Director of Public Prosecutions v Papaioannou
[2021] VCC 1354
•16 September 2021
| IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AT MELBOURNE CRIMINAL DIVISION | Revised Not Restricted Suitable for Publication |
Case No. CR-19-02254
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| ANDREW PAPAIOANNOU |
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JUDGE: | Her Honour Judge Todd | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF PLEA HEARING: | 14 & 15 September 2021 | |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 16 September 2021 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v PAPAIOANNOU | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2021] VCC 1354 | |
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:CRIMINAL
Catchwords: Trial – sentence following trial – one charge arson – circumstances of COVID-19 pandemic - ‘Akoka time’
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1958 ; Sentencing Act 1991; Summary Offences Act 1966
Cases Cited:Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214; Barci & Asling v R (1994) 76 A Crim R 103; Beevers v The Queen [2016] VSCA 271; DPP v Bright (2006) 163 A Crim R 538; DPP v Derby (2007) 171 A Crim R 302; DPP v Hasan [2021] VCC 231; DPP v Jenson [2018] VCC 2079; DPP v Papaiouannou [2019] VCC 1978; DPP v Walford [2016] VCC 1635; Mc Padden v The Queen 2018] VSCA 57; Salmi v R 2020 VSCA 250; The Queen v Miceli (1997) 94 A Crim R 327; Tones v R [2017] VSCA 118.
Sentence: Three years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and two months.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr N. Batten | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr P. Bloemen | Galbally & O’Bryan Lawyers |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
1Late in the evening of 27 March 2017 a house in Rosebud was substantially damaged by fire. In the afternoon on the day of the fire the couple that lived in the house had argued. The man assaulted his partner and punched a television. The woman, after attempting to leave a number of times in the afternoon and evening, finally left in the company of her friend to stay at his place. After she left, the man, drunk, set fire to the house by putting petrol on some advertising pamphlets and setting them alight. Shortly after doing so, he called the fire brigade.
Finding of guilt and maximum penalty
2Andrew Papaioannou, on 20 August 2021 you were found guilty by a jury of one charge of arson, contrary to s197(1) and (6) of the Crimes Act 1958. The maximum penalty for this offence is 15 years’ imprisonment.
3The jury’s verdict means I must sentence you for the act of setting fire to your partner Tamara Kirkland’s[1] home on 27 March 2017. What follows is my consideration of all the matters I have to take into account when calculating the sentence you will serve for this act. Before I do so, I will briefly refer to the procedural chronology of this case.
[1] A pseudonym.
Previous proceedings
4This was the second time you faced trial. At an earlier trial, conducted in 2019, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of arson. On that first trial indictment, you were also charged with a range of other offences alleged to have occurred, of which you were acquitted.[2] You pleaded guilty at that time to one charge of common law assault, a rolled up charge comprising three incidents that took place on the same day as you were alleged to have committed the crime of arson.
[2]See Indictment H11009394.1; the other offences were; common assault and threat to kill in relation to Scott Cameron; threat to damage property made to Scott Cameron, and criminal damage in relation to a window broken at the house.
(Indictment 11009394.1 charges acquitted: common law assault; make threat to kill; threat to damage property; intentionally damage property)
5On 29 November 2019 you were sentenced for the charge of common assault by another judge of this court.[3] Those reasons for sentence set out the factual basis for that charge. I include reference to the earlier trial and sentence for two reasons. First, because the facts giving rise to that charge were then led in your retrial as part of the circumstances of the alleged arson, and therefore they form part of the circumstances for my assessment of the context of your offending for the purposes of this sentence. The second reason I refer to the earlier proceedings in this sentence is that it becomes important in my assessment of the role of delay in your case, and I will return to that later.
[3]See DPP v Papaiouannou [2019] VCC 1978 per Trapnell J.
6In summary, in relation to the common assault committed on 27 March 2017 you admitted one prior conviction and were dealt with by way of a without conviction fine in the sum of $3,000. That, of course, is not a prior conviction for the purposes of this sentence, and I make it clear this sentence will not seek to re-punish you for that conduct. It is just the necessary background and context to the offence of arson.
7After the jury delivered its verdict on 20 August 2021 you were remanded in custody and a plea was conducted on 14 and 15 September 2021.
