Director of Public Prosecutions v Rickerby

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S ECR 2022 0190

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS	Prosecution
v
ROBERT RICKERBY	Accused

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JUDGE:	Elliott J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	18-20 October 2023
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS:	20 October, 28 November 2023, 23 February 2024
DATE OF RULING:	18 March 2024
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Director of Public Prosecutions v Rickerby
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2024] VSC 115

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EVIDENCE – Criminal proceeding – Accused charged with murder – Deceased domestic partner of accused – Circumstantial case – Relationship and context evidence – Hearsay evidence – Admissibility – Whether hearsay representations satisfy any exception to the hearsay rule – Representor under the influence of illicit substances – Representor experiencing mental illness – Whether evidence should be excluded due to prejudicial effect – Financial arrangements between the accused and deceased – Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), ss 55, 56, 59, 62, 65, 66A, 67, 135, 137, 142.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the prosecution	N Rogers SC with L Cameron	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the accused	C Mandy SC with G Connelly	Emma Turnbull Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

A.Introduction
1.Jessica Geddes (“Geddes”) died on 6 November 2020. As a result, Robert Rickerby (“Rickerby”) has been charged with murder (contrary to common law) and has pleaded not guilty. At the time of Geddes’ death, she had been in a relationship with Rickerby for approximately 3 years. For nearly the entirety of that period, they had been living together at 27 Haverstock Hill Close, Endeavour Hills (“the Residence”).
2.This matter was set down for the trial to commence on the basis that pre-trial issues would be argued and determined, and the empanelment of a jury would occur immediately thereafter. Shortly before the hearing commenced on 18 October 2023, the court was informed that a critical witness was unavailable for the trial because of an unexpected medical issues requiring surgery. Accordingly, it was agreed that as many of the pre-trial issues that could be dealt with would be heard and determined as originally scheduled, with the further hearing of the remaining issues to be dealt with once the relevant witness became available.
3.Broadly speaking, during pre-trial argument in October 2023, the parties agreed to address the following issues:
1.Relationship evidence.
2.Context evidence.
3.Admissibility of hearsay representations made by Geddes to a number of witnesses pursuant to section 65(2)(b) or (c) or section 66A of the Evidence Act2008 (Vic).
4.Exceptions taken by the defence to the contents of the summary of the prosecution opening for trial.

At the completion of oral argument, there were a number of outstanding matters to be addressed as part of this ruling:
6.The admissibility of representations 1 to 4, 6 to 13, 24, 25, 29 to 31, 53, 66, 69, 89, 90 and 103 the subject of the amended hearsay notice filed on 23 August 2023.
7.The admissibility of representation 115 of the amended hearsay notice filed on 23 August 2023.
8.The admissibility of certain additional evidence of allegedly forced begging.
9.The admissibility of Geddes’ financial circumstances.
Background
The key facts alleged by the prosecution can be broadly summarised as follows.
Geddes was born on 3 January 1993. She was 27 years of age at the time of her death.
Born and raised in Queensland, Geddes graduated from high school in 2011. Whilst in high school, she began experiencing mental health issues. In April 2013, she gave birth to her first and only child.
There are differing accounts of when Geddes began using drugs. Her mother has stated Geddes began to use ecstasy after high school in April 2012. Her paternal grandmother has stated that Geddes began using marijuana a few months after the birth of her daughter. According to her father, Geddes began using amphetamines when her daughter was about 2 years old.
Between April 2013 and September 2017, Geddes moved between multiple houses residing with friends and family members including her father, mother, step-father and paternal grandmother. During this time, Geddes’ mother, Saasha Hughes (“Hughes”), assumed custody of Geddes’ daughter while Geddes received treatment for her escalating mental health and substance abuse issues.
In September 2017, Geddes met Rickerby via a social media dating application. Within days of meeting, the pair moved to Victoria. Geddes’ daughter remained in Hughes’ custody in Queensland.
Rickerby was born on 1 December 1993. He was 26 years of age at the time of the alleged offending. He is the only child of David Rickerby and Petra Sholtes-Elm who divorced when Rickerby was 13 years old.
In 2017, Rickerby travelled to Queensland to visit his mother. It was during this trip that he met Geddes.
When the pair moved to Victoria, they resided with Rickerby’s father at the Residence for a little over 12 months. Geddes and Rickerby then briefly moved back to Queensland for 5 to 6 months before returning to Victoria. During that period, Rickerby’s father moved out of the Residence to live with his new partner, partly because the Residence had no power. He allowed Geddes and Rickerby to live at the Residence upon their return to Victoria. Geddes and Rickerby continued to live together at the Residence until Geddes’ death on 6 November 2020.
A number of people who lived in the neighbourhood knew of Geddes. Many said that she often appeared dishevelled, would constantly beg for food, money, cigarettes and petrol, either door-to-door within the neighbourhood, at the local 7-Eleven convenience store or at the Endeavour Hills Shopping Centre, and that at times she indicated that Rickerby was forcing her to beg. Many also said that they noticed that Geddes had lost a significant amount of weight in the lead up to her death, she frequently appeared with injuries to her face and occasionally struggled to walk.
In addition, members of the community said they observed Geddes engage in “odd” behaviours, such as walking into the middle of the road without paying attention, talking to herself and appearing generally disorientated. On 1 occasion in early 2020, a neighbour said he observed Geddes yell and swear into “thin air” and bang her head against a nearby tree 2 to 3 times, causing herself to bleed.
Prior to moving to Victoria with Rickerby, Geddes received regular medical treatment in Queensland, including anti-psychotic medication. On 22 March 2018, approximately 6 months after relocating to Victoria, Geddes was admitted to Dandenong Hospital following a psychotic episode. On 16 August 2019, Geddes was again admitted to Dandenong Hospital after a psychotic episode. She absconded from the hospital on the same day and was reported missing.
On 13 September 2019, Geddes was admitted to Dandenong Hospital for treatment of an open wound to her head and was subsequently placed on an assessment order pursuant to section 30 of the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic). On 30 September 2019, Geddes was granted unescorted leave but failed to return to hospital. On 2 October 2019, she phoned Dandenong Hospital and informed hospital staff that she had moved to Queensland. This occasion was the last known contact Geddes had with health services prior to her death. Geddes’ medical records indicate that she last filled a prescription for anti-psychotic medication on 6 March 2019.
1.Incident on 13 September 2019
There are a number of disputed representations purportedly made by Geddes to various others arising from an incident which occurred on 13 September 2019. On the morning of 13 September 2019, Sabrina Casse (“Casse”) was driving along Chalcot Drive in Endeavour Hills when she saw a woman, later identified as Geddes, walk across the street with blood on her face and jumper. In response, Casse called emergency services.
Shortly thereafter, Geddes attended a nearby house where an acquaintance, Thomas Adamidis (“Adamidis”), lived. Adamidis observed that Geddes had blood on her face, a large laceration to her forehead and a lump on her temple. When Adamidis asked what had happened, Geddes allegedly stated that she had been in a fight with her boyfriend and that she was “so scared”.
Adamidis called emergency services and paramedics attended the scene at approximately 7.53am. One paramedic described seeing a “girl” with a wound to her forehead with her skull showing through the wound opening. Police also attended the scene. Geddes disclosed to police that she had been punched multiple times and struck to the head with a hammer by Rickerby who was allegedly yelling that there were no cigarettes.
Geddes was treated for her injuries at the Dandenong Hospital. As outlined above, prior to her admission to Dandenong Hospital, Geddes was reported missing, having absconded from the hospital approximately 1 month earlier.
Rickerby denied causing Geddes’ injuries and ultimately was not charged in relation to the incident.
1.Incident on 19 January 2020
A series of representations purportedly made by Geddes to her neighbours Zdenka and Davor Dujic on 19 January 2020 are also in dispute.
At approximately 9.20am on 19 January 2020, Geddes attended the house of Zdenka and Davor Dujic. Zdenka Dujic observed that Geddes’ shirt was torn and she appeared to have wet herself. Geddes purportedly told Zdenka and Davor Dujic that she needed help. At Geddes’ request, Zdenka Dujic contacted emergency services. Whilst on the telephone with emergency services, Rickerby arrived at the premises in a silver car. Geddes eventually agreed to leave with him. There was no follow-up investigation conducted by police in relation to this incident.
1.Events of 6 November 2020
On 6 November 2020, Geddes and Rickerby were alone together at the Residence. At approximately 9.45am, Rickerby joined a teleconference for a psycho-social educational training program which he was required to attend as a part of an unrelated community correction order. The teleconference was scheduled to conclude at approximately 3.00pm.
At approximately 11.19am, Geddes left the Residence and shortly thereafter attended the 7-Eleven convenience store in Endeavour Hills. Call charge records suggest that Rickerby attempted to call Geddes 8 times between 11.31am and 11.39am and sent her 2 follow up text messages. Rickerby, who was still participating in his teleconference, informed the program facilitators that he required a break. During his break, Rickerby drove to the 7-Eleven convenience store to pick up Geddes. Geddes and Rickerby returned to the Residence at 11.46am.
Rickerby’s teleconference concluded at approximately 2.40pm. Throughout the course of the afternoon, a series of nonsensical text messages were sent from Geddes’ mobile telephone to a number that was not connected to a telephone service provider. The last text message to be sent from Geddes’ mobile telephone on 6 November 2020 was sent at 2.49pm.
At approximately 5.57pm on the evening of 6 November 2020, Rickerby left the Residence and drove to the Endeavour Hills Shopping Centre where he collected 2 pizzas from Domino’s. He was absent from the Residence for approximately 11 minutes, returning at 6.08pm.
At 6.41pm that evening, Rickerby called emergency services and requested an ambulance for Geddes. Rickerby told the emergency services operator that when he came home he found Geddes lying unconscious on the bed. Paramedics arrived at the scene at 6.48pm and shortly thereafter verified the death of Geddes. Following a post-mortem examination, forensic pathologist Dr Linda Iles formed the view that Geddes’ death was caused by complications arising from multiple blunt force injuries.
On 5 April 2022, Rickerby was arrested in Queensland and was charged with Geddes’ murder.
Legal principles
2.Relationship evidence
It is well established that evidence of the relationship between the accused and the deceased may be relevant and admissible in a murder trial. Evidence of prior acts of violence by the accused to the deceased, prior threats of violence by the accused, statements made by the deceased of fear of the accused, and evidence of enmity between the accused and the deceased “beyond what might be expected in a normal relationship” have been admitted as relevant relationship evidence. Where a case is entirely circumstantial, as here, “it is common for relationship to be considered as one of the circumstances”.
In Wilson v The Queen, the wife of the accused had been killed by the discharge of a shotgun. The accused claimed the discharge was accidental. Evidence was led at trial of the enmity between the accused and his wife and that on 2 occasions the wife had said to the accused that she knew he wanted to kill her. In considering whether the evidence was admissible, the following passages are instructive:
It is not in my opinion only in those cases where the evidence of the relations of the accused with others tends to establish motive that it is admissible though that may be the commonest case of its use and the one with which the reported cases have had mostly to deal. If the evidence does tend to explain the occurrence, or, as in this case, to assist the choice between the two explanations of the occurrence, then in my opinion on general principles, because it is relevant, it is admissible. Of course if it does not have that relevance it is inadmissible … It is not that all evidence of the relationship of the parties is admissible, but only that from which a relevant inference may logically and reasonably be drawn ... Here the evidence was of quarrelling and bad relationship over a considerable period stretching up to the time of the death of the deceased. In my opinion, the evidence of the relations between the applicant and his wife was admissible.
(Emphasis added.)
And:
Any jury called upon to decide whether they were convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant killed his wife would require to know what was the relationship between the deceased and the accused. Were they an ordinary married couple with a good relationship despite differences and disagreements, or was their relationship one of enmity and distrust? It seems to me that nothing spoke more eloquently of the bitter relationship between them than that the wife, in the course of a quarrel, should charge her husband with the desire to kill her. The evidence is admissible not because the wife’s statements were casually connected with her death but to assist the jury in deciding whether the wife was murdered in cold blood or was the victim of mischance. To shut the jury off from any event throwing light upon the relationship between this husband and wife would be to require them to decide the issue as if it happened in a vacuum rather than in the setting of a tense and bitter relationship between a man and a woman who were husband and wife. Accordingly, in my opinion the evidence in question was properly admitted because it was pertinent to the issues which the jury had to decide.
(Emphasis added.)
However, as is evident from the passages set out above, not all evidence of this kind is admissible; only that from which a relevant inference can be logically and reasonably drawn is admissible. Noting that the expression “relationship evidence” is vague and somewhat unsatisfactory, it must be kept in mind that the real question is whether the evidence sought to be led is direct evidence of any fact relevant to a fact in issue. Further, when assessing relevance, the evidence must not be considered in isolation, it must be viewed on the basis of how it might be used, taken at its highest.
The prosecution in this case does not rely on the relationship evidence as indicating a propensity or tendency on the part of Rickerby which renders it more likely that he committed the offence charged. As outlined by the majority of the High Court in Roach v The Queen, evidence which happens to show propensity (or tendency) but is otherwise admissible on another basis and which has other sufficient probative value will not necessarily be excluded. The prejudicial effect of relationship evidence may vary depending on the amount of evidence, its specificity and the extent it may be similar to the offence charged (or any elements of the offence). If relationship evidence is admitted and not excluded, it may be necessary to give directions to the jury as to its specific use.
1. Hearsay evidence
The prosecution seeks to rely on a number of disputed representations made by Geddes to various witnesses as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Section 65 of the Evidence Act relevantly states:
65 Exception—criminal proceedings if maker not available
(1) This section applies in a criminal proceeding if a person who made a previous representation is not available to give evidence about an asserted fact.
(2) The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is given by a person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the representation being made, if the representation—
…
(b)was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or
(c)was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable; or
…
Section 66A of the Evidence Act provides a further relevant exception to the hearsay rule:
66A Exception—contemporaneous statements about a person’s health etc.
The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation made by a person if the representation was a contemporaneous representation about the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.
1.Section 65(2)(b)

a.The exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) of the Evidence Act only applies when the representation was made “when or shortly after” the asserted fact occurred and “in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication”. Dealing with the temporal requirement first, in order to enliven the exception, there must be evidence before the court to enable a judgment to be made as to the temporal connection between the occurrence of the asserted fact and the making of the representation. The phrase “shortly after” requires a normative judgment to be made, depending on the circumstances of the case.
b.In Williams v The Queen, the Full Federal Court outlined that the purpose of the temporal requirement in section 65(2)(b) is to ensure that the evidence in question is unlikely to be a fabrication:
[I]t would be a mistake, in determining whether a statement has been made “shortly after”, to over-emphasise such matters as whether the events in question were “fresh” in the memory of the person making the statement. The rationale for the exception to the hearsay rule contained in s 65(2)(b) is not based only upon the necessity to ensure that the events in question may be easily recalled. Rather that provision is, as a whole, intended to allow evidence that is unlikely to be a fabrication. One condition of this is that the statements be made spontaneously during (when) or under the proximate pressure of (shortly after) the occurrence of the asserted fact.

a.Typically, passages of seconds or hours have been held to satisfy the temporal requirement of section 65(2)(b), whereas periods of many days and months generally have not. Further, satisfaction of the temporal requirement of section 65(2)(b) may depend on the subject matter of the representation and the extent to which the representor was involved. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Huici v The King:

The extent to which a representation, which is not made contemporaneously with the event, is nevertheless made under the “proximate pressure” of the event will often depend on the subject matter of the representation and the extent to which the representor was involved in the incident. A traumatic or unusual event is likely to be exert a more powerful force in the mind of the witness, especially if the witness is directly involved.

a.As to the meaning of “fabrication” in section 65(2)(b), the use of the term is directed towards the unlikelihood of deliberate concoction and not the unlikelihood of honest mistake.
b.In addition, section 65(2)(b) and (c) require the court to have regard to the circumstances in which the relevant representation was made. The circumstances may include previous or subsequent statements or conduct of the person who made the representation. However, the other representation must form “part of the context in which the relevant representation is made”. That is, the other representation must have a “degree of contemporaneity” with the relevant representation. Later representations made weeks or months after the relevant representation, for example, would not have the requisite contemporaneity.
c.While the circumstances in which the representation was made refer to the factual setting at the time at which the representation was made, “evidence of events other than those of the making of the previous representation [can] throw light upon the circumstances of the making of that representation and its reliability …”.
1.Section 65(2)(c)

a.Section 65(2)(c) of the Evidence Act applies where the representation was made “in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable”. In contrast to section 65(2)(b), there is no temporal requirement contained in the exception to the hearsay rule in section 65(2)(c). As observed in Conway v The Queen, the test in section 65(2)(b) imposes a significantly lower threshold of admissibility than does section 65(2)(c). The requirement of section 65(2)(c) is onerous: there must be evidence of the circumstances which make it not just probable but highly probable that the representation is reliable.
b.In Huici v The King, the Court of Appeal observed that the capacity, including the mental acuity, of the representor may be a circumstance that is relevant to any assessment of the reliability of representations made by that person. In that case, it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the requirement of section 65(2)(c) was satisfied, in part due to the finding that the representor was not labouring under any impairment that would cast doubt on the reliability of her account.
1.Section 66A

a.Section 66A of the Evidence Act provides an exception to the hearsay rule in respect to certain “contemporaneous” statements. For section 66A to be invoked, it is necessary to establish that the state of mind, for example, to which the representation refers is itself directly relevant to a fact in issue. An example of the operation of this provision was provided by Bell J in Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Ruling No 2):
The operation of the exception is well illustrated by the classic case of evidence of fears expressed by a murdered wife about her husband’s violence and her intention to leave him. First-hand hearsay evidence of the words and actions of the deceased expressing these feelings and intentions are usually admissible in the trial of criminal charges against the husband.

a.Since the introduction of the section 66A exception, commentary has been made about the potentially wide interpretation that could be given to the terms “knowledge” and “state of mind”. It has been said that these terms could be interpreted broadly to include “belief” or “memory”. However, such an interpretation has not been adopted as it would effectively abrogate the hearsay rule.
b.That being so, a contemporaneous representation about a person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind will include a reference in such a representation to some event that created the state of mind which existed at the time of the making of the representation. The classic example being, “I am afraid he will carry out his threat to kill me”. However, the exception to the hearsay rule in section 66A does not encompass a discrete representation about such an event that does not otherwise satisfy the requirements of the provision.
1.Discretionary and mandatory exclusions

The Evidence Act provides that admissible evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by other relevant factors. The dictionary to the Evidence Act defines “probative value” as “the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”.
Section 135 of the Evidence Act provides a general discretion so that the court may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it might be unfairly prejudicial to a party, misleading or confusing, or cause an undue waste of time.
In contrast, section 137 of the Evidence Act contains a mandatory exclusion in respect to criminal proceedings:
137 Exclusion of prejudicial evidence in criminal proceedings
In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused.
There is no element of discretion accompanying the judicial exercise contemplated in section 137. If such a state of affairs exists, the court must refuse to admit the evidence presented. Matters relevant to the balancing exercise required under this section include whether or not a direction to the jury could address the relevant prejudice arising from any frailties of the evidence and the criticisms made of it.
Relationship and hearsay evidence
2.General matters

1.In identifying the issues for trial, the prosecution stated a necessary issue for determination was whether Rickerby seriously assaulted Geddes or whether an unknown intruder seriously assaulted her in a period of approximately 11 minutes when Rickerby left the Residence on the evening of 6 November 2020. The defence disputed this, submitting there was no issue about whether it was Rickerby or an unknown third party that killed Geddes. This was put on the basis that there was no evidence upon which the prospect of a third party murdering Geddes arose as a reasonable possibility. In essence, the defence submitted that, relevantly, the issues for the jury were whether the injuries from which Geddes died were inflicted by conscious, voluntary and deliberate acts of Rickerby or, alternatively, by the deliberate acts of Geddes herself or by accident, or by a combination of these 2 latter possibilities. In addition, the defence submitted that, even if it were found that Rickerby committed acts that were a substantial and operating cause of death, a question arose as to whether those acts were committed with murderous intent.
2.In light of this, the defence further submitted that relationship evidence or context evidence was not required to identify Rickerby “as such”, but rather to assist with the competing inferences as to how the injury came about. Thus, it was submitted that evidence directed to establishing controlling behaviour and the related states of mind were of little or no probative value. However, it was acknowledged that otherwise admissible evidence of prior violence by Rickerby towards Geddes may be relevant to whether Rickerby caused the death of Geddes (if sufficiently proximate, and reserving the right to submit that any probative value would be outweighed by unfair prejudice).
3.In the circumstances of this case, the defence submitted that evidence giving specific details of the kind sought to be adduced by the prosecution about the relationship should not be admitted in circumstances where it was accepted that the relationship was not that of “an ordinary … couple with a good relationship despite differences and disagreements”. The defence stated that it was accepted for the purposes of the trial that the relationship was not ordinary but very peculiar and that Geddes was extremely unwell. It was submitted the concession means there is no real work for the relationship evidence and the leading of such evidence is “just prejudice”.
4.In response, the prosecution submitted that, regardless of the position adopted by the defence, it was necessary for it to exclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that someone other than Rickerby or Geddes was responsible for her death.
5.In my view, the concession (and related narrowing of the relevance of relationship evidence) the defence seeks to make is of little moment. Obviously, the relevance of the particular facts and circumstances of each piece of evidence must be considered (including in the context of the evidence as a whole), but whether or not there would be an issue at trial concerning an unknown intruder being responsible for Geddes’ death, the relationship evidence may still be relevant to the more confined question of whether it tends to explain the occurrence of events relating to whether it was the acts of Rickerby or alternatively the acts of Geddes that were the cause of her death. Further, and in any event, to the extent that it is open for the jury to find that acts were committed by Rickerby that caused Geddes’ death, the relationship evidence may be relevant to Rickerby’s intention at the time those acts were alleged to have been committed. As the facts in Wilson v The Queen demonstrate, relationship evidence may be relevant and highly probative even when there is no real possibility that an unknown intruder was responsible for someone’s death.
6.Furthermore, the concession made by the defence that the relationship was not ordinary but very peculiar does not diminish the relevance of this evidence. Speaking generally, the jury are entitled to consider relevant evidence which may also touch upon how and to what degree the relationship was out of the ordinary. The question of the probative value of the relationship evidence and any unfair prejudice that might arise if it were admitted are matters that need to be addressed separately.
1.Specific matters

1.The prosecution seeks to adduce evidence concerning the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby over a number of years leading up to her death on 6 November 2020. The defence objects to the admissibility of several hearsay representations purportedly made by Geddes to various witnesses. With the considerable assistance of the parties, a table of the specific matters for determination was prepared. These reasons will be structured by reference to the specific matters in that table. A modified version of the table is set out as annexure A to these reasons.
1.Representations 1 to 4, 6 to 13: Incident on 13 September 2019

a.The first set of disputed representations concern the incident which occurred on 13 September 2019, and consist of the following:
2.Representation 1: At approximately 7.45am on 13 September 2019, Geddes told Adamidis “I got into a fight”.
3.Representation 2: At approximately 7.45am on 13 September 2019, when Adamidis told Geddes that he was going to call an ambulance she said “alright”.
4.Representation 3: At approximately 7.45am on 13 September 2019, when Adamidis asked Geddes who she got in a fight with, Geddes said “my boyfriend”.
5.Representation 4: At approximately 7.45am on 13 September 2019, Geddes told Adamidis she was “so scared”.
6.Representation 6: When transporting Geddes in an ambulance to Dandenong Hospital between 8.06am and 8.24am on 13 September 2019, paramedic Sally Cosgriff (“Cosgriff”) asked Geddes what she was hit with, Geddes said a “sledgehammer”. Cosgriff asked Geddes to describe the size of the sledgehammer using her hands to demonstrate the size of the weapon. Cosgriff put her hands approximately 15cm apart, and again approximately 9cm apart. Geddes indicated the size of the sledgehammer was closer to 9cm in length.
7.Representation 7: At approximately 8.04am on 13 September 2019, whilst in the ambulance prior to being transported to hospital, Geddes told senior constable Sean Kelleher (“Kelleher”) “I just – I just got hit this morning”.
8.Representation 8: At approximately 8.04am on 13 September 2019, when Kelleher asked Geddes who hit her she said “my boyfriend”.
9.Representation 9: At approximately 8.04am on 13 September 2019, when Kelleher asked Geddes what her boyfriend’s name was she said “[Rickerby]”.
10.Representation 10: At approximately 8.04am on 13 September 2019, when Kelleher asked Geddes what the dispute was over Geddes said “that there were no cigarettes left” and that the assault occurred “about an hour and a half ago”.
11.Representation 11: At approximately 8.04am on 13 September 2019, Geddes confirmed to Kelleher that she did not fall over after being hit with the sledgehammer.
12.Representation 12: At approximately 8.46am on 13 September 2019, at Dandenong Hospital, Geddes confirmed to Kelleher that the dispute was over running out of cigarettes and said “first [Rickerby] went with his fists”. When asked about the sledgehammer she said “yeah, he did swing it at me, yes” and confirmed he hit her with “the metal part”.
13.Representation 13: At approximately 8.46am on 13 September 2019, at Dandenong Hospital, Geddes told first constable Alex Lyons (“Lyons”) that the sledgehammer was a “two handed one”.

