Director of Public Prosecutions v Sarantos
[2023] VCC 2011
•2 November 2023
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
GENERAL LIST
Case No. CR-23-00695
CR-23-00696
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| SARANTOS AND O'TOOLE |
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JUDGE: | His Honour Judge Palmer | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 13 October 2023 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 2 November 2023 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Sarantos & Anor | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VCC 2011 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:CRIMINAL LAW
Catchwords: False accounting – mature-aged offenders – no prior convictions – no other charges – offending period over seven years.
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1958; Sentencing Act 1991.
Cases Cited:DPP v Cetrola [2018] VCC 1929; DPP v Chen [2017] VCC 735; CDPP v Gerathy [2018] VSC 289; DPP v Matthews [2106] VCC 1261; DPP v Smith & De Alwis [2016] VCC 705; The Queen v Pakoti [2022] VCC 271.
Sentence: Sarantos: 6 months’ imprisonment and 2-year CCO; O’Toole: 4 months’ imprisonment and 2-year CCO.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr T Glass | Office of Public Prosecution |
| For the Accused (Sarantos) For the Accused (O’Toole) | M J Miller Mr G Lascaris | Leanne Warren and Associates Dribbin & Brown Criminal Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Alexander Sarantos, you have pleaded guilty to eight charges of false accounting, contrary to section 83(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958. David John O’Toole, you have also pleaded guilty to eight charges of false accounting. The circumstances of your offending are set out in the Amended Summary of Prosecution Opening (13 October 2023, Exhibit P1), and which both of you accepted.
Circumstances of offending
Alexander Sarantos, you commenced employment in the Parts Department at Graham Powell Mazda in Frankston on 3 December 1999. You became the manager of the department in approximately 2009.
David O’Toole, you commenced employment in the Parts Department, as a Spare Parts Interpreter, on 4 March 2010.
You both worked consistently together in the Parts Department from 2010, through a change of ownership to Frankston Mazda in February 2019, up until 17 April 2020, when your offending was first uncovered and your employment terminated.
Part of both your roles included ordering spare parts for the service department from other Mazda dealerships and suppliers. You would also order spare parts for sale to smash repairers and for walk-in customers.
Deliveries and pickups from suppliers would be checked off the invoices and put in the warehouse by the staff member who received it. The supplier invoice would then by placed in a tray for one of you to enter the details into the dealership’s Titan Dealer Management System (DMS). The DMS is a computer program used to record automotive parts and accessories and maintain inventory records.
The invoice would then be sent to the dealership’s accounts department for payment to the supplier.
You have both pleaded guilty to eight charges of false accounting. Each of the charges is a rolled-up charge which includes a series of misleading, false or deceptive entries made by each of you into the DMS in a particular calendar year. The details of the false entries are set out in Schedules to the indictment.
The dishonest scheme you were engaged in involved the following steps (which can best be understood by examining one of the items in the Schedules):
a.An order was placed with a supplier for spare parts (the invoice number, date of the invoice, supplier, part ordered, and price of the part are set out in the first five columns, respectively, of the Schedules).
b.The spare part and invoice would be received at the dealership.
c.One or other of you would make an entry into the DMS corresponding to the invoice.
d.The DMS entry would reflect the same price as the invoice.
e.However, instead of entering the spare part actually ordered and received, you would enter one or more other spare parts, which added up to the same amount as the invoice (these are the items listed in the right-hand column of the Schedules).
f.These substitute parts would be taken from a secret stockpile of spare parts that you maintained for that purpose, and which were not included in the inventory listings in the DMS.
g.You amassed this secret stockpile through a combination of three different methods:
i.Twice a year Mazda Australia instructed its dealers to destroy obsolete parts in return for a partial cash credit. Instead of destroying the obsolete parts, you would remove the parts from the inventory listings in the DMS (as if they had been destroyed), but then retain them in your secret stockpile.
ii.Each year Mazda Australia held “M Day” sales events. As part of these promotions customers would be given accessories packs worth approximately $500. These packs were provided free of charge to the dealerships by Mazda Australia. Instead of giving the packs to customers, you would add the items in the packs to your secret stockpile.
iii.You would add additional parts (usually of small value) to vehicle servicing repair orders and then add them to the secret stockpile (rather than providing them to the Service Department).
h.Before paying the invoice, the accounts department would check that the cost on the invoice matched the cost on the bottom of the DMS entry. Provided it did match, the invoice would be paid.
i.The spare parts that had actually been ordered and received would never be entered into the DMS and would, therefore, be available to you for other purposes, such as on-selling.
j.These misappropriated spare parts were mostly soft crash parts, car doors, headlights, bumpers and tailgates.
k.The identity of any third parties to whom misappropriated spare parts were sold by you is unknown.
l.However, the director of Maz Motors stated that he had known you, Mr O’Toole, for a number of years, and that he would buy up to about $10,000 worth of spare parts from you each year, and would always pay cash directly to you, with no invoices being raised.
