Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones

Case

[2021] VCC 1409

22 September 2021

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

CR 21-01031

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
JACOB JONES

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JUDGE: HIS HONOUR JUDGE LAURITSEN
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 8 September 2021
DATE OF SENTENCE: 22 September 2021
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: DPP v Jones
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2021] VCC 1409

REASONS FOR SENTENCE
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Subject:  CRIMINAL LAW

Catchwords:  One charge of culpable driving causing death – one charge of negligently causing serious injury – one charge of driving while disqualified – one charge of using an unregistered motor vehicle – one charge of using an unroadworthy vehicle – Standard Sentence Offence – sentence imposed greater than the Standard Sentence

Legislation Cited: Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)

Cases Cited:Victorsen v R [2020] VSCA 248; Rakatau v R [2021] VSCA 76; DPP v Reid [2020] VSCA 247; Worboyes v R [2021] VSCA 169; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; R v George Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 21 September 1990

Sentence:The total effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months’ imprisonment and cancellation of any licence or permit held to drive a motor vehicle and disqualification from obtaining another licence or permit for a period of eight years.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Director of Public Prosecutions Ms A. Morgan Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr A. Halphen Balmer & Associates

Introduction

1Jacob Jones, you have pleaded guilty to a charge of culpable driving causing death and a charge of negligently causing serious injury.  You have also pleaded guilty to three summary charges: driving while disqualified; using an unregistered motor vehicle; and using an unroadworthy vehicle.

Circumstances

2The circumstances giving rise to these charges are set out in the document entitled “Summary of prosecution plea opening”, which is Exhibit A.  Its factual content was agreed by your counsel.  

314 November 2020 was a Saturday.  You and your girlfriend, Savannah Maxwell, spent most of the day together, buying alcohol and household items and groceries.  When a friend visited you at your home in the afternoon, you and Ms Maxwell were by then quite intoxicated.  You travelled to another house and then went to a hotel to celebrate Daniel Limanis’ birthday. Later, you were driven to a house in Moorooduc.  At about 9.15 pm, you and Ms Maxwell left that house and travelled by an Uber vehicle back to your home in Hastings.  You arrived there at between 9.25 pm and 9.30 pm.  

4At 9.51 pm on that day, you were driving a Ford Falcon sedan in Boes Road, Tyabb.  You had two passengers in the vehicle – Ms Maxwell and Mr Limanis. Ms Maxwell was seated in the front and Mr Limanis behind the driver’s seat.

5At 9.51 pm, your vehicle was detected by a mobile speed camera travelling at 113 kph in an 80 kph zone.  Boes Road changes its name to Jones Road after the roundabout at the Mornington-Tyabb Road.  At some later stage, this driving at an excessive speed was the subject of a traffic infringement notice.  

6At about 9.55 pm, you were travelling north in Jones Road, Somerville.  You overtook another vehicle travelling at speed.  After overtaking, your vehicle swerved sharply to the left, narrowly missing the front of the other vehicle.  You accelerated away.  About thirty seconds later, in the vicinity of The Vines, you lost control of the vehicle after overcorrecting your steering.  It rotated clockwise towards the right or eastern side of the road, with the passenger side striking several trees and shrubs before overturning and coming to rest on its roof and facing west.

7You crawled out of the rear driver’s window of the upturned vehicle.  You told witnesses and the police at the scene that the driver had run away.  Sadly, none of those who arrived at the scene were immediately aware of anyone else in the vehicle.  

8Ms Maxwell died at the scene of the accident and Mr Limanis was seriously injured.  His injuries included fractures of his left femur, right tibia and the head of the right fibula.

9You told a psychologist you broke your neck.  I understand that to mean you fractured a vertebra in your neck.  You needed to wear a neck brace.  

10When the accident occurred, Jones Road was a two-way, two-lane bitumen road in a good state of repair.  The speed limit was 60 kph as shown in the traffic signs and implied by the presence of street lighting.  The road was a long straight stretch of roadway.  There were broken white lines separating north and south bound traffic.  Each side of the road had gravel shoulders and then grass verges.  On the western side of the road, there was a spoon drain and concrete footpath in the grass verge.  On the eastern side of the road, there was a smaller spoon drain and a heavily treed and foliaged verge.  This consisted of shrubs and medium sized trees.  On each side of the road, there were semi-rural properties.    

