement. This is, at the kindest, an opportunistic attempt to capitalise on the disadvantages under which Mr Skehan laboured, as a result of his being briefed so late, and without having participated in the lengthy preparation and instruction taking processes undergone by Mr Marshall with Mr Sharma and which had resulted in the guilty pleas and consequent narrowing down of the charges in dispute.
36 Mr Marshall, in his evidence said he had taken Mr Sharma through every charge (that is the original 50 charge plea indictment, and the original trial indictment, filed at the same time as the 50 charge plea indictment) between the time of committal and the time the original plea and trial indictments were filed on 7 February 2014. He said he sought Mr Sharma’s instructions as to his defence on each charge, and offered guilty pleas to the 50 charges, on instructions. He said he took Mr Sharma through each charge on the 50 charge indictment, and took the view that Mr Sharma understood exactly what he was pleading guilty to. He said, after committal, and in preparation for trial, he had given the bank statements and financial records to Mr Sharma to go through, and identify any transaction, or records which could be relied on to defend any charges.
37 He said it was not until late in the proceedings that he had sufficient instructions from Mr Sharma to prepare the defence response. In the course of preparing the defence response, Mr Marshall sought, and was provided by the prosecution with additional documents. Many, as I understand it, were documents which had been seized from Mr Sharma’s offices under warrant. That the defence response was filed late is clear from the chronology filed in this application. Mr Marshall pointed out the first version filed contained in its final paragraph, an indication the accused would be pleading guilty to 10 identified charges. That final paragraph was struck out of the amended response when the second plea indictment, and the amended trial indictment, reduced by the deletion of those ten charges, was filed on 23 February 2015. Mr Marshall said the pleas to these additional ten charges were offered on instructions. Again, he said, he was satisfied, in the weeks leading up to trial that Mr Sharma knew exactly what charges he was pleading, or had pleaded guilty to.
38 In response to questions about the late return of the brief, Mr Marshall said that he had put Mr Sharma on notice he was holding a brief in another case listed to commence interstate at the same time, and that, as the trial date approached, and the discussions about which of the remaining charges could be resolved by guilty plea, he began to feel “somewhat compromised”. He said he had “constantly changing” instructions about evidence and pleas. And so, he had finally elected to keep the interstate brief, and hand Mr Sharma’s over when it became clear it would not resolve into a plea on all charges.
39 No matter how difficult or intransigent Mr Sharma may have been, (and his evidence before me suggests he was) it was incumbent on Mr Marshall to retain the brief, hand it over in sufficient time for replacement counsel to properly master it, or, if relinquishing it within 7 days of trial, to seek leave of the court to do so (See PNCR 1- 2015, 6.6). Mr Sharma may have been a difficult client, but that is not to the point. It is difficult to know how a barrister, put in the position Mr Skehan was put in, briefed at the last minute in a fraud trial, reliant on a detailed knowledge of the financial transactions revealed in the spreadsheet could have fully appreciated the nature of the case, the basis on which the pleas had been offered and entered, and the basis of the defences to the remaining charges.
40 It would not be surprising if Mr Skehan said, as Mr Sharma says he did, that it was necessary to have a defence commissioned financial analysis of the materials. It may be he said to Mr Sharma that if he was pleading guilty that he must know what he was pleading to. It may be what Mr Sharma was telling Mr Skehan was at odds with what he had instructed Mr Marshall. He certainly changed his position before me, and it was difficult, at times, to keep him to the point.
41 Mr Skehan was not subpoenaed for the purposes of this application, as were Mr Marshall and Mr Paull. There is no evidence before me to give any support for Mr Sharma’s assertion he has, or may have a defence to any of the charges he has pleaded guilty to. Although I consider he, and Mr Skehan, were put in a difficult position by reason of the late withdrawal of Mr Marshall, I am not satisfied there is any evidence which would support Mr Sharma’s assertion he has, or may have a defence to any charges to which he pleaded guilty, or that his pleas were induced by duress, or a promise it would all be sorted out later. At its highest, it was bald assertion, or an expression of hope that something may emerge which would or might afford him a defence.
42 Mr Sharma also complained of the failure of his solicitors or counsel to seek a sentence indication and to obtain an expert report on his mental state. Mr Marshall said a sentence indication was not sought as, in his view, given the amounts involved, a custodial sentence was inevitable, and so, there was no basis for making the application. He said in his email to Mr Skehan he had recommended the commissioning of a psychological report, but, consistently with his knowledge of VLA guidelines, recommended it be obtained after all charges had been resolved by guilty pleas or jury verdict. I see nothing of concern with Mr Marshall’s reasoning or knowledge of the law, or VLA practice in respect of these matters, and nothing which would indicate the guilty pleas were entered in error, under duress, or through ignorance.
43 I am fortified in my conclusions to date by the procedural history which followed Mr Marshall’s withdrawal in the days before trial.
44 On 1 March 2015, the day fixed for trial, the matter was listed in the reserve list. Whether it was in the reserve list because of the late change of counsel, and Mr Skehan’s need for more time to get on top of the matter, or solely because there were insufficient judges to hear all trials listed that day is unclear. However, a third plea indictment, and a further reduced trial indictment was filed over the trial indictment which had been filed at the time the second plea indictment, with the 10 charges on it, had been filed. This suggests negotiations had been continuing between Mr Marshall and the prosecution in the days before his withdrawal. In any event, Mr Sharma was not arraigned on either the third plea indictment, or the latest version of the trial indictment. The matter was stood over to the following day.
45 I have already noted that on 2 March 2015 the court was advised Mr Sharma terminated the services of James Dowsley and Associates, and the following day, 3 March 2015, that the trial date was vacated, and the date for the plea on the 60 charges on the two indictments was fixed for 27 April 2015, and that Mr Sharma has been effectively unrepresented from that time.
46 VLA took the view that the circumstances in which Mr Sharma had terminated the services of James Dowsley and Associates did not satisfy their guidelines for transfer of the matter to its in-house practice, or to another approved solicitor.
47 A further four mentions were held, but by 22 April 2015, with all avenues for reconsideration apparently exhausted, and VLA’s position remaining unchanged, the plea date of 27 April 2015 was vacated and refixed for one month later, on 22 May 2015.
48 There were two further mentions, on 14 and 19 May 2015. The representation impasse remained. Mr Sharma applied for the plea to be adjourned. The application was refused.
49 On 22 May 2015, the day fixed for plea, Mr Sharma applied to change his plea. He had filed a notice foreshadowing his intention to do so the previous day. The plea date was vacated, and the application for change of plea listed. Meanwhile, a new date, of 2 May 2016 was fixed for the trial on the outstanding charges.
50 The timing of the change of plea application, following the legal aid impasse over representation, and after the unsuccessful application to adjourn the plea all support the conclusion that Mr Sharma’s desire to change the plea springs from his dissatisfaction with the manner in which he was left without the services of his counsel in the days before trial, and the resultant impasse with VLA.
51 Whatever legitimate sense of grievance he may have about the late change of counsel, and the limited contact he had with his solicitors since Mr Marshall was briefed, he has not satisfied me that he did not appreciate the nature of the charges, or did not intend to plead guilty to them.
52 I have read the prosecution summaries filed in respect of the two plea indictments. I am satisfied the matters referred to in the outlines are sufficient, if admitted, or otherwise proved, to make out each of the 60 charges to which guilty pleas have been entered. There is nothing in the materials presented by Mr Sharma on this application to suggest there is other evidence which, if accepted, would establish he could not, as a matter of law, be found guilty of any of any of those 60 offences to which he has pleaded guilty. Nor has he satisfied me that, upon the admitted or provable facts he could not, in law have been found guilty.
53 I am not satisfied the matters on which Mr Sharma has relied establish there would be a miscarriage of justice if he were held to his pleas of guilty.
54 The application for leave to change the pleas on indictments D10367362.1 and D10367362.3 is refused.
55 What remains unresolved is how the matter will progress from now on. These are serious charges, and the consequences for Mr Sharma’s reputation, record and liberty significant. He is eligible for legal aid, and wishes to be represented. His sense of grievance about the conduct of his solicitors may be misplaced, or exaggerated, but it is, I am satisfied, genuinely held. Like many people facing serious charges, he evidences some difficulties in identifying and analysing the incriminatory evidence, and appreciating what is, in a criminal trial context, relevant. He may be having difficulty coming to terms with the gravity of his conduct and its consequences. His previous counsel had concerns about his mental state as he prepared for committal and trial. They do not appear to be unfounded or unreasonable. He may at present have a somewhat reduced capacity to make the best, or most rational decisions about his future without professional advice. He impresses as a person who would find it difficult to navigate his way through the complexities of the criminal justice system without the legal assistance he is entitled to, and, under VLA guidelines, eligible to receive. In addition, without legal representation in respect of the outstanding charges, and an exploration of the possibility of resolving all outstanding charges, he risks losing the benefit of a reduction in the sentence which he might otherwise obtain under s.6AAA of the Sentencing Act.
56 I direct these reasons be sent to VLA, and urge them to work with Mr Sharma to find a way to ensure he is provided with the legal representation he is entitled to receive.
57 I direct the matter in respect of the two plea indictments, be listed for mention before the list judge on 11 November 2015.
1I should add, I have chosen that date because that is a Wednesday, and on Wednesday there is a representative of VLA present for the purpose of assisting the court where there are funding and representation issues. I extend Mr Sharma's bail in respect of the two plea indictments, D10367362.1 and D10367362.3, to that funding mention on 11 November at 9 am. Mr Sharma's bail in respect of the other outstanding matters, the trial indictment and the third plea indictment, has been fixed for the final directions hearing on 2 March 2016 and the trial date has been fixed for the outstanding matters on 2 May 2016.
2
Your bail, Mr Sharma, in respect of these two plea indictments is extended until the day of the funding mention on 11 November, and your bail in respect of the trial indictment has been extended to the final directions hearing on
2 March next year. Do you understand that?
3ACCUSED: Yes, Your Honour.
4HER HONOUR: All right. A copy of these reasons will be printed out almost immediately. There are just a couple of minor typo's that need to be fixed, so if you wait here, they will be printed out, and then you will be free to go.
5MS COOMBER: Your Honour, can I indicate for the record - sorry for interrupting.
6HER HONOUR: Yes.
7MS COOMBER: I have, as you know, email correspondence, so I knew the charges to the indictments were coming. I have prepared amended indictments to give to Mr Sharma, if I can just note that for the record.
8HER HONOUR: Thank you.
9MS COOMBER: It simply shows the change of court reference which has been marked in red on both indictments, just to ensure Mr Sharma has a complete copy.
10HER HONOUR: Thank you.
11ACCUSED: Thank Your Honour.
12HER HONOUR: That is just regularising the record. It is not adding any new charges or changing the detail of any charges. It is just the file number because there has just been a bit of a confusion as so many indictments had been filed, as to what the correct court number was. It is all sorted now, I think, Mr Sharma, so we should not have any trouble tracking any of them.
13As I have said, I am directing that a copy of these reasons be provided to VLA, to try and precipitate a further discussion, and an attempt to resolve the matter in relation to your funding, so they will have that, but you will have a copy of the reasons in any event, and if you want to get in touch with VLA before 11 November to see if you can initiate discussions, then feel free to do so, and I have no doubt the Crown will continue to provide the assistance it has to date, to Legal Aid, or to Mr Sharma if any further assistance is sought.
14MS COOMBER: Absolutely Your Honour, anything the Crown can do, we will assist.
15HER HONOUR: Thank you. All right. I will stand down.
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