Director of Public Prosecutions v Pell (Review of Suppression Order)

In this case, the Director of Public Prosecutions sought to review a suppression order that had been imposed in relation to the criminal proceedings against Cardinal George Pell. The suppression order was intended to prevent the publication of certain information that could prejudice the administration of justice. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the suppression order should remain in place, given the current state of the proceedings. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the suppression order was still necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court considered the relevant case law, including Chaarani & Anor [2018] VSCA 299, which established that a suppression order would remain necessary if there was a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice. The court noted that the suppression order had been in place for some time and that the proceedings against Cardinal Pell were ongoing. The court found that the suppression order was not futile and that it was still necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The court also considered the impact of the suppression order on the right to freedom of expression but concluded that the need to protect the administration of justice outweighed this consideration.

The Supreme Court of Victoria upheld the suppression order, finding that it remained necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The court emphasised that the suppression order was not intended to be a permanent measure but would remain in place until the proceedings against Cardinal Pell were concluded. The court also noted that the suppression order was not intended to prevent the publication of all information related to the proceedings but only that which could cause prejudice. The court considered that the suppression order was not futile and that it was still necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice. As a result, the suppression order remained in place.