Director of Public Prosecutions v Karen Hollis (a pseudonym)

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2019 0073

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS	Appellant
v
KAREN HOLLIS (a pseudonym)[1]	First Respondent
and
ALEX HULL (a pseudonym)	Second Respondent

[1]Because this is an interlocutory proceeding, pseudonyms have been used in place of the name of the first and second respondent and the reasons have been prepared in a form which omits identifying details.

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JUDGES:	MAXWELL P, T FORREST and EMERTON JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	17 April 2019
DATE OF ORDERS:	17 April 2019
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	21 May 2019
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2019] VSCA 110
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	[2019] VSC 226R (Beale J)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Interlocutory appeal – Evidence – Admissibility – Record of interview – Applicant arrested and detained – Initial interview – Applicant exercised right to silence – Interview suspended – Investigations continuing – Whether investigators obliged to release applicant – Whether continued detention unlawful – Whether detention for improper purpose – No unlawfulness – Evidence admissible – Appeal allowed – Crimes Act 1958 s 464A, Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 295(3)(a).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	Mr N A Hutton with Mr L Cameron	Mr J Cain, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the First Respondent	Mr J A Willee	Tait Lawyers
For the Second Respondent	Mr C T Carr	Slades & Parsons

MAXWELL P
T FORREST JA
EMERTON JA:

Summary

Section 464A of the Crimes Act 1958 is a provision of great importance to the administration of criminal justice. It both authorises and limits the detention of a person who is taken into custody in the course of a criminal investigation.

The authorisation and the limit are both provided by sub-s (1), which is expressed in the form of a statutory duty. Thus a person taken into custody for an offence must be released (unconditionally or on bail), or brought before a bail justice or the Magistrates’ Court, ‘within a reasonable time of being taken into custody’.

At common law, the detention of a suspect for the purpose of questioning was unlawful.[2] The statute reverses that position. Where a person suspected of having committed an offence is in custody for that offence, s 464A(2) provides that investigating officials may — within the reasonable time allowed by sub-s (1):

question the person or carry out investigations in which the person participates in order to determine the involvement (if any) of the person in that offence.

And sub-s (4) lists a large number of matters — including the need to take preparatory investigative steps — which may be considered in determining what constitutes ‘a reasonable time’.

[2]Williams v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 278, 292–4.

The respondent, Ms Hollis, was taken into custody at 9:40 pm on 24 October 2017. Later that evening, investigating police conducted a record of interview with her, in the course of which she said that she had been advised by her barrister to answer ‘no comment’. She indicated several times that she wished to follow that advice, after which the interview was suspended.

Ms Hollis was not charged that evening, nor was she released from custody. She remained in police custody for another two days. She subsequently completed a record of interview in which she gave responsive answers, and participated in two re-enactments.

The trial judge upheld a defence application to exclude the contents of the record of interview. In his Honour’s view, the detention of Ms Hollis became unlawful on the evening of 24 October 2017, after the initial interview was suspended. In the circumstances, his Honour held, s 464A(1) required her unconditional release at that time ‘because to hold her in custody overnight and beyond, was to hold her for more than a reasonable time’.[3]
[3]DPP v Hollis [2019] VSC 226R [47] (‘Reasons’).

Further, his Honour was satisfied that there was a ‘causal nexus’ between the illegal detention and the obtaining of the impugned evidence. He ruled that the evidence should be excluded under s 138 of the Evidence Act 2008, as he was not persuaded that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in those circumstances.

On application by the prosecutor, his Honour granted a certificate under s 295(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, holding that the exclusion of the evidence would ‘eliminate or substantially weaken’ the prosecution case. It was common ground on the appeal that this was so.

The prosecution sought leave to appeal against his Honour’s ruling on two grounds. The first was that the judge erred in concluding that the detention of Ms Hollis had become unlawful on the evening of 24 October; the second, put in the alternative, was that the discretion to exclude the evidence under s 138 had miscarried. At the conclusion of argument, we announced that leave to appeal would be granted, the appeal allowed, the ruling set aside and in its place there be a ruling refusing the application to exclude. We indicated that we would publish our reasons subsequently. These are those reasons.

