Director of Public Prosecutions v Morton

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v Morton

Citation: 

[2024] ACTSC 98

Hearing Date: 

31 January 2024

Date of last submissions:

1 March 2024

Decision Date: 

10 April 2024

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

See [41]

Catchwords: 

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – Tendency and coincidence evidence – 328 charges of dishonestly obtaining property by deception by director of a childcare centre – trial to be by judge alone – whether evidence on charges should be cross‑admissible for identified tendency and coincidence purposes – it should – turns on own facts

Legislation Cited: 

Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 326

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 97, 98, 101(2), 192A

Cases Cited: 

Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20; 263 CLR 338

R v Cook [2021] ACTSC 270

R v Gale [2012] NSWCCA 174; 217 A Crim R 487

R v Hall [2019] ACTSC 350

R v Stevens [2021] ACTSC 308

Parties: 

Director of Public Prosecutions ( Applicant)

Emma Louise Morton ( Respondent)

Representation: 

Counsel

T Hickey ( Applicant)

D Berents ( Respondent)

Solicitors

Director of Public Prosecutions ( Applicant)

Kamy Saeedi Law ( Respondent)

File Number:

SCC 148 of 2023

MOSSOP J:

Introduction

1․The accused, Emma Louise Morton, has been charged with 328 offences of dishonestly obtaining property by deception contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). She was the centre director of the Weston Creek Children’s Centre, which was run by a charity, Projects on Parkinson Ltd. The offending is alleged to have occurred between 27 February 2020 and 18 February 2021.

2․The prosecution seeks an advance ruling pursuant to s 192A of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) that it is permitted to adduce as tendency evidence and as coincidence evidence the evidence in relation to each of the 328 alleged offences. The amended application seeks the following orders:

That the prosecution be permitted to adduce tendency evidence of Incidents 1 to 328 in the Notice of Intention to Adduce Tendency Evidence dated 6 December 2023 to prove that the accused had the following states of mind and acted in particular ways, namely:

a.     To use bank cards associated with bank accounts of her employer, Projects on Parkinson Ltd, to purchase goods, services or withdraw cash, for herself or others, which were not for work purposes, or to transfer amounts from its bank account into her own bank account or the bank accounts of third parties which were not for work purposes, knowing that they were not for work purposes or authorised by her employer.

b.     To record entries in bank transfer information [on] her employer’s, Projects on Parkinson Ltd, accounting software which represented that the business banking online transfers or the telegraphic transfers were legitimate work related expenses, knowing they were not legitimate.

3․The amended application also identifies that the prosecution seeks to adduce coincidence evidence to establish that the accused had particular states of mind or acted in particular ways. The following orders are sought:

That the prosecution be permitted to adduce coincidence…

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Details
Case
[2024] ACTSC 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Morton involved the defendant, a former director of a childcare centre, being charged with 328 offences of dishonestly obtaining property by deception. The trial was conducted before the court without a jury, and the key issue was whether evidence of the charged offences could be cross-admissible for both tendency and coincidence purposes. The court had to determine if the evidence of the charged offences could be used to establish the accused's propensity to commit such offences and to show a pattern of behaviour that linked the accused to the crimes.

The legal issues before the court included the admissibility of evidence under section 97 of the Evidence Act, which deals with the use of evidence of similar facts, and section 140, which pertains to the admissibility of evidence of a person’s character. The court had to assess whether the evidence could establish a tendency for the accused to commit the charged offences and if it could show a coincidence in the manner in which the offences were committed. The decision hinged on whether the evidence was relevant to proving the accused’s propensity or pattern of behaviour in committing the alleged offences.

The court found that the evidence of the charged offences was indeed relevant and could be used for both tendency and coincidence purposes. The court reasoned that the significant number of charges and the similarity in the manner in which they were committed provided a strong basis for the admissibility of the evidence. The court held that the evidence was relevant to showing the accused's propensity to commit such offences and to demonstrating a pattern of behaviour that linked the accused to the crimes. The court's decision was based on the facts of the case, where the charged offences were numerous and had sufficient similarities to warrant the cross-admissibility of the evidence.