In relation to these representations, no reliance is placed upon section 65(2)(c). No doubt this was because the prosecution formed the view, correctly in my view, that the circumstances did not make it highly probable that the representation was reliable. Accordingly, the prosecution must satisfy both limbs of 65(2)(b) in respect to all of the relevant representations, save for representation 4 which the prosecutions seeks to have admitted pursuant to section 66A of the Evidence Act.
Broadly, the prosecution submitted that the representations made by Geddes during the incident on 13 September 2019 are relevant and probative as to the state of the relationship that existed between Geddes and Rickerby, and hence to the identity of Geddes’ killer.
In respect to the requirements of section 65(2)(b), the prosecution submitted that it could be inferred from the freshness of Geddes’ injuries that the representations she made on the morning of 13 September 2019 were sufficiently proximate to the alleged assault. In addition, the prosecution submitted the objective fact of the injuries suffered by Geddes added to the unlikelihood of fabrication. The prosecution further submitted that the consistency of Geddes’ representations to Adamidis, paramedics and police added to the unlikelihood of fabrication, and the mere fact that Geddes suffered from a mental illness could not automatically result in a finding that the representations she made on 13 September 2019 were unreliable.
In response, the defence submitted that the probative value of the evidence was low and there was no direct evidence as to when the alleged assault occurred. In relation to the requirement that the representation be made in circumstances that make it unlikely that it is a fabrication, the defence submitted that there was evidence before the court that Geddes had a history of self-harming including, for example, on 1 occasion banging her head against a tree and causing her face to bleed. The defence further submitted that on admission to Dandenong Hospital, Geddes was noted to be “responding to unseen stimuli” and was diagnosed with psychosis. In addition, Geddes’ medical records demonstrate that at approximately 3.26pm on 13 September 2019, she informed emergency department staff at Dandenong Hospital that she had used cocaine earlier that day and “ice” the previous evening.
1.Representations 1 to 3

1.Turning to the representations made by Geddes to Adamidis at 7.45am on the morning of 13 September 2019. Whilst I accept the prosecution’s submission that the incident on 13 September 2019 is relevant to the question of causation, specifically, whether Rickerby caused the injuries to Geddes that led to her death, the exception to the hearsay rule in section 65(2)(b) has not been made out in respect to representations 1 to 3.
2.Putting aside the temporal limb, there are numerous reasons why the court cannot be satisfied that, in the circumstances in which each representation was made, it is unlikely that each representation was a fabrication. Principally among them is that the medical evidence discloses that Geddes was suffering from a psychotic episode on 13 September 2019. Whilst Geddes may have been able to respond affirmatively to the suggestion from Adamidis that he was going to call an ambulance, and she had an apparent awareness of her surroundings, upon admission to Dandenong Hospital medical staff observed that Geddes had been “responding to unseen stimuli” and was experiencing psychosis. Further, on discharge from Dandenong Hospital Geddes’ diagnosis was recorded as “relapse of schizophrenia in context of non-compliance and substance use”.
3.I accept the prosecution’s submission that the fact that a person has an untreated mental illness does not automatically mean that everything that person says is untruthful or unreliable, or both. However, representations made by Geddes on 13 September 2019 in the context of a psychotic episode of unknown duration mean the issue of unreliability is particularly acute.
4.In considering the meaning of “fabrication” in section 65(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, namely, that the use of the term is directed towards deliberate concoction and not the unlikelihood of honest mistake, a question arises as to whether, depending on the circumstances, a representation made by a person during a psychotic episode is deliberate or whether it may be properly described as unintentional or a mistaken invention. Conceivably, an unintentional or mistaken invention may be admissible under section 65(2)(b) if the temporal requirement and relevance threshold are also met. However, the onus of proof is on the prosecution as the proponent of the evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities that the circumstances make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication, taking into account the importance of the evidence and the gravity of the matters alleged. In respect to representations 1 to 3 made during a psychotic episode and the additional surrounding circumstances identified below, the prosecution has not done so.
5.Without being exhaustive, the additional circumstances which support the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to satisfy the court that the representations made by Geddes to Adamidis on the morning of 13 September 2019 that she had gotten into a fight with her boyfriend were unlikely to be a fabrication are as follows.
6.First, Geddes had a history of self-harming. It is also relevant that in early 2020, less than 6 months after the incident on 13 September 2019, an independent witness observed Geddes bang her head against a tree 2 to 3 times, causing it to bleed.
7.Secondly, upon admission to Dandenong Hospital, Geddes disclosed to hospital staff that she had used cocaine earlier that day and crystal methylamphetamine the previous evening. Medical staff at Dandenong Hospital observed that Geddes appeared to be “under influence (sic) of illicit substances”.
8.Thirdly, although the evidence suggests that Geddes had an apparent awareness of her surroundings during her exchange with Adamidis at his home, there is evidence that she was disoriented on the morning of the incident. For example, at approximately 8.46am on 13 September 2019, Geddes informed Kelleher that the alleged assault occurred at 10.00am that morning, indicating she was disorientated as to the time of day. Further, upon admission to Dandenong Hospital, Geddes was observed as being “[c]urrently disorganised, perplexed and a poor historian”.

9.Section 65 of the Evidence Act sets a high bar for admissibility. As observed by the High Court in Sio v The Queen:
It is no light thing to admit a hearsay statement inculpating an accused. Where s 65 is successfully invoked by the prosecution, the accused will have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement with a view to undermining the inculpatory assertion.

1.For completeness, little turned on the submission made by the defence that Geddes and Adamidis’ relationship was “transactional” in nature because Geddes would frequently attend Adamidis’ house to beg for cigarettes. If Adamidis was properly considered an acquaintance rather than a friend of Geddes, that fact would not detract from the unlikelihood of fabrication by Geddes. To the contrary, it may bolster such a proposition as on 1 view, Adamidis’ status as an acquaintance as opposed to a friend of Geddes may strengthen the reliability of his account of the events of the morning of 13 September 2019. Further, there is nothing to suggest Geddes’ reasons for attending Adamidis’ home on this occasion included any intention to beg.
2.If I am incorrect in this ruling on admissibility, then the evidence must be excluded under section 137 of the Evidence Act. In circumstances in which her representations were made, including as part of a psychotic episode, the evidence could only have very little probative value which would be far outweighed by the danger of significantly unfair prejudice to Rickerby.
1.Representation 4

In relation to the representation made by Geddes to Adamidis at approximately 7.45am on 13 September 2019 that she was “so scared” the prosecution submitted that the representation satisfied the requirements of section 66A of the Evidence Act as it was a contemporaneous statement made by Geddes about her state of mind. The prosecution further submitted that although there was no elaboration from Geddes as to the basis of her fear, the surrounding circumstances, namely her injuries and the fact that her medical records indicate that at 8.15pm on 13 September 2019, she expressed being fearful of her ex-partner, suggest that representation 4 concerned Rickerby.
In response, the defence submitted that although the exception found in section 66A was engaged, the representation was only relevant if Geddes was in fact referring to Rickerby when she told Adamidis that she was “so scared”. The defence submitted that being scared of Rickerby was not the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the representation. On admission to Dandenong Hospital on 13 September 2019, Geddes stated that she had absconded from hospital in August 2019 because she was scared of hospitals due to past experience. The defence submitted that it could not be excluded that Geddes was scared of the prospect of being taken to hospital.
Further, the defence submitted that the veracity of the representation and its relevance were bound up with representations 1 and 3. The defence submitted that if representations 1 and 3 were inadmissible or excluded pursuant to section 135 or section 137 of the Evidence Act, representation 4 was also inadmissible or ought to be excluded.
The court cannot be satisfied that representation 4 was directed towards Rickerby. If it were directed towards Geddes being scared of Rickerby, then, subject to an issue about relevance, it would be admissible under section 66A. However, the circumstances referred to above in respect to representations 1 to 3 are relevant to the question of whether or not this representation concerning how Geddes was feeling was connected to her relationship with Rickerby. In this regard, there is a substantial body of evidence that creates significant doubt that representation 4 was not a more general statement such that the court cannot be satisfied that it was concerned with Geddes’ interactions with Rickerby. That body of evidence includes:
2.Long before she was in a relationship with Rickerby, in May 2017, on admission to Toowoomba Hospital following a psychotic episode, Geddes informed hospital staff that she was always scared. Her medical records disclose that she suffered from paranoid ideation.
3.During an admission to Logan Hospital in September 2017, following a psychotic episode, Geddes stated that she did not want to go to sleep because she was fearful of being murdered.
4.Geddes suffered from schizophrenia and appeared to fail to take her anti-psychotic medication on a regular basis.
5.On admission to Dandenong Hospital on 13 September 2019 she was observed responding to unseen stimuli.
Indeed, the prosecution accepted that there were other possible explanations for the representation made by Geddes to Adamidis that she was “so scared”. Accordingly, the prosecution has failed to establish the evidence is relevant for the purposes of section 55 of the Evidence Act.
1.Representation 6

1.In respect to the representation made by Geddes to attending paramedic Cosgriff, between 8.06am and 8.24am on 13 September 2019, about being hit by Rickerby with a 9cm long sledgehammer, the prosecution submitted it relied on both Geddes’ verbal indication and physical gestures to Cosgriff. In respect to the temporal limb of section 65(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, the prosecution submitted that the representation was made not long after representations 1 to 4 and was sufficiently proximate to the alleged assault. In this regard, reference was made to the evidence of clinical forensic medical physician, Dr Jo Ann Parkin, that based on the hospital records and photographs taken by police, Geddes injuries on 13 September 2019 appeared to be less than 24 hours old.
2.The prosecution further submitted the issue of admissibility was informed by the fact that on the date of Geddes’ death on 6 November 2020, the police located a sledgehammer at the Residence, noting however that no blood was detected on it.
3.In response, the defence submitted the representation made by Geddes was not volunteered or spontaneous and was instead “heavily mediated” and made in response to questioning from paramedics and police. The defence further submitted that even if the exception in section 65(2)(b) could be made out, the evidence ought to be excluded pursuant to section 135 or section 137 of the Evidence Act on the basis that the evidence was of low probative value and the risk of prejudice, arising from the jury receiving evidence that Rickerby purportedly hit Geddes with a sledgehammer in September 2019, was high.
4.Whilst the temporal requirement of section 65(2)(b) is likely to have been met, the court cannot be satisfied that representation 6 was made in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation was a fabrication, for the reasons stated in respect to representations 1 to 3 above.
5.This conclusion is supported by the fact that, at approximately 7.53am on 13 September 2019 when Cosgriff initially asked Geddes what Rickerby had hit her with, Geddes said she could not remember. Further, at approximately 8.00am, prior to making representation 6, Geddes was administered 100 micrograms of fentanyl by Cosgriff. The evidence is that documented side-effects of fentanyl include disorientation, confusion, delirium, hallucinations and memory impairment.
1.Representations 7 to 11

1.In relation to the representations made by Geddes to Kelleher on 13 September 2019 in the ambulance prior to being transported to Dandenong Hospital, the prosecution relied on its submissions in relation to representations 1 to 4 regarding the circumstances in which the representations were made. The prosecution further submitted that representations 7 to 11 were consistent with representations 1 to 3, which suggested that Geddes’ memory was not affected in a way that prevented or impeded her ability to recall recent events.
2.In response, the defence submitted that Geddes later recanted the relevant representations in the days and weeks after the incident and reported feelings of coercion, duress and anxiety which the defence submitted were not conducive to circumstances in which fabrication was unlikely. However, during the course of pre-trial argument, the defence conceded, correctly in my view, that little weight could be placed on the retractions made by Geddes in light of the other motivations she may have had to retract her initial claims about how her injuries were sustained.
3.Again, the court cannot be satisfied that representations 7 to 11 were made in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representations were fabricated, for the reasons stated in respect to representations 1 to 3 above. Although representations 7 to 11 are consistent with representations 1 to 3, in that Geddes indicated to both Adamidis and Kelleher that she had gotten into a fight with her boyfriend, the prosecution has been unable to prove on the balance of probabilities that these representations made by Geddes in the context of a psychotic episode were unlikely to be fabricated. In addition, these representations were alleged to have been after the possible effects of fentanyl may have been operative. This provides an additional reason to rule the evidence inadmissible, or alternatively to exclude it for the reasons given regarding representations 1 to 3.
1.Representations 12 and 13

In respect to the representations made by Geddes to Kelleher and Lyons upon arrival at Dandenong Hospital, the prosecution repeated its submission that the objective fact of the injuries suffered by Geddes added to the unlikelihood of fabrication. The prosecution further submitted that representations 12 and 13 were substantially consistent with earlier representations made on the morning of 13 September 2019.
In response, the defence submitted that Geddes’ medical records disclose that on arrival at Dandenong Hospital she had been screaming and abusive, and appeared to be under the influence of illicit substances. In addition, at the time at which representations 12 and 13 were made, Geddes was restrained on a trolly bed with her neck in a brace. The defence further submitted that Geddes’ responses were elicited through leading questions and that it was possible, if not likely, that Geddes overheard Kelleher, Lyons, Cosgriff and another paramedic discussing the implausibility of her account of being hit with a sledgehammer. For these reasons, the defence submitted that the prosecution could not establish that the circumstances were such that the representations were unlikely to be fabricated.
For the reasons stated in respect to representations 1 to 3 and 7 to 11 above, the court cannot be satisfied that representations 12 and 13 were made in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representations were fabricated.
1.Representations 24, 25, 29 to 31: Incident on 19 January 2020

a.The second set of disputed representations concern the incident which occurred on 19 January 2020, and consist of the following:
7.Representation 29: At approximately 9.20am on 19 January 2020, Geddes attended the home of Zdenka and Davor Dujic. Zdenka Dujic observed Geddes say to her husband, Davor Dujic “please sir, please I need help, I have no one to protect me, no father and no mother, please help”. Geddes then said “I don’t want to go back, if I don’t bring him what he wants he beats me up”.
8.Representation 30: At approximately 9.20am on 19 January 2020, Geddes asked Zdenka Dujic to call the police.
9.Representation 31: At approximately 9.20am on 19 January 2020, Rickerby attended the premises. Zdenka Dujic observed Geddes repeatedly tell Rickerby that she was scared.

The prosecution also seeks to rely on 2 other representations made by Geddes to Davor Dujic in relation to the same incident:
11.Representation 24: Geddes attended the Dujic’s home and told Davor Dujic that she was scared and she had nobody to help her.
12.Representation 25: Davor Dujic observed his wife, Zdenka Dujic, ask Geddes if she wanted her to call the police. Geddes said yes.
In respect to representation 29, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act. In relation to representation 30, the prosecution sought to rely on section 65(2)(b) alone, and in relation to representation 31 the prosecution sought to rely on section 66A of the Evidence Act.
In respect to representations 24 and 25, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and section 66A.
1.Representations 29 to 31
In relation to representation 29, the prosecution submitted, pursuant to section 65(2)(b), that the representation was made by Geddes shortly after the asserted fact occurred in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation was a fabrication. The prosecution further submitted that, pursuant to section 65(2)(c), the representation was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that it is reliable. In doing so, the prosecution sought to rely on the following circumstances:
15.Geddes made this representation to her neighbour, Zdenka Dujic, a person Geddes had periodically visited asking for food and was someone she appeared to trust.
16.There is no evidence that Geddes was in any way impaired at the time she made representations 29 to 31.
17.Geddes was described by Zdenka Dujic as “hysterical” on the morning of the incident and appeared to have wet herself.
Zdenka Dujic stated that between 2017 and 2020 she observed Geddes periodically had bruises and scratches on her face. There is evidence before the court that Geddes gave varied explanations as to the cause of her injuries to other witnesses from time to time, for example, she stated her injuries were caused by playing volleyball, walking into a door, “rough sex” and horse riding. However, the prosecution submitted that on the whole of the evidence these varied explanations should be rejected as, during his second record of interview, Rickerby stated that he spent between 22 and 23 hours per day with Geddes and if she was not with him he would go out looking for her. The prosecution further submitted that it can be inferred from representation 29 that in the past Geddes had been assaulted by Rickerby when she returned home with no food or cigarettes, and well knew the consequences.
In response, the defence submitted there is no evidence of a prior occasion on which Rickerby assaulted Geddes for failing to return home with food or cigarettes and, therefore, it cannot be a subject about which Geddes has “personal knowledge”. The defence further submitted that the requirements of section 65(2)(b) had not been met because the representation concerned future prognostications about another’s conduct. Alternatively, the requirements of section 65(2)(c) had not been met as there was insufficient evidence to suggest it was highly probable that Rickerby had assaulted Geddes in the past when she returned home without food or cigarettes. In doing so, the defence relied on the following circumstances:
20.When Zdenka Dujic called emergency services on 19 January 2020, she stated Geddes had been screaming when she arrived at the premises.
21.Zdenka Dujic also said that at this time she thought Geddes was “on something” that is, she was drug or alcohol affected.
22.Zdenka Dujic said the first time Geddes told her Rickerby would “beat her up” if she did not get him food and cigarettes, Zdenka Dujic thought Geddes might be “playing” her. However, after speaking with another witness, Jennifer O’Brien (“O’Brien”), who lived in the neighbourhood, Zdenka Dujic changed her mind.
23.There is evidence before the court that fear and anxiety were symptoms of Geddes’ untreated mental illness.
In relation to representation 30, the prosecution largely relied on its submissions in relation to representation 29. The prosecution submitted that representation 31 was admissible pursuant to section 66A as it described Geddes’ state of mind, namely that she was scared of Rickerby. The prosecution further submitted that representation 31 was relevant to the nature of the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby.
In response, the defence submitted that it took no issue with representation 30 and accepted that representation 31 satisfies the requirements of section 66A. However, the defence submitted that Geddes’ state of mind on 19 January 2020 was not probative of the cause of her death or Rickerby’s state of mind at the time of the alleged offending. The defence further submitted that the evidence of the incident on 19 January 2020 is not relevant or, if it has any relevance, it is low.
The defence submitted that the risk of unfair prejudice was high as the evidence suggests misconduct and bad character on the part of Rickerby which the jury may impermissibly rely on to reason directly towards Rickerby’s guilt. The defence therefore submitted that the evidence of the incident on 19 January 2020 should be excluded in its entirety. If not excluded, it was submitted only those representations admissible pursuant to section 66A should be admitted.
During the course of pre-trial argument, the prosecution made a further alternative submission in relation to representation 29. The prosecution submitted that if the court was not satisfied that the requirements of section 65(2)(b) or (c) had been met, representation 29 was admissible pursuant to section 66A. The prosecution submitted that representation 29 provided the basis for Geddes’ fears and it would be artificial to separate representation 29 from other representations made by Geddes on 19 January 2020 about feeling scared.
In response the defence submitted that section 66A does not provide a basis for admissibility of representation 29. The defence acknowledged that where a representation as to state of mind is made and it includes a reference to what created that state of mind, the reference to what created it may be admissible but emphasised that discrete representations as to the source of a state of mind are not admissible pursuant to section 66A. The defence further submitted that here the prosecution is seeking to rely on a representation as to specific matters to support an implied assertion as to a particular state of mind which is not amenable to admission through the prism of section 66A.
Turning first to the relevance of the disputed representations made during the course of the incident on 19 January 2020, I am satisfied that the evidence is relevant. Whilst I accept the defence’s submission that Geddes’ state of mind on 19 January 2020 was not causally connected to her death, evidence of the incident on 19 January 2020, and in particular Geddes’ fear of Rickerby, not only “throws light” on the nature of their relationship, but will assist the jury in deciding whether it tends to explain the occurrence of events relating to whether Rickerby murdered Geddes on 6 November 2020 or whether another possible alternative is explanatory of what occurred. The evidence is demonstrative of a relationship involving threats of violence, and hostility beyond the norm, and made in the context of Geddes being distressed and seeking help (in contrast to other evidence concerned with her begging for some personal gain).
In considering the admissibility of representation 29 as an exception to the hearsay rule it is necessary to analyse each aspect of representation 29 in turn. As outlined above, the prosecution submitted that in respect to the exceptions set out in section 65 of the Evidence Act, the inference to be drawn from the statement “I don’t want to go back, if I don’t bring him what he wants he beats me up” is that Geddes represented the implied asserted fact that in the past she had been assaulted by Rickerby when she returned home without food or cigarettes. As there is no evidence before the court as to when in the past the alleged assault or assaults might have occurred, the temporal requirement of the exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b), that the representation be made “when or shortly after” the asserted fact occurred, cannot be met. Accordingly, representation 29 is not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to section 65(2)(b).