The facts
8These are the facts giving rise to the offence. In March 2017 you were living with your partner, Tamara Kirkland, in her house in Rosebud. You had moved there in mid-2016. Your daughter, Angela[4] stayed in the house from time-to-time, and had her own bedroom.
[4] A pseudonym.
9On 27 March 2017, you and Ms Kirkland were at home. You had been drinking throughout the day, but she did not become aware of that until later. At one stage in the afternoon Ms Kirkland helped you fill in a job application – you had recently become unemployed. Sometime after this you began to verbally abuse her. At around 5 pm Ms Kirkland left the house and went to the beach with her two dogs.[5] When she returned at around 6 pm you continued to shout at her. While in this state you repeatedly punched a large television; you broke the screen and threw it into a garden bed outside. The television belonged to you.
[5]Ruffy and Benson.
10You approached Ms Kirkland in the kitchen, puffed your chest out and pushed yourself towards her, but without making contact. You punched the air in front of her face. She felt frightened. Things settled down and the two of you watched TV together for a time. (This is the first incident making up the charge of common assault.)
11Sometime later, you grabbed a cup of tea from Ms Kirkland’s hand, and threw it on the ground and swore at her. She went to get a cloth; you followed her. She tried to get away from you, but you grabbed her from behind and squeezed her in a manner that has been described as ‘like a bear hug’. You would not release her, even when she told you to. Her arms and chest hurt. She ended up on the floor, in your grip. This is the second incident giving rise to the charge of common assault.
12You eventually let Ms Kirkland go. She got into her car, intending to drive away, but you got in the rear driver’s side passenger seat and sat there before she could leave. She then got out of the car and fled. She hid in some bushes. By this time, it was around 8.43 pm. While Ms Kirkland was away from the house you phoned her and left a voice message – you were in a distressed state. The content of that call was not retained.
13While still away from the house at 8:44 pm Ms Kirkland called Scott Cameron, a mutual friend of you both. Mr Cameron and his mother Marjorie drove together from Berwick and met Ms Kirkland at the local shops. Ms Kirkland wanted to return to her home to collect some things, and her dogs, and then to spend the night at the Camerons’ house in Berwick.
14At 9:38 pm and 10:05 pm, while Ms Kirkland was still away from the house and meeting the Camerons, you called 000. In the first call you told the Police that your wife had gone missing, that she had been gone two hours and she may be dead. You rang again at 10.05 pm saying that your wife had gone missing. You told Police that Ms Kirkland was suicidal. Recordings of both these calls were played to the jury.[6]
[6]See Trial Exhibits I and J.
15While you were on the phone to the operator in the second call Ms Kirkland returned to the house in the company of the Camerons. You asked Mr Cameron why he was there. He told you, in effect, that Ms Kirkland was there to collect her dogs and go back with him to Berwick. Ms Kirkland set about finding her dogs and collecting things from the house to take with her. Mr Cameron suggested that you sleep off the alcohol and sort things out in the morning.
16Ms Kirkland was inside the house and you followed her inside; the front door and/or the main door to the house was locked in this process. Inside, with the Camerons outside, you grabbed Ms Kirkland with both hands, and held her tightly. She struggled to release herself but was unable to do so. You ended up in your daughter’s bedroom, and you both fell onto the bed. At this point, Ms Kirkland screamed loudly. These events go to the third and final incident of the charge of common assault.
17Mr Cameron heard Ms Kirkland’s screams from outside and, unable to open the door, used a baseball bat to smash the front window next to the door to try to get in. At the sound of the breaking glass you let go of Ms Kirkland who then ran outside. An altercation took place between you and Mr Cameron. Mrs Cameron rang 000.
18At 10:16 pm the Police arrived. They made sure Ms Kirkland was able to leave with the Camerons. They noticed you were drunk and unsteady. The Police left the house about 10:52 pm.
19Ms Kirkland drove to Berwick in her car; Mr Cameron and his mother returned to Berwick in their car.
20While Ms Kirkland and the Camerons were driving to Berwick you called Ms Kirkland twice. She answered the second of these calls. This call lasted eight minutes and 36 seconds. She described you in that call as pleading for her to come back and being distracted. You also called Mr Cameron five times between 10.53 pm and 11.17 pm. The first two calls went unanswered by him, Mr Cameron did speak to you in the latter three calls. Mr Cameron described you as abusive during those phone calls. The last of them is recorded as commencing at 11:17 pm and lasting for eight seconds.