11At the time of the accident, your vehicle was travelling at between 144 and 159 kph in a 60 kph zone.  The accident occurred when you steered too much to the right and this caused your vehicle to yaw.  Although the rear passenger tyre was worn to the casing and steel belts were exposed, it was not deflated after the accident.  The prosecution does not suggest the state of this tyre caused or contributed to the accident.

12At the time of the accident, you had a blood alcohol content of 0.193 per cent.  At the same time, six different substances were present in your body.  Although you were intoxicated by alcohol, the presence of the two benzodiazepine and two other drugs would have added to your level of impairment.  A forensic physician, Dr Sungaila said:     

“…Mr Jones was driving while intoxicated with a combination of alcohol at a high level and two benzodiazepine drugs.  The combination of benzodiazepines and alcohol will have caused an added impairment…The combination of mirtazapine and citalopram is not likely to have been significant, although these drugs in the mix of others and alcohol can cause unpredictable effects…Mr Jones would have been incapable of proper control of his vehicle.”  

13At the time of driving you were a disqualified driver.  On 2 June 2020, your licence was cancelled administratively through your failure to complete a Drug Behaviour Change Programme.  Accordingly, on 14 November 2020, you were disqualified from driving.  Irrespective of your level of intoxication, put simply, you should not have been driving.

14The vehicle you drove had been purchased by Ms Maxwell in March 2020.  It was registered in the name of her then boyfriend.  On 27 October 2020, the boyfriend cancelled its registration because he did not know the whereabouts of the vehicle.  On 14 November 2020, the vehicle was unregistered.  You should not have been driving that vehicle.    

15Ms Maxwell was 23.  She was the eldest child of Sharlene Simon. You and she had been in a relationship for a few months.  Despite wearing a seat belt, she suffered severe injuries to her head and died at the scene.

16Ms Maxwell must have been a delightful person.  Both the victim impact statements and the letters written by your family and friends testify to her friendly and outgoing nature.  

17I have briefly mentioned the injuries to Mr Limanis.  Principally, they were comminuted fractures to the left femur or thighbone and right tibia or shinbone and the head of the fibula, which is the other bone beside the tibia.  He underwent surgery with the need for internal instrument fixing of bone.  While in hospital, he developed clots in his legs which were treated with medicines.  Although Dr Sungaila spoke of the possible complications, he did so without examining Mr Limanis.  I was concerned to know how Mr Limanis was functioning ten months after the accident.  The word “comminuted” covers a variety of circumstances from more than one simple fracture to fragmentation of the bone.  I invited further information provided it was by consent but none was forthcoming.  Dr Sungaila identified possible complications:

(a)   the possibility of infection developing in association with the implanted materials and the fractures.  This is described as a catastrophic complication;

(b)   the suffering of pain due to the implanted materials, which will lessen in time. It is probable he will walk with pain for some time;         

(c)   if pain continues at a sufficient level, there may be the need to remove the intramedullary nail which carries the risk entailed by surgery, including infection;

(d)   the non-healing or poor healing of the bones.

18These are possible complications.  Ten months after the accident, I do not know the course of Mr Limanis’ injuries.  What I do know is that the injuries to his legs were significant and the persistence of some symptoms is to be expected.  Beyond that, I would move into the area of speculation.      

19You were taken to the Alfred Hospital. You remained there under police guard until your discharge on 20 November.  You were then interviewed, charged and remanded into custody.

Pre-sentence detention

20You have been in custody since your discharge from hospital on 20 November 2020.  Excluding today, there has been 306 days of pre-sentence detention.  

Personal

21You are 26.  You are the eldest of three children.

22Your parents separated when you were 10.  Both re-partnered and had children.  You now have five half-siblings and a step-sister.  After your parents’ separation, you lived with your mother.  In fact, you had little contact with your father until recently. 

23You attended two primary schools and completed Year 11 at secondary school. After leaving school, you undertook and completed a plumbing apprenticeship.

24You worked as a plumber for six years, leaving after growing tired of the negative attitude of your fellow workers.  You then worked as a bricklayer before working as a stone mason with your mother’s partner.  You continued in this work until February 2020 when you were injured as a passenger in a motor vehicle accident.

25You were significantly injured in this accident.  You were on life support for 10 days. Your spleen, two-thirds of your pancreas and liver and part of your bowel were removed.  You fractured ribs, part of your spine and your chest bone.  You spent four months in rehabilitation at the Alfred Hospital.  The removal of your spleen means your immune system is impaired and you will have to take antibiotic medicine for the rest of your life.

26The accident affected you psychologically.  You suffered from flashbacks and nightmares.  Your mood was lowered so that you felt hopeless and took no pleasure in activities.  You sought professional help and were prescribed and took the medicines, Mirtazapine and Valium.      

27You have had two relationships. The first started six years ago and lasted 18 months.  The second involved Ms Maxwell.  You told the psychologist, Laura Fleming, that although you and she had not been going out for long, you held her in great esteem as she had supported you after your February 2020 accident and helped you to live your life again.

28After the breakdown of your first relationship in 2016, you became distressed and depressed. Rather than seek professional help, you used cocaine, methylamphetamine and GHB to alleviate your symptoms.

29On 8 October 2020, you accidentally overdosed on illicit drugs and were hospitalised.  You stopped using methylamphetamine and GHB and substituted alcohol and Xanax, which continued until you were taken into custody.     

30The above description comes very largely from what your counsel has said and written and from the reports of the psychologists.  However, it appears your life has been even more complicated.  This is revealed in some of the letters written about you.  I will not go into detail.

Psychologists

Laura Fleming

31Laura Fleming is a forensic psychologist.  At the request of your solicitors, she interviewed you on 7 December 2020[1].  Although your counsel placed no particular reliance on her report, she diagnosed you as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.  She also noted that since the February 2020 accident you had not worked and had been receiving unemployment benefits.  You intended to apply for a disability support pension but your remand into custody intervened.

[1] Report dated 20 December 2020.

32After recommending, among other things, grief counselling over the death of Ms Maxwell and longer term psychological help to address the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and substance use, she noted imprisonment would weigh more heavily on you than on a person without your conditions.  She believed you would not receive the help you needed while in prison.  

Sandra Cokorilo

33Sandra Cokorilo is a psychologist.  At the request of your solicitors, she interviewed you on 23 August 2021.

34During the interview, your mood was low and you were anxious.

35You told her of your deep remorse for your actions; that you think of Ms Maxwell daily and you felt sad, guilty and hated yourself.  After the accident, you thought about suicide for months but no longer.

36Ms Cokorilo applied several psychological tests.  Overall, she diagnosed you as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and three types of disorder related to your drug and alcohol use. These three disorders were in some stage of remission because of your detention.  The post-traumatic stress disorder and depressive disorder arose out of the February 2020 accident and were inadequately treated at the time and led to your form of self-medication.  The generalised anxiety disorder has developed and increased while you have been in custody.   

Discussion

37Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 sets out the purposes of sentencing. All of the purposes for which sentences may be imposed are relevant in your case. There is a need to punish you to the extent and in a manner which is just in all the circumstances.

38There is a need to deter you and other persons from committing these or other offences of a similar character.  Deterring other persons from committing the indictable offences or offences of a similar character is important.  To an appropriate extent, my sentences must discourage such persons from driving in the way you did on 14 November 2020.  

39There is a need to manifest denunciation for the conduct you have engaged in.  There is a need to protect the community from you.  There is a need also to establish conditions which will facilitate your rehabilitation.  

40Section 5(2) of the Sentencing Act sets out matters, where relevant, which I must consider.

Maximum penalties

41The maximum penalties for the offences to which you have pleaded guilty are:

(a)   culpable driving causing death – 20 years’ imprisonment or a fine of 2,400 penalty units or both imprisonment and a fine;

(b)   negligently causing serious injury – 10 years’ imprisonment;

(c)   driving a vehicle during a period of disqualification – two years’ imprisonment or a fine of 240 penalty units;

(d)   using a vehicle on a highway when it was unregistered – 25 penalty units;

(e)   using a vehicle on a highway when it was not in a safe and roadworthy condition – five penalty units.

Standard sentence

42In 2017, Parliament legislated to introduce the standard sentence scheme into the Sentencing Act 1991. Only a few criminal offences are standard sentence offences for which standard sentences are prescribed. Culpable driving causing death is one such offence. Negligently causing serious injury is not. The standard sentence for culpable driving causing death is eight years’ imprisonment.

