Director of Public Prosecutions v Russo (a pseudonym)

Case

[2022] VCC 2104

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT Melbourne

CRIMINAL DIVISION

 Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
HARRY RUSSO (A PSEUDONYM)

---

JUDGE:

HER HONOUR JUDGE HAMPEL

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

22 November 2022

DATE OF SENTENCE:

01 December 2022

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Russo (a pseudonym)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2022] VCC 2104

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
---

Subject:CRIMINAL LAW

Catchwords:   Sentence – Guilty pleas – Common Assault – Causing injury intentionally – Conduct endangering persons – Make threat to kill – Persistent contravention of family violence intervention order – very serious example of offending – relatively limited criminal history

Legislation Cited:      

Cases Cited:Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223; Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 (‘Pasinis’); R v Robertson [2005] VSCA 190; R v Earl [2008] VSCA 162; Smith v The Queen [2010] VSCA 192; R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298; DPP v Muliaina [2005] VSCA 13; Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 [23].

Sentence:  Total effective sentence on both indictments of eight years imprisonment. Non parole period of six years

---

APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the DPP Mr R. Pirrie Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr W. Smith Bowler & Co

HER HONOUR:

1Between 2013 and 2017, you, Harry Russo[1] repeatedly assaulted your partner, Zoe Fielding[2], by punching her to the face and head, variously knocking her unconscious, breaking her teeth, leaving her with black eyes, choking her on a number of occasions, throwing her to the ground, kneeing or kicking her to the stomach, once when she was pregnant, hitting her with objects, slashing her arm with a box cutter and biting her hand so hard it was gashed and required sutures. You threatened to kill her and on one occasion pushed her out of the car when you were driving at speed.

[1] A pseudonym

[2] A pseudonym

2In 2017, Ms Fielding was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. While she was in custody, and in breach of a  Family Violence Intervention Order,  you continually spoke to her by telephone. In over 100 of those calls over a 3 month period, you abused and threatened her.  Those calls, close to 300 in total, were recorded on the prison Arunta system.

3Whilst Ms Fielding was in custody you remained in what had been the family home with her two just adult children. During that time, you assaulted Aidan[3], one of her sons. You punched him in the face while you were in the car taking him to the prison to see his mother. Then, having ordered him to get out of the car, you drove along the footpath straight at him at speed, just missing him as he jumped over a fence to get out of your way.

[3] A pseudonym

4Despite a number of separations, and a number of Family Violence Intervention Orders made on police application between 2013 and 2017, it was not until 2017, when Ms Fielding was serving the sentence to which I have referred, that the relationship came to the end and she was prepared to make a formal complaint about the conduct that she had been subjected to at your hands over those years.

5So it is that you now come to be sentenced for 9 charges of common assault, 3 charges of intentionally causing injury,1 charge of conduct endangering life, 2 charges of make threat to kill and 3 charges of persistent contravention of Family Violence Intervention Orders in respect of Ms Fielding. You are also to be sentenced for 1 rolled up charge of common assault where her son Aidan is the victim.

6Charge 1 is a charge of common assault where you kicked Ms Fielding in the face.  No explanation, reason or context is provided for how that came about.  She was knocked unconscious and taken to hospital by ambulance.  Whilst at the hospital awaiting treatment, she said to you 'you did this to me’.  You then  made her leave the hospital with you, before she could be assessed and treated.

7Charge 2 is a charge of common assault.  You became jealous when Ms Fielding spoke about her ex-partner, the father of her children, at a social function where, on leaving the function, you punched her,  pushed her over and then when she was in the car punched her to the eye, causing a black eye, and swollen eyes and lip.  You told her sister, who had been at home babysitting the children, that she had got drunk and fallen over.

8Charge 3 is a charge of intentionally cause injury.  On that occasion, having discovered that Ms Fielding had lunch with a female friend who you had told her not to see, punched her so hard that she fell over in the bath and you dislodged one of her teeth. Her children called the police and when the police arrived you told them that she had fallen over in the shower.  That was a lie that she maintained as she continued to seek dental treatment for the broken tooth.

9Charge 4 is a charge of common assault.  You had become angry with Ms Fielding because she was upset and crying about something concerning one of her children. The crying was apparently disturbing you, so you hit her across the wrist so hard with a television remote control that she ultimately needed to seek medical attention to ensure that the wrist was not broken.

10Charge 5 is a further charge of common assault.  On this occasion for no stated reason, you pulled Ms Fielding by the hair, threw her into a butcher's block in the kitchen, hit her in the ribs and threw her from a deck to the ground one metre below.  She went to hospital to have her ribs x-rayed because of the pain and discomfort that she suffered.

11A Family Violence Intervention Order was taken out in July 2014 shortly after that incident occurred. That order was later revoked on Ms Fielding's application but meanwhile, again in 2014 Charge 6 occurred, that is a further charge of common assault.

12Ms Fielding was pregnant.  She had decided to leave the relationship and wanted to terminate the pregnancy because of the violent nature of the relationship.  You did not want her either to leave or to terminate the pregnancy.  On discovering that she was trying to leave, you assaulted her, kicking her in the stomach, causing her to fall back and bruise her back.

13Charge 7 is one of intentionally cause injury.  Again, it occurred when Ms Fielding was trying to leave you.  You grabbed her by the throat and choked her.  She put her hand up to your face in order to try and push you away and stop you choking her.  You bit her hand so badly that it required suturing. When she went to hospital, she said she had cut her hand on glass.

14You continued to threaten and assault her over the next year or more.  You threatened to send sexual, intimate images of her to the principals of the schools her children attended.  It was not long after that that she apparently applied to have the intervention order revoked.  There appears to have been a period of separation followed by reconciliation after that.

15Charge 8 is a charge of reckless conduct endangering a person.  The two of you were having dinner.  You took Ms Fielding’s phone from her to check who she was in contact with.  She demanded the phone back and you refused to give it back to her unless she got into the car with you.  When she got into the car, you drove away and whilst travelling at about 80kph, removed her seat belt, opened the door of the car and pushed her out of the car.  She fell onto the road and you ran over her bag containing the phone, just missing her.

16Charge 9 is a charge of common assault. That is on the same occasion as charge 8 where you had already thrown her out of a moving car.  You told her that you would forget about it if she got back into the car  You kicked her so hard that she involuntarily urinated. 

17Charge 10 is a charge of threat to kill.  You had been to Queensland with Ms Fielding and there you had asked her to marry you.  She said no.  You then assaulted her by kicking her.  The assault occurred in or just outside a restaurant and the Queensland police were called. The police then took out an intervention order on Ms Fielding's behalf.  She and you returned to Melbourne shortly after that.

18On your return you said to her, 'I'll never leave you alone.  I'll kill you and myself'.  That constitutes Charge 10 of threat to kill.

19Charge 11 is a charge of common assault.  On that occasion an argument broke out after she had refused your sexual advances.  You punched her to the side of her face and punched her in the eye.  Police were called and found Ms Fielding hiding in the bedroom with her son.  She was taken to hospital. You told police that you had been the victim, that you had been assaulted by Ms Fielding and that you were simply defending yourself.

20Charge 12 is a charge of intentionally causing injury.   On that occasion, Ms Fielding told you that she would not marry you, and that the relationship should come to an end. You grabbed her by the throat and choked her.  She took a box cutter and held it towards you. You took it from her and slashed her on the arm with it.  That slashing was so severe that she required many sutures in the arm. When she was taken to hospital for treatment, you said that she had slashed her arm by accident.

21Charge 13 is a charge of threat to kill. Following an argument you said to Ms Fielding, 'I'll kill you and say that you killed yourself'.

22Charge 14 is a charge of common assault.  You pushed Ms Fielding into a wall and choked her. She kneed you in the groin to make you stop. You left the house, and came back some hours later, and made sexual advances. Ms Fielding said no. You grabbed her by the throat pushed her onto the bed, and with both hands around her neck, pushed her down into the pillow until she felt her neck crack.

23Charge 15 is a charge of common assault.  On that occasion, following an argument in the car over Ms Fielding wanting to tell her family that she anticipated being sentenced to a term of imprisonment, you struck her, punched her to the eye twice and then tried to push her out of the car.

24Charges 16, 17 and 18 are three charges of persistent breach of a Family Violence Intervention Order.  Each charge spans a period of one month, that is the statutory period for such a charge and occurred over three consecutive months while Ms Fielding was serving the term of imprisonment to which I have already referred.

25In total, during that time, of the 332 calls recorded from or to Ms Fielding on the prison Arunta system, 281 were calls that were between you and her.  Over 100 of those over that three month period involved economic, electronic, financial, psychological and emotional abuse of her.

26That is a very brief summary of the circumstances of the offending concerning Ms Fielding. I have already detailed the circumstances of the offending of the rolled-up charge of assault concerning her son.

27Ms Fielding filed a victim impact statement in which she detailed not only the distress, pain and physical suffering she suffered as a result of each of those individual assaults and threats during the course of the relationship, but the ongoing physical, and psychological and mental harm she has suffered since then.  She carries lasting injuries both physical and emotional from the assaults.  She is a woman of courage and resilience. She has managed to stay away from you and that she has had the courage to maintain her persistence in being prepared to be a witness in respect to these charges.

28Family violence is pervasive and insidious.  Recently, the Court of Appeal said in the case of Kalala at [59]: [4]

The trial courts of this State are imposing sentences for family violence offences with increasing frequency. This Court has repeatedly emphasised the need to condemn family violence, in line with community expectations.[5] In Filiz v The Queen, the Court acknowledged the ‘shameful truth that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44.[6]

[4] Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223 [59].

[5] See, eg, Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 (‘Pasinis’);  R v Robertson [2005] VSCA 190; R v Earl [2008] VSCA 162; Smith v The Queen [2010] VSCA 192; R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298; DPP v Muliaina [2005] VSCA 13.

[6] Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 [23].

29In Kalala the Court quoted with approval Neave JA and Kyrou AJA’s observations in Pasinis, namely that offences committed in the circumstances of family violence warranted lengthy terms of imprisonment.  The court in Pasinis said:

General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence … The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm.[7]

[7] Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 [57].

30As the Court of Appeal in Kalala pointed out,[8] Neave JA and Kyrou AJA further observed in Pasinis that:

…. the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence and noted that the ‘effects of family violence are now well documented’ and are ‘not confined to physical injury.[9]

[8] Ibid [2017] VSCA 223 [61].

[9] Ibid [2014] VSCA 97 [53]-[54].

31These charges and the number of them constitute separately, but more importantly together, a very serious example of such offending.

32It was protracted, spanning a period of over 4 years.

33Each incident in itself was a serious example of its type, in terms of the violence of the conduct, and the surrounding circumstances.

34Many of the hallmarks of coercive control are present in the circumstances: gaslighting, undermining Ms Fielding and her children to her and to others, isolation, controlling and seeking to control what Ms Fielding did and who she saw, by means including constant checking of her telephone, constant calls to see where she was or to let her know that you were nearby, compelling compliance with your wishes by means including threats of punishment, the infliction of violence, or actual punishment, whether for refusing sex, telling the truth about how her injuries were sustained, simply having a different opinion, or for any other reason whether it be large or insignificant, threats to shame her by publishing intimate images, victim blaming, portraying yourself as a victim, and making it even more dangerous for her to leave than to stay.

35It is clear therefore that the matters referred to by the Court of Appeal in Pasinis and in Kalala have particular and powerful application here.

36What then to counter those matters were relied on by Mr Smith in the course of your plea? 

37First he relied upon your guilty plea.  It clearly has, as he said and I accept, utilitarian value and that utilitarian value is increased because of the role it plays in the reduction of the backlogs in the court, due to the delays caused by the Covid pandemic.

38Although the plea was late, a plea on the first morning of trial, the resolution involved not proceeding with rape charges which had initially been laid and which were ultimately not pursued.

39I was told that resolution on that basis had first been floated after committal about 18 months ago, but not pursued then.  In those circumstances I do give the guilty pleas more weight than a court door plea would normally obtain, because although on the material it does not seem that there was anything more than a floating of the idea, there had certainly been the opening of that possibility of preparedness on your part to resolve the matters on that basis.