Returning to the Schedules:
a.There are separate Schedules for each of the charges, with each Schedule setting out the dishonest accounting entries made by one or other of you during the course of a particular calendar year.
b.I have not counted the number of these entries.
c.However, the Schedules run for 101 pages, with multiple dishonest accounting entries on almost every one of those pages, and frequently 15, 16 or 17 entries.
d.I estimate that for you Mr Sarantos there could be in excess of a thousand dishonest accounting entries for which you were responsible.
e.For you Mr O’Toole, there could be hundreds of dishonest accounting entries for which you were responsible.
f.Each one of those dishonest entries involved a spare part which was paid for by your employer, but never entered into the inventory maintained on the DMS, and was therefore never available to your employer for use or sale.
g.Each one of those entries also involved the concealment by you of that fact by the substitution of parts from your secret stockpile.
The offending came to light in April 2020, when the dealership’s Service Manager and Financial Controller investigated an invoice for demineralised water and found a discrepancy between the item recorded in the invoice and the item entered into the DMS. This discovery triggered a full examination of the DMS, which uncovered numerous false entries made by each of you for every year dating back to 2013.
The total value of the fraudulently processed invoices entered into the DMS by you, Mr Sarantos, is $341,936.50, comprising
a.In 2013, $39,341.08 (Charge 1);
b.In 2014, $50,641.74 (Charge 3);
c.In 2015, $52,678.68 (Charge 5);
d.In 2016, $61,425.16 (Charge 7);
e.In 2017, $72,712.97 (Charge 9);
f.In 2018, $54,503.91 (Charge 11);
g.In 2019, $6,957.31 (Charge 13); and
h.In 2020, $3,675.65 (Charge 15).
The total value of the fraudulently processed invoices entered into the DMS by you, Mr O’Toole is $102,286.11, comprising:
a.In 2013, $638.76 (Charge 2);
b.In 2014, $3,679.93 (Charge 4);
c.In 2015, $2,185.10 (Charge 6);
d.In 2016, $289.24 (Charge 8);
e.In 2017, $944.56 (Charge 10);
f.In 2018, $11,848.14 (Charge 12);
g.In 2019, $60,079.47 (Charge 14); and
h.In 2020, $22,620.91 (Charge 16).
These totals reflect the amounts paid by your employer for spare parts that were never entered into the inventory maintained on its DMS and were therefore never available to it for use or sale.
The prosecution was candid about the fact that, apart from approximately $800 worth of parts found by the police at your home, Mr Sarantos, it was unable to prove what either of you had done with any of the specific spare parts that were the subject of your dishonest accounting entries. Aside from the evidence from the director of Maz Motors, there was no evidence that you had on-sold them for gain. Nor was the prosecution able to quantify the loss suffered by the dealership. The only material before me relevant to the quantum of the dealership’s loss is the fact that its insurer paid out $21,219.40 on its claim (after the dealership had paid an excess of $10,000).
For that reason, the prosecution was unable to prove whether you had done these dishonest acts with a view to gain for yourselves, with a view to gain for another, or with intent to cause loss to your employer. This was a matter you both relied on in your written submissions, with you Mr Sarantos submitting that you should be sentenced on the basis you were only enriched to the amount of $813.28, representing the value of the spare parts found by the police at your home.
It was also suggested, on the basis of answers in your record of interview Mr O’Toole, that some of the misappropriated spare parts might have been used to replace parts that were legitimately lost, damaged, dropped or broken during the ordinary course of your employer’s business (see answers to QQ 154-5, 386-7, 404-5, 427, 443-6, 549-551, 563-573, 656-8 and 667-674).
