Director of Public Prosecutions v Lo (Ruling No 3)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
AT MELBOURNE
NOT RESTRICTED

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2017 0114

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v  
YU TUNG LO

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JUDGE:

Jane Dixon J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

12, 14-16, 19, 22, 26, 28 February, 1, 8, 15 March 2018

DATE OF RULING:

29 March 2018

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Lo (Ruling No 3)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2018] VSC 149

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CRIMINAL LAW – Ruling – Relevance of evidence about visit by marriage celebrant to make arrangements for a marriage between the accused and the deceased - Visit took place the night before the murder – Defence application for exclusion of evidence under ss 135 or 137 Evidence Act - Consequences for parties in respect of the potential for other evidence to be adduced if marriage celebrant evidence admitted.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Ms S Borg
Ms M Stylianou
Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr M Cahill  SC
Ms K Rolfe
Paul Vale Criminal Law

HER HONOUR:

  1. The factual background to this ruling may be found in my first ruling in this matter.[1]

  1. The Defence have now indicated that they object to the Crown leading evidence from Mark Davies, a marriage celebrant.[2] Mr Davies provides evidence that he attended Hogan’s home in Maddingley at Hogan’s request on 23 May 2016 at fairly short notice.

    [2]Depositions 567.

  1. In the presence of both Hogan and Lo, Mr Davies explained the procedures involved in arranging to marry, and, after both Hogan and Lo read the relevant forms and indicated their understanding of what was conveyed to them, they each signed a ‘Notice of Intended Marriage‘ form  which was then witnessed by Davies. They then both signed a Marriage Ceremony Agreement form. The latter form was incorrectly dated 22 May 2016.

  1. Mr Davies was informed that Lo was due to return to China on about 4 June but would return just before the planned wedding date of 24 June 2016 at 9.00 am. 

  1. The Defence objects to the evidence on the grounds of relevance. Mr Cahill argued that, although the Crown rely on the evidence as relationship and context evidence, it is a confusing piece of evidence for the jury. He argued that it is counter-intuitive to the Crown case that on the night of 23 May, Lo made a request that AB kill Hogan—the same night as the attendance of the marriage celebrant. 

  1. If the evidence were put before the jury, there would be a risk that the jury might be misled into thinking that Hogan wanted to marry Lo because he loved and cared about her. This would lead to the necessity for the Defence to adduce evidence from a number of other witnesses including Raine, Bartlett, Hughes, and Phelan showing an alternative scenario that Hogan had some other more utilitarian motive for wanting to marry Lo.  Such evidence would reveal that Hogan had been actively…

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Details
Case
[2018] VSC 149
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought a ruling on the admissibility of evidence regarding a visit by a marriage celebrant to the accused, the night before the deceased was murdered. The accused was on trial for the murder of the deceased. The evidence in question involved the celebrant's visit to make arrangements for a marriage ceremony between the accused and the deceased, which was scheduled for the following day. The defence sought to exclude this evidence on the basis that it was irrelevant and prejudicial under sections 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act.

The court needed to determine whether the evidence of the celebrant's visit was relevant to the issues in the case, and if so, whether its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The defence argued that the evidence was not relevant because it did not pertain to the accused's state of mind or actions on the night of the murder. The DPP countered that the evidence was relevant to establishing the relationship between the accused and the deceased, the planning of the marriage, and potentially the accused's motive or intent.

The court concluded that the evidence was relevant because it helped to establish the context of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, which was a significant aspect of the case. The court also found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have. The court reasoned that the evidence of the celebrant's visit was necessary to understand the background and circumstances surrounding the relationship between the accused and the deceased, and it was pertinent to the potential motive or intent of the accused. The court allowed the evidence to be admitted.

The court did not make final orders in this ruling as it was limited to determining the admissibility of evidence. However, the admission of the evidence regarding the marriage celebrant's visit to the accused the night before the murder is likely to have significant consequences for both the prosecution and the defence in the ongoing trial.

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