Director of Public Prosecutions v Reed

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v Reed

Citation: 

[2023] ACTSC 310

Hearing Date: 

26 October 2023

Decision Date: 

1 November 2023

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

See [72].

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and punishment – sentence – arson – offender started fire at doors of Old Parliament Housing during a public protest – fire caused significant damage to the building – consideration of political protest context – offending went beyond the types of protest which may be dealt with leniently due to significance of public protest as a part of democracy – offending in the mid-range of objective seriousness – sentence of imprisonment and good behaviour order imposed

CRIMINAL LAW – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Whether a protective service officer is a “territory public official” for the purposes of s 361 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) – consideration of specific categories of person identified as a “territory public official” – parties invited to provide further submissions on whether a protective service officer falls within the chapeau to the definition of a “territory public official”

Legislation Cited: 

Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), ss 4, 14H, 40B, 40D, 40EA, 40EC, 40F(1)(b), Div 4 of Pt II

Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 300, 361(1), 404(1), Ch 3

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 35A

Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), ss 7, 13

Public Sector Management Act 1994 (ACT)

Cases Cited: 

DPP v Luscombe (unreported, District Court of New South Wales, Kirkham DCJ, 28 January 2000)

R v Burgess; R v Saunders [2005] NSWCCA 52; 152 A Crim R 100

R v CA (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 371; 316 FLR 49

R v Catts (1996) 85 A Crim R 171

R v Wrigley [2015] ACTSC 114

The Queen v Latona and McCabe (unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, Penfold J, 19 November 2012)

Parties: 

Director of Public Prosecutions

Nicholas Reed ( Offender)

Representation: 

Counsel

S Saikal-Skea ( DPP)

J Sabharwal ( Offender)

Solicitors

Director of Public Prosecutions

Bevan & Co Lawyers & Conveyancers ( Offender)

File Numbers:

SCC 145 of 2023

SCC 146 of 2023

MOSSOP J:  

Introduction

  1. These proceedings are sentencing proceedings relating to Nicholas Reed.

  2. On 4 September 2023, a jury found Mr Reed guilty of the offence of arson, contrary to s 404(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN 325/2022). The maximum penalty is 1500 penalty units or 15 years’ imprisonment or both.

  3. Mr Reed also pleaded guilty to a transfer charge of obstructing a territory public official, contrary to s 361(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN 1126/2022). The maximum penalty is 200 penalty units or two years’ imprisonment or both.

Facts

  1. The facts relating to the arson must be found in a manner consistent with the verdict of the jury, based on the evidence presented at the criminal trial. The jury found Mr Reed guilty of the offence of arson. The principal issue at trial was one of identification. The jury concluded beyond…

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Details
Case
[2023] ACTSC 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory heard sentencing submissions in relation to Nicholas Reed, who had been found guilty of arson and obstructing a territory public official. The arson offence was committed during a protest at Old Parliament House on 30 December 2021. The protest was part of a series of events that had been peacefully ongoing in the vicinity of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. The maximum penalty for the arson offence is 1500 penalty units or 15 years' imprisonment or both. The maximum penalty for the obstructing charge is 200 penalty units or two years' imprisonment or both. The court considered the objective seriousness of the offending, the subjective circumstances of the offender, and the political context of the offending. The court found that the offending was in the mid-range of objective seriousness. The offender's subjective circumstances were also considered, including his background, motivation for the offending, and criminal history. The court noted that while the political motivation of the offending was relevant, it did not provide a basis for leniency. The court considered the need to maintain the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable public protests and the need to deter others from engaging in similar offending. The court imposed a sentence of 23 months' imprisonment, suspended after eight months, subject to a good behaviour order for two years. The court also granted liberty to relist the matter to address the transfer charge. The court invited the parties to provide further submissions on whether a protective service officer falls within the chapeau to the definition of a "territory public official" for the purposes of the obstructing charge.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 30 December 2021, Nicholas Reed participated in a protest at Old Parliament House (OPH) in Canberra, which had been peacefully ongoing for several days near the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. The protest was led by Mr Shillingsworth, who made speeches addressing issues concerning Aboriginal sovereignty, genocide, children in care, and the need for justice. Prior to the incident, sand had been placed in the OPH carpark and a fire had been lit on it on previous days. On the day of the offence, protesters, including Mr Reed, marched up the steps of OPH and banged on the doors while chanting. Around 11:10am, protesters painted over CCTV cameras and the glass panelling of OPH’s main entry doors. At 11:19am, CCTV footage showed Mr Reed walking between the fire on the sand and the portico, scooping hot coals from the fire and carrying them towards the portico. He was seen repeating this action multiple times. At 11:23am, 11:26am and 11:28am, Mr Reed was observed running away from OPH and returning each time with a bundle of sticks, which he added to the fire. A social media video showed Mr Reed placing a bundle of sticks on the fire at 23 seconds, by which time the fire had reached 1.5m up the doors. This conduct of starting and feeding the fire at the OPH doors constituted the offence of arson. At 11:36am, the fire engulfed the portico, and Mr Reed left the scene at 11:43am as a fire engine arrived. The damage to OPH was significant, with costs of over $5 million.

At around the same time, Australian Federal Police officers attempted to extinguish the fire but were resisted by protesters who had formed a barrier around the portico. During this confrontation, Mr Reed grabbed the radio of protective service officer Daniel Minney, ripping it off and pushing Minney, causing him to fall down the stairs. This conduct formed the basis of the charge of obstructing a territory public official. Due to the resistance of the protesters, police were directed to retreat back into OPH. Mr Reed's car was later driven away from the scene.

This matter came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as sentencing proceedings for Nicholas Reed, who was found guilty of arson and pleaded guilty to obstructing a territory public official. The case was heard by Mossop J on 26 October 2023, with the decision announced on 1 November 2023. The proceedings stem from an incident that occurred on 30 December 2021, during a protest at Old Parliament House. Reed was convicted by a jury of the offence of arson, contrary to s 404(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), and pleaded guilty to obstructing a territory public official, contrary to s 361(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). The court considered various prior decisions and statutory provisions in its sentencing determination, including the principles of equal applicability of the law and the importance of maintaining the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable public protests. The court also invited further submissions from the parties on whether a protective service officer is a "territory public official" as defined in the Criminal Code, which remains an unresolved issue in the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the political motivation of the offending in this case a basis for leniency in sentencing?
2. Does the significant damage to the property caused by the offending warrant a custodial sentence, or could alternative penalties be considered?
3. Is it appropriate to impose a reparation order on the offender, considering the cost of the damage to the Commonwealth and the offender's lack of means?
4. Should a reduction in sentence be granted under s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) for the manner in which the trial was run?
5. Whether a protective service officer is a “territory public official” for the purposes of s 361 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).

Held
1. **Is the political motivation of the offending in this case a basis for leniency in sentencing?**
The court concluded that while the political motivation of the offending is relevant, it does not provide a basis for leniency. The political motivation distinguishes the conduct from more usual motivations for arson but does not warrant lenient treatment. Result: Political motivation not a basis for leniency.

2. **Does the significant damage to the property caused by the offending warrant a custodial sentence, or could alternative penalties be considered?**
The court found that the significant damage to the property and the rectification costs warranted a custodial sentence. The magnitude of the harm caused by the arson and the lack of any criminogenic factors that might be addressed through alternative penalties led to the conclusion that a custodial sentence was appropriate. Result: Custodial sentence warranted.

3. **Is it appropriate to impose a reparation order on the offender, considering the cost of the damage to the Commonwealth and the offender's lack of means?**
The court decided that it was not appropriate to impose a reparation order. The lack of means of the offender and the nominal amount sought made such an order practically meaningless. Result: No reparation order imposed.

4. **Should a reduction in sentence be granted under s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) for the manner in which the trial was run?**
The court granted a reduction in sentence under s 35A because the trial was concluded in three days instead of the initially estimated ten days. This reduction was due to the prosecutor's decision to reduce the volume of evidence led, which was done with the cooperation of counsel for the offender. Result: Sentence reduction granted.

5. **Whether a protective service officer is a “territory public official” for the purposes of s 361 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).**
The court concluded that a protective service officer is not a "territory public official" as defined in s 300 of the Criminal Code. The court will hear further submissions from the parties on whether the charge should be dismissed or some other course should be followed. Result: Further submissions invited on the transfer charge.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed several key issues in this case, beginning with whether the political motivation behind the offending could justify leniency in sentencing. The court held that while political motivations are relevant, they do not provide a basis for leniency if the offence involves significant criminality, such as arson causing substantial damage. This aligns with the principle that the law must apply equally to all, regardless of the political goals of the offender, as emphasized in DPP v Luscombe and The Queen v Latona and McCabe. The court referenced cases like R v Catts, R v Burgess; R v Saunders, and The Queen v Latona and McCabe to illustrate that significant property damage resulting from protests warrants custodial sentences.

Next, the court considered whether the significant damage caused by the arson warranted a custodial sentence or if alternative penalties could be considered. The court concluded that only a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate due to the nature and extent of the property damage. The starting point for the sentence was 24 months' imprisonment, reduced to 23 months under s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), reflecting the efficiency of the trial. The court ruled out community service and intensive correction orders as unsuitable due to the offender's residence in Victoria and the severity of the harm caused.

The court also deliberated on imposing a reparation order on the offender. Given the offender's lack of means and the impracticality of enforcing a reparation order reflecting the actual cost of damage, the court decided against imposing such an order.

Regarding a potential reduction in sentence under s 35A for the manner in which the trial was run, the court found that the brevity of the trial, due to the prosecutor's decision to reduce the evidence volume with the cooperation of the defence, warranted a reduction in sentence.

Finally, the court examined whether a protective service officer qualifies as a "territory public official" under s 361 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). The court meticulously analyzed the relevant statutory definitions and concluded that a protective service officer does not fall within the specific categories of "territory public official" defined in the Criminal Code. The court invited further submissions from the parties on whether the protective service officer might be covered by the chapeau to the definition or if the charge should be dismissed.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that political motivations, while relevant, do not excuse significant criminal conduct such as arson causing substantial property damage. Custodial sentences are appropriate in such cases, and alternative penalties are unsuitable due to the nature of the harm caused. The court also determined that a protective service officer does not qualify as a "territory public official" under the specified statutory definitions.