SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S EAPCR 2020 0158
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| ZAC MORLEY (a pseudonym)[1] | First Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the name of the applicant.
S EAPCR 2020 0159
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| TIM MORLEY (a pseudonym)1 | Second Respondent |
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| JUDGES: | MAXWELL P, PRIEST and KAYE JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 17 November 2020 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 4 December 2020 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSCA 313 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v Morley (a pseudonym) (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Cahill, 11 June 2020) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Interlocutory appeal – Crown appeal – Fraudulently induce persons to invest money – Dishonest concealment of material facts – Dishonesty – Peters objective test applicable – No requirement to prove subjective awareness of dishonesty – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed – Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493, R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 considered – Crimes Act 1958 s 191(1).
WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘dishonest’, ‘dishonest concealment’.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Mr C Boyce QC with Mr M Cookson | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondents | Mr C Thomson | C Marshall & Associates |
MAXWELL P
PRIEST JA
KAYE JA:
Summary
This interlocutory appeal concerns the proper construction of the phrase ‘any dishonest concealment of material facts’ in s 191(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (the ‘Act’). The respondents, who are brothers, are charged with offences under that section.
The relevant allegation against each respondent is that ‘by dishonest concealment of material facts’ he induced a retired couple (‘the investors’) to invest in a scheme involving the purchase, fattening and ultimate sale of goats. The material facts said to have been dishonestly concealed related to the history of the respondents’ goat farming business and their parlous financial position.
It is common ground that the prosecution must prove that the brothers knew the relevant facts, and appreciated their materiality to the investors’ decision to invest. It must also be proved that the respondents deliberately withheld — ‘concealed’ — this information from the investors.
The question for determination concerns the test to be applied by the jury in deciding whether any concealment of material information was dishonest. The prosecution submits, as it did before the judge, that the word ‘dishonest’ is used in s 191(1) in its ordinary sense, such that the jury should be directed that the question of dishonesty ‘is to be decided by the standards of ordinary, decent people’.[2] The defence submission, by contrast, is that the jury would also need to be satisfied that the relevant respondent knew that his conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.
[2]Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493, 504 [18]; [1998] HCA 7 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (‘Peters’).
Initially, the trial judge ruled in…
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- Case
- [2020] VSCA 313
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation and application of the term 'dishonest' and 'dishonest concealment' as it pertains to the appellant's actions. Specifically, the court needed to decide whether the objective test set out in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493, and refined in R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, required proof of the appellant's subjective awareness of the dishonesty of his actions. The appellant argued that the test demanded such subjective awareness, while the prosecution maintained that objective dishonesty was sufficient.
The court ruled that the objective test for dishonesty, as established in Peters and Ghosh, does not necessitate proving that the appellant was subjectively aware of the dishonesty of his actions. The court emphasised that the objective test assesses whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have considered the conduct to be dishonest. The court found that the trial judge correctly applied the objective test, and there was no error in the conviction. Consequently, the leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed, affirming the conviction under section 191(1) of the Crimes Act 1958.
The final orders of the court included the affirmation of the appellant's conviction, with the court providing clarity on the application of the objective test for dishonesty in the context of concealment of material facts. The decision underscored that the subjective awareness of dishonesty is not a requisite element for proving the offence.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the County Court of Victoria where Morley was tried and convicted. Following the conviction, Morley appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal was heard as an interlocutory appeal, with the Crown seeking leave to appeal the trial judge's findings on the issue of dishonesty. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and subsequently heard the appeal on its merits. The appeal was determined by the Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the trial judge correctly applied the objective test for dishonesty as outlined in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493 and R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053.
2. Whether there was a requirement to prove subjective awareness of dishonesty under the Crimes Act 1958 s 191(1).
Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge correctly applied the objective test for dishonesty as outlined in Peters v The Queen (1998) 192 CLR 493 and R v Ghosh [1982] QB 1053. As a result, the appeal against this aspect of the trial judge’s decision was dismissed.
2. The court determined that there was no requirement to prove subjective awareness of dishonesty under the Crimes Act 1958 s 191(1). Consequently, the interlocutory appeal on this issue was dismissed.
3. The court granted leave to appeal on the issue of the objective test for dishonesty and allowed the appeal on that ground.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by reviewing the application of the objective test for dishonesty, which is established in Peters v The Queen and R v Ghosh. The court reaffirmed that under Australian law, the test for dishonesty is an objective one, focusing on what a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have understood, rather than the defendant’s actual state of mind. This test was correctly applied by the trial judge, and the court found no error in this application. Therefore, the appeal regarding the application of the objective test was dismissed.
The court then addressed the second issue concerning the requirement to prove subjective awareness of dishonesty. The court examined the relevant statutory language of the Crimes Act 1958 s 191(1) and concluded that the statute did not mandate proof of the defendant’s subjective awareness of dishonesty. This interpretation aligns with the established objective test for dishonesty in Australian law. Consequently, the interlocutory appeal on this issue was also dismissed.
However, the court granted leave to appeal on the matter of the objective test for dishonesty, as it considered this a significant point of law. The court allowed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge correctly applied the objective test, but granted leave to appeal to ensure clarity on this point of law. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the objective test for dishonesty, as outlined in Peters and Ghosh, is the applicable standard in criminal cases involving dishonesty under the Crimes Act 1958 s 191(1), without the need to prove subjective awareness of dishonesty.