[2006] TASSC 81
CITATION: Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips [2006] TASSC 81
PARTIES: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
PHILLIPS, Paul Vincent
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
FILE NO/S: C 292/1998
DELIVERED ON: 19 October 2006
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 22 September, 6 October 2006
JUDGMENT OF: Underwood CJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Jurisdiction, practice and procedure – Judgment and punishment – Sentence – Habitual criminals – Practice – Dangerous criminal declaration – Exercise of the discretion.
Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), s19.
Chester v R (1988) 165 CLR 611; Read v R (1994) 3 Tas R 387, applied.
R v Minney (2003) 12 Tas R 46, referred to.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [862]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Applicant: M A Stoddart
Respondent: J S Wilkinson
Solicitors:
Applicant: Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent: Wallace Wilkinson & Webster
Judgment Number: [2006] TASSC 81
Number of paragraphs: 44
Serial No 81/2006
File No C292/1998
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v PAUL VINCENT PHILLIPS
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT UNDERWOOD CJ
19 October 2006
The Director of Public Prosecutions seeks a declaration that Paul Vincent Phillips be declared a dangerous criminal.
The Law
The Sentencing Act 1997 ("the Act"), s19(1), empowers "a judge before whom an offender is convicted or brought up for sentence after being convicted" to declare the offender to be a dangerous criminal. Subsection (4) provides that a dangerous criminal is not eligible for release from prison until the declaration is discharged.
The Act, s20, gives the Supreme Court power to discharge a declaration that the offender is a dangerous criminal. The jurisdiction to make a declaration is conferred upon the sentencing judge, but the jurisdiction to discharge a declaration is conferred on the Court. This distinction is reinforced by s19(3) which provides:
"(3) A judge who declares an offender to be a dangerous criminal must, in addition to making that declaration, sentence that offender to a term of imprisonment for the crime referred to in subsection (1)(a)."
Section 19 contemplates that the declaration will be made at the time of imposing sentence, but because jurisdiction is conferred (inter alia) upon "the judge before whom an offender is convicted", the declaration does not have to be made at the time of imposition of sentence.
In this case, the respondent was last convicted and sentenced by me on 9 October 1998. At that time Crown counsel applied for a declaration that the respondent be declared a dangerous criminal, but with the consent of counsel for the respondent that application was adjourned to a date to be fixed. It seems that the fact that an application had been made at the time of imposing sentence was overlooked, for on 12 December 2002 the Director of Public Prosecutions filed a written application seeking a declaration. For a reason that I am unable to ascertain, the application did not come on for hearing until 12 May 2004. At that time then counsel for the respondent sought an adjournment. It was not…
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- Case
- [2006] TASSC 81
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was the interpretation and application of the habitual criminal and dangerousness provisions in the relevant statutes. The court had to determine whether the defendant's criminal history and the nature of his offences warranted the imposition of a more severe sentence than would otherwise be appropriate. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the evidence supported a declaration that the defendant was a dangerous criminal, and if such a declaration was necessary to protect the community. The court also considered the principles of proportionality and the need for a sentence that was commensurate with the gravity of the defendant's crimes.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the defendant's extensive criminal record and the seriousness of his current offences justified the imposition of a sentence that reflected the need for incapacitation and deterrence. The court concluded that the defendant qualified as a habitual criminal under the relevant legislation and made the appropriate declaration. Furthermore, the court determined that a declaration of dangerousness was warranted, as the evidence demonstrated that the defendant posed a significant risk to the community. The court imposed a sentence that was consistent with these findings, ensuring that it was proportionate to the defendant's criminal conduct and the need to protect the public. The court's decision was guided by the principles of justice and the protection of society, while also considering the individual circumstances of the defendant.
The final orders of the court included the declaration that the defendant was a habitual criminal and a dangerous criminal, as well as the imposition of a specific sentence that reflected the court's determinations. The court's judgment provided clarity on the application of the habitual criminal and dangerousness provisions in the relevant legislation, and ensured that the sentence imposed was appropriate for the defendant's criminal history and the need to protect the community.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Legal Principle Established
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