43The period of imprisonment specified for a particular offence as the standard sentence is the sentence taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle of the range of seriousness.[2]  The objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of an offence are to be determined without reference to matters personal to you and wholly by reference to the nature of the offending.[3]   

[2] S 5A(1)(b).

[3] S 5A(3).

44In sentencing you for this offence, among other things, I must take the standard sentence as one of the factors relevant to sentencing.[4]

[4] S 5B(2)(a).

45In one of the cases your counsel drew to my attention, Victorsen v R[5], the Court discussed the standard sentence scheme. At [18], it said:

“In Brown,  this Court said that a judge

when sentencing for a ‘standard sentence offence’ must ‘take the standard sentence into account as one of the factors relevant to sentencing’.  This requirement:

•    is to be treated as a ‘legislative guidepost’, having the same function as the maximum penalty;

•    does not affect the established ‘instinctive synthesis’ approach to sentencing;

•    does not require or permit ‘two-stage sentencing’; and

•    does not otherwise affect the matters which the court may, or must, take into account in sentencing.”

[5] [2020] VSCA 248.

Criminal history

46On 19 November 2019, you were found guilty of four offences.  Without conviction, they were adjourned to 16 November 2020 on your undertaking to be of good behaviour and making a payment to the Court Fund of $350.

47That was your only appearance in court.  However, you received a traffic infringement notice on 21 February 2020 for driving a motor vehicle with a drug in your blood.  Your licence was suspended for six months from that date.

48On the fateful day of 14 November 2020, you were detected speeding and received a traffic infringement notice.  Your licence was suspended but from 17 February 2021.   

Current sentencing practices

49For the purposes of current sentencing practices since the introduction of the standard sentencing scheme, your counsel drew my attention to three judgments of the Court of Appeal and summarised their salient points: Rakatau v R[6], Victorsen v R[7] and DPP v Reid[8].  I have read each judgment.  No other case was drawn to my attention.  That is unsurprising where the offence of culpable driving is concerned for I can only have regard to sentences imposed on this offence after it became a standard sentence offence[9].   

[6] [2021] VSCA 76.

[7] [2020] VSCA 248.

[8] [2020] VSCA 247.

[9] S 5B(2)(b).

Nature and gravity of the offence

50The circumstances of your driving mean the offences of culpable driving and negligently causing serious injury are grave examples.  You drove at a grossly excessive speed in a 60 kph zone while highly intoxicated by alcohol with your capacity to drive properly severely impaired by the level of alcohol and the presence of four drugs in your system.

51Admittedly, the driving occurred at 9.59 pm and the period over which you drove was from between about 9.30 pm until about 9.59 pm, something less than 30 minutes.  At least eight minutes of the driving was at great speed.  At 9.51 pm, you travelling at 113 kph in a 80 kph zone.  At about 9.55 pm, you overtook another vehicle at speed and accelerated rapidly away.  At about 9.59 pm you were travelling at between 144 and 159 kph in a 60 kph zone.

52The time and location may have had less traffic than other areas of Melbourne or greater Melbourne or even expected to be so but, nevertheless, you overtook a vehicle at speed and somewhat dangerously not far from the place of the accident.     

Culpability and responsibility

53Similarly, your moral culpability for these offences is very high.  The fact that you did not drive earlier and took an Uber does not reduce the level of your culpability for what happened.  It does fit in with some of the observations of the psychologist, Ms Cokorilo, of the relationship between your then untreated psychological disorders and your use of alcohol and drugs.

54It also explains the extraordinary circumstance that you drove on this occasion having seen the damage a motor vehicle accident can achieve.  The February 2020 accident left you seriously damaged, physically and mentally.     

Impact on victims

55Admitted into evidence was the victim impact statements of members of Ms Maxwell’s family and a friend: her mother, Sharlene Simon; her stepfather, Vikas Tandon; her sister, Aamani Tandon; her brother, Dante Maxwell; and her best friend, Brittany Phodi.

56Four victims read their statements to the Court and counsel for the Director read out the remaining statement.  There was no such statement of Mr Limanis.

57Ms Maxwell was her mother’s first child.  Ms Simon starts her statement[10]:

“You ask any parent what their biggest fear is, they will usually give you one of two answers: losing a child, or something happening to themselves leaving their child alone. You imagine what it will be like and you may even have nightmares involving the death of one of your children…When it happens to you it is much worse, you can’t imagine the pain, it’s even harder to explain or describe…”  

[10] Statement made on 2 September 2021 at p 4.

