| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S ECR 2021 0121
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Crown |
| v | |
| JOSHUA MOLONEY | Accused |
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JUDGE: | Lasry J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 6 July 2022 |
DATE OF SENTENCE: | 14 July 2022 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Moloney |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2022] VSC 393 |
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CRIMINAL LAW — Sentence — Drive in a manner dangerous causing death — Plea of guilty of significant utilitarian benefit — Collision caused by driver’s inattention to cyclist on highway— No alcohol, drugs, fatigue or high speed involved — Vulnerability in custody —Evidence of remorse — Category 2 offence — Court required to impose custodial sentence unless an exception under s 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) exists — Absence of exceptional and rare circumstances — Primacy of general deterrence in sentencing offences of this kind where offender is otherwise of good character — Very good prospects of rehabilitation — s 319(1) Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); ss 3, 5(2H), 5(2H)(e), 5(2HC), 5(2I), 89(1) and 89(2)(a) Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Crown | Stephanie Clancy | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Jason Gullaci | Tony Hannebery Lawyers |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
Joshua Moloney, on 10 January 2022 in this Court, you pleaded guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing death contrary to s 319(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). This concerned an incident in which you were the driver of a motor vehicle which struck and killed Michelle Lisa Ruitenbeek on Nepean Highway, Chelsea in the early hours of 28 March 2019.
The maximum penalty for the offence you committed is 10 years imprisonment.[1] It was originally 5 years imprisonment but was increased to ten years for offences committed after March 2008.
[1]Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 319(1) (‘Crimes Act’).
Under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the offence is a category 2 offence which means that a custodial sentence must be imposed unless certain circumstances apply. I am also required to disqualify you from holding a driver’s licence for a period of at least 18 months.[2]
[2]Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 89(1) and 89(2)(a) (‘Sentencing Act’).
On 6 July 2022 I heard a prosecution opening, received victim impact statements and heard submissions from your counsel on sentence and responses from the prosecutor. It is now my responsibility to sentence you for your offending.
Circumstances of offending
On the morning of 28 March 2019, you were driving south along the Nepean Highway, Chelsea in your Mitsubishi Triton vehicle, heading to work in Seaford. You were not speeding. As to be expected at that time of the morning it was not fully light but neither was it completely dark. There was artificial light along the roadway.
Ms Ruitenbeek was on her bike and training for triathlons. She was also riding south along the same route, ahead of you and riding to the left of the left hand lane.
The collision occurred on…
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- Case
- [2022] VSC 393
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered various factors, including the plea of guilty, the defendant’s lack of prior criminal history, the absence of alcohol, drugs, fatigue, or high speed contributing to the collision, and the defendant’s expressed remorse. Despite these mitigating factors, the court found that the general deterrence imperative in cases involving dangerous driving outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The court held that the statutory requirements for a custodial sentence in this instance could not be set aside, as the statutory language was clear and unambiguous, and there were no exceptional and rare circumstances present that warranted an exception under section 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act.
The court concluded that the statutory framework required a custodial sentence for the defendant, and no exceptions under section 5(2H) applied. The court imposed a custodial sentence, acknowledging the defendant’s remorse and prospects for rehabilitation, but ultimately found that the general deterrence aspect of sentencing was paramount in this case. The court ordered the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment, with credit for time already spent in custody.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi