| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
S CR 2017 0146
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| EARL JONES |
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JUDGE: | HOLLINGWORTH J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 8-9 February 2018 |
DATE OF REASONS: | 29 June 2018 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Jones (Ruling) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2018] VSC 43 |
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CRIMINAL LAW – Evidence – Hearsay evidence – Dying declaration – Statement by fatally-injured victim to friend that “Earl got in and got me” – Whether admissible as exception to hearsay rule – Whether probative value outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice – Statement admissible – Evidence Act 2008 ss 65(2)(b) and (c), 137.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the DPP | Mr A Grant | Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Accused | Mr D Sala | Emma Turnbull & Associates |
HER HONOUR:
Introduction
The accused man, Earl Jones, was charged with the murder of Stephen Lowry (also known as Stefan Lovic) on 1 August 2016. Around 5.00 am that morning, Mr Lowry bled to death from a stab wound to the thigh, in his room at the Regal boarding house in St Kilda.
Keith Baker, another resident at the Regal, was a prosecution witness at the trial. By notice dated 30 November 2017, the prosecution indicated their intention to adduce hearsay evidence, namely a representation made by Mr Lowry to Mr Baker shortly before he died, that “Earl got in and got me” (“the representation”).
The prosecution sought to rely on the representation as evidence of the identity of the person who inflicted the fatal stab wound. At the time of preliminary argument,[1] the defence did not dispute that the accused was at the Regal at the relevant time, but disputed that the accused was the person who inflicted the stab wound.
[1]The defence position as to the accused’s presence at the Regal changed several times before and during the trial.
In the course of preliminary argument before the jury was empanelled, the defence opposed the admission of the representation as an exception to the hearsay rule. Alternatively, the defence sought to have the representation excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008 (“the Act”).
On 9 February 2018, I ruled that the representation was admissible. I indicated that I would publish my reasons later; these are those reasons.
Hearsay
By virtue of s 59 of the Act, the statement was inadmissible unless it fell within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The prosecution sought to admit the evidence under the exception in s 65 of the Act. Mr Lowry, the maker of the statement, was clearly not available to give evidence, for the purposes of s 65(1). The prosecution relied upon the exceptions in ss 65(2)(b) and (c), which exclude the application of the hearsay rule to evidence of a previous representation if the representation:
(b) was made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication; or
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- Case
- [2018] VSC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of the hearsay rule exceptions under the Evidence Act 2008. Specifically, the court had to determine if the statement could be admitted as a dying declaration under section 65(2)(b) and (c), and if the probative value of the statement justified any potential unfair prejudice under section 137. The court was required to balance the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
The court examined the statutory framework and case law to conclude that the statement qualified as a dying declaration under section 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act 2008. The statement was made by the victim, who was aware of their impending death and could reasonably be inferred to be making a statement of fact about the events leading to their injury. The court found that the probative value of the statement was significant, as it directly implicated the defendant in the act of causing the victim's death. While acknowledging the potential for prejudice, the court determined that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effects, allowing the statement to be admitted as evidence.
Ultimately, the court ruled that the dying declaration was admissible as evidence, finding it to be a crucial piece of evidence in the prosecution's case against Jones. The court's decision hinged on the balance between the probative value of the statement and any prejudicial effects it might have, with the former prevailing. This ruling was pivotal in the case, setting a precedent for the admissibility of dying declarations in similar circumstances.