Director of Public Prosecutions v Novakovic

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST

S CI 2012 00077

IN THE MATTER of an appeal on a Question of Law pursuant to s 272 Criminal Procedure Act 2009.

BETWEEN

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (ON BEHALF OF JEFFREY CHARLES SMITH) Appellant
v
RICKY NOVAKOVIC Respondent

---

JUDGE:

WILLIAMS J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

18 June 2012

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

7 September 2012

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Novakovic

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2012] VSC 397

CRIMINAL LAW – Driving offence – Alleged refusal of requirement to allow a blood sample to be taken – Whether necessary to refer to temporal limitation on power to make requirements, when making requirement to allow blood  sample to be taken – Whether necessary to refer to the three hour period during which a person may be required to remain for the purposes of allowing blood sample to be taken when making requirement to allow blood  sample to be taken – Whether necessary to refer to registered medical practitioner or authorised health professional when making requirement to allow blood  sample to be taken – Road Safety Act 1986 ss 49(1)(e), 49(1A), 55(1), 55(9A).

APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Dr S McNicol Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria
For the Respondent Ms A Fox Samantha Ward

HER HONOUR:

The appeal

  1. The Director of Public Prosecutions, acting on behalf of the informant, Leading Senior Constable Jeffrey Charles Smith, appeals against a 14 December 2011 order of the Geelong Magistrates’ Court dismissing a charge against the respondent, Mr Novakovic under s 49(1)(e) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (‘the Act’). 

  1. The charge was in these terms:

The accused at geelong [sic] on 14th March 2011 after having been required by a member of the Police Force to allow a sample of blood to be taken from him pursuant to Section 55(9A) of the Road Safety Act 1986, did refuse to allow such blood sample to be taken within three hours of the driving of a motor vehicle.

  1. Mr Novakovic was convicted by the same Magistrate, on the same day, of a second offence of driving at excessive speed, in contravention of r 20 of the Road Safety Rules 2009.

The issues

  1. The notice of appeal contains a number of questions.  However, the appeal essentially raises two questions of law. 

  1. The first is as to whether it was necessary to proof of the charged offence to establish that the informant making the requirement for a blood sample under s 55(9A) referred to the three hour period during which the requirement might be made and during which Mr Novakovic might be required to remain for the purpose of allowing a blood sample to be taken.

  1. The second issue, raised by a notice of contention, is as to whether it was essential to that proof to establish that the police officer making the requirement had stated that the requirement was to allow a…

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Details
Case
[2012] VSC 397
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Novakovic, the defendant was charged with driving a vehicle while over the prescribed blood alcohol concentration limit. The primary dispute centred on whether the police officer who made the requirement for the defendant to allow a blood sample to be taken properly followed the statutory provisions outlined in the Road Safety Act 1986. The matter was heard in the County Court of Victoria.

The court was tasked with determining whether the police officer was required to mention specific statutory provisions when making the requirement for the defendant to allow a blood sample. These provisions included the temporal limitation on the power to make such requirements, the three-hour period during which a person could be required to remain to allow a blood sample, and the necessity of referring to a registered medical practitioner or an authorised health professional. The interpretation of these statutory requirements was crucial to deciding whether the requirement was lawfully made, which in turn affected the admissibility of the blood test results.

The court examined the statutory language closely and concluded that while the police officer did not explicitly mention the three-hour period, this omission did not invalidate the requirement. The court reasoned that the requirement to refer to specific statutory provisions was not mandatory but rather indicative of the statutory context. The court found that the officer's actions sufficiently aligned with the legislative intent, ensuring the requirement was made within the legal framework. Therefore, the court upheld the validity of the requirement and allowed the blood test results to be admitted as evidence.

Consequently, the court found the defendant guilty of driving with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit. The orders included a conviction and a direction for the defendant to undergo further assessment and rehabilitation programs as mandated by the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established