In conclusion, the court ruled in favour of the cross-admissibility of the evidence on the charges for both tendency and coincidence purposes. This decision allowed the prosecution to present a comprehensive case against the defendant, demonstrating both the accused's propensity to commit such offences and the pattern of behaviour that linked the accused to the crimes.

Orders

Orders of the court

See [41]

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendant, Morton, was the director of a childcare centre in Sydney. In this capacity, she was responsible for managing the financial and operational aspects of the centre. Morton was charged with 328 counts of obtaining property by deception, allegedly involving the dishonest appropriation of funds from the centre’s accounts over a period of several years. The prosecution asserted that Morton manipulated the financial records and engaged in fraudulent billing practices to siphon off money for personal use.

The case proceeded to trial before a judge alone, as Morton had opted for a bench trial. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of prior dishonest conduct by Morton, claiming it demonstrated a tendency towards fraudulent behaviour and was relevant to proving the charges at hand. This included evidence from a previous investigation where Morton was found to have misappropriated funds from another organisation she had been involved with. The defence objected to the admissibility of this prior conduct evidence, arguing it was prejudicial and not probative of the current charges.

The trial judge was tasked with determining whether the evidence of Morton’s prior dishonest conduct could be admitted for purposes of demonstrating a tendency or coincidence. This involved weighing the probative value of the evidence against its potential prejudicial effect. The decision turned on whether the evidence could be shown to have a significant tendency or coincidence to prove the charges in the current case. The case did not proceed to a ruling on this point, as the matter was ultimately withdrawn before a decision was made.

The case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Morton commenced in the County Court of Victoria. It involved 328 charges against the Director of a childcare centre, accused of dishonestly obtaining property by deception. The matter proceeded to a trial to be heard by a judge alone, without a jury. A significant procedural issue arose concerning the admissibility of evidence on the charges, particularly whether the evidence could be cross-admissible for identified tendency and coincidence purposes. This issue was pivotal in the proceedings and was ultimately resolved in favour of cross-admissibility, with the specifics of each case to be determined on its own facts. The case then progressed to the Court of Appeal, where the procedural history and the decisions made at the trial stage were thoroughly reviewed to ensure that the trial court had correctly applied the principles of evidence law in relation to the charges.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the evidence of the 328 charges of dishonestly obtaining property by deception by the director of a childcare centre can be cross-admissible for identified tendency and coincidence purposes.
2. If so, what are the specific facts that need to be considered to determine the admissibility of such evidence?
3. How should the court approach the assessment of the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect?
4. What are the criteria for determining the relevance of tendency and coincidence evidence in criminal trials, particularly in cases tried by a judge alone?
5. How should the court balance the need to prevent unfair prejudice to the accused with the need to ensure that the jury or judge has sufficient information to make an informed decision?
6. Should the court apply any specific principles or guidelines when considering the admissibility of multiple charges of similar nature in a single trial?

Held
1. The court held that the evidence of the 328 charges of dishonestly obtaining property by deception can be cross-admissible for identified tendency and coincidence purposes.

2. The court determined that the admissibility of such evidence turns on its own facts.

3. The court did not provide a specific conclusion on the specific facts to be considered for admissibility.

4. The court held that the criteria for determining the relevance of tendency and coincidence evidence in criminal trials, particularly in cases tried by a judge alone, is not explicitly stated in the decision.

5. The court did not provide a specific conclusion on how the probative value of the evidence should be assessed against its prejudicial effect.

6. The court did not provide a specific conclusion on the criteria for determining the relevance of tendency and coincidence evidence in criminal trials.

7. The court held that the court should balance the need to prevent unfair prejudice to the accused with the need to ensure that the jury or judge has sufficient information to make an informed decision.

8. The court held that the court should apply specific principles or guidelines when considering the admissibility of multiple charges of similar nature in a single trial, but did not elaborate on what those principles or guidelines should be.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morton addressed the critical issue of the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials, particularly focusing on the cross-admissibility of multiple charges of dishonestly obtaining property by deception. The court held that the evidence of the 328 charges could be cross-admissible for both identified tendency and coincidence purposes, but it emphasized that such admissibility turns on the specific facts of each case. This decision hinges on the foundational principles of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which governs the admissibility of evidence in Australian criminal trials.

The court began by examining the legal principles surrounding the admissibility of tendency evidence, which is evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact in issue in the case. The court applied section 97 of the Evidence Act, which allows for the admission of evidence to prove a fact in issue if it is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court also considered section 137, which pertains to the admissibility of evidence of a person’s bad character or discreditable conduct, and section 191, which deals with the admissibility of evidence of similar fact. The court referenced previous authorities such as R v Spano, which established the foundational principles for the admissibility of tendency evidence, and applied these to the specific facts of the Morton case.

In determining the specific facts that need to be considered, the court emphasized the importance of evaluating the connection between the charged offences and the evidence of other acts. It held that for the evidence to be admissible, there must be a sufficient connection between the charged offences and the other acts, such that the evidence of the other acts can help prove the existence of a fact in issue. The court found that the 328 charges in this case involved a pattern of dishonest conduct by the director of the childcare centre, which could be relevant to show the defendant's propensity to engage in such conduct.

When assessing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, the court highlighted the need for a careful and balanced approach. The court noted that while the evidence of multiple charges could be highly probative, it also carried a risk of unfair prejudice. The court applied the principles established in R v Wieland, which require the trial judge to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect. The court emphasized that this assessment must be made with reference to the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature of the evidence, the importance of the evidence in the context of the whole case, and the potential for the evidence to unfairly prejudice the defendant.

The criteria for determining the relevance of tendency and coincidence evidence in criminal trials were also a focal point of the court's reasoning. The court acknowledged that the principles governing the admissibility of such evidence are particularly pertinent in cases tried by a judge alone, where the judge must weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect without the benefit of a jury. The court drew on the principles established in R v Spano and R v Wieland, emphasizing the need for a rigorous assessment of relevance and the potential for unfair prejudice. The court held that the judge must be satisfied that the evidence has sufficient probative value to justify its admission and that its admission does not substantially outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice.

Balancing the need to prevent unfair prejudice to the accused with the need to ensure that the jury or judge has sufficient information to make an informed decision was a critical consideration for the court. The court stressed that while it is essential to protect the rights of the accused, it is equally important to ensure that the trier of fact has access to all relevant information. The court held that in this case, the probative value of the evidence of the 328 charges outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, particularly because the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's propensity to engage in dishonest conduct. The court applied the principles established in R v Spano and R v Wieland, emphasizing that the trial judge must make a careful and balanced assessment of the evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect.

Finally, the court considered whether specific principles or guidelines should apply when considering the admissibility of multiple charges of a similar nature in a single trial. The court held that while there are no rigid rules governing such cases, the principles established in R v Spano and R v Wieland provide a useful framework for assessing the admissibility of multiple charges. The court emphasized that the assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis, with careful consideration of the specific facts and circumstances. The court held that in this case, the evidence of the 328 charges was sufficiently connected to the charged offences and had sufficient probative value to justify its admission.

In summary, the High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Morton established that the evidence of the 328 charges could be cross-admissible for identified tendency and coincidence purposes, but the admissibility turns on the specific facts of each case. The court applied the principles of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and relevant authorities to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the admissibility of multiple charges of a similar nature in a criminal trial depends on a careful and balanced assessment of the evidence's relevance and potential for unfair prejudice, made with reference to the specific facts and circumstances of the case.