The foundation of our decision was s 464A(4) which, as noted earlier, lists a large number of matters which may be considered in determining what constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ for the purposes of sub-s (1). The wide variety of potentially relevant circumstances highlights the fact that the length of the period of detention, by itself, is likely to shed little light on the question of reasonableness.[4] Rather, the inquiry must be directed at understanding why the detention continued for as long as it did and whether — having regard to the sub-s (4) factors — the period of detention was reasonable.
[4]See, eg, R v Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 297, 314–5 [48].

In the present case, however, the question was much narrower. As we have indicated, the judge decided that the ‘reasonable time’ allowed under s 464A(1) expired as soon as the initial interview was suspended. By then Ms Hollis had only been in custody for a matter of hours. What was crucial, his Honour held, was that she had by then exercised her right to silence.

In our respectful view, it was not open to his Honour to reach that conclusion on a proper application of the statute. On the contrary, the investigating officers were entitled to keep Ms Hollis in custody while they gathered information for use in a resumed interview. That this is a proper purpose is made clear by s 464A(4)(c), which makes relevant to the ‘reasonable time’ question:

any need of the investigating official to read and collate relevant material or to take any other steps that are reasonably necessary by way of preparation for the questioning or investigation.

Neither of the respondents to this application submitted to the Court that, if his Honour’s conclusion were held to be erroneous, it should be found that the ‘reasonable time’ had expired at some later time. Given the chronology of events (set out in detail below), this was unsurprising.

As will appear, there were substantial periods of time during which the questioning of Ms Hollis was suspended to enable her to receive medical treatment[5] and to rest.[6] Also relevant was that Ms Hollis was in receipt of legal advice on three separate occasions during the period of detention.[7] It was of particular significance that, immediately before the resumption of the record of interview and her giving of responsive answers, she had had a 30 minute conversation with her solicitor. Moreover, there was expert evidence before the judge to the effect that Ms Hollis was at all relevant times fit for interview. There was no suggestion of her will having been overborne.

Factual background[8]

[5]See Crimes Act 1958 s 464A(4)(i).

[6]See ibid s 464A(4)(j).

[7]See ibid s 464A(4)(g).

[8]Paragraphs [15]–[36] are adapted from the reasons of the trial judge.

Ms Hollis is charged with murder. The prosecution alleges, pursuant to ss 323(1)(b) and 324(1) of the Crimes Act 1958, that she was a party to the murder of the deceased (‘RL’) by her co-accused (the second respondent, Alex Hull) on 15 October 2017.

In brief terms, the prosecution case is that Ms Hollis told Mr Hull (her recent ex-boyfriend) that she had been raped by RL; that she was concerned for the safety of her friend (‘GC’), with whom RL was staying; and that GC wanted RL out of her unit. Hull then went with his friend (‘ED’) to GC’s unit and murdered RL. A few days later, Hull and Hollis dumped RL’s body.

GC is also standing trial, essentially for being an accessory after the fact to murder.[9] ED has already pleaded guilty to manslaughter but is yet to be sentenced.
[9]She is charged with assisting an offender contrary to s 325 of the Crimes Act 1958.

Events on 24 October 2017

At approximately 4:30 pm on 24 October 2017, Hollis accompanied police to the local police station to make a statement about the last time she saw RL. In the course of her statement to Detective Watson of the Homicide Squad, she alleged that RL had raped her on the afternoon of 14 October 2017 when she was visiting GC’s unit.

Detectives were also speaking to GC on the afternoon of 24 October 2017. Detectives Ross and Riley made an overt field recording with her between 4:32 pm and 5.44 pm. Detectives Burke and Walsh then took a video-recorded significant witness statement from her between 9:14 pm and 4:45 am on 25 October 2017. GC signed her witness statement at 4:43 am on 25 October 2017. During the overt field recording on the afternoon of 24 October 2017, GC indicated that Hull and another male had attended her unit and had had an altercation with RL, resulting in his death, and that Hollis had also attended her flat soon after.

At approximately 9:40 pm on 24 October 2017, as a result of information received by police from GC which suggested Hollis was not being truthful, Hollis was arrested by Detective Watson and taken from the witness room to the custody area. She asked to speak to a barrister, which Watson facilitated.

