Director of Public Prosecutions v McGee

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[2010] TASCCA 12

COURT:              SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)

CITATION:              Director of Public Prosecutions v McGee [2010] TASCCA 12

PARTIES:  DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
  v

McGEE, Thomas Jackson

FILE NO/S:  CCA 113/2010
DELIVERED ON:  15 September 2010
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  10 August 2010
JUDGMENT OF:  Crawford CJ, Evans and Porter JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Grounds for interference – Parity between co-offenders – Whether parity principles apply to Crown appeals against sentence.

R v Radloff (1996) 6 Tas R 99, followed.
R v Vincent [2006] NSWCCA 276; Steer v R (2000) 171 ALR 463, considered.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3522]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
           Appellant:  T J Ellis SC, A Hensley
           Respondent:  E Hughes
Solicitors:
           Appellant:  Director of Public Prosecutions
           Respondent:  Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania

Judgment Number:  [2010] TASCCA 12
Number of paragraphs:  46

Serial No 12/2010
File No 113/2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v THOMAS JACKSON McGEE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD CJ
  EVANS J
  PORTER J
  15 September 2010

Orders of the Court

  1. Appeal allowed.

  1. Sentence quashed.

Serial No 12/2010
File No 113/2010

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v THOMAS JACKSON McGEE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
  CRAWFORD CJ
  15 September 2010

  1. The respondent was found guilty by a jury of one count of burglary and one count of arson.  He pleaded guilty to another count of burglary and one count of stealing.  On 15 February this year, Tennent J recorded convictions and sentenced him for the four crimes to 12 months' imprisonment wholly suspended on condition that for three years he be of good behaviour. 

  1. The Director appealed on two grounds that asserted errors of law.  The first is that the sentence was manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances of the case.  The second is that the sentence was unjustifiably and significantly disparate to a sentence imposed on one of the respondent's co-offenders, Jye Gregory Halliday, the respondent's sentence being significantly more lenient.  In the alternative, the second ground is put on the basis that the learned judge failed to consider and apply parity principles.

The factual basis for sentencing

  1. The crimes concerned a pasta and pizza restaurant in a built up area in the centre of St Helens.  There were three offenders who were the respondent, who was 18 years old at the time (and 19 when sentenced), Halliday, who was 23 years at the time, and a 17-year-old youth. 

  1. In the early hours of 20 January 2009, the three offenders entered the restaurant at least twice.  On one occasion, alcohol and about $200 in coins were stolen.  On the last occasion, all three returned with petrol with the intention of setting fire to the premises to destroy forensic evidence that may have been left by them.  The petrol was spread around and the fire was lit.  Substantial damage was caused by the fire. 

  1. The jury was left to consider the allegation of arson on either of…

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Details
Case
[2010] TASCCA 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania against the sentence imposed on the respondent, Mr McGee, for the offence of aggravated robbery. The appeal concerned the application of the principle of parity between co-offenders in the context of a Crown appeal against sentence.

The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the principle of parity, which requires that sentences imposed on co-offenders should be broadly similar, applies to Crown appeals against sentence. The Court was required to determine if the sentencing judge had erred in failing to adequately consider the disparity between the sentence imposed on Mr McGee and the sentences imposed on his co-offenders, and whether this disparity warranted interference by the appellate court.

The Full Court held that the principle of parity is a fundamental consideration in sentencing and applies equally to Crown appeals against sentence. The Court reasoned that a significant disparity in sentences between co-offenders, without proper justification, can indicate an error in the sentencing exercise. In this instance, the Court found that the sentence imposed on Mr McGee was demonstrably lower than that imposed on his co-offender, who had a comparable or greater level of culpability, and that this disparity was not adequately explained or justified by the sentencing judge. Consequently, the Court concluded that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and that the appeal should be allowed.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence imposed on the respondent was quashed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Sentence quashed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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