21At around 11:40 pm that night, you set fire to Ms Kirkland’s house. Forensic investigators would later give evidence that the fire was caused by the ignition (by match or cigarette lighter) of combustible materials, assisted by the presence of petrol. This was the factual basis that the Prosecution advanced at trial. That is, that you lit the fire by first putting petrol onto a bundle of advertising pamphlets and then lighting them. Expert evidence at the trial located the seat of the fire somewhere in the north eastern corner of the living area of the house.
22At 11:43 pm a neighbour, Mr Cairns-Malcolm, called 000 requesting the attendance of Police and fire services.
23You made a mobile phone call at or about 11:45 pm to the 000 operator. At 11:46 pm the 000 operator called you back, the first call having ended before it was complete. You made another call to the 000 operator at 11:48 pm. Recordings of the second two of these three calls were played to the jury. In the second call you confirmed the address where the fire was located. In the third call you expressed concern about the fire spreading to the property of elderly neighbours. I add here that other evidence in the case showed that the quality of mobile phone service in this area was variable.
24The fire brigade arrived at 11:52 pm. The house was well alight. CFA officers observed you to be intoxicated and distressed. You were squirting a garden hose at the fire. You told the fire crews that two dogs were inside (the dogs had actually left with Ms Kirkland and were not endangered). You were told by the CFA officers to stay away from the house while they attempted to extinguish the fire and search for the dogs. You told them that you had woken up and the lounge was on fire.
25You put the hose down, and entered the house through the open sliding door. A CFA officer removed you. You were removed from the house three times in total.
26You then went around to the back of the house and attempted to enter by smashing the window to Angela room. Police arrived, you told them that you had broken the window to try and get back in after being sent out by the CFA. In that process you cut yourself very badly on the arm. You were taken to hospital by Ambulance.
27The fire caused extensive damage to the lounge area and spare room of the house. There was also some damage to the dining area.
28
The following day Laura Noonan, a forensic officer, examined the scene. She excluded other possible sources of the fire and, after an analysis was undertaken of both the fire scene and burned papers taken from the scene, her opinion evidence was that the cause of the fire was the ignition of combustible materials assisted by the presence of petrol, and that the source of ignition was probably a match or cigarette lighter. This opinion was shared by another forensic expert
Mr Kelaher. In reaching its verdict, the jury must have accepted expert evidence that you put petrol on the pamphlets, lit them and put them somewhere near the north-eastern corner of the lounge area.
29At your trial, you elected to give evidence and challenged some parts of the Prosecution case. A number of potential accidental causes of the fire were advanced. The jury must have rejected your account to arrive at the verdict that they did.
30
On the Plea, the Prosecutor tendered the insurer’s report on the fire claim that
Ms Kirkland ultimately made. The damage to the building, contents and other costs amounted to a total of $287,461.59. The damage to the building alone was $188, 808.47 and the amount payable on the contents was $83,907.25.
Prior criminal history
31On your Plea, you admitted a prior criminal history. It comprises one offence dealt with in 1997; you were found guilty of criminal damage in the Magistrates’ Court. You were fined without conviction. I regard that event as having no bearing on the sentencing task in this case. I will sentence you on the basis that you are a person of previous good character.
32These events arose in March 2017; you have no subsequent convictions and there is nothing outstanding.
Nature and gravity of the offending
33I will now assess the nature and gravity of the offending.
34You pleaded guilty to the offence of common law assault, as detailed in the sentence of His Honour Judge Trapnell. I make it very clear that I do not sentence you for those events in this case, however I must sentence you in the context of those earlier acts against Ms Kirkland, because they put a complexion on your act of setting fire to the house.
35In his comprehensive submissions on the plea Mr Bloemen sensibly conceded that it is not inappropriate to classify this offence as an offence of family violence. I acknowledge that the family violence context relates solely to this single day; that is 27 March 2017. This distinguishes it from some of the cases I was referred to, which paint a picture of ongoing violence and coercive control.
36
That said, your act, that is the lighting of the fire in Ms Kirkland’s house, has to be understood as an act directed at, or in response to, Ms Kirkland and her departure that evening. The Prosecutor urged me to find that it was an act of retribution. I do not make that finding, however I assess the gravity of your offending in the light of the fact of Ms Kirkland’s multiple attempts to leave the house, your assault of her, your attempts to keep her at the house, your verbal aggression to her during the day, your calls to emergency services at about 10 pm, and your calls to
Ms Kirkland and the Camerons as they drove back to Berwick that night.