In my view these latter submissions come close to traversing the plea: although it can perhaps be said that false accounting entries done for such a purpose were done with a view to gain for another, namely your employer, it is less obvious how they could be said to have been dishonest. I also note that I share the scepticism of the interviewing police officers about these claims. I will, nevertheless, sentence you on the basis that some of your offending may have been done for the purpose described in the record of interview.
Ultimately, however, you both accepted that it was open to me to sentence you on the basis of a finding that a significant portion of each of your offending was done with a view to your own gain (where I am not using significant as a synonym for most, or the majority).
Objective gravity and moral culpability
I now turn to a consideration of the objective gravity of your offending and an assessment of your moral culpability.
The law provides a maximum period of 10 years’ imprisonment for the offence of false accounting. Given the prosecution’s inability to prove what happened to the spare parts, you have only been charged with, and are only being sentenced for, the offence of false accounting not – as in many cases like this – with the additional offences of theft or obtaining property by deception.
I note that the offence of false accounting does not include any element of gain or loss: that is, the offence is committed regardless of whether you or another received any actual gain, or whether your employer suffered any actual loss. However, your plea carries with it an acknowledgement that you carried out these acts dishonestly, and with a view to gain for yourselves or another, or with the intent to cause loss to your employer. That remains so whether or not it can be proved that you actually achieved those objectives.
The following matters are, therefore, relevant to the objective gravity and moral culpability of your offending:
a.The fact that the offending involved numerous individual acts of dishonest accounting, carried out repeatedly over a period of more than seven years;
b.The relatively large quantum of the total sums of the dishonest accounting entries (albeit these do not correlate to the quantum of any proven gain by you or by another, or proven loss to your employer); and
c.The fact that your offending involved an abuse of the trust of your employer, particularly by you Mr Sarantos, as the manager of the Parts Department (acknowledging that almost all false accounting offences are likely to involve some degree of abuse of trust).
Written submissions filed on behalf of Mr O’Toole described the offending as having a “low degree of sophistication”. I am not convinced that is an accurate description. What I can say is that your fraudulent scheme was sophisticated enough for you to be able to carry it out in almost plain sight for over seven years and to thereby misappropriate hundreds if not thousands of spare parts. Were it not for your mistake in ordering a product – demineralised water – which your employer had no reason to order, your scheme might still be operating today.
Current Sentencing Practice
In sentencing you, I am required to have regard to current sentencing practice: Sentencing Act 1991, s 5(2)(b). Assessing current sentencing practice for the offence of false accounting is not entirely straightforward. Frequently, charges of false accounting are laid in conjunction with charges for another offence such as theft or obtaining property by deception, where the false accounting has been used as a means to conceal those other crimes.
However, in this matter you are to be sentenced for false accounting alone. That is, you are not to be sentenced for the misappropriation of the spare parts, or for any gain you may have made as a result of that, but for the false accounting which enabled the misappropriation.
The court provided the parties with a table of summaries for property and dishonesty offences from the Judicial College of Victoria. Four of the cases involving charges of false accounting were discussed during oral argument. I have reviewed the reasons for sentence in those cases. I was also referred to a number of cases involving somewhat analogous Commonwealth offending: DPP v Smith & De Alwis [2016] VCC 705; DPP v Matthews [2106] VCC 1261; and The Queen v Pakoti [2022] VCC 271. Although less relevant as comparators, I have had regard to them.
In DPP v Chen [2017] VCC 735 (Judge Gaynor):
a.The offender was a 36 year old man with no prior convictions. He suffered from a major depressive condition, obesity and anxiety.
b.The offender was employed by a privately-owned information technology company.
c.Over four years the offender stole computer hardware and software valued at $557,018.58 in total and made false accounting entries relating to inventory and credit notes to conceal the thefts. The stolen items were on-sold, and the proceeds used to purchase property. The offender’s acts ultimately resulted in the company’s liquidation.
d.The offender pleaded guilty to four charges of theft, one charge of knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime, and four charges of false accounting.
e.The sentencing judge described the offending as extremely serious, given that it involved a breach of trust, a sophisticated system of fraud, and grave harm to his employer.
f.The sentencing judge found that issues of just punishment and general deterrence were dominant in the sentencing process and that the offending was too serious for a combination sentence of imprisonment and community correction order (CCO).
g.The offender received nine months’ imprisonment for each of the false accounting charges. One month of each of those sentences was cumulative upon the base sentence (a charge of theft). Ultimately, the total effective sentence was one of three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months.