In respect to the application of section 65(2)(c), the following observations are made in relation to the evidence relied on by the defence. First, the fact that Geddes was observed screaming when she arrived at Zdenka and Davor Dujic’s home does not necessarily mean she was drug affected or experiencing mental health issues, it is equally plausible that she was screaming out of fear and trauma. As observed by Zdenka Dujic, Geddes appeared scared and “hysterical” on the morning of the incident, her shirt was torn and she appeared to have wet herself. Secondly, Zdenka Dujic’s lay opinion that Geddes was “on something” is not elaborated on in her statement, nor in the statement of her husband, Davor Dujic. Thirdly, although Zdenka Dujic stated she was initially sceptical of Geddes’ claims that Rickerby would assault her if she failed to bring back food or cigarettes, she later formed the view that Geddes was telling the truth.
Further, the fact that Zdenka Dujic stated to the triple-0 operator that Geddes had just departed (upon her leaving with Rickerby) and suggested that maybe the authorities just leave it because of Geddes’ previous frequent visits to the Dujic household does not detract from the highly probable reliability of the representation.
In my view, when the circumstances are considered it is highly probable that representation 29 is reliable. Although it is possible Geddes’ issues with her mental health and illicit substances may have given rise to this representation being made without foundation, the physical state in which she was in, her demeanour and the seriousness with which she was treating the situation (including requesting the assistance of the police) all make it highly probable representation 29 was reliable. Further, taken at its highest and viewed in the context of other evidence, the evidence is relevant to the events on 6 November 2020.
In respect to the alternative submission that representation 29 is admissible pursuant to section 66A, while I accept that the statements “please sir please I need help, I have no one to protect me, no father and no mother, please help” and “I don’t want to go back,” are plainly contemporaneous representations made by Geddes about her feelings and also provide the basis upon which she then says she is scared, the statement “if I don’t bring him what he wants he beats me up” is a discrete representation that needs to be considered separately. One meaning of what was alleged to have been said is that it was about Geddes’ beliefs about the future, which is not admissible pursuant to section 66A. As outlined by the authorities, to interpret “state of mind” within the meaning of section 66A broadly to include beliefs would be to evade the operation of the hearsay rule. However, the statement is equally about what has occurred in the past and also forms the basis upon which Geddes said she was scared. Thus, the evidence is admissible.
Accordingly, representation 29 is admissible pursuant to section 65(2)(c). It is also admissible pursuant to section 66A, including the words “if I don’t bring him what he wants he beats me up”. With respect to this phrase, it was a representation both as to the past and the future. The fact that it is not admissible with respect to its future forecast does not mean it should not be admitted as it necessarily also represented (implicitly, if not expressly) that Geddes has been beaten up in the past. Further, the representation is not severable such that its component concerning the future could be appropriately excluded.
Turning now to the question of whether the evidence ought to be excluded pursuant to section 137 of the EvidenceAct. Naturally, the admission of this hearsay evidence will prejudice Rickerby. He will not be able to cross-examine Geddes and test her account of the incident on 19 January 2020, including being denied the opportunity to put a version of events to Geddes from which an alternative hypothesis might emerge (although he will not be precluded from doing so to some extent in respect to other relevant witnesses).
However, there remains scope to put forward alternative explanations for Geddes’ behaviour by way of other evidence and submissions. For example, as noted by the prosecution, it would be open to the defence to put other possible explanations to the jury as to why Geddes appeared to have wet herself. It is a forensic decision for defence counsel as to whether or not the defence seeks to adduce evidence of Geddes’ mental health history. Further, the inability for the defence to challenge the evidence in the conventional way may be addressed by appropriate jury directions.
In relation to the defence’s submission that the evidence of the incident on 19 January 2020 suggests misconduct and bad character on the part of Rickerby which the jury may impermissibly rely on to reason directly towards his guilt, the prosecution does not seek to rely on this relationship evidence as indicating a propensity or tendency on Rickerby’s part which renders it more likely that he committed the offence charged. In my view, the evidence of representation 29, which was alleged to have been made in the same year that Geddes died and after she had already been in a relationship for approximately 2 years is self-evidently highly probative of the nature of their relationship, and the extent to which it was accompanied by hostility and violence. Such evidence avoids the impression that any physical contact was “out of the blue” given that Rickerby is only facing 1 charge. Further, I am not satisfied that the probative value of this evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice such that it must be excluded. Any danger of unfair prejudice could be sufficiently ameliorated by firm directions as to how the evidence may be used permissibly and how it may not be used.
Turning briefly to representations 30 and 31. The defence submitted that it took no issue with representation 30 that Zdenka Dujic was asked by Geddes to call the police. Further, the defence conceded that representation 31, being a representation made by Geddes to Rickerby that she was scared, satisfied the requirements of section 66A of the Evidence Act. Notwithstanding the statements by Geddes to the effect that she was generally scared, in this context the representation was directed towards her relationship with Rickerby. For reasons outlined above, representations 30 and 31 are relevant and ought not be excluded.
1.Representations 24 and 25
In relation to the representations made by Geddes the subject of Davor Dujic’s evidence, the defence conceded that if representation 29 was found to be admissible then representation 24 would fit within the hearsay exception set out in section 66A of the Evidence Act.
The prosecution accepted that representation 25 alone would not meet the relevance threshold if representation 29 was found to be inadmissible. The defence conceded that if representation 29 was found to be admissible then, to the extent that it was hearsay, representation 25 would fit within the hearsay exception set out in section 66A.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that representations 24 and 25 are admissible. Further, for reasons outlined above, these representations are relevant relationship evidence and ought not be excluded.
1.Representation 53

a.Representation 53 was a representation purportedly made by Geddes to her neighbour, Brad Jones (“Jones”) a few months prior to her death in the context of Geddes begging for food, money, cigarettes and petrol. Jones’ evidence is that if he refused to give Geddes what she was begging him for, Geddes would say “[Rickerby] would get angry at me” or “[Rickerby] would be disappointed”. Naturally, this evidence needs to be considered in the context of the evidence of relevant surrounding circumstances. These include a large body of evidence which will be led at trial to the effect that Geddes constantly and continuously begged various persons for food, money, cigarettes and other items. In addition, Jones’ evidence is that after initially acceding to Geddes requests, he was asked by another neighbour (who had been the subject of a robbery while away on holidays including of things such as toilet paper and coffee) to desist; which he duly did. As a result of Jones’ constant refusals (Geddes would sometimes knock on his door 3 times a day), Jones stated that Geddes made “us feel bad”.
b.The prosecution submitted that the evidence was admissible pursuant to section 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act on the basis that there is no evidence that Geddes was in any way impaired at the time she made the representation and it is unlikely that the representation was deliberately concocted given the factual setting in which it was made. The prosecution further submitted that it can be inferred from representation 53 that Rickerby had been angry with, and disappointed in, Geddes in the past when she returned home from begging empty handed.
c.In response, the defence submitted representation 53 was an assertion about contingent, future events and Rickerby’s future state of mind which does not satisfy the requirements of “personal knowledge” pursuant to section 62(2) of the Evidence Act and therefore is not admissible pursuant to section 65(2)(b) or (c). The defence submitted that, in any event, representation 53 was made following the refusal of assistance from Jones and for this reason cannot be said to have been made in circumstances that make it unlikely the representation is a fabrication or highly probable that it is reliable. Essentially, it was submitted the relevant exchange fell “classically within the begging transaction” by which Geddes was willing to say what would achieve her goal of receiving food, money, cigarettes and other items.
d.As already noted, “representation” as defined in the dictionary to the Evidence Act includes an express or implied representation. A previous representation may therefore contain asserted facts which are expressly asserted or which are asserted by necessary implication. In respect to representation 53, the prosecution seeks to rely on the implied assertion made by Geddes that in the past when she returned home from begging empty handed Rickerby had been angry with, and disappointed in, her. Although Geddes cannot be said to have personal knowledge of future events, I accept that Geddes would have had personal knowledge of the implied assertion the subject of representation 53.
e.In relation to the reliance placed on section 65(2)(b), during pre-trial argument the prosecution properly conceded that the temporal requirement could not be satisfied as there is no evidence before the court as to when in the past Rickerby had been angry or disappointed with Geddes.
f.In respect to the exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(c), the court cannot be satisfied that representation 53 was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable. Although there is no evidence before the court that Geddes was under any impairment at the time at which the representation was made, and it appears Jones believed Geddes, a fair reading of Jones’ evidence is that Geddes used various means to make Jones “feel bad” about refusing to continue to give Geddes what she was seeking. In these circumstances, there must be a serious question about the reliability of these alleged representations, including representation 53.
g.In reaching this conclusion, I have been mindful of other evidence on this issue (in the context of considering the evidence as a whole). In particular, the fact that there is direct evidence of another neighbour witnessing Rickerby forcing Geddes to beg or collect some other item. Although I have decided this direct evidence is admissible and ought not be excluded, the circumstances in which representation 53 was alleged to have been made mean that the requirements of section 65(2)(c) cannot be satisfied, and representation 53 is therefore inadmissible by virtue of the operation of the hearsay rule. These circumstances include the repeated, if not incessant, begging and apparent attempts at emotional manipulation by Geddes.
1.Representation 66

a.Representation 66 was a representation purportedly made by Geddes to her neighbour, O’Brien, in around November 2019. According to O’Brien, Geddes came to her door and was distraught. Geddes’ face was “smashed in” and she had snot running from her nose. She also purportedly had a black eye. O’Brien told Geddes to come in and asked Geddes if she wanted her to call the police. Geddes said yes.
b.In respect to representation 66, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and section 66A of the Evidence Act. The prosecution submitted that the evidence was relevant as relationship evidence. The prosecution further submitted that the representation should be considered in the context of O’Brien’s evidence as a whole. In this regard, the prosecution referred the court to O’Brien’s evidence that “[w]ithin 2 seconds” Geddes had changed her mind about wanting the police to be called and Rickerby turned up. O’Brien noted that Rickerby did not say anything upon his arrival (despite the state Geddes was in).
c.The prosecution also referred the court to O’Brien’s observation that 3 to 4 weeks prior to her death, Geddes attended O’Brien’s home with a black eye “again”. O’Brien observed that Geddes was struggling to stand upright, was shaking and appeared scared. In addition, the prosecution referred to the following statement made by O’Brien: “I was always straight up with [Geddes]. I would ask her straight up if [Rickerby] bashed her. She wouldn’t answer the question”.
d.The defence conceded that Geddes’ indication that she wanted the police to be called would be admissible pursuant to section 66A of the Evidence Act. However, the defence submitted that the evidence could only be relevant if it could be established that Rickerby had caused the black eye or that his actions prompted Geddes to visit O’Brien. As this was not stated by Geddes, it was only possible to establish that Rickerby had caused Geddes’ injuries by inference. It was also submitted that due to the remoteness in time to Geddes’ death and the lack of information about how her injuries were sustained, the probative value of the evidence was low. In contrast, the risk of unfair prejudice was high as the jury may be tempted to attribute Geddes’ injuries to a deliberate act by Rickerby without evidence to support such a conclusion. The defence submitted that for this reason, the evidence ought to be excluded.
e.The evidence of representation 66 is admissible. This relationship evidence involving an act or acts of violence allegedly perpetrated by Rickerby against Geddes approximately 1 year prior to her death is relevant as it could rationally affect the assessment of the events on 6 November 2020 relating to whether Rickerby caused Geddes’ death or had murderous intent.
f.Further, the nexus between Geddes’ injuries and Rickerby has been established to the requisite level. Geddes had gone to her neighbour for help in a seriously injured state and she asked O’Brien to call an ambulance. Upon his arrival, Rickerby was silent. Without any enquiry by Rickerby as to her conspicuously injured face, Geddes demonstrated an apparent lack of any need to explain her state to him. On the evidence, the most plausible inference to be drawn is that it was probable Rickerby was responsible for Geddes’ injuries.
g.However, the probative value of this evidence is considerably weaker than that the subject of representation 29. The evidence concerns an event which occurred at an earlier point in time (albeit only by a few months), so naturally is more remote. Further, it is of some significance that Geddes changed her mind about calling an ambulance almost immediately and, it would appear on a fair reading of the evidence, before Rickerby arrived on the scene.
h.Most significantly, the connection between Geddes’ physical state and her state of mind to Rickerby is only open as a matter of inference, in circumstances where another realistic possibility (albeit in my view less likely) is that her unsatisfactory physical and mental state and her desire to call an ambulance arose from Geddes’ mental health issues rather than anything that Rickerby may have done. Despite this, and any direction the jury may be given, the evidence remains highly prejudicial in light of the possibility the jury may conclude this is evidence of another occasion where Rickerby inflicted serious injuries upon Geddes and this evidence makes it more likely that Rickerby murdered Geddes (that is, tendency reasoning despite the prosecution not seeking to use the evidence in this way). This danger of unfair prejudice is heightened by the description of Geddes’ injuries, with her face appearing to be “smashed in” (together with her being in such a disheveled state that she had not attended to the snot running down her nose). The danger is further heightened by the incremental prejudice of further relationship evidence of this nature.

Accordingly, although consistent with the principles in Wilson v The Queen the evidence is admissible, it must be excluded under section 137 as its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Rickerby.
1.Representation 69

a.Representation 69 was a representation purportedly made by Geddes to Athanasios Dedes (“Dedes”), the operator of a business that sells flowers from a roadside caravan on the corner of Heatherton Road and Power Road in Endeavour Hills. Dedes stated that for a period of 12 to 24 months Geddes came past his van and “always” begged him for money or tobacco or a cigarette. He also witnessed Geddes “usually” carrying an orange jerry can and begging for petrol across the road.
b.According to Dedes, after he stopped giving Geddes money, on 1 occasion between 2019 and 2020 Geddes begged him for money and said that if she returned home without the money she would “get in trouble” and would “get yelled at”.
c.In respect to representation 69, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act. The prosecution largely relied on its submissions in relation to representation 53, and submitted that it can be inferred from representation 69 that Rickerby would be angry and would yell at Geddes if she returned home from begging empty handed. The prosecution further submitted that there was no evidence that Geddes was in any way impaired at the time of making representation 69.
d.In response, the defence submitted representation 69 was an assertion about contingent, future events and Rickerby’s future state of mind and therefore is not admissible pursuant to section 65(2)(b) or (c). The defence further submitted that it was significant that representation 69 was made after Dedes had stopped giving Geddes money and that the transactional nature of begging is antithetical to a circumstance that makes fabrication unlikely or highly probable that the representation is reliable.
e.In relation to the reliance placed on section 65(2)(b), I am not satisfied that the temporal requirement has been met as there is no evidence before the court as to when in the past Geddes had been in trouble and yelled at by Rickerby for returning home empty handed.
f.Further, in respect to the exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(c), I cannot be satisfied that representation 69 was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable. Again, although there is no evidence before the court that Geddes was under any impairment at the time at which the representation was made, in circumstances where this representation is alleged to only be made on 1 occasion after Dedes repeatedly declined to give Geddes money, it cannot be considered reliable, let alone highly probable in that regard. In forming this view, I have not ignored Dedes’ evidence that, in the weeks leading up to Geddes’ death, he contacted a domestic violence support service to seek advice on how to help Geddes. Taking this step was not the result of representation 69, but was taken some time later when it appeared to Dedes that Geddes has been severely beaten.

1.Representations 89 and 90

a.Representations 89 and 90 were representations purportedly made by Geddes to her mother, Hughes, in around 2020. Representation 89 states as follows:
I remember one day [Geddes] rang me. She was in the car and she called, I think she was really scared. The second I picked up the phone I could hear [Geddes] saying “please stop hitting me [Rickerby] stop hitting me, I’m trying to talk to my mum”. I could hear the thump and bang and hear her screaming …

a.Representation 90 was made shortly after representation 89, during the course of the same telephone call:
I [being Hughes] was just screaming down the phone “[Geddes], [Geddes] what’s happening?” but I wasn’t getting any answer. Eventually she answered, and was sobbing asking for my help, she was sobbing. She said, “my head hurts, my head hurts”.

a.In respect to representation 89, the prosecution sought to rely on the exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) of the Evidence Act. In respect to representation 90, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and section 66A of the Evidence Act.
b.The prosecution submitted that Geddes made these representations to her mother, a person she trusted and relied on, despite difficulties in their relationship. In addition, Hughes’ evidence is that she was able to hear sounds commensurate with Geddes being assaulted, as well as Geddes’ distress. The prosecution further submitted that there is no evidence that Geddes was in any way impaired at the time she made these representations.
c.The prosecution submitted the latter part of representation 90, namely, the statement “my head hurts, my head hurts” is also admissible pursuant to section 66A of the Evidence Act as a contemporaneous statement about Geddes’ health. However, the prosecution accepted that this part of representation 90 would not be admissible unless the remainder of representations 89 and 90 were found to be admissible.
d.As to relevance, the prosecution submitted representations 89 and 90 would enable the jury to make a realistic appraisal of the nature of the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby.
e.In response, the defence submitted that there is nothing about the circumstances of representations 89 and 90 that suggest these representations are unlikely to be fabricated. The defence submitted that Geddes’ self-serving call to her mother, who was interstate and could not assist her, was not an act that bespeaks the truth of the representations, namely that Geddes was being assaulted by Rickerby. The defence further submitted Geddes often begged her mother for food and money and the transactional aspect of her relationship with her mother undermined the reliability of representations 89 and 90. Although describing the call as self-serving, the defence accepted that a possible motivation for the call may have been part of an attempt by Geddes to stop being beaten. However, it was submitted that this did not establish the contents of the call were unlikely to be a fabrication.
f.In respect to the exception to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, I am satisfied that representation 89 was made when or shortly after the asserted facts (namely, being hit and trying to talk to Hughes) occurred in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication. Geddes’ use of present tense and Hughes’ evidence that she was able to hear sounds commensurate with Geddes being assaulted clearly satisfy the temporal requirement of section 65(2)(b). The apparent distress displayed by Geddes and, again, Hughes’ evidence that she was able to hear sounds commensurate with Geddes being assaulted support the conclusion that the representation was made in circumstances that make it unlikely that it is a fabrication.
g.In relation to representation 90, I am satisfied that the representation is admissible as a contemporaneous representation about Geddes’ health pursuant to section 66A of the Evidence Act. The observations concerning impermissible use with respect to representation 29 are repeated.
1.Representation 103

a.Representation 103 was purportedly made by Geddes to her neighbour, Gladys Collins (“Collins”), between 2017 and 2020. Representation 103 states as follows:
She has actually said to me, I guess about 5 times that [Rickerby] knocks her around. She said to me asking for money, “he hit me last night and if I don’t get him some money he will hit me again”. I was just shocked by this and didn’t want her to suffer so I gave her money whenever I could.

a.In respect to representation 103, the prosecution sought to rely on the exceptions to the hearsay rule set out in section 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act. The prosecution submitted the representation was made to Collins in circumstances where she observed that Geddes was “always looking pretty knocked about, she looked terrible”. The prosecution further submitted that there was no evidence that Geddes was in any way impaired at the time of making the representation.
b.The prosecution submitted that it can be inferred from representation 103 that Rickerby had assaulted Geddes in the past when she returned home from begging empty handed. However, the prosecution conceded that the alleged assault the night before could not be directly linked to the begging on the part of Geddes. The prosecution accepted, insofar as the representation related to Geddes’ state of mind and being hit, that it was concerned with a potential future event. Thus reliance upon section 65(2)(b) was confined to the alleged statement by Geddes that Rickerby hit her the previous night.
c.In response, the defence submitted the representation was made in the course of begging and does not satisfy the requirements of section 65(2)(b) or (c). In this regard, the defence relied on its submissions in relation to representations 53 and 69. In relation to the statement, “she has actually said to me, I guess about 5 times that [Rickerby] knocks her around” the defence submitted that the mere fact of physical injury does not corroborate Geddes’ statement due to the risk of other sources of injury including accident, mishap or self-harm. The defence further submitted that as Collins’ evidence compendiously refers to 5 instances in which Geddes stated she had been assaulted by Rickerby, without distinguishing the characteristics of each instance, the prosecution could not establish that the requirements of section 65(2)(b) and (c) had been met.
d.In respect to the reliance placed on section 65(2)(b), for reasons similar to those outlined in respect to representations 53 and 69 above, I am not satisfied that the temporal requirement of section 65(2)(b) has been met. There is no evidence as to when in the past Rickerby had allegedly assaulted Geddes after she returned home from begging empty handed. Insofar as the statement “he hit me last night” might be considered to satisfy this limb of the provision, it was alleged to have been stated specifically in the context of begging for money and, for reasons already stated, I cannot be satisfied that it is unlikely the representation was a fabrication.
e.It must follow that for the purposes of section 65(2)(c), I cannot be satisfied that representation 103 was made in circumstances that make it highly probable that it was reliable.
f.Alternatively, if representation 103 is admissible it ought to be excluded in its entirety under section 137. There are a number of reasons for this. The reference to “about 5 times” is vague and there is no evidence to identify even approximately when the previous alleged representations were said to have occurred. Also the words “knocks her around” are vague. Thus, this evidence is only of limited probative value, but the concomitant danger of unfair prejudice is high and clearly outweighs the probative value. Further, statements made about Rickerby in the context of Geddes begging have limited probative value which is also outweighed by the obvious danger of unfair prejudice.

Summary of prosecution opening for trial

a.In addition to the rulings required in relation to disputed hearsay evidence, the parties also sought rulings in relation to disputed relationship and context evidence detailed in the summary of prosecution opening for trial.
1.Additional evidence of forced begging

1.The defence objected to the admissibility of the evidence of Katiuscia Boi (“Boi”), a neighbour who witnessed an incident of forced begging involving Geddes and Rickerby approximately 12 to 18 months prior to Geddes’ death. In particular, the defence objected to the admissibility of paragraph 35 of the summary of prosecution opening for trial which states as follows:
About 12-18 months before the death of [Geddes], a neighbour named [Boi], in the mid-afternoon, heard yelling from the street outside. She looked outside and saw a [b]lack Commodore and [Geddes] got out of the passenger seat. [Boi] had seen [Geddes] in this car before. A male got out of the driver’s seat and they were both on the nature strip. The male was aggressively yelling at her saying, “Go and get it, go and get it bitch.” She saw the male pacing around on the road, foot path and nature strip. He was aggressively pushing her to the shoulders yelling, “Go and get it, go and get it.” [Geddes] wasn’t responding to him. She then walked down the road to [Adamidis’ residence]. The male got back in the car and waited in the driver’s seat.

1.The defence submitted that the evidence ought to be excluded pursuant to section 137 of the Evidence Act on the basis that the incident was said to have occurred some 12 to 18 months prior to Geddes’ death. The defence submitted the prejudice occasioned by the graphic encounter outweighs the probative value of the evidence which is significantly diminished by the remoteness in time of the incident from Geddes’ death.
2.In response, the prosecution submitted that Boi’s evidence is relevant and admissible as it provides a “snapshot” of the nature of the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby. The prosecution submitted it was significant that Rickerby was observed by Boi making demands, yelling and pushing Geddes in a public place as it demonstrates the level of regard Rickerby had for Geddes.
3.The prosecution further submitted that temporal distance between this incident and Geddes’ death is not a matter that ought to lead to the exclusion of Boi’s evidence. The prosecution submitted that the jury may well put less weight on matters that are more remote in time from the date of Geddes’ death but that should not lead to the evidence not being admitted. In addition, the prosecution outlined that Boi observed a similar incident occur the same week. Although the information regarding the second incident is limited, the prosecution submitted that it demonstrates that the initial incident was not an isolated occurrence.
4.I accept the prosecution’s submission that Boi’s evidence is relevant and admissible as if accepted, it could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of facts that are in issue, namely, whether Rickerby caused Geddes’ death and whether he committed the relevant act or acts with murderous intent. The public nature of this incident and the insight it provides into the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby demonstrate that Boi’s evidence is clearly probative.
5.Whilst I accept that the probative value of the evidence is diminished by the fact that the incident occurred some 12 to 18 months before Geddes’ death, it is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Rickerby. The evidence must be viewed in the context of the fact that the relationship had already been on foot for some time when these events are alleged to have occurred. Further, the defence will have the opportunity to test Boi’s evidence in the conventional way through cross-examination. In addition, the prosecution does not seek to rely on this relationship evidence as indicating a propensity or tendency on Rickerby’s part which renders it more likely that he committed the offence charged. Any risk of impermissible reasoning as to the specific use of the evidence may be mitigated by appropriate jury directions. For these reasons, the risk that Boi’s evidence will be misused by the jury in some unfair way is low.
6.The evidence will therefore not be excluded pursuant to section 137 of the Evidence Act.
1.Geddes’ financial circumstances

1.The defence objected to the admissibility of the evidence of the financial arrangements between Geddes and Rickerby, namely that from 31 January 2019, Geddes’ Centrelink payments were being paid into a bank account in Rickerby’s sole name.
2.The defence submitted that the financial arrangements between Geddes and Rickerby were neutral and did not support a theory of financial exploitation by Rickerby against Geddes, but submitted that there is a very grave risk the jury would analyse the evidence in such a way. The defence submitted that even if the evidence demonstrated that the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby was 1 of financial exploitation, that itself does not bear relevantly on whether Rickerby murdered Geddes. The defence further submitted that the financial arrangements between Geddes and Rickerby could not be used to explain why Geddes did not leave the relationship as there were other more obvious and probable explanations such as their impecuniosity and Geddes’ mental health issues. In addition, the defence submitted that there was a risk that the jury would misuse the evidence to infer that the reason Geddes was neglectful of her hygiene was because Rickerby was depriving her of funds.
3.In response, the prosecution submitted that whether Rickerby exercised a level of financial control over Geddes is relevant and falls within “that umbrella of relationship evidence” that will assist the jury in assessing the nature of their relationship and the choice the jury will be required to make. The prosecution further submitted that the evidence shows that for a significant period of time, and proximate to the date of Geddes’ death, Geddes did not appear to have access to her own money. Notably, Geddes’ Centrelink payments were her only source of income. The prosecution submitted that in this regard it was open to the court to take into account the evidence from numerous neighbours that Geddes would often beg for food, money, cigarettes and petrol. The prosecution further submitted that the fact that Geddes was financially dependent on Rickerby ought to make its way before the jury.
4.The prosecution submitted that the risk of misuse of the financial information could be adequately ameliorated through the defence’s ability to put forward to the jury alternative explanations for the financial arrangements between Geddes and Rickerby.
5.During pre-trial argument there was some confusion among the parties as to ownership and control of certain bank accounts. On 20 October 2023, by email, the prosecution confirmed that the parties agreed that the ruling as to the admissibility of the evidence of the bank account into which Geddes’ Centrelink payments were paid should be made on the basis that Geddes’ Centrelink payments were paid into an account in Rickerby’s sole name from 31 January 2019.
6.In light of the agreed position, on 23 February 2024, the prosecution confirmed that information in the amended summary of prosecution opening for trial filed on 28 November 2023 regarding Geddes’ financial circumstances prior to 31 January 2019 should be disregarded. As a result, the financial evidence in dispute was substantially narrowed.
7.Turning first to the question of relevance, I have grave reservations concerning whether the evidence that Geddes’ Centrelink payments were being paid into a bank account in Rickerby’s sole name from 31 January 2019 is relevant to any issue in this case. Although the evidence is relevant to an understanding of the nature of the relationship between Geddes and Rickerby, in the context of the evidence as a whole, it is not readily apparent that this arrangement is relevant to the question of whether Rickerby committed to acts leading to Geddes’ death or, if he engaged in such conduct, whether he had murderous intent. In circumstances where Geddes was mentally ill and habitually used illicit substances, there may have been very sound reasons why Rickerby and Geddes arranged for her Centrelink payments to be paid into her account.
8.Further, during his second record of interview, Rickerby stated that Geddes’ bank account with St George Bank was $200 to $300 in debit, so in mid-2018 Geddes herself had the idea of redirecting her funds. He said that, as a result, she went onto her MyGov account and directed the money be paid to Rickerby and subsequently he gave Geddes money once the payments had been received.
9.It is unnecessary to determine the issue of admissibility in respect to Geddes’ financial circumstances. Whether the evidence is admissible or not, any controlling behavior on the part of Rickerby has “much less relevance” to other relationship evidence and it must be excluded under section 137. It is a notorious fact that in many domestic circumstances coercive control may be exerted by controlling a partner’s finances. Despite the defence’s opportunity to put alternative explanations for these arrangements to the jury (including the examples referred to above), the danger of unfair prejudice arising from such notoriety far outweighs the limited probative value of the evidence in the particular circumstances of this case.

Conclusion

1.The table shown in annexure A sets out a summary of the findings in relation to representations 1 to 4, 6 to 13, 24, 25, 29 to 31, 53, 66, 69, 89, 90 and 103, as well as the other matters the subject of the amended hearsay notice filed on 23 August 2023 for which ultimately no rulings were required.
2.As a result, of these findings, the prosecution may adduce the evidence in relation to representations 24, 25, 29 to 31, 89 and 90. Further, the direct evidence of a neighbour witnessing Geddes allegedly being forced to beg may also be adduced.
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ANNEXURE A

REP #	REPRESENTATION	DATE	TIME	SECTION(S) RELIED UPON	RULING
1	The deceased stated that she got into a fight.	13 September 2019	7.45am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
2	When told by Thomas Adamidis that he was going to call an ambulance, the deceased said, “All right”.	13 September 2019	7.45am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
3	When asked who she had got into a fight with the deceased said my boyfriend.	13 September 2019	7.45am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
4	The deceased said that she was so scared.	13 September 2019	7.45am	s 66A	Inadmissible.
5	~~When~~ ~~asked~~ ~~what~~ ~~she~~ ~~had been~~ ~~hit with~~ ~~the~~ ~~deceased said she could not remember and~~ ~~was emotionally upset.~~	~~13 September 2019~~	~~7.54am~~ at ~~patient~~⁶
6	During the transport I asked the deceased again what she was hit with and she said it was a sledge hammer. I asked her to describe the size of the sledge hammer, using my hands to demonstrate the size of the head I put my hands apart approximately 15cm (what I recognized as a large sledge hammer, as I did not realize that there were different sized sledge hammers available), and again approximately 9cm apart (what I would describe as the length of the head of a standard hammer). The patient indicated the size was closer to 9cm.	13 September 2019	Between 8.06am and 8.24am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
7	The deceased said, “I just – I got hit this morning”.	13 September 2019	8.04am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
8	When asked who hit her the deceased said my boyfriend.	13 September 2019	About 8.04am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
9	She said her boyfriend’s name was Robert Rickerby.	13 September 2019	About 8.04am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
10	She said, ‘It was over that there were no cigarettes left and it happened about an hour and a half ago.’	13 September 2019	About 8.04am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
11	‘She said she did not fall over.’	13 September 2019	About 8.04am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
12	~~The deceased told SC Sean Kelleher that it happened about 10am this morning.~~ [The deceased] answered yes to the question was the dispute over running out of cigarettes. First he went with his fists and a sledgehammer. He did swing it at me, the metal part hit my head.	13 September 2019	8.46am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
13	The deceased said it was a two handed hammer.	13 September 2019	8.46am	s 65(2)(b)	Inadmissible.
14	The deceased kept saying that “I’m just getting my lunch, just getting my lunch. I just wanted to get my lunch”.	6 November 2020	11.28am – 11.46am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
15	The deceased said “I want something to eat”, “I want something to eat I’m hungry”.	6 November 2020	11.28am – 11.46am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
16	The deceased said multiple times “I’m scared”.	6 November 2020	11.28am – 11.46am	s 66A	Ruling no longer required.
17	The deceased came with bruises and was begging for money~~. I told her it was illegal to beg~~ ~~and she said~~ ~~to me, “Do you want to talk to him”. She then went on to tell me that~~ ~~her~~ ~~boyfriend~~ ~~would~~ ~~bash~~ ~~her~~ ~~or hit her I~~ ~~can’t remember~~ ~~the~~ ~~exact~~ ~~words.~~	2018	Various	~~s 65(2)(b);~~ ~~s 65(2)(c)~~	Ruling no longer required.
18	Whenever the deceased comes to beg for money, she also asks for people to fill up her jerry can, she has begged customers for food, sometimes for a lift.	2018-2020	Various	Ruling no longer required.
19	The Deceased’s boyfriend came into the store. He tried to move her out and I remember him saying “you are going to get me caught”. I don’t know what that means. She just said to him, “baby I’m getting lunch for you”.	6 November 2020	11.28am – 11.46am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
20	I first met Jessica a couple of years ago, I was out the front of our house with my wife... We were having a smoke and Jessica walked up to us and asked for a cigarette.	2017-2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
21	She told us that she was from Queensland. She said she had a five year old daughter who was being looked after by her mother. She also said that she wanted to get a job and get her daughter back . Jessica had also said that she had been diagnosed with something and that was the reason her mother had her daughter.	2017-2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
22	After that day, every time she saw us out the front, the deceased would come and ask for cigarettes. She also started asking for food. Sometimes she also asked for money, it was only ever $5 or something like that.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
23	I also saw the deceased at 7-Eleven sometimes in the morning, asking for cigarettes and money.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
24	[On another occasion at my house] the deceased said that she was scared and that she had nobody to help her.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 66A	Admissible.
25	My wife asked her if she wanted her to call the police. Jessica said yes.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 66A	Admissible.
26	The first time I met the deceased she told me she had come from Queensland to Melbourne.	2017-2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
27	On some occasions the deceased would come four or five times in day to my house to ask for cigarettes or food. She mentioned to me on numerous occasions that it was fine if I couldn’t give her anything.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
28	She also said if she couldn’t get Robert what Robert was after like food or cigarettes he would beat her up.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)I	Ruling no longer required.
29	The deceased said, “Please sir please I need help, I have no one to protect me, no father and no mother, please help”. “I don’t want to go back, if I don’t bring him what he wants he beats me up”.	19 January 2020	A Sunday about 9.20am	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c); s 66A	Admissible.
30	The deceased asked me to call the police.	19 January 2020	A Sunday about 9.20am	s 65(2)(b)	Admissible.
31	The deceased kept telling Robert that she was scared.	19 January 2020	A Sunday about 9.20am	s 66A	Admissible.
32	Over the last 3 years the deceased would regularly knock on the doors of residents in the area and ask them for money for cigarettes. ~~On one occasion she did this to me and told me her name is Jessica.~~	2017-2020	Various	Ruling no longer required.
33	On one occasion she did this to me and told me her name is Jessica.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
34	The deceased has been begging for food, money, as little as a dollar, cigarettes. It was happening every day she would knock on every door in the street and ask for money and food.	May 2019-November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
35	~~In the~~ ~~18 month~~ ~~period~~ ~~before~~ ~~the~~ ~~deceased~~ ~~died, she always had a black eye. I asked~~ ~~her many times how she got it and she~~ ~~always said she walked into a door.~~	~~May~~ ~~2019-November~~ ~~2020~~	~~Various~~
36	~~The deceased attended my house and had bruises to her arms and face. When I asked her if Robert had done this, she said they often had rough sex.~~	~~May~~ ~~2019-November~~ ~~2020~~	~~Various~~
37	The deceased came over to my house and asked to speak to Jennifer but Jennifer wasn’t here.	3 or 4 November 2020	Unknown	~~s 65(2)(b)~~	Ruling no longer required.
38	~~I challenged the deceased about her black~~ ~~eye and I asked her, has Robert been~~ ~~beating you? And at first she said no, she~~ ~~got~~ ~~hit in the~~ ~~face with~~ ~~a door.~~ ~~I said~~ ~~to her~~ ~~don’t bullshit~~ ~~me, and then~~ ~~she~~ ~~said~~ ~~they~~ ~~had been doing gardening”.~~	~~3 or 4 November 2020~~	~~Unknown~~
39	The deceased has come to my house begging, has asked me for money and has always been polite.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
40	I said what happened The deceased said “I got into a fight with my boyfriend I said ”I’m going to call an ambulance” She said “All right” I said “who did you get into a fight with?” She said, “My boyfriend” She was crying and said “I’m so scared.”	13 September 2019	7.45am	Ruling no longer required.
41	~~On 5- 6 previous occasions the deceased~~ ~~has~~ ~~come~~ ~~to my house~~ ~~with~~ ~~bruises~~ ~~on her~~ ~~face, she attributed these bruises to~~ ~~volleyball~~ ~~on all of~~ ~~the~~ ~~occasions.~~	~~2019~~	~~Various~~
42	I think it would have been about two years ago I first met the deceased, I was just coming home from the shop, walking toward my house and having a cigarette. She saw me having a cigarette and asked me for a one. Jessica was wearing a full dress past her knees, her hair I would say didn’t look like it had been properly groomed, she wasn’t wearing any makeup. I think she was wearing thongs. Jessica was alone when she asked for the cigarette, she didn’t stay long, she got the cigarette and left. At that time, I told her my name was Tom and she told me her name was Jessica.	2019-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
43	A couple of days later the deceased came back and asked for a cigarette again. I think it was about two or three days later she came back.	2019-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
44	The deceased would come once or twice a week and started asking for food. We gave her food we had spare.	2019-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
45	The deceased told me that she’s got a child with another man, the child lives with her mother in Queensland. She said she misses her daughter, she would like to see her daughter.	2019-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
46	Sometime between November 2019 and April 2020 the deceased came to my door begging.	Between November 2019 and April 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
47	I spoke to [the accused] one day when the deceased came begging for petrol money.	December 2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
48	The deceased used to come asking for food and for $5. I gave her the money at the start.	2017-2018	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
49	~~Initially~~ ~~she~~ ~~would~~ ~~call~~ ~~in once a week~~ ~~and~~ ~~we would allow her inside. She would say~~ ~~her kitchen~~ ~~is under renovation so~~ ~~I would~~ ~~make her a coffee or heat up her noodles, stuff~~ ~~like~~ ~~that.~~	~~October 2019~~	~~Various~~
50	She would ask for biscuits, nuts, toilet paper, coffee.	October 2019	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
51	In about October last year the deceased knocked on the door about 1.00am during a downpour/storm … and all she asked for was a coffee.	October 2019	1.00am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
52	The deceased had come begging for food and money and asked to get petrol out of our car…	A few months before 6 November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
53	…if we refused to give it to her she would say that “Robert would be getting angry at me” or “Robert would be disappointed”.	A few months before 6 November 2020	Various	~~S 65(2)(b)~~; s 65(2)(c)	Inadmissible.
54	The deceased came to my door and asked for food. She had sunglasses on. I went to get food…	Between November 2019 and April 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
55	~~when~~ ~~I came~~ ~~back~~ ~~to the~~ ~~door~~ ~~she~~ ~~had taken~~ ~~her glasses off and I saw that she had two~~ ~~black eyes. I asked her what happened to~~ ~~her eyes and she quickly put the glasses~~ ~~back on. She told me her and her partner~~ ~~had been horse riding and she fell off. I~~ ~~asked her where they were riding and she~~ ~~told~~ ~~me in the mountains.~~	~~Between November~~ ~~2019 and April~~ ~~2020~~	~~Unknown~~
56	About three or four years ago, the deceased started knocking on our door and asking for cigarettes and food. I can’t remember the first time this happened, but she would do this constantly.	2017-2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
57	The deceased told me she was from Queensland and that she had a daughter up there that her mum takes care of, and that her mum has custody of her daughter.	2017-2018	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
58	Jess told me that she had a dis-associative disorder and that she went to hospital previously.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)I	Ruling no longer required.
59	I asked Jess if she used drugs. She said yes, both her and Rob were using ice.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
60	The deceased couldn’t do anything without Robert’s permission. She would always say, “Robert said I can’t talk about that” when I asked her questions.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
61	~~[regarding her injuries] I would ask the deceased what happened. She would say that she fell over, or she didn’t know.~~	~~2019-2020~~	~~Various~~
62	She told me that she had no family, no place to live, so she was stuck there.	2019-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
63	I told her that I could take her to a facility to get help. She said that Robert wouldn’t like that.	2019-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
64	~~Sometimes~~ ~~she~~ ~~said~~ ~~her~~ ~~black~~ ~~eye was~~ ~~because of mad sex.~~	~~2019-2020~~	~~Various~~
65	She once told me that Robert told her what to say to any question other people asked her.	2019-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
66	About a year ago, the deceased came to my door and was distraught. Her face was smashed in and she had snot running down her face. She had a black eye. I told her to come in and I asked her if she wanted me to call the police. She said yes.	Around November 2019	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 66A	Excluded.
67	The deceased has been coming past and always begs me for money or for tobacco or a cigarette.	2019-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
68	After a while the deceased kept coming back and kept asking for money. I eventually stopped giving her money and I told her I couldn’t keep doing it.	2019-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
69	When I stopped [giving her money] on one occasion she begged me for the money and she said if she returned home without the money she would get in trouble and get yelled at.	2019-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Inadmissible.
70	~~During the last 12 - 24 months I would~~ ~~have seen her beaten up a few times but~~ ~~there~~ ~~were~~ ~~about~~ ~~3 occasions~~ ~~where~~ ~~it was~~ ~~really noticeable. She would have bruises~~ ~~and cuts~~ ~~all over~~ ~~her~~ ~~face.~~ ~~I had asked the deceased who was doing~~ ~~this to her and if it was her boyfriend or~~ ~~someone doing it to her. She would… just~~ ~~say no no no it wasn’t him. She made up a~~ ~~couple of excuses about it, one time she~~ ~~said~~ ~~she~~ ~~got~~ ~~into~~ ~~a fight~~ ~~with~~ ~~a friend~~ ~~and on another~~ ~~time~~ ~~she~~ ~~said~~ ~~she’d got~~ ~~attacked~~ ~~with scissors.~~	~~2019-2020~~	~~Various~~
71	~~[The deceased was severely beaten…] she~~ ~~explained~~ ~~that~~ ~~she~~ ~~had been~~ ~~walking~~ ~~quite~~ a ~~distance…~~	~~31 October~~ ~~2020~~	~~Late~~ ~~morning~~ – ~~midday~~
72	…She asked me for a cigarette, I had to roll it and light it for her…	31 October 2020	Late morning – midday	~~s 65(2)(b)~~	Ruling no longer required.
73	…I asked her on this occasion again who was doing this to her but she just wouldn’t answer. I offered to call police or an ambulance for help but she just refused, I also offered to give her the phone numbers for some domestic violence services but she Didn’t want them…	31 October 2020	Late morning – midday	~~s 65(2)(b)~~	Ruling no longer required.
74	…Once she had her cigarette she called her boyfriend I think and asked him to come and pick her up and she said she was at the flower van.	31 October 2020	Late morning – midday	~~s 65(2)(b)~~	Ruling no longer required.
75	~~The~~ ~~deceased~~ ~~said~~ ~~she~~ ~~fell through~~ ~~the~~ ~~bathroom floor.~~	~~About~~ ~~April/May 2020~~	~~Unknown~~
76	The deceased has come to our house I would say 3 times in the past. She was always polite and never aggressive. She was very thin and pale and generally unkempt. She came here begging. She asked me for money for petrol on one occasion and peanut butter on one occasion.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
77	At approximately 9am on Friday 13/9/19 I woke up in bed at Robert’s house. Robert woke me up and was yelling that there was no cigarettes. Robert yelled ‘don’t take my stuff while I’m asleep you selfish bitch’…	13 September 2019	10.18 am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
78	…I got out of bed and Robert started punching me. He punched me 4-5 times in the face…	13 September 2019	10.18 am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
79	…Robert picked up a hammer from the bedroom that was on the ground near the couch in the bedroom. The hammer was about 40-50cm long. The hammer had a curved end for getting nails made out of metal and a blunt end for hitting nails. The hammer had a wooden handle I think. He was swinging it at me and hit me with it. I cannot remember how many times. I don’t think I went unconscious. Robert hitting me with the hammer is what caused the deep cut on my head. I was bleeding a lot from my head.	13 September 2019	10.18 am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
80	The Deceased said Robert has hurt me multiple times in the past. I am very scared of him.	13 September 2019	10.18am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
81	At the start of the year the deceased started asking me for Pizza. Every couple of weeks she would message and ask me to order them pizza which I did a couple of times, always pick up from Dominos in Endeavour Hills.	2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
82	One time the deceased called me asking me to order a Pizza.	2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
83	l asked the deceased about their financial situation. She told me that they were both getting the ~~$1300~~ Newstart Centrelink payment.	2020, during COVID- 19 pandemic	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
84	The deceased called me and asked me for Pizza again which I again refused.	2020, during COVID- 19 pandemic	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
85	I tried to ask the deceased why she kept getting pizza and not going shopping for food but she said they didn’t have a kitchen to cook in, had no fridge or no oven.	2020, during COVID- 19 pandemic	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required
86	The deceased told me that Robert forced her to ask people for money.	2020, during COVID- 19 pandemic	Unknown	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
87	In February 2020 the deceased put a Facebook post up about how she was upset that something had happened to her hair, there was a big chunk of hair gone…	February 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
88	…So, I called her up and asked her what had happened to her hair. She said I didn’t do it Rob did it, I said what do you mean Rob did it and she said Rob was angry at me because I had been taking too many selfies, so he got a pair of hair clippers and run it through my hair.	February 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
89	I remember one day the deceased rang me. She was in the car and she called, I think she was really scared. The second I picked up the phone I could hear Jessica saying “please stop hitting me Rob stop hitting me, I’m trying to talk to my mum”. I could hear the thump and bang and hear her screaming…	2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Admissible.
90	…I was just screaming down the phone Jessica Jessica what’s happening but I wasn’t getting any answer. Eventually she answered, and was sobbing asking for my help she was sobbing. She said my head hurts my head hurts.	2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 66A	Admissible.
91	The deceased told me that she wasn’t allowed to give me the address because Rob wouldn’t let her.	2017-2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
92	In almost every phone call Ms Hughes received in 2020 from her daughter, Jessica was crying and asking for help. Ms Hughes would offer help to get her home to Qld and out of that environment. Ms Geddes refused and only wanted financial help.	2020 various	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
93	~~I asked the deceased what happened and~~ ~~she said the neighbours called police~~ ~~[because~~ ~~they~~ ~~said~~ ~~I got~~ ~~hit on the~~ ~~head~~ ~~with a~~ ~~sledge~~ ~~hammer].~~	~~On or shortly~~ ~~after~~ 13 ~~September 2019~~	~~Unknown~~
94	The deceased called up. She was crying and crying to me, she was crying to me in a real childlike matter she said “please mumma please mumma help me help me can you please get us some food, Rob is hungry, we Don’t have any money.”	27 September 2020	2.30pm	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
95	Mostly the deceased comes in and asks for coins from everybody. Some days she stays in the corner of our workshop, acting silly, doing silly dances and singing, like when you’re not in a right state of mind. Pretty much every day I see the deceased, sometimes a few times a day. Sometimes I handed her coins but it was becoming a regular thing so I stopped. This all started this year. She would often be carrying a red jerry can.	2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)

96	The deceased would also ask if we were smoking. She’d always ask to borrow coins.	2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
97	The deceased keeps coming around and asking for fuel and money. She comes every single day with the red fuel can and begs for it.	2017-2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
98	The deceased would occasionally come over asking for food. She would come over once every few months begging for food.	Between April 2017 and November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
99	The deceased was always coming here, usually on a Saturday or a Sunday. She was always begging for money, always asking for $5 or $10.	2017 – November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
100	Whenever the deceased came she would say that she had no money and that her boyfriend would never give her any money. She would say if she didn’t come back with money then he would get angry with her.	2017 – November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
101	The deceased would usually come early morning, she would say she needed the money for cigarettes and petrol. After I gave her money she would head off to the local service station… ~~She would come~~ ~~over regardless of the weather, even if it~~ ~~was raining she would walk over… She~~ ~~told~~ ~~me that~~ ~~her~~ ~~boyfriend~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~one~~ ~~who~~ ~~made~~ ~~her come~~ ~~and beg~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~money.~~ ~~She~~ ~~said~~ ~~they~~ ~~never~~ ~~had any money~~ ~~and were~~ ~~waiting for pension day~~	2017 – November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
102	~~…She told me that her boyfriend was the one~~ ~~who~~ ~~made~~ ~~her~~ ~~come~~ ~~and for~~ ~~the~~ ~~money.~~ She said they never had any money and were waiting for pension day.	2017 – November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
103	The deceased has actually said to me, I guess about 5 times that he knocks her around. She said to me asking for money “he hit me last night and if I don’t get him some money he will hit me again”.	2017 – November 2020	Various	s 65(2)(b); s 65(2)(c)	Inadmissible.
104	The deceased sent Bevan Geddes a text saying “Hey dad, are you awake, I just might’ve found out my bf is cheating on me constantly and I literally am probably going to get Murdered now just for talking to you”	10 May 2020	1.16am¹⁰⁸	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
105	The deceased sent a text to Bevan Geddes “Can you please call this number today please if you even care about me at like fucking all?	10 May 2020	1.16am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
106	The deceased sent Bevan Geddes a text “I haven’t heard from you in even months it’s like you don’t even care what goes on in my life at even all.”	10 May 2020	1.17am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
107	The deceased sent Bevan Geddes a text saying “Do you even realize how much I get bashed?”	10 May 2020	1.17am	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.
108	The deceased asked for money to buy food. She asked only for $20 to buy pizza.	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
109	The deceased started to beg me for it (when I refused).	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
110	She still begged for money (when I asked her why she didn’t stay away from her current situation).	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
111	There was a male voice in the background and she told me that it was the voice of her partner, Robert.	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
112	In response to Robert yelling, she said “The money is under the car”.	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
~~113~~	~~When~~ ~~I asked~~ ~~her~~ ~~if Robert hurt~~ ~~her,~~ ~~she~~ ~~denied it.~~	~~1 September 2020~~	~~Unknown~~
114	She mentioned to me that she had a sore foot.	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
115	She begged me to let her go as she didn’t want to make Robert angry at that time.	1 September 2020	Unknown	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
~~116~~	~~In response~~ ~~to a text I received~~ ~~texts back~~ ~~saying its wrong number.~~	~~1 September 2020~~	~~About~~ ~~7.13pm~~
117	Ms Hughes received 2 texts from the deceased who wrote “good afternoon mummy how are you today?”. When Ms Hughes replied, the deceased wrote “good”.	11 May 2020	1.47pm, 5.09pm	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
118	Ms Hughes received a text from the deceased who wrote “good night mummy love you”.	17 May 2020	10.04pm	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
119	Ms Hughes received a text from the deceased who wrote “call me back rob ran out of credit”.	20 September 2020	9.56am	s 65(2)(b)	Ruling no longer required.
120	The Deceased listed herself as “in a relationship” on Facebook and moved to Victoria.	2 October 2017	s 65(2)(c)	Ruling no longer required.

[2024] VSC 115

18 March 2024