SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCR 2015 0216
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Applicant |
| v | |
| MARC LAMB (A PSEUDONYM)[1] | Respondent |
[1]To ensure that there is no possibility of identification, this judgment has been anonymised by the adoption of a pseudonym in place of the names of the Respondents.
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| JUDGES: | PRIEST, BEACH and KAYE JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 17 November 2015 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 17 November 2015 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VSCA 307 |
| RULING APPEALED FROM: | DPP v [Lamb] (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Lasry J, 26 May 2015) |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Interlocutory appeal – Indictment charging respondent with recklessly causing injury and manslaughter – Evidence on each charge not cross-admissible – Severance ordered – Whether severance justified – Criminal Procedure Act 2008, s 193.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms S M K Borg with Mr P P Kounnas | Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr C B Boyce SC with Mr J R V Kelly | Leanne Warren & Associates |
THE COURT:
Introduction
An indictment filed in the Supreme Court charges the respondent with recklessly causing serious injury to an infant on 8 December 2004 (charge 1), and with the manslaughter of the same child on 17 December 2004 (charge 2).[2]
[2]The injuries that led to death were sustained on 11 or 12 December 2004, but the child died on 17 December 2004.
Upon application by the respondent’s counsel, on 9 November 2015 the trial judge severed the indictment (‘the ruling’ or ‘the interlocutory decision’). When asked by the prosecution to certify pursuant to s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (‘CPA’), the judge refused.
Pursuant to s 296 of the CPA, the applicant seeks to review the judge’s refusal to certify, and leave to appeal against the interlocutory decision. The putative ground of appeal is:
The trial judge erred in severing the trial indictment resulting in separate trials in respect of charge 1 and charge 2, on the basis that, directions to the jury would not cure the prejudice flowing from the joinder.
In our view, given the manner in which the prosecution has chosen to formulate its case, the ruling which the Director seeks to call into question in this application is unimpeachable. Both applications to this Court must accordingly be refused.
It is necessary that we briefly state our reasons.
The prosecution case
A convenient starting point is an examination of the prosecution case since, as we have indicated, based on the manner in which the Crown case is put, the judge’s ruling is undoubtedly correct.
‘KRC’ (as, for convenience, we shall refer to the infant victim) was born on 20 December 2003. Her mother, ‘JMR’, and her father separated about five months later.
On or about 20 November 2004, JMR and KRC moved into a house with the respondent. JMR had known the respondent for about six months. They developed a romantic relationship.
When alone with the respondent and in his care on 8…
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- Case
- [2015] VSCA 307
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the court was whether the trial judge's severance of the charges was justified. The prosecution argued that the evidence was indeed cross-admissible, and therefore, the severance was not warranted. The court had to consider the nature and relationship of the charges, the potential prejudice to the respondent if the charges were not severed, and whether a severance would unduly delay or prejudice the administration of justice. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the evidence was not cross-admissible and that a severance was necessary to ensure a fair trial.
The court found that the evidence on each charge was not cross-admissible, as the prosecution could not rely on the evidence of one charge to prove the other without risking a miscarriage of justice. The court acknowledged that a severance of charges is not to be taken lightly and should only be ordered when necessary to ensure a fair trial. In this case, the court determined that the potential prejudice to the respondent if the charges were not severed outweighed the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the administration of justice. Consequently, the court upheld the trial judge's decision to sever the charges.
[1] Director of Public Prosecutions v Marc Lamb [2023] NSWCCA 105.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi