Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones

[2019] VCC 200

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

CR 18-01805

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

v

BAILEY JONES

---

JUDGE:	HIS HONOUR JUDGE MCINERNEY
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	20 February 2019
DATE OF SENTENCE:	22 February 2019
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v Jones
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2019] VCC 200

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
---

Subject:	CRIMINAL LAW
Catchwords:	Plea of guilty – aggravated home invasion – intentionally cause injury (3 counts) – young offender – youth justice centre order – mandatory minimum non-parole period – special reason
Legislation Cited:	Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); Carjacking and Home Invasion Bill 2016; Sentencing (Community Correction Order and Other Acts) Amendment Bill 2016.
Cases Cited:	R v Tsiamas & Kastanis [1997] VSC 194; R v Bainbridge, Cullen & Ludowicki (1995) 74 ACR 265; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; DPP v O'Neill [2015] VSCA 325; DPP v Tokava [2006] VSCA 156; Merritt, Piggott & Ferrari [2007] VSCA 1; R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235.
Sentence:	Convicted and sentenced to detention in a Youth Justice Centre for a period of three years on each charge, to be served concurrently.

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Director of Public Prosecutions	Mr S Devlin	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Ms E Miller	Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR: 

1In this plea, which was conducted yesterday, Mr Jones who is now 20, about to turn 21 tomorrow, and 19 at the time of this offending, has pleaded guilty to one charge of aggravated home invasion pursuant to indictment J10274750.  Mr Devlin appeared on behalf of the Director, Ms Miller on behalf of Mr Jones.

2The charge of aggravated home invasion is a recent charge, to the extent that I have never had to sentence a person for that charge.  It brings with it a number of legislative changes these being set out in the Sentencing Act.  These matters were matters of concern to this Court prior to the plea, I will come to those in due course.

3The summary prepared by the learned prosecutor as to these crimes was tendered as Exhibit A.  An indication of the seriousness of the aggravated home invasion is obtained from the fact that the maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament is 25 years' imprisonment.

4Also, as a result of the various researches and determinations that have had to be made into the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Sentencing Act, one was able to gauge the intent of Parliament, being a response to what the Parliament described as "community outrage" about such crimes, and as was clearly stated by the Parliament, that the community expects gaol for such offences.

5This attack upon Mr Pithie at his home, and the two other fellow residents, took place at 10 pm on 24 February 2017. Mr Jones entered the premises with at least three other persons at 2 Laurie Street. Those persons were in possession of a taser, bats, and poles.  They were all in dark clothing.  They all came through the front door.  They also had a home-made .22 - however, the plea was made on the basis that Mr Jones had no knowledge of that particular weapon being brought into the home.  Fortunately, despite the barbarity of this attack, the impact upon Mr Pithie, from a physical point of view, has been somewhat limited.

6While he did spend two days in hospital, predominantly as a result of bruising, his physical recovery has been quite complete and without any ongoing problems.  However, because of the circumstances of this crime, as set out in his victim impact statement, Exhibit B, he has suffered from PTSD because of the severe trauma inflicted, Mr Jones, by you and your companions.

7As he said, he was hospitalised for being tasered more than ten times, as he described, pistol-whipped multiple times, and as a result of the severe deep tissue damage that he got.  He maintains the one physical consequence is that he still has ongoing back pain.  He submits that as a result of the totality of these matters - in particular, the anxiety - he has had difficulties with his employment and has needed counselling.

8The associated charges to which Mr Jones has also pleaded guilty are causing injury intentionally to Mr Pithie, causing injury intentionally to
Mr Elliot, and the same offence insofar as the other person at the premises,
Ms Harris.  It is not necessary for me, albeit that I have read both of their victim impact statements, to go to them individually.

9Again, fortuitously, despite the experience that both of them had - and indeed, it must be remarked that Mr Elliot performed quite bravely in trying to assist his friend, but fortunately, but for the laceration that he suffered, neither of them have any ongoing issues.

10When one takes into account the seriousness of this behaviour, the seriousness of the crimes, and the view that the community takes about such crimes,
it is almost unbelievable that they were committed by a person of Mr Jones' age and in the circumstance where, at that time, he had no priors for violence whatsoever.