In DPP v Rowe [2017] VCC 1731 (Judge Smallwood):
a.The offender was a 63 year old woman with no prior convictions. She suffered from depression and other health issues and had had a difficult upbringing.
b.The offender was employed as a law clerk.
c.Over eight years, she stole $660,000 through numerous dishonest transactions from clients and trust funds. She also attempted to hide the transactions through false accounting.
d.The offender pleaded guilty to nine charges of theft (three of which were continuing criminal enterprise charges) and eight rolled-up charges of false accounting, each relating to a calendar year.
e.The sentencing judge considered the offending was serious, as it had occurred over an extended period, that the application of general deterrence was paramount, and that denunciation and appropriate punishment were also important parts of the sentencing process.
f.The offender was given an aggregate sentence across all charges of five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months.
In DPP v Cetrola [2018] VCC 1929 (Judge Cohen):
a.The offender was a 43 year old man with no prior convictions and numerous mental health problems.
b.The offender was the retail manager of a Priceline Pharmacy.
c.Over approximately 2 years, the offender stole $746,000 through the daily banking process, which he attempted to hide through false accounting. He was motivated by financial gain and by a gambling problem.
d.The offender pleaded guilty to one rolled-up charge of theft and one rolled-up charge of false accounting.
e.No victim impact statement was tendered. None of the stolen money was repaid.
f.The sentencing judge noted that the offending was not just a rash and short-lived lapse in judgment, and that the nature and extent of the offending called for a sentence that had, as its main purposes, general deterrence, just punishment and denunciation.
g.The offender received a sentence of three years’ imprisonment on the charge of theft and nine months’ imprisonment on the charge of false accounting. Two months of the false accounting sentence were cumulative on the theft sentence, giving a total sentence of three years and two months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
In CDPP v Gerathy [2018] VSC 289 (Bell J):
a.The offender was a 67 year old man with no prior convictions. He had terminal cancer and had experienced a major depressive episode. Delay was significant and the plea of guilty was early. There were strong indications of remorse and cooperation with the authorities.
b.The offender was a senior officer at a company associated with the Reserve Bank of Australia.
c.The offender carried out the directions of his superiors to perform an act of false accounting for the gain of another. The false accounting was done to facilitate the payment of $79,502 to a business associate of the company, who was seeking a commission for work done for the company, by falsely describing the payment as reimbursement of expenses. The offender believed the business associate was genuinely entitled to the commission.
d.The offender pleaded guilty to one charge of false accounting.
e.The sentencing judge noted the strong need for general deterrence in cases of this type.
f.The offender was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment (wholly suspended for six months).
In drawing current sentencing practice from these decisions, I have focussed on the sentencing for the false accounting charges and put out of consideration the sentences imposed for theft. What I take from these decisions is that:
a.The primary sentencing purposes for offending of this type are general deterrence, just punishment and denunciation;
b.Sentences of imprisonment are commonly imposed, with a sentence for a single charge typically for a period of less than 12 months, and with some cumulation for multiple charges; and
c.The lighter sentence in Gerathy is explicable by reference to the fact the offender was sentenced for a single transaction, carried out on his superiors’ direction, and in the belief that the beneficiary of the false accounting was entitled to the payment (albeit not in the form in which it was described in the accounts).
Personal Circumstances
Alexander Sarantos you were born in Melbourne in June 1960 and are now 63. Your father was a factory worker, and your mother was a stay-at-home parent whilst you and your sister were young.
You attended school in Gippsland, leaving school at form 5, and going into business with your mother in a milk bar.
You married your wife Katina in 1983 and have two sons and a daughter now aged between 32 and 38.
The original milk bar business ceased when the owner of the building didn’t renew the lease. You and your mother purchased a block of land and developed a mixed business that you ran for 4 years.
After selling that business you entered a partnership in a fencing business that quickly failed, resulting in financial loss.
Your wife suffers from respiratory issues, especially asthma. You moved to the Mornington Peninsula for the clean air and a better lifestyle.
You briefly supported your family through the delivery of newspapers and catalogues before starting work for the Mazda dealership in 1999.
You suffer from several health conditions, for which you take medication. You require the assistance of a CPAP (Continuous Positive Airway Pressure) machine to sleep.
You have never seen a psychologist or psychiatrist. You have never experienced difficulties with drugs or alcohol abuse. You do not have any prior convictions.