58Later in her statement, she says:

“My family and I walk this lonely dark path, it's cold, it's stormy, it's rugged, it’s harsh, it’s heartless and it’s never ending.  A constant nightmare, we can’t escape this path.”

59Unsurprisingly, she has suffered a recognised psychological disorder, a post-traumatic stress disorder and receives psychological treatment.  Given the shattering effect of her daughter’s death upon her, one would expect the need for protracted treatment. 

60Culturally, Ms Maxwell’s body was taken to her family’s home before the funeral.  It was viewed by the family.  Unfortunately, her face was badly damaged in the accident.  This has added to the sadness felt by the family and Ms Phodi.  

61Collectively, the five statements describe the profound distress felt by each of the victims through Ms Maxwell’s death.  It was difficult to for each of the four victims to read their statements out loud.  It was difficult to listen and re-read the statements later.

Guilty pleas

62You were charged with offences on 20 November 2020. At the second committal mention hearing, you pleaded guilty. In terms of the timing of your pleas of guilty, they were made at an early stage.

63Your pleas of guilty are evidence of your remorse for your actions.

64Your pleas of guilty have what is called a “utilitarian” benefit. They assist the process of the administration of justice by bringing these charges to an end far earlier than if you had elected for a trial by jury.  They relieve the 19 prosecution witnesses from the arduous task of giving evidence in your trial.  

65The ability of criminal courts to hear and determine cases has been severely compromised by the restrictions necessitated by the pandemic.  Recently, the Court of Appeal in Worboyes v R[11] gave this advice to the courts:

“As is abundantly clear, one of the pernicious effects of the current pandemic is that the lists of the criminal courts in this State have become severely congested.  Unacceptable delay in the disposition of criminal cases is endemic.  Indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that the system of criminal justice in this State is in crisis, requiring a response from the courts.  We therefore consider that, whilst the courts of this State continue to labour under the adverse effects of the pandemic, a sentencing court should view a plea of guilty as carrying with it a greater utilitarian benefit than at other times and in other circumstances, and, concomitantly, as attracting an augmented mitigatory effect on sentence, simply because the plea will benefit the beleaguered administration of justice.  Given the unhappy state of the courts’ lists, the courts must, in an endeavour to alleviate the strain on the system, encourage those accused who are guilty to so plead.  Such encouragement must come from an actual and palpable amelioration of sentence.”

[11][2021] VSCA 169 at 35.

66Your counsel submitted the Director’s concession that it could not be established the state of one of the tyres on the vehicle you drove caused or contributed to the collision meant that your conviction for the indictable offences was not inevitable although likely.

67I will not give any further discount to this factor. The prosecution case was overwhelming and the inability to prove that point would make no difference to a jury finding you guilty.     

68Overall, your pleas of guilty warrant a very significant discount on the sentences I would have imposed in their absence.

Other factors

Verdins

69Of the six propositions stated in the case of R v Verdins[12], you rely upon proposition five. This proposition deals with an aspect of impaired mental functioning relevant to sentencing.  If the existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) could mean that a given sentence would weigh more heavily on you than it would on a person in normal health.

[12] (2007) 16 VR 269.

70You rely on a passage in Ms Cokorilo’s report to support your submission that your mental impairment will weigh more heavily upon you in custody than upon a person in normal health. At [73]. she says in part:

“…it is noted that Mr Jones' mental health issues would likely be exacerbated by a further period of imprisonment unless he is properly supported. His clinical profile, with marked alterations in arousal, reactivity, and intrusion symptoms, produces challenges that would weigh more heavily upon him than an offender without his conditions. Despite adherence to pharmacological treatment in custody, he continues to present with symptoms of posttraumatic stress and depression which have not resolved or reduced in severity since his assessments with Ms Fleming eight months ago. He now additionally meets criteria for Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) which is likely exacerbated by the volatile nature of the custodial environment.”

71Your time in custody has already weighed upon you.  Despite some treatment with medicines, the symptoms referable to two disorders have not improved and the level of anxiety has worsened such that another disorder is legitimately diagnosed.  Plainly, proposition five applies in your case and works to mitigate the penalty I will impose.   

72You are not a young or youthful offender.  At 25, one would expect some maturity.  At 26, your prospects of rehabilitation are good.  I say this for these reasons.