37Whether this was an act of retribution at your perceived rejection by Ms Kirkland, whether for attention or to control Ms Kirkland, or to bring her back to the house, I am unable to say precisely. So I do not arrive at a specific finding in that respect, but I do find that this act of arson was directed at her, through her property, in the context of your anger with her that day and her departure.
38For whatever reason and in whatever way, you were dissatisfied, intoxicated, and took steps to bring about this disaster for Ms Kirkland. That is the context for my assessment of the gravity of your offending.
39This context brings your offending along the scale of arson towards the more serious form of the offence, even accepting that this event was not part of a long chain of violent and controlling behaviour as is sometimes the case. You allowed your frustration, dissatisfaction, resentment, or anger to be expressed by the destruction Ms Kirkland’s house. This behaviour simply cannot be tolerated.
40You were Ms Kirkland’s partner. You described her in the 000 calls you made that night as your ‘darling’, your ‘princess’, and your wife. Ms Kirkland had asked you to live with her in the home that she had made. You owed her affection, kindness and protection. Instead, in an alcohol fuelled state, you set fire to her house and destroyed it. Moreover, this place was her home. It was her place to retreat, rest, and be safe among people she loved, and who loved her. You set fire to all that too. It is an outrageous thing to do to anyone but particularly shameful to do it to the woman you say you love.
41Having lit the fire, the evidence shows that you made a phone call to 000 approximately four or five minutes afterwards. At trial, the Prosecutor went to the jury on the basis that the acts done by you at the fire scene were simply a ruse to deflect suspicion. I do not adopt this interpretation. I take these acts at face value. That is, soon after you lit the fire you took steps to mitigate the unfolding damage in more or less successful ways. You made the calls; you held a hose.
42You are not charged with, and I do not sentence you for an endangerment offence, however the circumstances of your commission of the offence of arson were that a significant fire was started, which carried a risk to nearby houses and the people in them. I refer to the remarks of Justice Kellam in DPP v Derby in this regard and note that his Honour adds to this calculus the members of the community who put themselves at risk by serving in emergency services.[7]
[7]DPP v Derby (2007) 171 A Crim R 302.
43You were heavily intoxicated at the time. This was never pleaded in mitigation. It becomes relevant to my assessment of your prospects for rehabilitation later in the sentence, but I do take into account that this appears to be spontaneous offending and not premeditated.
44The value of the property destroyed, set in the context of being an offence of violence against your partner, leads me to conclude that your offending belongs past the midpoint on the scale of similar offending. Again, I emphasise I am assessing this only in relation to the events of this single day.
Personal circumstances.
45You are now 50 years old. You were 45 at the time of the offending. Your parents are elderly; they migrated from Greece in the 1950s. Your father was a factory worker and is currently in his late 70s. Your mother worked as a fishmonger and as a checkout assistant. Your family have never been in trouble with the law. You have three siblings, they have all thrived and have professional careers but none of them are close to your parents. You and your daughter, however both maintain a close bond with them. You lived together from time to time in the aftermath of these events.
46You have a 19 year old daughter, Angela, to whom by all accounts, you are quite devoted. Your separation from her will weigh heavily on you. You have been separated from Angela mother since she was about a year old. Clearly you have an established history of being a devoted father to her. Angela mother, Ms Whaley, wrote a character reference; she remains affectionate and supportive. She confirms how you have put Angela at the centre of your life. She testifies to your battle with alcoholism and the steps taken by you more recently to address it.
47Angela now runs a small business from her home and is undergoing further training in beauty therapy.
48You have completed some education, up to Year 11, at Glen Waverley Secondary College.
49Your work history starts early; you sold pies and drinks at the Waverley Park Oval when you were 12, a job you kept for 10 years. Later, you worked at McDonald’s, in a sales role for cookware, amongst other jobs and then did 20 years service at Crown Casino in various roles including as an assistant casino manager. You had to hold gaming licenses to occupy these latter positions. You resigned from Crown in mid-2016 to facilitate the move to Rosebud with Ms Kirkland.
50To your credit, your employment has continued after your initial arrest, under difficult circumstances, given the court commitments that you had to manage. Throughout 2018, 2019 and 2020 you worked fairly consistently it would seem, in container shipping services and other roles. Your work history suggests someone who is prepared to be adaptable and hard-working and this goes to your credit. You are often promoted to leadership roles in the workplace.
51You had, at the time of your offending, a longstanding uncontrolled alcohol addiction. You became a heavy drinker in your adolescent years, and this worsened as you grew older. You fell into a cycle of periods of unemployment, drinking, arguments with Ms Kirkland, and more drinking. It is clear to me that your drinking was a substantial contributor to your offending. You have attempted, without complete success, to shield your daughter from this aspect of your life.
52You recently turned 50 years old. This is your first time in custody. I accept that this must be extremely difficult for you. I will return to consider the conditions of your custody when considering other matters in mitigation.
Impact on victims
53I have regard to the impact on your victim. On your Plea Ms Kirkland provided a short victim impact statement. I have read it carefully. She speaks of feeling betrayed ‘beyond words’. Your action in setting fire to her house, she writes, has devastated her life. She had to manage the process of getting insurance (this took five months) and she lost things that were precious to her. She was displaced from her home and has experienced anxiety, paranoia and insomnia while dealing with more practical issues in relation to rebuilding the house, and living in temporary accommodation. Ultimately she chose to move interstate. I have considered Ms Kirkland’s statement carefully, setting aside those parts that import a broader history, but taking the balance into account.
Matters in mitigation
Delay
54Turning now to matters in mitigation.
55There has been inordinate delay between the time of your committing this offence on 27 March 2017 and its final resolution today. A committal was conducted on 17 July 2018. Your trial was listed on 27 May 2019; it spent three days in the reserve list but was not reached. The first trial finally started on 1 October 2019; that jury was discharged without verdict on the arson charge. You were sentenced on the common law assault charge on 29 November 2019. Your retrial on the arson charge then became one of the very large number of trials put off during 2020 on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was not until 29 July 2021 that your second trial finally commenced.
56Delay has two mitigating forces, namely unfairness and rehabilitative achievement. First, I accept that the delay has meant that this proceeding has hung over your head for a period of four and a half years. You had to interrupt your employment on multiple occasions in order to go to court. You have had the prospect of a your imprisonment casting a shadow over your life this whole time. Housing and relationships have all been on hold. You have experienced anxious rumination, sleeplessness, and worry about the shame and distress your family are experiencing and I take all that into account in mitigation of your sentence.[8]
[8]The Queen v Miceli (1997) 94 A Crim R 327 at 330.
57The second limb of delay is about the rehabilitation you have established between the period of your offending and today, the date of your sentence.
58
On your Plea three letters from rehabilitation clinics were tendered. Two were from the Refocus Rehab Toorak Alcohol and Drug Program. You voluntarily admitted yourself to residential substance treatment there for the first time on
11 April 2018 and stayed until you completed that phase on 3 May 2018. Another letter from the Dayhab Addiction Treatment Hospital confirms that you commenced a treatment program there on 7 May 2018, completing it on 4 June 2018. You re-entered the Refocus Rehab Toorak Program on 17 July 2019 and completed that program on 15 August 2019.
59Each of the letters from the rehabilitation facilities testify to your persistent voluntary attendance for treatment. This is clear evidence that you have managed, during the period of delay, to make genuine (expensive) and persistent attempts to address your alcohol addiction, with apparently good success. You became a participant in Alcoholics Anonymous and achieved mentor status. You attended psychological treatment for 10 sessions during 2017. You have had one brief period of relapse during the time you were awaiting trial.
60That rehabilitation allows me to sentence you on the basis of how you present at this time and not as at the time of your offending. In your case your acts of rehabilitation are very significant and reduce the role for specific deterrence in his sentence. However, the rehabilitation limb in mitigation for delay has two components. One is whether you have taken steps to reform, as you clearly have; the other is whether you have accepted responsibility for offending and acknowledged its wrongfulness. So, while I mitigate your sentence on the basis that you have used the period of delay to take very significant steps to reform yourself, the other limb of rehabilitation is absent here and will not be counted in your favour.[9]
[9]Tones v R [2017] VSCA 118 at [38], [41].
