| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No S CR 2012 0151
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| TRACEY KERR |
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JUDGE: | HOLLINGWORTH J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 30 April, 1-2, 5-7 May 2014 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 9 December 2014 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Kerr (ruling No 2) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2014] VSC 604 | |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Murder – “No case” submission – Circumstantial case on causation – Whether jury could rationally exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence – Case to answer
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr P Rose QC Mr G Hayward | Office of Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr S Tyrrell Ms C Hollingworth | Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
The accused, Tracey Kerr, was charged with murdering Douglas Barrett on 26 May 2012, in the bungalow at the back of his property.
At trial, there was no dispute that Mr Barrett died from a fatal cardiac arrhythmia; however, there was a dispute as to whether one or more acts of Ms Kerr had contributed significantly to, or been a substantial and operating cause of, that fatal arrhythmia. In summary, the prosecution case was that the arrhythmia was caused by the oculocardiac reflex (from some eye-related injuries), neurogenic shock (from a stab wound to the neck), or a combination of the two. The defence case was that the jury could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the arrhythmia was not caused by a combination of Mr Barrett’s pre-existing heart problems with stress or excitement, quite independently of any injuries inflicted by Ms Kerr.
At the close of the prosecution case, on 6 May 2014, defence counsel made a “no case” submission in relation to the issue of causation. After hearing argument, on 7 May 2014 I determined that there was a case to answer.[1] I said that I would publish my reasons at a later date; these are those reasons.
[1]At the end of the trial, the jury found Ms Kerr not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter.
“No case” principles
There was no dispute about the principles governing an application such as this one. The starting point is that:
… if there is evidence (even if tenuous or inherently weak or vague) which can be taken into account by the jury in its deliberations and that evidence is capable of supporting a verdict of guilty, the matter must be left to the jury for its decision. Or, to put the matter in more usual terms, a verdict of not guilty may be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty.[2]
[2]Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207, 214-5.
In assessing a “no case” submission, the judge is to take the prosecution evidence at its highest, and to draw all inferences most favourable to the prosecution which can reasonably be drawn from the…
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- Case
- [2014] VSC 604
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were centered around the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a circumstantial case on causation. The court had to determine whether the jury could rationally exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with Kerr's innocence, given the evidence presented. This involved assessing whether there was enough evidence to allow a jury to conclude that Kerr was the perpetrator of the murder and that the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
The court examined the evidence presented by the prosecution, considering the nature of circumstantial evidence and the requirement for the jury to be able to exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. The court held that the prosecution had indeed presented a case that met the requisite standard. It found that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to rationally exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with Kerr’s innocence. Therefore, the court ruled that there was a case to answer, and Kerr's "no case" submission was dismissed. The matter proceeded to the jury for determination of guilt.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi