Director of Public Prosecutions v Rule

[2015] VCC 387

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

AT BALLARAT
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

CR-14-01584

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

v

TROY JOHN RULE

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JUDGE:	HIS HONOUR JUDGE MCINERNEY
WHERE HELD:	Ballarat
DATE OF HEARING:	25 March 2015
DATE OF SENTENCE:	27 March 2015
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v Rule
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2015] VCC 387

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:  CRIMINAL LAW

Catchwords:  Sentence – negligently causing serious injury – dangerous driving while pursued by police

Legislation Cited:     Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Cases Cited:Ibbs v The Queen [1987] 163 CLR 447; Hall v The Queen [2010] VSCA 349; Gorladenchearau v The Queen [2011] 34 VR 149; R v Veen (No.2) [1987] 164 CLR 465; R v O'Brien and Gloster [1997] 2 VR 714; Driscoll v The Queen [2013] VSCA 366; Pesa v The Queen [2012] VSCA 109; Shields v The Queen [2011] VSCA 386; Hasan v The Queen [2010] VSCA 352

Sentence:Convicted and sentenced to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months imprisonment

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Director of Public Prosecutions	Ms C.B. Hollingworth	Solicitor for the Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Offender	Ms E. Turnbull (Plea) Mr G. O'Shea (Sentence)	Turnbull Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

1

Mr Rule is aged 40 and, in regard to Indictment No. E10568605, pleaded guilty to the four charges therein before me on 23rd day of March of this sittings.  On that day the learned prosecutor, Ms Hollingworth, appeared on behalf of the Director, Ms Turnbull appeared for Mr Rule, and today

Mr O'Shea appears for Mr Rule.

2On that Indictment, three counts are of negligently cause serious injury as a result of the driving of a motor vehicle, an offence against s.24 of the Crimes Act1958 (Vic), for which the maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament is a period of ten years imprisonment. It is to be noted, and will be referred to later, by me in this sentence that such penalty was increased, indeed the sentence for the offence was doubled, in 2008.

3Dealing, firstly, with the three charges of the causation of serious injury as a result of the negligent driving of a motor vehicle, the first charge concerns Virginia Smith.  She was aged 72 at the time of this accident and tendered as Exhibit C a victim impact statement.  Hers were the lesser of the injuries in regard to the three victims.  She suffered from the obvious trauma of this particular accident, not only because of the injuries she observed to her husband, but also the fact that her grandson was in the car and suffered minor injuries.  She, herself suffered bursitis to the left arm and hip.  From then on she has had sleepless nights, an emotional impact of this accident, and flashbacks.  She has had to become a carer for her husband.

4In the victim impact statement filed (Exhibit C) was a report from her general practitioner of July of last year.  Mrs Smith suffered, as he had observed, soft tissue neck pain as a result of the accident, which has been brought about from exacerbation of prior degeneration.  In regard to the neck, he thought that there was a good prognosis.  She has also suffered from similar issues with her shoulder.  However, the doctor was of the view there was a good prognosis in regard to that as well.  The most significant injury, as he perceived, was the fracture of the sternum.  That has left Mrs Smith with ongoing chest pain, and that would appear to be continuing, albeit intermittently.  She also, according to the doctor, suffered from aggravation of degeneration of the knee and lower back and, in his opinion, that has led to her suffering more pain than she would otherwise have suffered in those areas.

5In regard to the second charge, that is a charge concerning Sarah Carter, Sarah Carter, of course, was the partner of Troy John Rule and the mother of four of his five children.  She has filed no victim impact statement.  The plaintiff's counsel indicated to me at the plea that there has been very limited contact between Mr Rule and Ms Carter since this accident and that Mr Rule is not really sure what the extent of the relationship now is. 

6

Exhibit E was a report of the Hospital Emergency Department at Ballarat.  That showed multiple fractures to the body of

Ms Carter, in particular, and most seriously, a complex fracture to the pelvis, a fracture to four of her ribs, to the sternum, a haematoma in the pelvis and fractures to the hip, including a laceration to her spleen.  No doubt, as a result of those matters, in particular the laceration of the spleen, she was transferred from the Emergency Department of Ballarat Hospital on the day of this accident for further surgery at the Alfred Hospital in Melbourne.  The only additional material insofar as her injuries are concerned was Exhibit D.  That is the discharge material from the Alfred.  It appears to indicate that she was discharged some eight days later to another hospital. 