40I do not consider the case was a weak one, and that the guilty plea in the circumstances requires more weight than would ordinarily be given to a guilty plea because of its significance in advancing the interests of justice.

41The circumstances detailed in the prosecution summary, in my view demonstrate a very powerful case and the matters that were relied on as going to the credibility of the complainant, in my view are of little moment.

42I take into account though as reducing the sentence otherwise appropriate that by those guilty pleas Ms Fielding and her son were spared the ordeal of having to give evidence at trial, spared the indignity of being challenged on the truthfulness of their account, and spared the experience of having yet again to relive the circumstances.

43I am not satisfied, for reasons I will detail later, that the guilty pleas evidence, or were accompanied by any expression of remorse.

44The next matter relied upon was the impact on any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment of the additional onerousness of imprisonment by reason of Covid.  Clearly you are entitled to have that taken into account and the sentence reduced accordingly.

45It has been 4 years since the charges were laid and you have had these matters and the more serious charges of rape, which were ultimately not proceeded with, hanging over your head.  I take that delay into account in the impact of waiting for so long for the matters to be resolved and for the fact that the more serious charges were hanging over your head for that period.

46The next matter relied upon was your limited criminal history at the time of the offences.  I accept that you are to be treated for the purposes of Charge 1-6 as a person without any previous convictions, for Charges 7-13 you had one conviction only that counts as a previous conviction, one for unlawful assault, and for Charges 14-18 and for Charge 1 in relation to the victim Aidan, you had a further conviction for unlawful assault, intentionally destroying property and contravention of the Family Violence Intervention Order.

47So you come before the Court in respect of all charges as a man of either no, or relatively limited criminal history, and I take that into account.  You had gotten to the age of 36 before any criminal convictions at all were amassed against your name.  Again, I take that into account in your favour.

48So far as the previous convictions, for the purposes of Charges 7-13 or Charges 14-18 are concerned, and Charge 1 in relation to Ms Fielding’s son Aidan, it was initially put on the plea that those convictions should be treated as minor in terms of the sentencing weight, because on each occasion they were punished by relatively low-level non-custodial outcomes. 

49It was only on specific enquiry by me that I was told that those convictions were both for assaults on Ms Fielding and that in respect to the punishment imposed in relation to the second, that that community correction order was varied to remove the punitive aspect of it, that is the unpaid community work condition on the basis that you were then caring for Ms Fielding’s children while she was in custody.

50Initially a submission was put to me that I should apply the principle of totality and reduce the sentences for these offences because you had, over the same overall period of offending, been sentenced for those other offences involving Ms Fielding, and that therefore I should take into account that had all charges been dealt with together, there would be a need to avoid double punishment.

51When I pointed out that I was concerned as to how I could evaluate that submission and the weight to put on it if I were uninformed about the circumstances of the previous offences, and what inference I could draw simply from the penalties imposed without knowing the circumstances, Mr Smith  told me he was not in a position to put any information before me concerning the circumstances of those previous convictions.  I gave Mr Smith time to obtain the summaries from the prosecution and to make further submissions in support of the totality submission. 

52As I confirmed just before I started reading these reasons for sentence, Mr Smith has advised that a decision has been made not to put any evidence before me in relation to the circumstances of those other offences, and the totality submission, so far as it is referable to taking into account the sentences for those other offences involving Ms Fielding’s was not being pressed.

53Coming back then to the matters that were relied upon on your behalf.

54There is still part of the principle of totality that must be properly given weight and I accept that submission.

55Having regard to the number of charges here, and the need to avoid a sentence that is crushing, whilst each individual sentence must reflect the seriousness of the individual offence, totality must be given proper deference so as to make the overall sentence reflective of the overall offending taken as a whole.

56It was put in oral submissions that in assessing your prospects for rehabilitation I could and should take into account not only the history of no convictions until the age of 36, but also the fact that you had a history of employment, in the family business predominantly, and that you were capable of and keen to return to work after what was conceded was an inevitable term of imprisonment for these offences.

57Although I had previously heard and determined a bail application (or rather a contested application for revocation of your bail, following entry of the guilty pleas to these charges) and I had through that become aware of a significant criminal history post-dating these offences, none of the circumstances of those subsequent offences were put before me or addressed on the plea. They are clearly not prior convictions for the purposes of sentencing but conduct since offending is relevant to assessment of prospects for rehabilitation.

58Whilst it is completely within your rights not to put any material before me in relation to the circumstances of subsequent offending, and I have, as I said to Mr Smith in the course of the plea, carefully put out of my mind anything that I recalled from what I was told of the circumstances of the offending that were detailed in the course of the bail revocation application, the fact that there are subsequent matters means that there is no evidence before me to indicate that you have used time well since being charged with these offences.  That is, there is no evidence relevant to bolstering your prospects for rehabilitation based upon your subsequent conduct. 

59So I am not making any affirmative finding adverse to you.  I am saying there is an absence of evidence that permits me to make an affirmative finding in your favour in relation to prospects for rehabilitation based on your conduct since this offending ceased.

60Troublingly, no evidence of any insight, contrition or preparedness to change your attitude to relationship with women was placed before me on the plea. Apart from those court door guilty pleas there is no evidence of any acceptance of responsibility for your conduct and no evidence of any acknowledgement of its wrongness.

61It was notable that on the plea the only matters that were put before me in relation to the circumstance of the offending were victim blaming or responsibility shifting, e.g. pointing to the evidence that Ms Fielding had given the explanations for her injuries which did not implicate you at the time that she was seen by police, paramedics, at hospitals or doctors rooms, or dental surgeries, the assertion, as if it were a mitigating factor, that it was Ms Fielding who had initiated the phone calls from the prison where you had abused and threatened her in breach of the intervention order, and a gratuitous detailing of Ms Fielding's criminal history for dishonesty.

62A psychological report was tendered at the last minute, and it contained an explanation or justification for your conduct which sat at odds with the facts which, by then, you by your guilty plea and by your acceptance of the prosecution summary had admitted.  Again, that reinforces the concerns I have about the absence of any evidence of contrition or remorse, acceptance of responsibility or preparedness to change your ways.

63The psychological report is of very limited value. Despite the fact that I had granted an adjournment of the plea so a report could be obtained, the psychologist was not given any detail in relation to any of these offences, or apparently any indication of the charges before me. The material provided to the psychologist in relation to pending charges addressed a different, less serious and more limited set of circumstances.

64The history and explanations provided by you to Mr Cunningham sat at odds with these charges and the admissions constituted by your pleas and acceptance of the prosecution summary in respect of them. So in that sense, the content of the psychological report serves only to support my conclusion that there is no evidence of remorse, contrition, acceptance of responsibility or preparedness to change your ways. The one positive that can be taken from it is that there is no evidence of any mental illness or psychological condition that would prevent you from engaging in rehabilitative programs addressing the causes of the offending, should you choose to do so.

65Nothing was put on the plea to displace the overwhelming evidence that you are, and remain, a real threat to any woman unfortunate enough to attract your interest.

66It is clear therefore that deterrence, both general and specific, play a significant role in the sentencing mix. So too does denunciation and so too, for the reasons I have detailed, does protection of the community.

67Whilst there are some positive factors counting in favour of your rehabilitation; a work history, a capacity to work, and nothing impeding you embarking upon programs to address the underlying causes of your offending and the attitudes that must inform it, I am of the view that your prospects for rehabilitation can be assessed as no better than guarded.

68Now given the number of charges and the time over which they occurred, assessing individual sentences and the overall sentence is a difficult task.  There is no point to be served in seeking to draw fine distinctions between each of the offences of common assault, each of the offences of intentionally cause injury, or the individual circumstances of the threats to kill.

69Whilst there is a distinction to be drawn between the fact that you had no previous convictions in respect of Charges 1-6, only one conviction in respect of Ms Fielding of the Charges 7-13 and two sets of convictions in relation to her, for the last two assault charges and the three family violence breach orders, in my view no real distinction can be made for the purpose of overall sentencing.

70So what I have decided to do, because I consider that each of the common assault offences are in themselves serious, I see no point in drawing fine distinctions measurable by weeks, months or years between the individual common assault charges.  Each of them is serious, for the reasons that I have detailed. 