73First, I accept you are genuinely remorseful for your actions and the immense harm they have done.  An aspect of your remorse is that you are the cause of the death of a person you loved and the injuring of a good friend.  If I had any doubt, your grandparents and your godmother, for example, speak of your deep remorse.

74Second, you have attempted to start the process of rehabilitation while in custody.  As part of the documents tendered on your behalf are certificates showing your participation in courses at the Kangan Institute and courses under the auspices of UnitingCare ReGen.  Twice this year, your urine has been analysed and no illicit drugs have been detected.

75Third, Ms Cokorilo noted[13]:

“He displayed good insight and judgement in understanding the connection between his deteriorated mental state, self-medication with alcohol and illicit substances, and his involvement in the offending.”

[13] At [33].

76Through understanding and remorse, there should come a strong desire for change.

77Fourth, there is considerable support shown by members of your family.  I read the letters from members of your family and friends tendered on your behalf. It is best stated by your mother when she says[14]:

“We absolutely love Jacob with all our hearts and will stand by him through every step of the way in this next journey of his life.”

[14] Shelby Burke, 1 September 2021.

78Fifth, you are a qualified plumber with experience in bricklaying and the work of stone masons.  Until the accident in February 2020, you had a continuous work history.  If you had not been so injured in the February 2020 accident, upon release from prison, with that work background, one would expect you to find work easily.  However, I am uncertain whether your condition would allow the physical work of the past.  

79Your counsel pointed to your criminal history including your driving offences.  I would not describe them as limited given the relatively short period over which they occurred.  They display a disobedience of the law and orders made under the law.  They are to be weighed against your understanding identified by Ms Cokorilo.    

Totality   

80In sentencing you I must be mindful of the principle of totality. The fact you were driving while disqualified is one of the features behind the gravity of the first two charges and your culpability for them.  The sentence on that charge will be served concurrently with the sentences on those charges.

81The need to deal with your ability to drive a motor vehicle is an aspect of the punishment I will impose.      

82The summary charges of using an unregistered motor vehicle and using an unroadworthy vehicle are punishable by a fine at most.  Given the lengthy sentences of imprisonment I am about to impose, no useful purpose would be served by fining you on those two offences.

Departure from standard sentence

83The sentence imposed on the charge of culpable driving causing death is greater than the standard sentence for that offence.  It reflects the gravity of the offence, your culpability, the impact on the victims but also the matters submitted in mitigation, which I have discussed.   

Sentence

84Charge 1: culpable driving causing death I will sentence you to nine years’ imprisonment.

85Charge 2: negligently causing serious injury I will sentence you to three years’ imprisonment.

86Charge 3: driving while disqualified I will sentence you to one year imprisonment.

87Charge 4: using an unregistered motor vehicle I will convict you and discharge you.

88Charge 5: using an unroadworthy vehicle I will convict you and discharge you.

89The sentence on Charge 1 is the base sentence.  One year’s imprisonment on Charge 2 will be served cumulatively upon the sentence on Charge 1. The sentence on Charge 3 will be served concurrently on the sentences on Charges 1 and 2.  The total effective sentence is 10 years’ imprisonment.

90I will set a non-parole period of six years and six months’ imprisonment.   

Disqualification

91I invited counsel to address me on the issue of the period of your disqualification.  I provided a copy of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v George[15] and drew attention to s5(2AA)(a) of the Sentencing Act. The existence of s5(2AA)(a) makes the punitive effect of the period of disqualification uncertain in your case. If you are paroled, the period may not have expired but if you are not paroled, the period may have expired before your release from custody. Ignoring as I must the question of parole or non-parole, and having read the submissions of your counsel, and the factors outlined in George’s case, I will cancel any licence or permit you hold to drive a motor vehicle and disqualify you from obtaining another licence or permit for a period of eight years.

[15] Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 21 September 1990.

Pre-sentence detention

92I declare the period of 306 days of pre-sentence detention (excluding today) as time served under these sentences. 

Section 6AAA

93If you had not pleaded guilty to these offences but had been found guilty, I would have imposed a total effective sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine years’ imprisonment.  I would have imposed the same period of disqualification and still convicted and discharged you on the two other summary offences.

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Victorsen v The Queen [2020] VSCA 248
DPP v Reid [2020] VSCA 247