7There is, unfortunately, as I said, no victim impact statement tendered from Ms Carter, nor is there any up-to-date information.  I make the point again, and I do not know how many times I have had to make it, but in these cases it is totally inappropriate for the prosecution to come before the Court without updated medical material.  I accept in this case there may have been an excuse in the sense that this plea was put together for the assistance of the Court and no doubt to assist Mr Rule to have his matter finalised at some haste and there may just not have been time to update medical material.

8It is very difficult, therefore, on that information to be precisely clear, except to come to the conclusion that clearly she suffered quite serious injuries. My difficulty is that I do not know precise details of what operations were undertaken at the Alfred, nor do I know to where she was transferred.  She was apparently, according to the discharge notes, transferred to another hospital.  I assume back to The Base.  I have no information in regard to that, nor do I have any update information.

9Coming then to the third of these charges.  That concerns Mr James Smith. 

10Mr James Smith, at the time, was 76 years of age.  His most serious injuries suffered were a tibial plateau fracture of the upper shinbone and interference with the knee, soft tissue injuries to his shoulder.  In regard to the knee, he spent the following six weeks in a Zimmer splint.  He had extreme body bruising, as is demonstrated from the photographs, and indeed, as did his wife.  He suffered from a loss of knee flexion and there is concern as to future knee replacement as a result of this injury.

11Exhibit B was the victim impact statement filed by Mr Smith.  Again, he speaks of the emotional trauma at the time of the accident, and since, brought about by the injuries to his wife and grandson.  He talks of the loss of personal confidence brought about by this injury, the limitations and interference with his capacity to go about his normal tasks such as, for example, being able to drive and pick up his grandchildren from school.  These issues, of course, have to be understood in light of the fact that Mr Smith is aged 76 and these interferences with capacity are obviously of importance.

12Attached to Exhibit B was a report from the general practitioner.  That is the same general practitioner who reported on his wife.  The general practitioner noted in addition to the matters that I have referred to, an aggravation of pre-existing degeneration in his lower back.  That has led to issues with the discs of the lower back, as described by Mr Smith, and has led to restrictions in regard to his walking.  The doctor also reported Mr Smith suffered from a right shoulder bursitis and tendonosis of the right shoulder and, in particular, a lack of mobility

13Charge 4, to which Mr Rule pleaded guilty, was a charge pursuant to s.319AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) of dangerous driving while pursued by police contrary to such section. I find, having considered all of the circumstances, that Mr Rule created a grave risk to the public and the police during such escapade.

14In summary, this chase took place at 7.10pm in the evening through the suburban streets of Ballarat.  Mr Rule travelled at between 70 and 80 kilometres per hour in either a 50 or 60 zone.  At one stage he crossed the road dividing line, he drove through a Give Way sign, he then, as I have said, drove at 70 to 80 in a 60 zone and finally had the accident. 

15Insofar as this charge is concerned, in his record of interview he admitted that he was aware that police were following him, and provided really no explanation for why he decided to go on such escapade.  At the time, of course, he was aware that his tyres were unroadworthy, and that the brakes were defective. 

16Exhibit A was tendered by the learned prosecutor and accepted by the plaintiff's counsel as an accurate description of the facts upon which Mr Rule is to be sentenced.  The learned prosecutor indicated to the Court that 404 days had already been served by Mr Rule on remand, and I presume that therefore is, by simple addition, 406 as of today.    

17The learned prosecutor has today sought a forensic sample, which I have refused to grant in the circumstances, as a sample has already been provided.

18The learned prosecutor also tendered Exhibit F.  There are, apparently no snapshots in regard to this crime, provided from the Sentencing Council. What was provided was a sentencing summary for the period July 08 to June 13 which showed that at to sentences imposed during that period, 47.6 per cent comprised somewhere between three to four years imprisonment.

19The major discussion during the plea was to the issue of the assessment of Mr Rule's culpability. So far as Exhibit 1 is concerned, that is, the submission as to sentencing by Ms Turnbull, and in regard to her oral submissions, there was no dispute that this Court was dealing with, as she described it, grave criminality on behalf of her client, Mr Rule.

20There is a need, of course, for this Court to assess that culpability in the terms as set out by the High Court in Ibbs v The Queen [1987] 163 CLR at 447 [452], where the Court is required to assess the culpability of these crimes on the spectrum of heinousness.

21As was said by the Court of Appeal in Hall v The Queen [2010] VSCA 349, such assessment depends primarily on the facts of the offending.