71Similarly, I see no purpose in fine and ultimately meaningless distinctions between the sentence for the intentionally cause injury charges, or for the sentences to be imposed in respect to the threats to kill.  So what I have sought to do is to impose the same level of sentence for each of those clusters of charges, but to reflect the cumulative effect of them by modest cumulation orders, in order to mark each one separately and to achieve, as best I can, an overall sentence that reflects the overall offending.  That is the structure that I have fixed upon.

72I sentence you as follows.

73On all charges, Harry Russo, on the first Indictment J13301739.C concerning Ms Fielding, you are convicted.

74On Charge 1 of common assault, you are sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of three years.

75Charge 2, common assault, three years.

Charge 3, intentionally cause injury, five years.

Charge 4, common assault, three years.

Charge 5, common assault, three years.

Charge 6, common assault, three years.

Charge 7, intentionally cause injury, five years.

Charge 8, reckless conduct endangering, three years.

Charge 9, common assault, three years.

Charge 10, threat to kill, five years.

Charge 11, common assault, 3 years.

Charge 12, intentionally cause injury, five years.

Charge 13, threat to kill, five years.

Charge 14, common assault, three years.

Charge 15, common assault, three years.

Charge 16, persistent breach of Family Violence Intervention Order, one year.

Charge 17, persistent breach Family Violence Intervention Order, one year.

Charge 18, persistent breach Family Violence Intervention Order, one year.

76The sentence on Charge 3 of intentionally cause injury of five years is the base sentence. There is to be one month cumulative for each of the common assault charges, that is 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 14 and 15.  Two months cumulative for Charge 7, intentionally cause injury, Charge 8, reckless conduct endangering, and Charge 12, intentionally cause injury.  Three months cumulative for Charge 10, threat to kill and Charge 13, threat to kill.  One month cumulative for each of Charges 16, 17 and 18, persistent breach of Family Violence Intervention Order.  That makes on the first indictment a total effective sentence of seven years imprisonment.

77On the second Indictment J13301739D, Charge 1 of common assault, a sentence of three years imprisonment and I direct that one year of that be served cumulatively upon the sentence on the first indictment. 

78That makes a total effective sentence on both indictments of eight years imprisonment and I fix the period of six years as the time to be served before being eligible for parole.

79How many days of pre-sentence detention now, Mr Pirrie.

80MR PIRRIE:  Sixty-nine as of the day of plea, Your Honour.  Sorry, Your Honour.

81HER HONOUR:  Mr Smith, have you calculated it?

82MR SMITH:  I am sorry I have not calculated it, Your Honour.

83MR PIRRIE:  The day of the plea, Your Honour.  I have not got my original court book here, but I know it was 69 days on the day of the plea, Your Honour.

84HER HONOUR:  All right, can someone calculate that for me; 78 I am told.

85MR PIRRIE:  I will look up the diary.

86HER HONOUR:  The plea was on 22 November.

87MR PIRRIE:  And today is the 1st, so that was nine days ago.  So that is correct.

88HER HONOUR:  Seventy-eight.  I declare that 78 days have been spent in
pre-sentence detention and direct that 78 days t be counted and reckoned as part of the sentence already served.

89I declare pursuant to s6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 that but for your pleas of guilty, Mr Russo, I would have sentenced you to a term of imprisonment of 12 years with a non-parole period of nine years and nine months.

90Are there any further orders that are required to be pronounced?

91MR PIRRIE:  Forfeiture order, Your Honour.

92HER HONOUR:  Is that consented to, Mr Smith?

93MR SMITH:  No, it is not.  It was consented to in relation to the fourth item in the schedule, which is a computer, but not in relation to the other items.

94HER HONOUR:  All right, well I will receive written submissions on that and make a decision about it.  Can they be filed by close of business tomorrow please?

95MR PIRRIE:  Yes, Your Honour.

96MR SMITH:  As the Court pleases.

97HER HONOUR:  I will determine the forfeiture order in chambers. 



Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

8

Statutory Material Cited

0

Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223
Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97
R v Robertson [2005] VSCA 190