11To date, he has served pre-sentence detention - what is it at current?  Is it 70?

12MS MILLER:  Twenty-two days, Your Honour.

13HIS HONOUR:  Twenty-two in regard to this matter.  That is right. 

14MS MILLER:  That's right. 

15MR DEVLIN:  I'm sorry, that'll change.  It was 22 as of Wednesday.

16HIS HONOUR:  Twenty-two does not change, I do not think.  It is set.  Yes,
I apologise.  Insofar as the orders sought, a disposal order was sought and
I think I have signed it, have I, Associate?  Or not?  I will sign that.  Which I have now signed insofar to each of those matters, or some of the matters that I have detailed which were taken into the premises.

17Having detailed the full circumstances of the crimes, and in terms as set out in Exhibit A, which Ms Miller accepts are the facts upon which I am to sentence her client, the prosecutor submitted to the Court that given the seriousness of the crimes, they warrant a term of immediate imprisonment, in contradistinction to detention in a youth training centre.

18The background of Mr Jones, is set out in particular in Exhibit 1, which is the submission of Ms Miller, and Exhibit 2, the first report of the psychologist.  Essentially, he left school at Year 10.  He had difficulties at school, in particular, being bullied.  These difficulties seem to be ongoing, and in the psychologist's opinion, a lot to do with him being so stupid as to go along with this plan which led to this home invasion.

19As I say, he has not completed an apprenticeship.  Essentially, his work has been in labouring.  He has had particular difficulties in his life, in particular late last year when he and his girlfriend lost a child very shortly after birth. 
Subsequently, he was involved in a motor accident where he also lost his girlfriend, and stands charged with further matters in that regard.

20Mr Jones had, prior to those matters, suffered from, according to the evidence of the psychologist, a form of post-traumatic stress disorder combined with a complex grief syndrome which related back to another dramatic incident in his life when his best friend, or one of his best friends, was stabbed to death and died, a circumstance being observed by Mr Jones.  This occurred in 2016.

21Unfortunately, he has had issues with polysubstances, in recent times, particularly with ice.  He has also had issues with alcohol.  He has undergone the Second Change Program.  A letter to that effect was detailed from Mr Moore, there was strong support expressed by Mr Moore as to his potential, as to him needing help, but in the opinion of Mr Moore, being a young man who basically had a good moral compass.  Those matters, and the issues of drugs, are further referred to by the psychologist, in particular at p.6 of Exhibit 2, being the first report.

22I mentioned that there were jurisdictional issues relevant in this plea. 
The first relates to this being a Category 2 offence under the Sentencing Act. The consequence of that is that, pursuant to s.10AC of the Sentencing Act, this Court, unless there are special reasons, must impose on Mr Jones a period of gaol, with a minimum non-parole period.

23I confirm the determination that I made, prior to the plea being entered, and the formal arraignment, that upon the evidence of the psychologist, Dr Mynard, in particular as set out in Exhibit 8, which was the subsequent report, I was satisfied that a special reason, as required under s.10AC, was established on the balance of probabilities.

24I found that, pursuant to 10A(2C)(ii), Mr Jones had impaired mental functioning as defined under s.10A of the Act. I also found, again on the evidence of Dr Mynard, to the balance of probability satisfaction, that as required by the section, that such impaired mental functioning would result in Mr Jones being subject to significantly more than the ordinary burden of risks of imprisonment as a result thereof.

25Hence, the mandatory provisions insofar as immediate imprisonment is concerned do not apply, as set out in 10AC.

26Insofar as my determination, despite some unease about the actual terminology in the Act itself, the comments of the Attorney-General in Hansard confirm the view that I have taken.  I referred to Hansard of 1 September 2016, in particular, at p.3330, being the Charter of Human Rights statement.  Insofar as the Carjacking and Home Invasion Bill 2016, the Attorney said:

"Although we are imposing statutory minimum sentences for the most serious offences, we do recognise that there are always unusual cases that, for a variety of reasons, will not warrant three years' gaol.  To allow for these cases, the bill preserves the application of existing special reasons provisions that allow a court to consider factors that either substantially reduce the offender's moral culpability or provide a strong public policy for imposing a lesser sentence than the statutory minimum."

27Further comments were made and incorporated into Hansard in regard to a subsequent Bill, being the Sentencing (Community Correction Order and Other Acts) Amendment Bill in 2016, in Hansard of 13 October 2016, in particular, at p.3860.  In reference to Category 2 offences, the Attorney-General said:

"The bill acknowledges that a custodial order may not be an appropriate sentence for all offenders convicted of a Category 2 offence.  If a court finds that a statutory special reason exists, it has full discretion to impose a community correction order, including a community correction order combined with a term of imprisonment."

28Again, insofar as Category 2 offences were concerned, given the finding of a special reason which has been made in this Court, at the next page, 3861, the Attorney said:

"This will mean that if a court finds that a special reason exists, it will retain full sentencing discretion and it may impose a community correction order, combined order, or other lesser non-custodial order."

29I find, that those statements indicate the view of Parliament, and any initial uncertainty as to interpretation of the section is overcome by understanding fully the intent of Parliament.

30Hence, insofar as this plea is concerned, as a matter of law, there is an alternative, given the finding I have made, to immediate gaol.  Whether I make such an order depends totally upon the circumstances.

31It was, of course, the submission of Ms Miller that in the totality of the circumstances, I should make a Juvenile Justice Order pursuant to s.32(1), having regard to the factors set out in s.32(2).  That allows a maximum period for this Court of detention in such a centre for a period of three years.

32As I indicated to both counsel, and Mr Jones' family, fortuitously, by dint of his current age, and the legislation that currently applies to him and applied at that time, it is possible for him to receive a sentence sought by Ms Miller - that is, detention in a youth training centre.  However, as I stressed yesterday, the question for this Court is:  is such appropriate?

33Such matters were discussed in R v Tsiamas & Kastanis [1997] VSCA 25. In the judgement given on 21 May 1997, a consideration was made of a determination below as to such a sentence.

34There had been, what was described as an "orgy of destruction" where essentially a work site was smashed to the extent of some $75,000 worth of damage and serious loss of wages.  Down below, the prisoners had been sentenced to YTC orders of 15 months.  The sentence was upheld by majority, with the Chief Justice dissenting.  His Honour, the then-Chief Justice, said at p.6:

"The scale, persistence and ferocity of your behaviour puts yourselves beyond the pale.  In my judgment, the only appropriate sentence is imprisonment."

35The Chief Justice referred to a Queensland Court of Appeal case, at p.7, of R v Bainbridge, Cullen & Ludowicki [1995] 74 ACR 265, and said:

"There are, of course, some cases which are so serious that notwithstanding youth and the absence of relevant prior convictions, the offender must go to gaol."

36It so happened that in the circumstances of that case, the Chief Justice was in the minority.  However, I have found over many years consideration of those words of importance, and clearly a vital consideration in this case.

37It is, as I have already said, the submission of the learned prosecutor, on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the seriousness of
Mr Jones' crimes in this instance, notwithstanding his youth and the matters put, and the absence of relevant prior convictions, are such that he should go to gaol.

38We come, therefore, to a consideration of the matters put.  The first matter relied upon by Ms Miller is the tendering of the report from Mr Riordon, which became Exhibit E.  I think it is appropriate to summarise that as a report that is very favourable to Mr Jones.  This Court takes cognisance of determinations made by Mr Riordon, and I note that his recommendation of acceptability, has been accepted by his superiors.

39In addition, Ms Miller relied upon Exhibit 2, being the report of Ms Mynard that I have referred to.  In particular, I want to quote - and I should say, the fundamental reason for such reliance was the proposition that the principles set out in Verdins apply in this case.  There was no dispute from the prosecutor that principles five and six clearly apply, and that relates to my earlier finding.

40The issue, of course, here is:  do the principles set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 apply, so that what would otherwise be highly relevant principles of general deterrence and specific deterrence, while still being relevant, if principles one to four are established, then such principles can be moderated.

41In that regard, I refer to p.5 of the report where Ms Mynard refers to the statement made by Mr Jones as to the circumstances relating to this home invasion, Mr Jones saying that he was not sure what it was over, and that he was high on drugs, and his attitude was that of not caring and not thinking about his actions or consequences.  He went on to refer to the matters that I have already referred to.  He acknowledged that it was a stupid decision, and he should not have done it, and that it was a bad situation that only got worse. 
He expressed massive regret, which will impact on him for his whole life, and displayed empathy.

42On p.7, Ms Mynard speaks of the background of drugs that, I have referred to and the issues that I have referred to, and at the third full paragraph, concluded that it was her view that Mr Jones was suffering from PTSD at the time of the offending, and he also reported he was affected by methamphetamine.  She described the symptoms of the PTSD and the impact associated, which could only, you would imagine, exacerbate those symptoms, of the methamphetamine. 
She concludes:

"It appears that Mr Jones was affected by both his mental state and his substance intoxication at the time of the offending.  Although he briefly thought he didn't want to participate in the home invasion, Mr Jones recalled he didn't want to look like a coward to his friends and so, without thinking further about the consequences, went ahead."

43The doctor said that she believed this issue had been pertinent for him for many years, relating back to his issue of bullying at school, which he kept from his family because he did not want them to think that he lacked courage.

44Positively, the psychologist stated that she believed that in time, with proper support, Mr Jones has the potential to recover from his grief and PTSD symptoms.  He also has the potential, given he is on a positive pathway, to recover from his addiction.  She concludes:

"Mr Jones is a young offender and he has had multiple serious losses and traumatic situations over the last months and years."

45The psychologist opined that his ability to cope in an adult prison system will be significantly reduced, due to his severe mental health issues.

46The determination of a Verdins moderation of fundamental principles of sentencing, for such crimes as this, is not a matter lightly entered into by a Court.  Indeed, the Court of Appeal in O'Neill, [68], refer to the obligation on this Court to conduct a rigorous evaluation of the evidence to determine not only that at the time of the offending a prisoner was affected by mental incapacity, or issues with his mentality, and that he suffers from an impairment of mental functioning.

47They go on to require a close analysis, and to indicate the need for a Court, insofar as the first four principles as enunciated in Verdins, to find a connection between the impairment of mental functioning and the offending, for which they say there must be some realistic connection, cause or contribution.

48I have indeed so analysed the evidence that is before the Court. 
I take into account particularly the professional evidence of Ms Mynard. 
In addition, the circumstances, as I perceive them to be.  In addition, the comments received about the otherwise high morality of this young man - in particular, that I have already quoted from Mr Moore.  And then I try to balance that with the circumstances of this case, where a young boy at the age of
19 commits such a serious crime, in circumstances where he has no priors for violence whatsoever.

49I find upon the totality of the circumstances of this matter, I should accept the proposition that the principles set out in Verdins, principles one to four, do apply in this case, and that there is a need for moderation of the sentencing principles of denunciation, punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence in these circumstances.

50I accept the proposition and summary made by Ms Miller that these crimes committed by Mr Jones came about not only by his accepted stupidity, but by the poor insight brought about by the totality of the matters mentioned by the psychologist, by way of, at the time, a combination of his poor mental health and the drug use, which exacerbated same, and the fact that he had to that time, no treatment for same.

51In those circumstances, as I said, giving the matter the rigorous analysis that is required, I do accept such proposition. I note in so accepting, that the submission from the prosecution was to the opposite effect.

52The other principles and matters put to me was in regard to his actual role. 

I have quoted already from the psychologist in regard to the background of that role, and how he did not bring to bear appropriate insight into the circumstances of the crime, that he was about to participate in.

53I do not know fully the background to his discussion with the other perpetrators, except we do know that one of the alleged main perpetrators was the boyfriend of his cousin, and that there were a number of phone calls between the accused and him that afternoon, prior to these events. 

54I accept that he has pleaded guilty, and pleaded guilty on the basis that there is no specific indication of his role.  He therefore bears responsibility for all of the circumstances. 

55I do accept, which was accepted by the Crown, that there would appear to be, apart from the poor decision made that day, no background to any issues that others in the party who descended into this house had with Mr Pithie, and nor was there any bad blood between them.

56The other matter put was the issue of delay.  There was no issue from the Crown that, given the circumstances involved in this investigation, there was a year delay before he was charged, and I accept the comments of Ms Miller that, given his age and no priors, that is a matter of some significance.

57The year that passed thereafter, until he has indicated a plea in January of this year, must be characterised by the fact that at all times up till then, he had pleaded not guilty.  However, he gets the benefit of that plea and I accept that that plea was made, given appropriate legal instruction, that steps insofar as that had been taken where he did not cross-examine at the committal, and that plea is significant.

58I also note that the offending took place at the age of 19, and that he is still, as of today, a young offender.  Ms Miller quoted from the case of Mills, and I accept the principles set out therein.  Those principles established in Mills have been taken into consideration by the current President, in particular, in DPP v Tokava [2006] VSCA 56.

59In that case, he was considering the determination as to the sentence on a serious charge.  It is not appropriate to go into that in any more details, except that I want to quote his comments at paragraph 21, where he said this:

"A sentencing judge should be astute to investigate whether a non-custodial provision is to be preferred, even in the case of a serious offence, if in the long term the community's interests will be best served by that course.  When, therefore, a court has to consider whether to send a young person to gaol for the first time, it has to take into account the likely adverse effects of a gaol sentence.  A distinct possibility, particularly if the sentence is a long one, is that the person sent to gaol will come out more vicious and distinctly more antisocial in thoughts and deeds then when he went in.  It would be unreal and artificial for sentencing courts to ignore all the evidence about the antisocial effects of time spent in gaol."

60His Honour had further comments to make on the issues before this Court in Merrett, Piggott & Ferrari [2007] VSCA 1. He talks about the issue of rehabilitation, and he said at paragraph 49:

"….the sentencing court looks to the future as well as the past.  There is a very great benefit to the community at large, as well as to individuals themselves and their immediate families, if future criminal activity can be avoided.  It is important that the court, via its sentencing decisions, recognise and reward and promote efforts at rehabilitation just as we should support judges who do so.  It is important to reinforce in the public mind the very considerable public interest in the rehabilitation of offenders."

61He went on to make these very astute comments:

"The preoccupation with retribution, which characterises much of the public comment on sentencing, is understandable, but it focuses on only one part of what the sentencing court does."

62In addition to the principles set out in Mills, I take into account those words.

63I also note, in considering the issue of rehabilitation, the subsequent offending.  In that regard, he is still a young offender.  The offending related to the possession of methamphetamine in April of last year.  Despite the circumstances of these crimes, the prosecutor put to the Court that this matter should be considered closely when deciding whether this a person who the Court should take a risk on, by promoting his rehabilitation as against just sentencing him to gaol.

64In response, it was pointed out by Ms Miller, that her instructions were that once he became aware of his partner's pregnancy, despite this offence, he did give up the drugs. Indeed it was not again the circumstance that he went back on drugs until the subsequent issues that I have rehearsed about the loss of the child. 

65Clearly, as detailed by me in the considerations for such offences, as the Court of Appeal set out in Tsiamas, that was a split Court of Appeal allowing a YJC determination for serious offences.  The balancing process is very fine in a case like this.

66I accept totally the view of the Government that we are dealing with a very serious crime which is, but for a case which has special reasons, a crime that must involve immediate imprisonment.  That is so because a need for a crime such as this - not just the crime of home invasion, but the associated assaults to which he has pleaded - brings with it the need for general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and punishment.

67But as I have found, it is appropriate to moderate those principles.  It is also, in my view, appropriate to take into account, very importantly, given his age and lack of any priors for violence, the principles in regard to rehabilitation that I have rehearsed.

68To make a determination to impose a Youth Justice Centre order, the requirements of s.32 must be complied with.  Given the totality of the evidence, the support from the various materials tendered, and in particular, the support from Mr Riordon, and the family support expressed, I do find, as required under s.32(1)(A), that there are reasonable prospects for the rehabilitation of Mr Jones.

69The second matter relates to his immaturity and the issues as to the undesirability of him being placed in an adult prison.  That matter is clearly expressed by Ms Mynard, and is the essence of Mr Riordon's recommendation.

70In the totality of the circumstances, and in particular, with that expertise, I do also accept that he is a person who is likely to be subjected to undesirable influences in an adult prison.

71It seems to me, again, as I have stated, what stands out:  despite the traumas in his life and the long-standing drug abuse, that he has no priors of any sort for violence.  It seems to me that the positive view taken by the psychologist and by Mr Moore that with assistance, Mr Jones can become a positive person in this community - that that can be accepted.

72There is, of course, given the seriousness, however, no alternative but for a period of detention.  This is not a case where any other alternative could be put, and quite realistically, there was no such submission from Ms Miller.

73In regard to each offence, therefore, it is my intention to, despite the strong submission of the prosecution in the alternative, sentence Mr Jones to a period of detention, and that period will be for the maximum that can be prescribed.

74Yes, Mr Jones.  If you could stand up, please?

75Mr Jones, it is the order of the Court that in regard to these four offences -
Mr Prosecutor, do I do it on each offence or do I do it as an aggregate?

76MR DEVLIN:  Aggregate, sir.  In my submission, Your Honour, clearly all offences arise from the same incident so an aggregate sentence is available.

77HIS HONOUR:  All right.  I am not certain, it does not really say.  It says that sub-s.3 applies.  That is the maximum three years, irrespective of how many offences.  And then all sentences are to be concurrent.

78MR DEVLIN:  Yes. 

79HIS HONOUR:  So I think probably I will do an order on each of them.

80MR DEVLIN:  As Your Honour pleases.

81HIS HONOUR:  And then they are to be served concurrently.  So Mr Jones, on each of these four charges in this indictment, you will be sentenced to a period of youth confinement at a Youth Justice Centre for the maximum period that I can provide in that regard, being for a period of three years.

82In regard to the agreed 22 days, I make a declaration under s.35 that that is pre-sentence detention that has been served and should be deducted, as set out in that section.  I have signed the disposal order.  Do I have to do anything else?

83MR DEVLIN:  As Your Honour pleases.  There was just - the short answer is no, but just in relation to Your Honour's sentencing remarks, there was just two matters that may need very slight revisement.  Your Honour referred to five persons entering the house.  The agreement was at least three.

84HIS HONOUR:  Yes, that is right.  He was - on the basis we had amended the original ‑ ‑ ‑ 

85MR DEVLIN:  Yes, Your Honour. 

86HIS HONOUR:  So we have amended your - because of the circumstances, that it was at least three.  Rather, that "five" should be amended to be "at least three."

87MR DEVLIN:  Yes, Your Honour, and I think Your Honour - my hearing's not great, but I think Your Honour said Davis.  Ms Harris is the mother of - I think you referred to Ms Harris as Davis.

88HIS HONOUR:  Ms Harris, the victim?

89MR DEVLIN:  Yes. 

90HIS HONOUR:  I apologise.

91MR DEVLIN:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Apart from that, thank you.

92HIS HONOUR:  Yes.  Mr Jones, I hope you have been listening. It might be said you were lucky with your age.  You were lucky with the interpretation of the legislation.  Persons who were not afflicted like you with problems, would otherwise be getting sentences of significance with a minimum period of three years.  This is your last chance.  You come back in front of this Court again for any matter - you understand this?  Any matter - next time you will not be going to Youth Training.  Do you understand?

93OFFENDER:  Yes, Your Honour. 

94HIS HONOUR:  All right.  There has a lot been said about your rehabilitation, so I wish you luck and I say in the nicest terms:  I do not want to see you again here.  Yes. 

95COUNSEL:  As Your Honour pleases.

96HIS HONOUR:  Ms Miller, there is not much one can do at the moment because he has not got bail in regard to the subsequent matters, has he?

97MS MILLER:  No, Your Honour.  No, he doesn't.

98HIS HONOUR:  You are going to have to take steps ‑ ‑ ‑ 

99MS MILLER:  I'll speak to my instructor about that.  Thank you, Your Honour. 

100HIS HONOUR:  Yes.  Can I thank both counsel for their assistance in what turned out to be a fairly complicated number of matters.

101COUNSEL:  Thank you, Your Honour. 

102HIS HONOUR:  Yes, thank you.  I will stand down before we start the next plea.  Everyone here and ready to go?

103VOICE (from body of court):  Yes, Your Honour. 

104HIS HONOUR:  All right. 

‑ ‑ ‑