At approximately 10:26 pm, Watson proceeded to conduct a record of interview with Ms Hollis. She was told she was being questioned in relation to the death of RL. She informed Watson that she had been advised by her barrister to answer ‘no comment’. She also indicated several times that she wished to follow that advice. Watson tried to get her to answer questions by telling her that what her barrister said to her was merely advice, not instructions, but Hollis continued to answer ‘no comment’.

Watson suspended the interview at 10:37 pm, saying he intended to speak to ‘the rest of the crew’ about the state of the investigation. Hollis was not charged, nor was she released from custody on the night of 24 October 2017. Instead, she was held in police custody for another two days.

Events on 25 October 2017

As noted earlier, GC signed her witness statement at 4:43 am on 25 October 2017. At 5:30 am, Watson spoke with Hollis in the custody area of the police station. Hollis said she was feeling the effects of alcohol withdrawal and required medical treatment.

At around 8:00 am, pursuant to instructions from a Forensic Medical Examiner, Hollis was taken to the Emergency Department of a major hospital by Detectives Watson and Walsh for assessment and treatment regarding alcohol withdrawal. On the way to the hospital, police allowed Hollis to speak to her barrister again over the phone.

At the hospital, Hollis was given three 10 mg doses of diazepam (at 9:43 am, 11:01 am and 2:10 pm) and at approximately 2:45 pm she was allowed to leave the hospital in the custody of other detectives, who had relieved Detectives Watson and Walsh. The hospital gave the police a prescription for diazepam for Hollis and instructions that she should be given one or two 5 mg diazepam tablets and Vitamin B tablets every six hours. Police attended a chemist and filled the prescription before arriving back at the police station with Hollis at around 3:15 pm.

Detectives Burke and Walsh began interviewing Hollis at around 5:13 pm on 25 October 2017. Burke told Hollis that she was being interviewed about RL’s death. Burke gave Hollis a caution and her rights and asked Hollis to explain them back to him in her own words, a task which Hollis performed promptly and satisfactorily. According to the trial judge:

In this first part of the record of interview, [Hollis] appeared alert. She certainly appeared in much better shape than she had been when interviewed by Watson the previous evening. She had no difficulty comprehending or responding to Burke’s questions.

When Hollis asked if she could speak to her barrister again, the interview was suspended to allow that to take place. She ended up speaking to a solicitor for about half an hour between 7:09 pm and 7:41 pm as her barrister was not contactable.

Burke and Walsh recommenced the interview at approximately 8:05 pm. It was only at this stage that Hollis began answering police questions about the circumstances surrounding RL’s death.

Shortly before 8:45 pm, Walsh interrupted the questioning to ask Hollis whether she wanted more diazepam. Approximately six and a half hours had passed since her last dose at the hospital. Hollis indicated that she would like to have more diazepam because she wanted to stop symptoms of alcohol withdrawal returning. The interview was suspended at 8:45 pm so she could have a break and take her medication.

At 8:56 pm the record of interview re-commenced. Hollis was reminded of the caution and her rights, and proceeded to answer questions promptly and responsively. At about 9:30 pm, Hollis agreed to participate in the re-enactments.

At approximately 9:43 pm, the police suspended the record of interview with a view to taking Hollis to the scene of the killing and the scene of the disposal of the body for video recorded re-enactments. Just before that suspension, Burke asked Hollis whether she would like something to eat, to which Hollis replied ‘No, I feel sick’. Burke replied ‘Yeah, well, you yell out if you need anything at all from us, alright’ and then suspended the interview. Neither Burke nor Walsh asked Hollis whether she needed medical attention and there is no evidence that medical attention was provided to her prior to the crime scene re-enactments.

The first video re-enactment commenced at approximately 11:45 pm on 25 October 2017 and lasted for about 18 minutes. During that re-enactment, Hollis gave prompt and responsive answers. There were a number of times where she yawned and where she struggled to recall details but she provided a reasonably informative and coherent account of events that she said had happened there some 10 days beforehand.