22It is to be pointed out that in each of these three instances, that is, Charges 1 to 3, it is, of course, the same conduct that makes up the negligent driving, albeit such negligent driving resulted in three separate serious injuries being caused to three separate individuals.

23Insofar as the assessment of culpability, one is assisted in such task by the determination of the Court of Appeal and, in particular, the comments of the President of the Court of Appeal in Gorladenchearauv The Queen [2011] 34 VR 149. As is pointed out by the President, the objective gravity in these crimes, [22] through to [28], is to be assessed by reference to firstly, the degree of negligence; and secondly, the seriousness of the injuries caused. As to the degree of negligence, one must look at the extent of risk created, that is, the likelihood that something could go wrong as a result of the circumstances; and secondly, in regard to the degree of negligence, one has to look at the likelihood of the result if such did go wrong, which is summarised by the President as the extent of public harm.

24Insofar as Mr Rule's driving in regard to each of these charges, that is, the actual driving and its assessment, I find the negligence in each charge to be of a high degree.  The objective features of this driving demonstrate a high degree of failure of the standard of care required. 

25The first of the factors that lead me to that conclusion is that, by way of a background factor, Mr Rule was in fact a person disqualified from driving in Victoria, a matter to which I will turn in due course. 

26Secondly, he was driving with a drug concentration of methylamphetamines of .23 milligrams per litre, in circumstances where the prescribed concentration is nil.  It was accepted, and not disputed by Ms Turnbull, that the expert evidence of Mr Odell, as set out in Exhibit A, demonstrated that such a reading was in the range which would affect the driving of a person. 

27The third matter, again accepted by Ms Turnbull, given the facts set out in the learned prosecutor's summary in Exhibit A, was that, by way of collision reconstruction, it was demonstrated that the car driven by Mr Rule at the time of the collision was driving at 75 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre zone.

28Fourthly, the plaintiff was driving a car which he knew was unroadworthy, in particular, in the circumstances of this accident, he knew and was aware that the brakes were grinding and not operating correctly, apparently because of worn pads.  A mechanical inspection, referred to again in Exhibit A and accepted by Ms Turnbull, certified that the inner front brake pad was worn to the degree of 15 per cent where it meets with the metal braking plate.

29The fifth factor that led me to reach my conclusion as to negligence is the plaintiff, in fact, apparently saw Mr Smith’s car before the collision, but decided apparently to try to go around it because, to use his words in the record of interview, he could not stop.  It is difficult to know why.  Probably the answer is a combination, that he was too close to the intersection, travelling too fast and knew, as a result of that, that his brakes would not work to effectively stop him in the circumstances.

30The sixth objective factor is that he was, and knew he was, approaching a Give Way sign, and as he said in answer to Question 297 in the Record of Interview, he could not stop to avoid driving through it. 

31Given such degree of negligence, it comes to the Court, therefore, in light of the matters set out by the learned President in Gorladenchearau, to assess the extent of risk created by such negligence. The first question to ask is, what was the degree of risk caused? Remembering that the negligence was in fact occurring in the context of a police chase through the streets of Ballarat in the evening at 7.10pm, I find that there was a grave degree of risk caused. In such circumstances, there was a risk of failure to be able to stop at a Give Way sign, to keep or make a proper lookout in order to deal with emergencies and be able to stop in such emergencies.

32The second question, as part of the determination of culpability, is the question of the extent of public harm that would be created if such risk eventuated.  I find that there was a grave degree of risk of public harm if these risks eventuated given that the circumstances were that the plaintiff went through a Give Way sign at 75 kilometres per hour, and also given the condition of the car as it was approaching such intersection. 

33The second aspect of the consideration of culpability, as I have detailed, is a consideration of the objective gravity or culpability of the seriousness of the injuries caused.  I have earlier detailed such injuries precisely. 

34Insofar as Charge 1 is concerned, that is, the first charge concerning Mrs Smith, as to such injuries, given her age, I assess such as in the midrange of the scale of serious injuries that this Court would encounter. 

35In regard to Charge 2, as to the injuries to Ms Carter, as I say, given the type of analysis that the Court of Appeal requests the Court undertake, it is somewhat difficult given the limited information that is provided to the Court.  However, even upon such information I find that the serious injury to Ms Carter is in the midrange to high on the scale of serious injury. 

36In regard to Charge 3, the charge concerning Mr James Smith, again the classification here is dependent very much upon his age.  Again, for the matters, I have set out earlier, I assess him at midrange to high. 