I have been provided with Forensicare report dated 19 October 2023, which states that you present with a moderate level of mental health impairment and recommends that if you are sentenced with a CCO, a mental health mandate would be beneficial to reduce the risk of recidivism.
David O’Toole you were born in July 1964 and are now 59 years old. You grew up in Gippsland. Your father passed away when you were 12 years old, after which your family moved to Melbourne.
You have three siblings from you parents’ marriage, and two stepsiblings from your mother’s second marriage. You have a healthy relationship with all your siblings, and maintain a strong connection with your mother, seeing her twice a week and assisting her with day-to-day tasks.
You left high school after completing Year 11. After leaving school you commenced work in the automotive engineering industry and worked for a number of employers over the years, including Graeme Powell Mazda in Frankston. You then worked five to six years for Rothmans Pall Mall as a cigarette vendor, before returning to work at Graeme Powell Mazda in 2010.
You have had one serious long-term relationship, from which you have a son and three grandchildren, with whom you have a strong relationship.
You have no history of drug or substance abuse. Following your termination from Graeme Powell Mazda, you have experienced anxiety and high blood pressure, for which you have been prescribed medication.
You do not have any prior convictions.
Sentencing Submissions
Mr Sarantos, your counsel submitted on your behalf that:
a.Your plea of guilty was entered at the earliest possible stage.
b.You are entitled to the maximum utilitarian benefit of the plea, which demonstrates your acceptance of responsibility and remorse.
c.You are of previous good character (which is supported by character references from your daughter, and from two business associates).
d.The possibility of imprisonment has been hanging over you from April 2020 until now.
e.You have good prospects of not re-offending and of rehabilitation.
f.Delay diminishes the necessity of specific deterrence and protection of the community.
g.You should be assessed for a CCO.
Mr O’Toole, your counsel submitted on your behalf that:
a.The prolonged and sustained period for which you engaged in the offending is aggravating.
b.However, the offending cannot be seen as a serious example of false accounting because the cumulative value alleged against you is not significant; there was a low degree of sophistication; the level of enrichment or personal gain remains unknown; and the breach of trust cannot be considered at the highest level.
c.Given the lack of prior convictions, specific deterrence is not a weighty consideration.
d.Your counsel also relied on character references from your son, your ex-partner, and two close friends.
e.Your risk of recidivism is low, and prospects of rehabilitation excellent.
f.You entered your plea of guilty at an early stage.
g.The plea of guilty is indicative of remorse and of your willingness to accept responsibility for your conduct.
h.The plea of guilty has great utilitarian value.
i.There was a delay of 14 months between interview and charge, and 26 months between the matter first coming to the informant’s attention and charge (albeit that Mr O’Toole’s lack of admissions did not assist the investigation).
j.A CCO is the most appropriate sentencing disposition.
The Crown accepted that a combination sentence of imprisonment and a CCO was open. All parties agreed that it was open to me to impose an aggregate sentence for all of the offending.
Sentencing factors
Previous good character
I accept that you are both of previous good character, in the sense that you have no prior convictions, and that there is a low risk of recidivism and good prospects for rehabilitation. The character references tendered on behalf of both of you attest to your generally good characters and deeds.
However, given that your offending involved hundreds of individual acts of dishonesty over a period of more than seven years, I find it difficult to accept – as some of the character references suggested – that your offending was out of character. Rather, I would suggest, you had kept the dishonest and criminal aspects of your characters hidden from those who know and love you.
Nevertheless, I accept that neither specific deterrence nor community protection are weighty considerations in this case.
Plea of guilty and remorse
The prosecution accepts that both of you have pleaded guilty at an early stage. A plea of guilty is of utilitarian value in that it avoids the need for a trial, and it attracts a sentencing discount accordingly. It was also submitted by both counsel, and I accept, that the pleas, being entered at a time when the courts were still labouring under the backlog created by Covid-19, should bring a greater amelioration of sentence than otherwise. This is pursuant to the principle enunciated in Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169.
Both counsel also submitted that remorse is inherent in the pleas of guilty. No further evidence of remorse was provided by either counsel. In circumstances where neither of you made any admissions, assisted the police to understand what had happened to the misappropriated spare parts (other than the limited assistance given by Mr O’Toole in his record of interview, referred to in paragraph 17 above), or provided any explanation for your offending, I find it difficult to accept that either of you are genuinely remorseful to any significant degree.