Events on 26 October 2017

Hollis was then taken to where RL’s body had been dumped by Hull and Hollis. The second re-enactment commenced there at 12:25 am on 26 October 2017. That re-enactment went for about 10 minutes and again, whilst Hollis showed signs of tiredness and yawned a number of times, her answers were prompt, responsive and coherent. She was then taken back to the police station where Walsh conducted a short interview commencing at 2:07 am. He commented that Hollis seemed very tired: she said she was exhausted. She was then taken to a different police station to rest. At her request, she was placed in an interview room, rather than in the cells, and during the night she was observed to be sleeping on the floor in that interview room.

Burke and Walsh collected her at approximately 10:05 am and took her back to the local police station for a continuation of the record of interview. At Hollis’ request she was given two more diazepam tablets and two vitamin B tablets, at approximately 10:30 am. Hollis had not been given any medication during the previous night.

At 12:05 pm, Burke and Walsh re-commenced the interview with Hollis and that part of the interview lasted until approximately 1:29 pm. At 2:15 pm, Walsh provided Hollis with another two diazepam tablets and two vitamin B tablets.

At 3:09 pm, Burke and Walsh re-commenced the record of interview, suspending it at 4:19 pm. They re-commenced the interview at 4:32 pm. The interview concluded at 5:16 after Hollis was informed that she would be charged with murder.

Detention for the purpose of questioning

At common law, investigating officers had no authority to detain a suspect in custody for the purpose of interrogation. In R v Banner, the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court said:

Police officers have, of course, power to arrest and detain a citizen where they have reasonable and probable grounds for suspecting that a felony has been committed, and that he is the person who committed it. But this power is exercisable only for the purpose of taking him before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law for that felony. They have no power whatever to arrest or detain a citizen for the purpose of questioning him or of facilitating their investigations. …[10]

[10][1970] VR 240, 249.

As noted earlier, that position was altered by legislation. Section 464A, which came into force on 15 March 1989,[11] provides as follows:
[11]Introduced by the Crimes (Custody and Investigation) Act 1988.

Crimes Act 1958
464A   Detention of person in custody
(1) Every person taken into custody for an offence (whether committed in Victoria or elsewhere) must be—
(a)        released unconditionally; or
(b)        released on bail; or
(c)       brought before a bail justice or the Magistrates' Court—
within a reasonable time of being taken into custody.
(2) If a person suspected of having committed an offence is in custody for that offence, an investigating official may, within the reasonable time referred to in subsection (1)—
(a) inform the person of the circumstances of that offence; and
(b)question the person or carry out investigations in which the person participates in order to determine the involvement (if any) of the person in that offence.

(3) Before any questioning (other than a request for the person's name and address) or investigation under subsection (2) commences, an investigating official must inform the person in custody that he or she does not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do may be given in evidence.
(4) In determining what constitutes a reasonable time for the purposes of subsection (1) the following matters may be considered—
(a) the period of time reasonably required to bring the person before a bail justice or the Magistrates' Court;
(b) the number and complexity of offences to be investigated;
(c) any need of the investigating official to read and collate relevant material or to take any other steps that are reasonably necessary by way of preparation for the questioning or investigation;
(d) any need to transport the person from the place of apprehension to a place where facilities are available to conduct an interview or investigation;
(e) the number of other people who need to be questioned during the period of custody in respect of the offence for which the person is in custody;
(f) any need to visit the place where the offence is believed to have been committed or any other place reasonably connected with the investigation of the offence;
(g) any time taken to communicate with a legal practitioner, friend, relative, parent, guardian or independent person;
(h) any time taken by a legal practitioner, interpreter, parent, guardian or independent person to arrive at the place where questioning or investigation is to take place;
(i) any time during which the questioning or investigation of the person is suspended or delayed to allow the person to receive medical attention;

(j)any time during which the questioning or investigation of the person is suspended or delayed to allow the person to rest;
(k)the total period of time during which the person has been in the company of an investigating official before and after the commencement of custody;
(l) any other matters reasonably connected with the investigation of the offence.