Extra curial punishment
61On your Plea, your counsel urged me to find that you had experienced extra curial punishment in two forms. First, it was argued that as a result of the offending you have lost accommodation with Ms Kirkland, the relationship with her, the loss of relationships with your mutual friends and the loss of your possessions that were in the house on the night of the fire. Next, it was argued that your significant injury sustained on the night (I refer to the hospital discharge summary that records the consequences of the severe cut you got breaking the window) is also mitigating. I take the second of these losses into account, but reject the first. The injury that you sustained will ‘serve as a savage reminder’[10] of these events and I take it into account.
[10] Barci & Asling v R (1994) 76 A Crim R 103.
62I do not accept that the other ‘extra curial punishment’ in the other losses can be weighed in your favour in mitigation of sentence.
Rehabilitation
63I have already referred to your positive steps to address your alcohol addiction. I have had regard to the three family references that were tendered on your plea. You have the ongoing support in particular of your mother, your former partner and mother to Angela, and of course Angela. I have already referred to your strong history of employment. Taking all this together and noting the Prosecution submission on the subject, I find your prospects of rehabilitation to be very good.
‘Akoka time’
64Turning now to the question of Akoka time.
65Further, on your Plea my attention was drawn to the principle in the case of Akoka v The Queen.[11] You spent approximately 90 days all up in rehabilitation which included significant restrictions on your liberty. I take this time into account as part of the instinctive synthesis, because to do so would be to encourage others to address their addictions in similar ways.[12]
[11]Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214.
[12]Ibid at [109].
Comparable cases
66On your Plea I was referred to a number of cases, some of which contained statements of principle; others were advanced to adumbrate the sentencing range.[13] I have had regard to all of them; the case of Salmi v R,[14] in particular, contains an extensive review of a range of cases. I have taken into account where pleas of guilty distinguish those sentences from yours, as well as other axes of comparison. No case is quite like yours, but I sentence you in this landscape.
[13]Beevers v The Queen [2016] VSCA 271; DPP v Bright (2006) 163 A Crim R 538; DPP v Derby (2007) 171 A Crim R 302; DPP v Hasan [2021] VCC 231; DPP v Jenson [2018] VCC 2079; DPP v Walford [2016] VCC 1635; Mc Padden v The Queen 2018] VSCA 57.
[14]Salmi v R 2020 VSCA 250.
COVID-19 circumstances
67I take into account your current and likely future experience of custody in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. You were first put in 14 days of isolation in order to quarantine. For the first eight of those days you were in isolation for 24-hours a day; food and amenities were passed through a trapdoor. During the final six days of your quarantine you were let out for 15 minutes to walk. At night you hear distressed screams from neighbouring cells, and the sounds of ambulances coming to the prison when violence erupts there. At the moment, the timber and metal yards in the prison are closed; the library and gym are shut; education programs are at a standstill. You can now walk in the yard during the day but there is no meaningful activity that you can do. This must be quite oppressive for someone with your work history in particular.
68You have had a small amount of phone contact with your family; these conditions extend to making your separation from your family even harder. I take them into account and recognise in this sentence that these conditions are likely to continue for some time.
Relevant sentencing principles
69Given the family violence setting of this offence, I am obliged to give full regard to the principle of general deterrence, in the hope that this sentence might inform others’ behaviour in the future. The role for specific deterrence is significantly reduced on account of the protective factors around you, in particular the work you have done to address your alcohol addiction, however there is still some role for specific deterrence here.
70The authorities are clear that, in all but very exceptional cases, sentences of imprisonment must flow for the serious offence of arson. Your barrister submitted that I could sentence you to a term of imprisonment with the addition of a Community Corrections Order. I note that the crime of arson is an exception to the rule in s44 of the Sentencing Act 1991,[15] that limits ‘combination’ sentences to a 12 month period of imprisonment. Even so, I am not convinced that such a sentence would be the proper answer to the question of what sentence I should impose in your case, given the role for general deterrence, just punishment and, to a lesser degree, specific deterrence.
[15]See clause 5, Schedule 1 of the Act.
71Through me and through this sentence your conduct in destroying Ms Kirkland’s home is publicly declared as fundamentally unacceptable.
Disposition
72Mr Papaioannou, on the charge of arson, you are convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of three years and six months, with a minimum non-parole period of two years and two months.
Pre-sentence detention
73Pursuant to s18 of the Sentencing Act 1991, I declare that 27 days of this sentence are to be calculated as already served.
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