Director of Public Prosecutions v Moloney

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No.  S APCI 2010 0124

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS & ANOR

Appellants

v.

ROBERT GERARD MOLONEY

Respondent

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JUDGES:

MANDIE and BONGIORNO JJA, SIFRIS AJA

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

23 August 2011

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

16 September 2011

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2011] VSCA 278

JUDGMENTS APPEALED FROM:

Moloney v Attorney-General of Victoria & DPP [2010] VCC 0481 and Moloney v Attorney-General of Victoria, DPP & Anor (No 2) [2010] VCC 1201 (Judge Saccardo)

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CONFISCATION ACT 1997 – Award of damages pursuant to undertaking as to damages - Duty to disclose material matters in application for ex parte restraining order – Meaning of ‘any relevant matters’ in s.16(4) – Meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ in s 18(1)(c) – No general discretion pursuant to s 18 based on justice or convenience to grant or refuse a restraining order – Appeal allowed and award set aside

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr S O’Bryan SC with
Ms L De Ferrari
Mr A Hanger, OPP Victoria
For the Respondent Ms F I O’Brien SC with
Mr J Buchecker
Davies Moloney

MANDIE JA:
BONGIORNO JA:
SIFRIS AJA:

  1. The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) and the State of Victoria appeal against orders[1] made by a judge in the County Court whereby the State was in substance ordered to pay the sum of $262,720 to Robert Gerard Moloney (‘the respondent’ or ‘Mr Moloney’) by way of enforcement of an undertaking as to damages given on behalf of the State in order to obtain a restraining order[2] under the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) (‘the Act’). The amount so awarded represented Mr Moloney’s net equity in real property situated at 71 Mathiesons Lane, Nirranda (‘the Property’).

    [1]The relevant orders were an order made 8 September 2010 as varied by an order made 1 October 2010.

    [2]The undertaking was recorded in a restraining order made by Judge McInerney in the County Court on 9 September 2008. 

Background and procedural history

  1. By an application dated 4 September 2008, the DPP sought a restraining order pursuant to s 16(2)(c) of the Act in respect of the Property. Section 16(2)(c) of the Act empowers the DPP to apply without notice to the Supreme Court or the County Court for a restraining order in respect of property if:

a person has been charged with a Schedule 2 offence and that person has an interest in the property or the property is tainted property in relation to that offence.

  1. The application recited that the jurisdiction to make the order sought arose because Mr Moloney had been charged with the offences of:

Cultivate a commercial quantity of cannabis, traffick cannabis in a commercial quantity and possess cannabis, amongst other offences, and some of these offences are Schedule 2 offences within the meaning of [the Act].

  1. The application further stated, inter alia, that the purpose of the order sought was to satisfy automatic forfeiture of property that might occur under Division 2 of Part 3 of…

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Details
Case
[2011] VSCA 278
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between the Director of Public Prosecutions and Moloney was heard in the court. The primary issue in the case was the interpretation and application of the Confiscation Act 1997, particularly concerning the award of damages, the duty to disclose material matters in an application for an ex parte restraining order, and the meaning of certain statutory terms such as ‘any relevant matters’ and ‘reasonable grounds’. The case focused on whether there was a general discretion to grant or refuse a restraining order based on justice or convenience.

The court was required to decide if there was a duty to disclose material matters in an application for an ex parte restraining order and the extent of the disclosure required. Additionally, the court needed to interpret the terms ‘any relevant matters’ in section 16(4) and ‘reasonable grounds’ in section 18(1)(c) of the Act. The court also had to consider whether there was a general discretion under section 18 to grant or refuse a restraining order based on considerations of justice or convenience. The court found that the applicant had not discharged the onus of establishing that there were no material matters that would assist the court in deciding the application for a restraining order. Furthermore, the court held that there was no general discretion to grant or refuse a restraining order based on justice or convenience.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders made on 8 September 2010 and 1 October 2010 were set aside. The court ordered that Moloney’s application be dismissed with costs, including any reserved costs. The court proposed that an order be made, subject to submissions from the parties, that Moloney pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

We would allow the appeal, set aside paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the orders made below on 8 September 2010 and the whole of the order made below on 1 October 2010 and in lieu thereof we would order that Mr Moloney’s application be dismissed with costs, including any reserved costs. We would further propose that an order be made (subject to any submissions from the parties) that Mr Moloney pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established