The judge’s reasons

After setting out the chronology of events, his Honour concluded as follows:

In my view, [Hollis] was illegally detained when she was not released from custody on the night of the 24 October 2017 after the Watson interview. Clearly, the police did not have enough evidence to charge her at that time. Further, she had indicated to Watson a number of times in the course of that interview that she had received advice from her barrister to answer no comment and that she intended to stick to that advice. Whilst Watson and the other detectives may have wanted to gather more information regarding her possible involvement in the killing of [RL] and to put that information to her in due course, they could not just ignore the protections afforded to her by s 464A, especially given her reliance on the right to silence. In all the circumstances, s 464A required them to release her unconditionally on the night of 24 October because to hold her in custody overnight and beyond, was to hold her for more than a reasonable time. If further information came to light which implicated her in the killing of [RL], the police could re-arrest her and attempt to re-interview her, a course of action which is commonplace in many police investigations.
By keeping her in custody overnight and throughout the next two days, there was a real potential for [Hollis’] right to silence to be undermined, for her to be worn down, whether or not that was the intention of the police at the time. It is not difficult to see how a suspect’s resolve to act on her lawyer’s advice to answer no comment can be weakened and possibly overcome if the suspect is kept in custody for an extended period of time. As the period of detention wears on, the suspect may well reason that, since silence in response to questioning has not brought about her extrication from police custody, one way or another, the only hope is to start answering questions.
The mere fact that police provide a suspect with various amenities throughout their time in police custody (for example, time to rest, food and drink, medical assistance when required, further opportunities to communicate with lawyers) does not negate the accumulated pressure on a suspect from continuing to be held in police custody and does not transform illegal detention into legal detention.
In summary, I am satisfied that there was a contravention of s 464A(1) and that there was a causal nexus between [Hollis’] illegal detention and the police obtaining the impugned evidence.[12]

[12] Reasons [47]–[50].

In view of our conclusion, it is unnecessary to set out his Honour’s reasons with respect to the application of s 138 of the Evidence Act 2008 .

Consideration

As can be seen, his Honour’s conclusion turned on the fact that Ms Hollis had exercised her right to silence by making it clear in the initial interview — a number of times — that she had been advised to give ‘no comment’ answers and ‘intended to stick to that advice’. To detain Ms Hollis in those circumstances, his Honour said, was effectively to ‘ignore the protections afforded to her by s 464A, especially given her reliance on the right to silence’.

It was not enough, in his Honour’s view, that the investigating officers wanted to gather more information to put to Ms Hollis in due course. The only course open, should that occur, was for the police to re-arrest Ms Hollis and attempt to re-interview her.

The submission for the Director was that this was not the only course open consistent with the constraints of s 464A. The investigators were not bound to release Ms Hollis at that point but were entitled to proceed, as they did, by suspending the interview pending further inquiries and holding her in detention in the meantime. When the interview was suspended, other investigators were continuing to interview GC, whose information had been the basis for the arrest of Ms Hollis earlier that day.

Counsel for Ms Hollis submitted that, given her ‘peculiar frailties’ and her vulnerable position as a victim of an alleged rape, any continued detention created a real risk that her will would be overborne. As things turned out, counsel submitted, Ms Hollis

was coerced into the role of assisting the homicide squad and by continuing to participate in two re-enactments and another record of interview she might have become her own betrayer.[13]

[13]Emphasis in original.

The submission on behalf of Mr Hull[14] invoked the public law notion of improper purpose. According to the argument, the power to detain (which s 464A implicitly conferred and explicitly controlled) was used, in this case, for the improper purpose of ‘challenging’ Ms Hollis’ exercise of her right to silence. Once Ms Hollis had made it clear that she did not intend to answer questions, it was said, it was a misuse of the power to detain her with a view to asking her further questions at a later time.
[14]As a co-accused, Mr Hull was a party to the appeal: Watkins [2015] VSCA 321 [15].

For this purpose, counsel relied on what was described by Barwick CJ in R v Ireland as a ‘rule of practice for the conduct of police officers’,[15] namely, that it was improper for police investigating the commission of a crime ‘to persist in questioning a suspect after an indication that he did not wish to answer any more questions’.[16]

Reliance was also placed on what was said by this Court in R v Robinson, as follows:
The questioning of the applicant proceeded on more than one occasion in total disregard of his strongly expressed wish to terminate the interview. Questions which were unfairly formulated or irrelevant to the subject matter of the investigation were asked. In other words, there were a number of departures on the part of the interrogating police members from the proper standards to be adopted in such a process.
These breaches clearly possessed the potential of overbearing the will of the applicant or of rendering the admission of statements made by him unfair or subject to exclusion as an expression of public policy.[17]

[15](1971) 126 CLR 321, 333.