Moreover, Mr Sarantos, your CCO Assessment Outcome Report (dated 16 October 2023) suggests that you still refuse to acknowledge that your offending extended beyond the exculpatory explanation given by Mr O’Toole in his record of interview:
When discussing the offending Mr Sarantos was forthcoming in explaining what had occurred, he stated that he was charged with false accounting meaning that he was changing invoices, so they were not reflecting the parts that were damaged. This was to justify the parts that were being written off. He explained that if he had known the repercussions the severity of his actions, he would not have continued doing it.
I find such statements to be at odds with your counsel’s submission that you have accepted responsibility for your offending, and that your plea demonstrates remorse.
Nevertheless, I accept that you are both entitled to significant sentencing discounts for your pleas of guilty, including some weight for the indication of remorse that a plea of guilty represents.
Delay
It is now more than three years since you were both terminated from work and the investigation into your offending began. I accept that the prospect of imprisonment has been hanging over your head for that period of time, and that this is a mitigating factor in your favour.
Parity
In relation to the need for parity between co-offenders, I find that both of your offending was of the same nature and a similar level of seriousness, but that Mr Sarantos’ offending was the more serious because of:
a.The larger number of dishonest accounting entries made by Mr Sarantos;
b.The larger quantum of the total sums of the dishonest accounting entries made by Mr Sarantos; and
c.The more senior position held by Mr Sarantos, making his abuse of trust greater.
Orders
I have formed the view that the sentencing purposes of general deterrence, just punishment and denunciation require that I impose a term of imprisonment on both of you. However, I accept that those purposes can be adequately achieved by sentencing you both to a short term of imprisonment followed by a two-year community correction order, or CCO.
In order for me to impose a CCO, you need to consent to it. Therefore, I should tell you what conditions would attach to them.
The following core conditions apply to all community correction orders:
a.You must not commit, whether inside or outside Victoria, during the period of the order, an offence punishable by imprisonment.
b.You must report to and receive visits from the Secretary to the Department of Justice, or his or her nominee, during the period of the order.
c.You must report to a Community Corrections centre within two clear working days after the date of completing your sentence of imprisonment. In your case, Mr Sarantos, you would be reporting to Rosebud CCS which is at 2/843-849 Point Nepean Road, Rosebud. In your case, Mr O’Toole, you would be reporting to Dandenong GSO, which is at 46-50 Walker St, Dandenong.
d.You must notify the Secretary, or his or her nominee, of any change of address or employment within two clear working days after that change.
e.You must not leave Victoria except with the permission of the Secretary to the Department of Justice, or his or her nominee.
f.You must comply with any direction given by the Secretary that is necessary for the Secretary to give to ensure you comply with the order.
I intend to impose further conditions in relation to these CCOs. The first is that each of you perform 200 hours of unpaid community work over the period of the order.
Secondly, in relation to you alone, Mr Sarantos, there would be a condition that you undergo any mental health assessment and treatment that may include psychological, neuropsychological, psychiatric or treatment in a hospital or residential facility (as per section 48D(3)(e) of the Sentencing Act 1991).
If either of you breach the CCO by committing further offences, you can be charged and a sentence of imprisonment is one of the options that can be imposed for that breach. You can also be re-sentenced for the offences which are currently before me.
If you fail to comply with any direction of the Secretary to the Department of Justice, that is a Community Corrections officer, a substantial fine can be imposed.
Mr Sarantos, do you consent to the community correction order I have just outlined?
OFFENDER SARANTOS: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Mr O’Toole, do you consent?
OFFENDER O’TOOLE: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: So we have just got some administration to do.
COUNSEL: Permission to approach, your Honour?
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
Mr Sarantos, I sentence you as follows. On eight charges of false accounting, I sentence you on an aggregate basis to six months’ imprisonment, followed by a two-year community correction order with the conditions I have just outlined.
Mr O’Toole, I sentence you as follows. On eight charges of false accounting, I sentence you on an aggregate basis to four months’ imprisonment, followed by a two-year community correction order with the conditions I have just outlined.
But for your pleas of guilty, I would have imposed aggregate sentences of 18 months’ imprisonment in relation to you, Mr Sarantos, and 16 months’ imprisonment in relation to you, Mr O’Toole.
A number of compensation orders were sought by the Crown. Those are consented to, and I will make those orders.
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