37Mr Rule, I apologise for the degree and the length of these reasons, however, it is necessary that the Court goes through the processes determined by the President.  However, I want to stress the President’s words at paragraph 30 of such case, when he said that such matters "cannot be weighed to a nicety."  However, having gone through such process, I assess the plaintiff's moral culpability at the higher end of the scale, albeit certainly, as submitted by Ms Turnbull, not at the highest that this Court has encountered or is aware of.  I would, however, reject the submission of Ms Turnbull that the culpability is in the scale somewhere between medium and high range.  As I say, I assess it at the higher end of the scale.  I should say, in regard to that oral submission, I note subsequently on closer reading of Ms Turnbull’s written submission (Exhibit 1) on the second page she had classified, or put the classification of culpability "at the higher end of the scale." 

38Having made such an assessment as to the culpability in this matter, the next matter is to assess the personal circumstances of the prisoner. 

39The first matter that stands out insofar as the prisoner is concerned is his prior offences or his antecedents.  I stress, as I said to Mr Rule and his counsel during this plea, no person who comes before a Court can be resentenced again for his priors.  However, the High Court said in R v Veen No.2 [1987] 164 CLR 465, [477] to [478], the following:

"The antecedent criminal history is relevant, however, to show whether the instant offence is an uncharacteristic aberration or whether the offender has manifested in his commission of the instant offence a continuing attitude of disobedience of the law.  In the latter case retribution, deterrence and protection of society may all indicate that a more severe penalty is warranted.  It is legitimate to take account of the antecedent criminal behaviour when it illuminates the moral culpability of the offender in the instant case, or shows his dangerous propensity, or shows a need to impose condign punishment to deter the offender and other offenders from committing further offences of like kind."

40Charles JA said in R v O'Brien and Gloster [1997] 2 VR at 714 [718], the following:

"It is of course clear that no principle of sentencing requires that more severe sanctions be administered to those who persist in their criminal behaviour.  But an adverse criminal record may impact on the sentencing process in a number of ways.  For example, as an indicator of the offender's moral culpability, his prospects of rehabilitation, his dangerous propensity and the community's need for protection, and the increased importance of specific deterrence as a factor in sentencing, having regard to the failure of more moderate penalties as a means of deterrent."

41It seems to me that it is most appropriate, acknowledging those authorities, to assess the facts to see if they illuminate the moral culpability of offender in this matter.

42It is clear that Mr Rule is unfortunately an incorrigible offender.  He had just finished serving a full term of five years for armed robbery in November 2013 and he commits these very serious offences within the next three months. 

43Mr Rule has 60 prior offences for driving while disqualified.  Undoubtedly, certainly in my experience, a record, unequalled in this State, if not in Australia. 

44More particularly and illuminating of the culpability in this matter as to Mr Rule are the following: 

Firstly, that he has one prior offence for reckless conduct endangering persons to serious injury, for which he was convicted in 2002.  I am told that this again involved a police chase.  For that matter he was given 12 months in gaol sentence.  Again in 1995 he was convicted and charged with recklessly cause injury, for which he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four months.  I do not know and nor was I able to be told the circumstances of such matter.

45He has three convictions of refuse to accompany police to a station for testing; one in 2005 for drug impairment; one in 2000 for the requirement for a breath test; and in 1999 for requirement for a breath test. 

46Mr Rule has seven priors, as best as I can count them, and that was the number put to me by the learned prosecutor, for exceed 05.  Those were occasioned in 2005, 1999, three in 1998, one in 1997 and one in 1996; next, he has prior offences for exceed the speed limit on seven occasions; next, he has an offence for prior use of amphetamines in 2005; and finally, he has a careless driving count in 1993. 

47I find, such offences, in the terms as set out by the High Court in Veen, illuminate the culpability in this case and demonstrate, firstly, a person who, by way of lifestyle, continues to disobey the law; secondly, a person who has a dangerous propensity to drive cars in an unsafe condition, be that either from his own personal state, being affected by alcohol or drugs, or from the manner in he drives a car, by way of speeding. 

48Given his criminal incorrigibility, I find in the circumstances of this case that Mr Rule is very unlikely to rehabilitate.  I say that with some sadness.  I have always, during my term as a Judge, approached sentencing with a generous and positive approach, with a general view that persons will rehabilitate and change their lifestyles, even persons afflicted by drugs as Mr Rule has been throughout his life.  However, it is unfortunate in these circumstances that I cannot be so positive about Mr Rule.

49Fourthly, given his dangerous propensity, I find that there is a particular need in this case for a sentence which protects the community;

50Fifthly, I also find that there is a need for a sentence which gives increased importance to specific deterrence; and

51Sixthly, that in totality, given the circumstances to which I have referred, such illumination of his moral culpability demonstrates a need for a sentence which imposes condign punishment upon Mr Rule, in an endeavour to prevent and deter him from further criminality.

52I say this again with a somewhat heavy heart because it is clear that he is apparently institutionalised, as was put by his counsel.  But another important reason for condign punishment, and perhaps a most important need in this circumstance, is to demonstrate generally to the community that offences of this kind will not be tolerated. 

53Of course, the Court must balance all factors in the process of synthesis of sentencing as required by s.5(2) of the Sentencing Act1991 (Vic), and Ms Turnbull indeed referred to a number of personal factors which go to mitigation of penalty. The first of these, which I accept, was that Mr Rule made admissions and indeed expressed remorse in the record of interview. He described himself, in particular at Question 447, as a "fucking idiot." He felt, and described, and said in the record of interview, in particular, for example, at Question 249, sorrow for those who had been injured as a result of his actions.

54The second matter was his plea of guilty.  It was put to me by Ms Turnbull that he is entitled, as a result of that plea and the remorse that it indicates, to the maximum discount that is available for such plea, and I agree with that.  I accept that such plea was a facilitation of justice and was made at the earliest possible time in the circumstances.

55Ms Turnbull went further and submitted to the Court that I should also accept such remorse as an indication of it being genuine remorse.  I have some difficulty with that submission.  The totality of these circumstances and his background lead me to conclude that I could not accept that further submission.  I have no doubt, however, as I have said, in accepting that Mr Rule, given the impact upon these three victims, in particular his own partner, would be less than humane if he did not express, which he duly did, remorse for the injuries that he had caused.

56

It was also put to me that this offending occurred in the throes of an uncontrollable addiction to methylamphetamine.  I accept that as a fact.  However, there is nothing ameliorating about his culpability as a result of that.  It is somewhat incomprehensible to me to understand in terms that

Ms Turnbull put to me that he is a person who wants to see his family, wants to enjoy his family, he has five children.  He spent the last five years in gaol, allegedly on a methadone program, and within three months he is back on it, having, as described by his counsel, an uncontrollable addiction.  I question his desire to reform.  However, in putting that question, I do not want to indicate, and I should make clear that, given my experience, one does not lose sight of the difficulty of trying to overcome such addictions.  However, it is clear, as I said, there is only three alternatives when you have addictions of this sort.  Firstly, you end up in gaol for most of your life, and indeed you must have gone very close to getting a much higher sentence in this matter.  The circumstances of this are such that we could have had at least three deaths, if not four. 

57I, two years ago, presided in a culpable driving trial in Casterton which totally mirrors these circumstances.  Two elderly people out having a drive on a Sunday afternoon T-boned by a car in which both of them were killed.  So the only thing that can be said is at least, fortuitously, albeit they are serious injuries, the victims in this matter lived and Mr Rule is not facing even a more severe sentence than he is going to get.  One only hopes that in the future he understands that the alternatives in life now for him are very minimal, as I said, he seems somehow to have avoided the drug abuser's path of dying from an overdose in a lane.  He has got to an age of 40 and is still alive.  He has only got two choices.  He either stops drugs totally or he is going to be in gaol for the rest of his life.  Unfortunately, considering his antecedents to date, as I say, the prospects are not great.

58In further submission, Ms Turnbull described Mr Rule and his partner, the victim in this matter, and their struggle with drugs.  I accept that.  She further detailed their family circumstances and background. 

59As to the sentence to be imposed, Ms Turnbull submitted to the Court that there is no doubt, given its seriousness, that there could only be one sentence, and that is imprisonment.  However, she asked the Court in the circumstances not to make the sentence crushing.  She stressed the principle of totality, and I accept the operation of such principle and the importance of such principle in a case such as this. Ms Turnbull further submitted in regard to Mr Rule and his priors, that the Court must be mindful not to inflate the sentence, simply because of the number of priors.  That is, not to inflate the sentence to a degree which makes it disproportionate to the criminality for which Mr Rule has pleaded.  One hopes, with experience, that one does not do that. 

60As to the sentence to be imposed, I go back again to Gorladenchearau and the analysis of the President in regard to these types of sentences. In particular, the analysis as to sentences imposed from the time such penalty for these crimes was increased, or was doubled, in 2008 from five years to ten years by the Parliament of Victoria. In this regard specifically, I refer to the discussion at paragraphs 41 through to paragraph 45.

61

I have also read the case of Driscoll v The Queen [2013] VSCA 366,

Pesa v The Queen

[2012] VSCA 109, and in particular the case that the learned President refered, Shieldsv The Queen [2011] VSCA 386.

62This process of analysing other similar cases and/or sentencing statistics, Exhibit 1, was referred to by the Court of Appeal in Hasan v The Queen [2010] VSCA 352, and I want to, in particular, refer to paragraph 44, where it was said:

"An examination of comparable cases will then assist judges to make an objective assessment of the range of sentences applicable in cases where the gravity of the offence is of a similar nature to the particular offence for which the offender is to be sentenced, but that the limitations of this exercise must be borne in mind."

63Further, at paragraph 49 the Court said:

"Consistency is to be achieved by the application of the appropriate range, and not from the application of single instances of 'like' case."

64Further, at paragraph 53 the whole Court said:

"In summary it may be said, therefore, that consistency in sentencing is not to be achieved by a search for the matching case or cases.  It requires the placement of the sentence within the correct range.  That task is a matter for objective determination, leavened only to the extent that the process of instinctive synthesis is properly employed at that stage, and by the application of relevant principles.  Once the correct range has been determined, however, the fixing of an appropriate sentence within that range is within the discretion of the sentencing judge."

65Finally, at paragraph 54 the Court said:

"The principles to which a sentencing judge must have regard include those laid down by the relevant legislation.  In Victoria, the most important repository of sentencing principles is the Sentencing Act1991.  Section 5(2) of that Act prescribes the matters to which a Court must have regard to.  First amongst these is the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence.  The second is current sentencing practice."

66Taking all of the matters that I have recited into account as best I can, I have determined to sentence Mr Rule as follows:

67If you would be good enough to stand, Mr Rule.

68Insofar as the first charge, that is the negligently cause serious injury to Virginia Smith, I sentence Mr Rule to a period of imprisonment of four and a half years.

69In regard to Charge 2, the like charge insofar as the serious injury to Sarah Carter is concerned, I sentence Mr Rule to five years imprisonment.

70In regard to Charge 3, that is the offence committed against Mr James Smith, I sentence Mr Rule to five years imprisonment. 

71In regard to Charge 4, I sentence Mr Rule to a period of imprisonment of one and a half years.

72Using Charge 3 as the base, I order that nine months of the sentence imposed in regard to Charge 2, six months of the sentence in regard to Charge 3 and three months of the sentence in regard to Charge 4 be served cumulatively upon the base sentence and upon each other, or with each other.  That makes an aggregate sentence, Mr Rule, that I propose to sentence you to of six years and six months. 

73I order, pursuant to s.11 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), that the period you must serve before being eligible for parole period of four years and three months, and I declare, pursuant to s.18, that you have served on remand as part of this sentence, as agreed by counsel today, a period of 406 days, and I declare that that period is deemed to be part of this sentence.

74I will clarify that for you, that means an aggregate of six years and six months, a minimum of four years and three months, of which you have already served 406 days. 

75In regard to the summary offences, on Count 11, drive unlicensed, a period of three months' gaol.  On Count 13, drive over the prescribed limit, I impose a fine of ten penalty units.  At the appropriate time a penalty unit was $144.36 and the minimum period prescribed of loss of licence or, in your case, disqualification from obtaining a licence is three months, which I impose.  On Charge 15 of the summary offences, drive unregistered vehicle, I impose a fine of 20 penalty units of the same sum that I have indicated.

76I declare, pursuant to s.6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), that had you not pleaded guilty to these charges, I would have sentenced you to an aggregate period of eight years and seven months with a minimum period of five years and nine months.

77Mr O'Shea or Ms Hollingworth, are there any matters I need to clarify?

78MS HOLLINGWORTH:  No, Your Honour.

79MR O'SHEA:  No, Your Honour.

80HIS HONOUR:  All right.  You will no doubt explain in more detail, Mr O'Shea, the sentence to Mr Rule in due course.

81MR O'SHEA:  Yes, Your Honour.

82HIS HONOUR:  Yes, thank you, Mr Rule.  You can take the prisoner away.

83I thank counsel for their assistance in this matter, which I think obviously, by the terms of the sentence, was not an easy sentence.

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