[16]Ibid.

[17][1998] 1 VR 570, 583 (emphasis added).

Counsel also drew attention to the following statement of principle by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Plevac:

1.Police may, in the course of investigation, interrogate a suspect who is willing to answer their questions, and that interrogation may include putting to the suspect the facts as the police know, or believe, or suspect them to be, in order to ascertain what, if anything, the suspect will say about them.
2.Such questioning must be fair and must not amount to ‘intimidation, persistent importunity or sustained or undue insistence or pressure’, but questioning is not to be regarded as unfair merely because it is persistent.
3.Police should not persist with such an interrogation after the suspect has indicated that he or she does not wish to answer further questions, although merely because a suspect says he does not wish to answer, or will not answer, any further questions does not render inadmissible answers to further questions which the suspect does answer provided the questions are fair and proper and the answers are otherwise admissible.[18]

[18](1995) 84 A Crim R 570, 579-80.

In our view, what occurred here did not in any relevant sense amount to a ‘disregard of’ or a ‘challenge to’ Ms Hollis’ exercise of her right to silence. Plainly enough, she did exercise that right in the initial interview. But there was no breach of s 464A(1) in holding her in detention while inquiries continued. As counsel for the Director pointed out, the very matter being further investigated was the information provided by GC on which the arrest of Ms Hollis had been based.

That part of the investigation came to fruition when GC signed her statement at 4:43 the following morning. The police were evidently intending to resume the interview with Ms Hollis when she indicated that she was feeling unwell, which in turn prompted the trip to hospital and the obtaining of appropriate medication.

As noted earlier, the legislature has expressly contemplated that the length of time for which a suspect may reasonably be detained may be affected by

any need of the investigating official to read and collate relevant material or to take any other steps that are reasonably necessary by way of preparation for the questioning or investigation.[19]

Given that provision, it could hardly be an improper purpose to detain the suspect while such ‘reasonably necessary’ steps were taken. Of course, whether the length of the resulting detention was reasonable would be a separate matter for determination.

[19]Crimes Act 1958 s 464A(4)(c).

Nor is there — or could there be — any general rule that a person must be released following an initial refusal to answer questions. As the investigating officer put to Ms Hollis in the initial interview, he was giving her the opportunity to give her version, and describe her role, in her own words. When she reiterated that she was not proposing to answer questions, the officer said:

Well, that being the case then, it’s best that I go and speak to the rest of the crew and see where the investigation’s up to. So that we can formulate this interview.

There was no impropriety in resuming the interview, following the obtaining of a signed statement from GC, in order to give Ms Hollis a further opportunity to provide her version of events. In the event, after receiving legal advice immediately before the resumption of the interview, she decided to take up that opportunity.

Accordingly, on a proper application of the provision in the circumstances of the case, it was not open to his Honour to conclude that the ‘reasonable time’ in s 464A(1) had expired upon the suspension of that interview because Ms Hollis told investigators that she intended to follow her barrister’s advice not to answer questions.

As noted earlier, his Honour did not identify any later time at which the detention had become unlawful, should his primary conclusion be held to have been erroneous. Nor did either of the respondents advance an alternative position in this Court.

For completeness, we should add that there appeared to be nothing unreasonable about the continuation of the detention after that time. Exactly as s 464A(4) contemplates, there were interruptions of the questioning for the purposes of allowing Ms Hollis to:

·secure appropriate medical treatment;[20]
·rest;[21]
·communicate with a legal practitioner;[22] and
·visit the locations where the offence was believed to have been committed for the purpose of re-enactments.[23]

[20] See ibid s 464A(4)(i).

[21]See ibid s 464A(4)(j).

[22]See ibid s 464A(4)(g).

[23]See ibid s 464A(4)(f).

There was nothing in the circumstances to indicate that her will was overborne. On the contrary, as we have mentioned, she received legal advice on three separate occasions.

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